Draft Statutory Guidance on the Meaning of “Significant Influence or Control”

Motion to Decline to Approve

Moved by

That this House resolves not to approve the draft Statutory Guidance on the Meaning of “Significant Influence or Control” in the Context of the Football Governance Act 2025, as it creates uncertainty regarding the eligibility criteria; increases the likelihood of legal and ownership challenges; creates a conflicting regulatory regime for the licensed football clubs; and has the potential to damage the financial success and growth of the regulated leagues.

My Lords, I have initiated this debate because the question of who is captured as a person of “significant influence or control” under the Football Governance Act inextricably links to the regulatory regime they will have to follow, and that will determine the success or failure of the Act. We need to get it right; clarity is the key word here. We need clarity to have effective regulation, and good regulation is essential for the success of EFL clubs and Premier League clubs alike. Unlike in debates during the passage of the Bill, we are all at one on this. We need to get this right, because that is the best way of ensuring the financial success of professional football.

Just one reason was given by the Minister for Sport in introducing the statutory guidance in another place on 27 October. She stated that the purpose of the statutory guidance on the meaning of “significant influence or control” under Section 1 of the Act was to

“ensure that fans can identify the real persons exercising control of their clubs, notwithstanding any opaque or complex ownership structures. This will give fans the much-needed transparency they deserve”.

She added just one further observation:

“This delivers the Government’s election promises to combat poor governance and financial mismanagement of football clubs in this country”.—[Official Report, Commons, 27/10/25; col. 1WS.]

Unfortunately, as drafted, it does no such thing.

As the Minister, the noble Baroness, Lady Twycross, helpfully contributed during the passage of the Bill, the concrete benefits to fans are a few statutory protections, mainly of heritage items, typically club names, crests— courtesy of my noble friend Lord Parkinson—home colours and home ground; and consultation, which already exists in most of the professional clubs in this country. There are no fan veto powers. What it does is create far tougher owners’ and directors’ tests than exist anywhere in the world, and it overlaps with UEFA and the Premier League and EFL’s requisite regulation.

As reported in the Athletic in August this year:

“Leeds are now 100 per cent owned by 49ers Enterprises Global Football LLC, a business registered in the U.S. state of Delaware. The makeup of 49ers Enterprises is fairly opaque; all that is really known is that current Leeds chairman Paraag Marathe and Jed York, principal owner and CEO of the San Francisco 49ers, each own greater than 10 per cent but less than 25 per cent of 49ers Enterprises Partners LLC (which wholly owns 49ers Global Football). Unravelling the rest is close to impossible, but some names of other minority shareholders in 49ers Enterprises are known. Australian businessman Peter Lowy, of the global retail property company, Westfield Group, sits on the club board and has a shareholding. Red Bull, the energy drinks giant, acquired a little under 10 per cent in 2024, alongside a sponsorship deal with the club. 49ers Enterprises is split into general partners and limited partners: the former is a smaller group providing most of the funding, the latter a large group of unknown quantity contributing smaller amounts to the cause. Marathe, York and Lowy all comprise general partners, but beneath them, there’s a huge cast of supporting characters”

who have influence.

The Athletic continued:

“The full list isn’t known, but those with small holdings in the group —and thus in Leeds—include Russell Crowe, Michael Phelps, Jordan Spieth, Justin Thomas, Russell Westbrook, T.J. McConnell, Larry Nance Jr, Jim Messina and, as of May last year, Will Ferrell”,

the comedian. They can certainly exercise influence, but would they be included in the personnel statement and be subject to detailed scrutiny? How about the partners in 49ers Enterprises, who meet regularly and have an influence over their investment? Would they be included in the personnel statement?

From the Minister’s reading of the draft statutory guidance, who among those whom I have listed—all, incidentally, already known to the fans of Leeds United—would not require listing on the personnel statement, since under paragraph 1.6 they would? Does she believe they are all de facto owners? Under paragraph 1.10 of the guidance, they have the right to exercise, or actually exercise, significant influence. They all meet paragraph 1.13, the master clause of intentionally opaque drafting, which reads:

“There may be other ways an individual actually exercises, or has the right to exercise, significant influence or control over a club”

but those are not mentioned, so there is no definition. If you do not have clarity but have opaqueness, you are basically providing a field day for lawyers. The noble Lord, Lord Pannick, will be in a lawyers’ paradise on reading this guidance. In fact, I suggest that the Government rather rapidly sign him up before the Premier League or the EFL does.

Surprisingly, for the fans of Leeds United, the board of directors, who most fans focus on and see at their games, as they are there virtually every match day and are under the club’s spotlight, fall into the list of exceptions. As officers of the club, the managing director, the sole director and non-executive directors—even a non-executive chairman, such as Tottenham Hotspur has, who may have a casting vote—are on the list of excepted people in this guidance. This is because the guidance says that

“although being the officer of a club necessarily involves having a degree of control and influence over its activities, it would be exceptional for an officer to have significant influence or control”.

I ask the Minister: what determines a chairman, who is on the board, with clear fiduciary responsibilities in this country, being exempted from the guidance because they do not have the undefined concept of significant influence? They are not puppets of the owners; some of them have casting rights in final votes on key issues facing the future of the club.

It makes no sense to me why the chairmen and non-executive directors of a club may be exempted from this, whereas people right down the food chain of ownership that I have mentioned are covered. When we have sorted out this maze of uncertainty, what are the implications for those with significant influence or control? With 100 plus pages of legal backing, the football regulator has, in its very first conference, called for yet more powers in the case of Sheffield Wednesday. Does the Minister know what these additional requested powers are?

This guidance has a lack of clarity. It has opaque wording. What concerns me, as much for an EFL club as a Premier League club, is that we must not rock confidence in a highly competitive global market for investment dollars in professional football. If you lack clarity in the regulation, that is precisely what will happen.