My Lords, perhaps I may be forgiven for my second intrusion into the Committee by all those who are toiling so hard on it day after day.
It may be a bit trite, but in a democracy, all citizens are presumed to have the right to vote. That is the way by which they have a say in making the laws that govern them: demokratia. The Joint Committee of both Houses appointed to consider the draft voting eligibility (prisoners) Bill in 2013 concluded that the vote is a right, not a privilege. It does not have to be earned, and its removal without good reason undermines democratic legitimacy.
In the Criminal Justice Act 2003, the purposes of sentencing are said to be
“the punishment of offenders … the reduction of crime … the reform and rehabilitation of offenders … the protection of the public, and … the making of reparation by offenders to persons affected by their offences.”
Where does the disfranchisement of a prisoner come within those aims? It obviously has nothing to do with the reduction of crime, the protection of the public or the making of reparations. If it is regarded as an act of retribution, part of the punishment of offenders, it is doubtful that the prisoner thinks it significant in any way, compared with his loss of liberty.
This does not concern itself with proportionality: a prisoner loses the vote by the act of imprisonment, not by the nature of his crime. A person imprisoned for dangerous driving is in exactly the same position as a person serving a life sentence for rape or murder. Of course, unconvicted prisoners, convicted prisoners awaiting sentence and people imprisoned for either contempt of court or debt, remain eligible to vote.