Digital Markets, Competition and Consumers Bill

Commons Reasons and Amendments

Motion A

That this House do not insist on its Amendments 9 and 19, to which the Commons have disagreed for their Reason 19A.

19A: Because it is appropriate for the CMA to be required to act proportionately in relation to conduct requirements and pro-competition interventions.

My Lords, I will also speak to Motions A1, B, B1, C, C1, C2 and D.

I start by thanking noble Lords for their constructive input and careful scrutiny during the passage of the Bill. We have created legislation that will drive innovation and deliver better outcomes for consumers across the UK by addressing barriers to competition in digital markets and tackling consumer rip-offs.

The Bill has been strengthened in many places in this House. However, today, I will speak to Motions A to D, which address amendments that remain to be agreed across the Bill. The Government ask that this House does not insist on the amendments rejected in the other place and that it agrees to the amendment proposed in lieu of changes proposed by noble Lords.

Noble Lords will be aware that the digital markets issues relate to amendments made in the other place. This House has debated those in detail, and I have had the pleasure to meet noble Lords to discuss them subsequently. The Government have made an important amendment in lieu in this area, which I will come to shortly. However, the other amendments, as made in the other place, strike the right balance between vigorously promoting competition in the interests of consumers and healthy challenge of the CMA’s decisions. I will take these in turn to discuss why we encourage the House not to insist on these amendments to revert the Bill to its original wording.

I will first speak to Motion A, relating to Amendments 9 and 19, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Faulks. I am grateful for the noble Lord’s contributions and experience on this matter. It has been my pleasure to engage with him on his view that proportionality in this context would create a novel legal standard for appeals regarding the CMA’s decision to impose obligations. The CMA will have significant new powers and discretion under this ex ante regime and it is right that there are safe- guards which ensure that it designs its interventions proportionately. This will strengthen the UK’s position as one of the best places in the world to do business.

I hope that noble Lords on all sides can agree that overregulation is undesirable, and this threshold provides an important safeguard to prevent that. The Government expect that the courts and the Competition Appeal Tribunal, or CAT, will interpret proportionality by taking an approach consistent with their approach to proportionality in ECHR challenges. We also expect that ECHR considerations on proportionality will be directly relevant in most cases anyway.

Moving to Motion C, relating to Amendments 26 to 28, 31 and 32, on penalty appeals, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Bassam, and the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Whitchurch, I appreciate the concerns of noble Lords about the potential of full merits appeals to lead to what has been termed “bleed back” into regulatory decisions and we have reflected closely on previous case law on similar issues. Given the CMA’s ability to impose considerable fines, a merits-based approach will allow the CAT to take a more thorough view on whether any penalties have been properly applied.

Having considered the approach of the courts to appeals decisions in competition cases under similar legislative frameworks, the Government are confident that the courts will have no problem in finding that appeals on the merits relating to penalties must be restricted to challenges about the penalty itself and will not be extended to any earlier breach decisions. Appeals against all other digital markets decisions will be under judicial review principles. I hope that this provides reassurance to noble Lords that there is little risk of “bleed back”.

Does the Minister not agree that since, with a merits appeal, a fine could be reduced to nugatory amounts, that what would be considered equivalent to a full merits review of the substantive decision?

That would be in respect only of the fine itself. Any other element of the decision, such as the imposition of new conduct requirements or other actions taken to correct anti-competitive effects in the market, would stand and would have been standing throughout the appeal in any event.

I turn to Motion B, which addresses Amendments 12 and 13, on the countervailing benefits exemption, moved by the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Whitchurch. The amendment looks to revert the clause back to its original wording of

“the conduct is indispensable ... to … those benefits”.

The Government’s revised wording, which replaces “indispensable”, does not change the effect of the clause. It still requires the same high threshold to be met and has the same safeguards. To qualify for the exemption, SMS firms must establish that all the criteria are met. There must be no other reasonable, practicable way to achieve the same benefits to consumers with a less anti-competitive effect. I hope that noble Lords feel reassured that the Government’s drafting maintains the same robust threshold and keeps consumers at the heart of the pro-competition regime.

Your Lordships will remember Amendment 38, tabled by my noble friend Lord Lansley, which sought to place in the Bill a 40-day timeframe for the Secretary of State’s approval of CMA guidance. The Government listened carefully to concerns led by my noble friend relating to a risk of delay in the digital markets regime. We are absolutely committed to getting this regime up and running to start fixing competition problems and deliver greater consumer benefit.

To reinforce this commitment, the Government have tabled Amendment 38A in lieu. This takes the spirit of my noble friend’s amendment and merely adjusts the time limit to working days to align with other timelines in the Bill. It also asks for reasons if guidance is not approved within the time limit. I hope that this provides reassurances to noble Lords about our commitment to the digital markets regime. I thank my noble friend for championing this matter in earlier debates and for his support for the amendment in lieu.

Leave out from “House” to end and insert “do insist on its Amendments 9 and 19.”

Many of your Lordships will be familiar with the arguments we have had on the Bill. The important point to stress is that there has been a general welcome of this legislation. I would also like to stress that a measure of cross-party co-operation was the hallmark of the scrutiny of the Bill during its passage through your Lordships’ House. Ministers and officials have given their time generously in meetings and have responded promptly and helpfully to the issues that scrutiny has thrown up.

At the heart of the Bill is the regulation of the internet in a way that should prevent market abuse, in particular by big tech. Helpful though the Government have been, they have not provided answers to some important questions, hence amendments being passing on Report. These have been sent back to us by the House of Commons without the Government—save in one respect—making concessions.

One of the areas that gave noble Lords particular concern is the inclusion of amendments in the House of Commons at a late stage, following lobbying of the Government by big tech. A prospective intervention by the regulator is unlikely to be welcomed by big tech companies and, given their enormous legal budgets, will inevitably be challenged. The change of wording from “appropriate” to “proportionate” will make such challenges easier. A reversion to the Bill’s original wording will help to restore balance, and it is hoped that the amendments in my name and those in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, on appeals against interventions, will achieve that. Our amendments on Motion C are intended to prevent a seepage of arguments on penalty, which involves a merits test, into the judicial review test, which applies to the intervention itself.

Why have the Government made this late change of “appropriate” to “proportionate”? They have been rather coy about this. There has been some waffle—I am afraid I must describe it as such—about increased clarity and the need for a regulator to act in a proportionate manner. That is quite so but, on further probing, the reasoning was revealed: it is intended to reflect the level of challenge derived from jurisprudence from the European Court of Human Rights and the CJEU, where human rights issues are engaged. I remain bewildered as to why big tech has human rights. This is not what the framers of the convention had in mind.

My Lords, I will speak to Motion B1 and briefly in support of other motions in this group.

Last December, at Second Reading, I said that we on these Benches want to see the Bill and the new competition and consumer powers make a real difference, but that they can do so only with some key changes. On Third Reading, I pointed out that we were already seeing big tech take an aggressive approach to the EU’s Digital Markets Act, and we therefore believed that the Bill needed to be more robust and that it was essential to retain the four key competition amendments passed on Report. That remains our position, and I echo the words of the noble Lord, Lord Faulks: that the degree of cross-party agreement has been quite exemplary.

As we heard on Report, noble Lords made four crucial amendments to Part 1 of the digital markets Bill: first, an amendment whereby, when the Competition and Markets Authority seeks approval of its guidance, the Secretary of State is required within 40 days to approve the guidance or to refuse to approve it and refer it back to the CMA; secondly, an amendment reverting the countervailing benefits exemption to the version originally in the Bill, which included the “indispensable” standard; thirdly, amendments reverting the requirement for the CMA’s conduct requirement and pro-competitive interventions to be “proportionate” back to “appropriate”; and fourthly, amendments reverting the appeals standard to judicial review for penalties.

We welcome the fact that the Government have proposed, through Motion D, Amendment 38A in lieu, which effectively achieves the same aims, ensuring that the approval of the CMA guidance by the Secretary of State does not unduly hold up the operationalisation of the new regime. However, the Government’s Motions A, B and C disagree with the other Lords amendments.

In Europe, where the Digital Markets Act is now in force, we have seen big tech gatekeepers frustrate enforcement by evading the spirit, and in some cases ignoring the letter, of the law. They continue to use their market power to twist their obligations under the Act to maintain their stranglehold. The amendments passed by the Lords and put forward today offer the solution to minimise the chance of this happening in the UK and to ensure that the CMA’s new powers are sufficiently robust to hold big tech to account.