Digital Markets, Competition and Consumers Bill

Our amendment poses the challenge of why the CMA is acting only for consumers when it should be acting in the interests of all our citizens to ensure protection of the greater good. We raised this issue with Ministers when we met them recently and they helpfully sent a follow-up letter, conceding that the DMU taskforce had recommended that the DMU’s overarching statutory duty should be

“to further the interests of consumers and citizens in digital markets”.

It was recognised that competition in digital markets had deep interactions with a range of other issues, such as data privacy and media plurality.

However, the Government rejected the citizens’ interest proposal on the basis that it created some unhelpful overlaps with other regulators. We accept that there is some overlap with the other regulators, particularly Ofcom, but we argue that there are also large swathes of digital competition that do not easily fit under the remits of other regulators. As such, in many digital activities, no one is protecting the interests of citizens as a whole. Also, there is already a requirement for the DMU to consult key regulators before it makes an intervention, which would enable any overlap to be addressed at that point. While the Government are concerned not to make the remit of the DMU too broad, we counterargue that they risk making it too narrow if they do not add in a citizens’ interest provision.

This is clearly a probing amendment and we may well not have found the right wording, but I would be interested to hear the views of other noble Lords about whether these definitions should be broadened to encompass the interests of all citizens in the deliberation of the CMA. I beg to move.

Late last week I discovered that the City of London Law Society had made roughly the same point in its submission on the Bill. The wording in my amendment is pretty much taken from that submission. At the time I tabled it, I had not discussed it with the City of London Law Society and, since then, I have had time only for a couple of minutes with it on the phone. I cannot think of a good reason for not applying this duty to the CMA, but I can think of plenty of reasons why it should be applied.

These duties on public bodies can appear to be little more than motherhood and apple pie but, as I have discovered over the years, they can influence behaviour in powerful public bodies in quite a big way, and usually for the better. I will illustrate that. Take an accounting officer who comes under pressure to do something that he or she considers inappropriate. That happens not infrequently, as those of us who have been on the inside of the public body fence will know. With a statutory duty in place, the accounting officer is much better protected and placed to be able to say, “I’m not going to go ahead with that”. That is no doubt one of several reasons why these specialist regulators have these duties imposed on them: they serve as a reminder, a backstop, for securing good conduct from those at the top of organisations, particularly those with a high degree of statutory independence.

Now, the Government—on advice, no doubt—will point in response, probably in just a moment, to codes of conduct, guidelines and other documents that already require good regulatory practice. I can see the Minister smiling. I know most of these documents quite well—as a matter of fact, I contemplated reading them out myself, but I will spare the Committee that pain and leave it to him to take the flak. The department’s impact assessments should work, in principle, to provide some of the heavy lifting as well, and they are audited by the NAO. I have seen that scrutiny in action, and it does far less to improve behaviour than would a statutory obligation. It is the latter that really concentrates the mind.

More and more as we examine the Bill, the absence of a general duty on the CMA seems to be of a piece with the approach taken right across the draft legislation. We are creating a body with unprecedented powers but with unprecedentedly feeble avenues for the securing of accountability. We are creating ideal conditions for executive overreach. All the necessary ingredients are being put in place as we legislate here.

First, there is the long history of patchy to poor scrutiny by Parliament, particularly by the Commons, of the CMA. As I may have pointed out on more than one occasion, I was its very first chairman ever to appear before the BEIS Select Committee, and I secured my audience by request—I said that I really would like to come along—which gives you an idea of the distance between the committee and the activities of the CMA. Of course—and I do not mean this disparagingly to anybody in this House—it is the Commons Select Committee that really counts most when it comes to delivering punchy cross-examination and accountability.

Parliament could do a better job, which I think was the point that the noble Baroness, Lady Stowell, made on Monday, but it would be a profound mistake, even if we got the improvements that she is proposing, to rely exclusively on Parliament to do the heavy lifting.

So the first reason why we need this amendment is that we do not have much parliamentary scrutiny. Secondly, we have a body with a historically weak board, with most of the important decisions already delegated to the most senior executives, mixed-quality governance at best and a history of patchy to poor non-executive challenge of executive decisions. I realise that it is concerning that an ex-chairman should feel the need to put that on record, but it is necessary. Thirdly, as things stand, we are protecting the CMA from any substantive review at all of decisions on digital, which is a discussion we had earlier with respect to JR.

A fourth reason why this amendment is needed is that it now seems that the body is to be exempted from the core duties to conform to best regulatory practice which have been considered essential for all the other sector regulators that I have checked out. My amendment would rectify that problem at least. I hope that the Minister will look favourably on the suggestion.