197: After Clause 59, insert the following new Clause—
“Unincorporated associations and permissible donors
(1) An unincorporated association required to notify the Electoral Commission of political contributions by paragraph 1 of Schedule 19A to PPERA must make permissibility checks on donations to the unincorporated association in accordance with subsection (2).(2) An unincorporated association must take all reasonable steps to establish whether the donor of a relevant donation is a permissible donor under section 54 of PPERA.(3) In this section, a “relevant donation” is any donation which is either intended for political purposes or might reasonably be assumed to be for political purposes.(4) An unincorporated association must not accept a relevant donation from a person who is not a permissible donor.”Member’s explanatory statement
This new Clause requires unincorporated associations to establish whether a person making a donation for political purposes is a permissible donor and, if not, reject that donation.
My Lords, there are quite a number of amendments in this group, of which Amendment 197 is mine. I want to pay attention to amendments specifically looking at foreign interference in our elections and some of the consequences of the provisions to extend the overseas elector franchise. Under the previous group of amendments tabled in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, we discussed foreign interference, but looked specifically at digital materials, whereas this is wider.
By way of introduction, I say that voters deserve to know that elections in the UK are free and fair, and that laws are in place to safeguard them from unlawful influence. The Bill is an opportunity to make that tighter and better. The Electoral Commission recommended introducing new duties on parties, based on existing money laundering regulations, to enhance the due diligence and risk assessment of donations. The reasons behind this are to protect parties further and to build confidence among voters that sources of party funding are thoroughly scrutinised.
Unfortunately, we do not believe that the Bill takes this into account or does enough, as the Electoral Commission recommends. We need an effective regulatory and enforcement regime that ensures that foreign and dark money cannot enter our political system through donations to political parties. We believe there is the risk not only of money coming into the system that should not be there but of losing the level playing field that we have always striven to achieve in our election law. It is disappointing that the Bill so far does not address these problems. Our amendments and those of other noble Lords aim to address this.
As it stands, the Bill creates a paradox, because it opens the floodgates for a potentially large influx of foreign-based money into our democracy while making it harder for civil society organisations, charities and trade unions to have their say—as we heard during the debates on previous days on Clauses 24, 25 and 27—despite the massive contribution they make to British life. We have tabled amendments that would protect our democracy from this foreign money that is already impacting our politics. We believe that this Bill threatens to make the situation much worse.
My Lords, my name is on several of the amendments in this group, and I will therefore speak to some of them.
Amendment 197 would tighten the rules on permissible donors and incorporated associations. Amendments 198 and 199 would limit permissible donations to companies and individuals resident in the UK, as would Amendments 204, 212D and 212E. Amendments 200 and 212G, the longest in this group, offer different language on the need for much more careful scrutiny of donations. Amendments 212A, 212B and 212DA, with the reference to the CSPL, would put caps on donations. The Minister will have noticed that, among other things, we are concerned that people who do not live in the United Kingdom should not be allowed to donate to political parties, even if they are on the electoral register.
In a facetious moment, I wondered whether I might table a separate amendment banning British citizens who live in Monaco or the Channel Islands from donating to political parties. Since the major motive of British citizens moving to those places is to avoid tax, that would be a way of saying that we do not want people who are deliberately avoiding paying tax in Britain to be funding political parties here, which we know happens. Some people believe that the main factor in extending overseas voting in the slipshod way it is being done is to make it easier for tax exiles to make major donations to the Conservative Party. “Perish the thought”, the Minister may say—but not everyone in the Conservative Party is as honest as he is.
I will talk mainly about Amendment 200, which some noble Lords may have noticed makes a reference to the ISC report on Russia. I remind the Minister that the Intelligence and Security Committee specifically recommended that the evidence it had collected on foreign interference in British politics should be published as fully as possible, and that the Government have said that they see no need to do so because, in their opinion, foreign interference has not been successful. That seems to be a mistake, and I hope that the Government will come to their senses and publish that evidence. So long as it remains unpublished, it will look as though the Government have something embarrassing that they are trying to hide.
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Amendment 200 therefore includes, as do one or two others, the insistence that a
“company or limited liability partnership’s profits generated and taxable within the United Kingdom over the previous 12 months are greater than the value of the donation given.”
That is a clear reference to AQUIND and others, and the ability to create, in effect, fake companies that conduct almost no business in the United Kingdom but which serve as vehicles to provide large funds to one party or another—unfortunately, it is almost entirely one party. Restrictions on donations, foreign-influenced or foreign, must include stricter limits on unincorporated associations, limited liability partnerships and companies within the United Kingdom, and the amendment sets out various conditions and how to satisfy them.
It then moves on to the issue of donations which provide, or are thought to provide, a potential national security risk—the subject of several paragraphs of the ISC Russia report, which the Government appear not to have taken sufficiently seriously. On the risks to national security, it talks about those that may be linked
“to entities which may seek to undermine or threaten the interests of the”
UK, or have a distant and hostile ultimate controller, or are involved in criminal or illicit activities, and states that all donations above £25,000 should be treated in this way.
I will leave it to the noble Lord, Lord Hodgson, who kindly rolled Amendments 201 to 203 into this amendment, to talk about the fit and proper test, which it goes on to cover. I suggest to the Government that we need to strengthen this part of the Bill substantially and that it would do their reputation a great deal of good if they accepted that. I also support Amendment 210 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Hodgson, on public contracts, because there is a not entirely unjustified fear that a nexus between external contractors and the Government could also quite easily become a corrupt two-way street.
At a slight tangent, I will add that I am also concerned by foreign influence on think tanks and contractors funding them. I was asked by a think tank to contribute not that long ago on the question of the future of public service. It was very unhappy with what I wrote for it. I discovered that it at least published on its website its major donors, which were almost entirely outsourcing companies. I thought it was very difficult to be a neutral think tank writing about the future of public service if you are funded by outsourcing companies. I had the same worry about Policy Exchange when I read its papers on freedom of speech and universities, which had a large number of footnotes to American rather than British sources, and to publications of some extremely right-wing foundations in the United States. Policy Exchange does not publish its sources of income, and there is no way, therefore, that we can discover whether it received money from those right-wing American foundations for that sort of publication. That would also be improper—but I leave that to one side.
We need to strengthen controls over public finance in the Bill: involving both major domestic donors and, much more importantly, donors with foreign influence. It is already a problem; it has contributed to a loss of confidence in public life. I hope, therefore, that the Minister will be willing to accept, in some revised form or other, some of the overlapping language that appears in several of these amendments, including the ones which have my name on them.
My Lords, I will speak to Amendment 212. It is a great pleasure to follow the noble Lord, Lord Wallace, and I also fully support the position taken by my noble friend Lady Hayman on this Bill. There are a number of amendments here which all have a common concern with preventing abuse and ensuring that there is a level playing field, and my amendment is a contribution to that. Amendment 212 seeks to end abuse of “permissible donors” and prevent the flow of foreign money into UK political parties.
The Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act 2000 was really shaped by the Committee on Standards in Public Life’s fifth report, which was published in October 1998 under the chairmanship of Lord Neill of Bladen. In developing its recommendations, the committee invited evidence and considered the issue of foreign donations at some considerable length—chapter 5 of the report covers that. In its evidence to the committee, the Conversative Party stated:
“in the future we will not accept foreign donations.”
That appears on page 69 of the report. There was concern about abuse, and on page 74 the Neill committee report said:
“It is possible to imagine that a foreign corporation wishing to evade the underlying purpose of the provisions which we advocate might cause to be brought into being a UK subsidiary, the sole function of which would be to receive money from the foreign corporation and then channel it to the political party of its choice. This would clearly be an abuse of the system”.
That is a very powerful statement. The committee recommended that the legislation should consider:
“making it a criminal offence to attempt to evade or to render nugatory the statutory provisions limiting donations to those coming from ‘permissible sources’. It would, for example, be a crime for an individual in the United Kingdom, who did not, himself or herself, have the resources to make a large donation, to become a mere conduit pipe through which foreign money was channeled to a particular party.”
My Lords, I put my name to Amendment 200 of the noble Lord, Lord Wallace, and I have Amendment 210 of my own. The noble Lord, Lord Wallace, has done most of the heavy lifting on Amendment 200, as he explained. I joined with him because I thought that, where we dealt with donations and national security risk, an additional power for the Electoral Commission—the fit and proper test—might be helpful. I tabled the amendment separately, and then, as the noble Lord explained, we wound them together so they are now one amendment.
The concept of a fit and proper test is well developed. Importantly, it lies at the heart of the powers of the Financial Conduct Authority and other financial regulators. It is important because it can put under the microscope the behaviour of individuals, not just a company itself. It has been found that, when people find that they themselves are going to go under the microscope as opposed to the company they work for, that tends to concentrate the mind rather wonderfully. The fit and proper test has a number of aspects to it that might usefully form part of the Electoral Commission’s armoury: honesty, integrity, reputation, competence and capability and financial soundness, all of which would be helpful for the Electoral Commission to have.
What I was seeking to do with the amendments here was propose a similar arrangement in respect of donations from overseas where there was a security risk. This amendment is not going to try and lay down what the fit and proper test should be in respect of this area, because that will need to be done specifically. I just gave the examples from the financial regulator to show the sorts of areas I think the Electoral Commission could usefully focus its activities on. This amendment, along with the broader amendment that the noble Lord, Lord Wallace, tabled, will give the Electoral Commission a full set of tools to police this important part of our national life.
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Concerns about how our democracy is being affected by malign foreign influences have been highlighted in the Russia report and were mentioned in the previous debate. I am sure we will hear more about this from the noble Lord, Lord Wallace of Saltaire, when he speaks to his amendment on this specifically, so I will not go into any more details about the Russia report.
Why are we concerned that the Bill will allow even more foreign interference in our democracy? The system created by the Bill is more vulnerable to overseas interference. It allows a person to call up any and every local authority to say that they were resident in the area 30 or 40 years ago and provide what we think is fairly flimsy proof; I am sure that it will not be a photographic identification, as would be the case for other electors. Having done that, they would then be able to donate enormous sums of money, if they wished. I am sure that the Minister will say that that is not the intention but, if he accepts our amendments, he can be sure that the possibility of this happening is strictly safeguarded.
We have a number of amendments. Amendment 197 specifically looks at whether a person making a donation for political purposes is a “permissible donor”—if not, that is then rejected. My noble friend Lady Smith of Basildon has an amendment that would require donors to be based in the UK, and one that would prevent overseas electors from donating. My noble friend Lord Collins has an amendment about the Secretary of State publishing
“draft legislation to regulate expenditure deriving from donations by non-UK nationals.”
We also support other amendments in this group that have been tabled to provide better security against overseas donations. If the Minister has understood our genuine concerns and intends to close this loophole that will weaken our democracy, he can choose from plenty of amendments that will greatly improve the Bill. We believe that this is a serious matter and that these amendments bring proportionate safeguards.
However, if the Government do not accept these amendments or commit to introducing their own in a similar vein, it will look as if the real motivation behind these changes to overseas voting is to create a loophole in donation law that would allow donors to bankroll Conservative Party campaigns from their offshore tax havens. What other justification is there for changing the law in this way, without closing this loophole?
Let us look at some of the evidence. Research from the Times shows that, through existing methods, the Conservative Party was able to accept about £1 million from UK citizens living in tax havens ahead of the 2017 general election. The Bill takes away the barriers that kept this at just £1 million. With the situation in Ukraine, it is more important than ever to end the flow of dirty Russian money flooding into our country—and that must include political donations, to block the threat of foreign interference in our politics.
We appreciate that it is impossible for someone with only Russian nationality, however rich they are, to donate legally to a UK political party. But what has undoubtedly happened is that a series of people with dual UK-Russian nationality or with significant business links with Russia have donated heavily to the Conservative Party in recent years. Questions about Russian donors that warrant further investigation have been raised in the media during the current Prime Minister’s tenure. For example, Lubov Chernukhin has given the Conservative Party over £2 million, £1.9 million of which was given after her husband, Vladimir, received money from Suleiman Kerimov, a man who was later sanctioned by the United States Treasury, not only for being a Russian government official: he was arrested in France for smuggling in hundreds of millions of euros in suitcases.
Then there is Mr Temerko, who has donated £1.2 million to the Conservative Party. The problem is that he used to operate at the very top of the Russian arms industry, with connections high up in the Kremlin. He works with Mr Fedotov, who is a key shareholder in Aquind Ltd, which the Guardian reports has donated £700,000 to the Conservative Party, along with another firm. This is unfortunately the same Mr Fedotov who, according to the Pandora papers, has revealed that his fortune was made through an offshore financial structure in the mid-2000s, at about the time that he was allegedly siphoning funds from the Russian state pipeline company, Transneft.
Another big Tory donor in the Johnson era is the businessman Mohamed Amersi, who has given £258,000 over the period. He advised on a lucrative telecom deal in Russia in 2005, with a company that a Swiss tribunal subsequently found to be controlled by an associate of Russian President Vladimir Putin. We consider this extremely concerning. One reason for this is that the Sunday Times recently reported that high-value Conservative donors were invited to participate in an “advisory” group, during which they were allowed to bend the ear of the Prime Minister, senior Ministers and officials.
Members of the public have a pretty low opinion of politicians much of the time. Reports of outside influence that threatens to undermine our democracy serve only to further drive down trust. The Bill provides an opportunity to increase trust in our political system, but, unless this loophole is closed and political donations are cleaned up and given proper scrutiny, trust will continue to fall. If we are to open up our system by allowing far more overseas electors to vote, we must at the same time ban them from making donations to individual politicians and parties. That is the only way to ensure that our system does not receive unwarranted donations and influence from outside. I beg to move.
The noble Baroness, Lady Hayman, mentioned a number of major donors. One has to say in passing that it is astounding that we are now six years after the 2016 referendum and we still do not know where the largest single donation to the Brexit campaign came from. I was told by a senior figure in the City that everyone in the City knew exactly where it came from and that it had come from a foreign state. I do not know that—but we ought to be informed and we ought to have had some ability to discover where that £8 million came from.
The legislation has been grossly circumvented and exploited. I will give a couple of examples of this—that is all I will have time for, although I am sure that the Ministers may be able to add more examples, given their experience and knowledge of the party. The first example relates to Lord Ashcroft, who was once upon a time a treasurer of the party. Around 2008 and 2009, I was asked by a number of media outlets to investigate his donations to the Conservative Party, which added up to £5,137,785. These donations were made by a company called Bearwood Corporate Services, a limited company registered in the UK. However, it never had sufficient profits to be able to pay the donations. My investigations uncovered a complex network of corporations behind it, and the aim of this network was to obfuscate the money trail.
The trail of money began with a company called Stargate Holdings Ltd, which was based in Belize and controlled by Lord Ashcroft. The moneys went in various packages from there to a UK-based company called Astraporta (UK) Ltd. From there, the moneys went to another company called Bearwood Holdings Ltd, and then from there to Bearwood Corporate Services Ltd, and then from there to the Conservative Party. The attempt was to disguise the origins. None of the companies disclosed the payment of political donations. They were all carefully constructed to ensure that they met the definition of a small company, because small companies do not need to disclose political donations. The UK companies involved in this chain either did not trade at all or had insufficient profits to enable them to make the donations. For all practical purposes, the moneys came from Belize and were finally handed over to the Conversative Party. I am sure that a lot of legal advice would have been taken in order to complete that particular route. Clearly, the moneys originated from abroad.
I reported the matter to the Electoral Commission. I told the commission that I was investigating it and what I had initially found. At the minutes of ameeting, the commission noted that it had heard from me. However, in the end, no action was taken by the Electoral Commission.
The second example, which has already been cited, relates to the company called Aquind. This company was incorporated in the UK in 2008, and over many years it remained dormant, but it has paid large sums of money to the Conservative Party. As recently as 2019-20—I have looked at its accounts—the company had no turnover. Indeed, it had no turnover at all at any time in its life. It never made any profit. So, the donations made by the company to the Conservative Party did not originate from any trade or profit in the UK; they obviously came from abroad. The company says that it is ultimately controlled from Luxembourg. I have not looked into who controls the Luxembourg entity, because there is not sufficient time, but I would be happy to take that assignment for the Conservative Party if it wished.
These two examples show how determined donors have been able to play our legal system and bypass it by carefully constructing transactions, and that is not helpful. My suggestion is that companies that make political donations should be able to make them only if they have sufficient realised profits. The term “realised profits” is well understood in the Companies Act. It is nothing new, so I am connecting to it. It generally means the company must generate profits that must result in cash or cash equivalent. If it is not trading, it cannot generate realised profits. This is a way of ensuring our legal system is not abused.
I briefly turn to Amendment 210, which is also in this group. It is a probing amendment—it is not in a final form by any manner of means—but it would prohibit individuals or companies donating to registered political parties where they have been awarded government contracts of more than £100,000. The broad purposes would be to prevent conflicts of interest, to mitigate any appearance of impropriety relating to the awarding of an individual contract, and to contribute towards maintaining public trust and confidence after a number of scandals—Greensill springs to mind.