My Lords, I start my opening speech with a reference to the importance of digital. In recent decades, digital technologies have brought untold benefits to people around the world. From connecting us with loved ones in faraway places to streaming our favourite album or TV series in an instant, our lives are enriched by the services that these technologies enable. In the UK, digital technologies were fundamental to our collective response to the Covid-19 pandemic, helping businesses to continue operating and helping friends and family to stay in touch in challenging times for us all.
The digital revolution has also had transformative and hugely beneficial effects on our economy. The UK has the largest tech ecosystem in Europe. Last year, our start-ups and scale-ups raised more investment than France and Germany combined. We have more tech unicorns than any other country in Europe with eight cities having at least two unicorns, including Edinburgh, Nottingham and Leeds.
The strengths of our vibrant digital sector are numerous and closely interlinked. From our world-class universities and breadth of tech talent to our support for start-ups and our innovative financing sector, the UK is a global tech powerhouse. Furthermore, the UK leads the world in our approach and response to developments in digital technology. Just last month at Bletchley Park, the UK hosted the first AI Safety Summit, bringing together Governments, leading technology organisations, academia and civil society to inform action at the frontier of AI development.
I turn to the rationale for the Bill and the detail of its parts. Part 1 is on digital markets. The continued success of our tech sector relies on highly competitive digital markets. Firms with alternative market offerings and innovative ideas should have the freedom to grow and challenge powerful incumbents on a level playing field. This benefits consumers by giving them access to the best products at the lowest prices.
However, the UK’s competition framework is not set up to keep pace with developments in fast-moving digital markets. A handful of powerful tech firms now dominate strategically critical services, such as online search, app stores and digital advertising, and in effect set the rules of the game for other businesses and consumers. Jurisdictions around the world are now considering how best to address the unique competition challenges presented by digital markets, and the UK is playing a major part in these efforts.
The Digital Competition Expert Panel and the Digital Markets Taskforce—expert groups set up to examine competition issues in digital markets—both independently concluded that digital markets have specific features which may lead them to tip in favour of one particular firm. This restricts choice for consumers, growth for emerging digital companies, and the potential of small businesses that rely on large firms to reach their customer base. As such, both groups recommended the establishment of a new pro-competition regime for digital markets, which the Bill delivers.
My Lords, it is a great pleasure to follow the Minister, who has very ably set out the purposes behind this much-needed and long-awaited Bill. I hope he has not given it a fake review or indulged in any drip pricing in his opening salvo.
Our Labour colleagues in the Commons made it clear during the passage of the Bill in another place that we are fully behind the intents of the Bill. Indeed, if anything, we wish to strengthen it—a comment that will no doubt be echoed many times during today’s debate. We are at one with its direction of travel, even if we have a slightly different destination. There are, for us, issues of continuing concern, and we will focus on these when we go through its detail in Committee and on Report.
I know the Government argue that the Bill delivers on a manifesto commitment, but the truth is that it has been much longer in the making. It was as far back as 2018 when the Government set up their Digital Competition Expert Panel, and it is nearly three years since the CMA set up the Digital Markets Unit. Even with a speedy passage through your Lordships’ House in 2024, this Bill will have little impact much before 2025—a full six years after the Furman report concluded that digital markets required a new approach. Of course, we were promised the Bill in 2022, the year of extreme chaos in government and a time when Ministers were not sure if they favoured any regulation at all. All the while, we have been falling further and further behind our European neighbours and other jurisdictions and playing catch-up.
Thankfully, wiser heads have now prevailed and we have a workable, if not fully formed, piece of legislation. We should be grateful to the CMA, UKHospitality, the Chartered Trading Standards Institute, the CAB, Which? and others in the tech sector who have through their persistence helped make this happen. The sector and market are, as we know, dominated by a small number of large companies and the truth is that the lack of competition and regulation is acting as a barrier to market entry and expansion. This in turn impacts on consumers, their interests and the health of the market and our digital economy. Five years ago, the OECD reported that digital markets were exhibiting
My Lords, it is a great pleasure to be working on this Bill—a Bill that we on these Benches broadly welcome. I hope we will be able to work constructively to improve it as it moves through your Lordships’ House. It is about time, as the noble Lord, Lord Bassam, noted. The Furman report was set up five or six years ago; we have been impatient for competition law in the digital space to be reformed and for the Digital Markets Unit to be empowered—so, at last.
As the noble Lord, Lord Bassam, also noted, this is a big Bill, and it acts in a number of different ways. I fear that many of the things I say will be similar to what was said by the noble Lord; in order to maintain novelty, I will probably say them in a different order.
I will start with consumer issues. Clearly, these issues have excited correspondence from a lot of people in the outside world. We should note and thank them for the work that they have done in sending through a load of briefings. There are some important issues here, and areas that should be tightened up and improved. These include: tackling online scams, dealing with product safety issues and strengthening trading standards; taking action on primary and secondary ticketing; impeding price drip and mid-contract price rises; addressing the pernicious nature of fake reviews, as we heard from the Minister; devising a sensible way of redesigning automatic subscription rollover—there is a danger of us taking a number of other areas down with the law we have, so we must be careful of unintended consequences of that move—and delivering a range of other consumer rights, such as the possibility of collective action for consumer claims. I am sure there will be plenty of grist to this mill as we work through that part of the Bill.
Moving on from consumers, the second big challenge is the need to tip the balance of power toward content providers—and here I should declare that I have several creators in my family. As a basic principle, all content creators should be properly paid for the work they do. UK law requires payment for the commercial use of another’s copyrighted work, yet commercial use is currently being made of content by global platforms without any permission being obtained or payment being made. The dominant platforms profit from the efforts of content creators, from songwriters and artists to publishers and broadcasters, and they do not get rewarded.
My Lords, I declare my interests as chair of Peers for the Planet and a director of the associated company.
The content of this Bill is not my area of expertise— I intend to contribute on a very narrow issue—and I was therefore particularly grateful for the clarity with which the Minister described the content of the Bill and for the parsing of its contents by the two Front-Bench speakers. I thought I would be making a speech perhaps at the end of a long list of speakers, when everything had been dealt with and raised, as a little coda, but I find myself speaking first from the Back Benches.
However, I can at least assure the noble Lord, Lord Fox, that I have something to add to the list of things we might need to deal with in this Bill. It is a narrow issue, to which I will speak in a moment, but I would like to raise one other thing. In the briefings that I have received since putting my name down on the list, important points were raised by a number of charities on the measures proposed around the auto-renewal of subscription contracts and the impacts they may have on the claiming of gift aid. That is an issue I hope the Minister responding to the debate might speak about.
I will focus my contribution on Part 4 of the Bill, which relates to the protection of consumer rights, and what I believe is a missed opportunity in relation to right-to-repair provisions. I am grateful for the work of organisations which have briefed on this issue, particularly the Design Council, which has a long-standing interest in this area. Strengthening our existing right-to-repair provisions and extending them in line with international norms would have multiple benefits. It would help us to shift to a more circular economy, reduce the waste from our throwaway culture and drive down emissions.
I am sure that there is no one in the Chamber who has not had some experience of planned obsolescence—where manufacturers have deliberately designed a product to limit its lifespan. For example, they have had to throw away a perfectly good kettle and buy a new one because the on/off switch has stopped working and it is not possible to replace that part, or they have had no choice but to buy a new mobile phone because the producer has stopped providing software updates even though the handset continues to work perfectly.
My Lords, I am grateful for the opportunity to speak so early in this debate, ahead of many noble Lords who actually know what they are talking about and have specific expertise in this area. I begin by declaring my interests in the register, specifically my role as a trustee of Tate, adviser to Pixel United and broadcaster on Times Radio, which is owned by News UK.
I should say from the outset that I am a huge supporter of this Bill. As the Minister set out at the Dispatch Box, updating our competition regime—for the first time comprehensively, I think, for some 25 years —is long overdue, to take account of how the digital tech giants have changed the landscape. It is one of a number of pieces of legislation that this Government are putting through, including the Online Safety Act, the forthcoming media Bill and the data protection Bill, providing a much-needed framework for regulation of digital companies.
I shall concentrate on two issues in the Bill, but I have to say that I was extremely grateful to all the Front Benches for highlighting some of the other issues, which I was blissfully unaware of, particularly aspects such as copyright—so I may well get stuck into some other issues in Committee. But we all know what we are talking about, when we talk about giving the competition authority power: we are talking about the power to take on big tech and big platforms such as Apple and Google, which have effectively established a duopoly. They set the terms and conditions and the rents, and there is very little comeback.
It is an unusual position to be in, because as consumers we all benefit from this technology. During my speech, as it becomes duller and duller, noble Lords will whip out their iPhones and androids and have a range of apps to choose from. But this is really a Bill which puts small businesses in the place of the consumer, because small businesses are being shut out from these opportunities —and who knows what other apps noble Lords could have taken advantage of if this Bill was already law.
My Lords, I declare an interest as a television producer. I too welcome this Bill, which has been a long time coming.
Five and a half years ago, I had the honour to be a member of the Communications and Digital Committee inquiry into digital advertising in the UK. We heard how the two big tech companies, Facebook and Google, used the combination of their massive databases and near-total control of the supply, intermediary and purchase sides of the digital advertising market to take a more than 80% share. Our inquiry recommended that the CMA conduct a market study as quickly as possible into the digital ad market. Two years later, that market study confirmed the tech companies’ near-complete domination of the market. It concluded that the lack of competition harmed consumers by excessive exploitation of their data and lower quality of service to them and to advertisers.
However, the tech companies’ dominant position in the market has also had a deleterious effect on media advertisers. Publishers of news in particular have suffered from the massive reduction in advertising revenue. In the first half of 2020, while tech platforms’ ad revenue grew, digital advertising fell by 8% for national news brands, by 10.5% for online magazines and by 10% for online regional titles. It is expensive to create original news and, especially, to launch investigative journalism, which is essential to holding those in power to account.
It was therefore not surprising that the Communications and Digital Committee launched an inquiry into the future of journalism in the digital age. Journalism deserves special consideration in this Bill. I say this not just because I am a career journalist but because it plays a role of public value and importance to our society and democracy. It helps people stay informed about the world beyond their personal experience—surely a prerequisite for an active citizen in a democratic society—but it is under threat, especially the provision of local news.
I declare my interest as an adviser to DLA Piper. I too strongly support the Bill. Rather than dwell in any detail on how to improve it further—there will be plenty of time to do that in Committee—I thought it might be helpful first to attempt briefly to explain what I think is the Bill’s place in a wider policy perspective, and why I support it. Secondly, I will explain why the legislation on its own probably will not deliver the benefits that we are hoping for it. The CMA needs to do better, and so will Parliament, in scrutinising it.
On the first point, it is now widely accepted in many western democracies that competition policy has simply not been delivering the goods. I will not dwell on this for long, but concentration ratios are rising everywhere, and consumer detriment with them. The result is an erosion of public confidence in competition and consumer protection and in many regulatory bodies, including the CMA. That is only part of a much bigger picture of vulnerability to obsolescence of the tools and machinery that western Governments have been using over the past 30 years to manage capitalism and secure consent for it.
One of the problems the Bill seeks to address is that the West’s technological inventiveness, while improving economic performance, has also had the effect of challenging the legitimacy of global free enterprise. The platforms were created by global capitalism and they have improved consumer welfare dramatically. But they have also brought corrosive by-products: risks to privacy, fake news, online harm, greater cyber risk. These corrosive effects have been greatly amplified by the tendency of big platforms to monopoly. Western Governments are now struggling to adapt the machinery of regulation—in some cases radically—to cope with this. Consumer protection has also been badly neglected. Millions of people now feel vulnerable to rip-offs and no longer think that free enterprise works for them. As the noble Lord, Lord Vaizey, pointed out, small businesses —which are also consumers—have been at the wrong end of platform power a great deal recently.
My Lords, it is a pleasure to follow the noble Lord, Lord Tyrie, and I will come to his theme of accountability later in my remarks, but I am very grateful to my noble friend the Minister for setting out in his introductory speech just how successful the UK’s tech sector is to date, because it really is a huge success. I was delighted to learn that Nottingham, my home city, is one of only a small number with two unicorns—billion-dollar tech start-ups. I did not know that, so that was good to hear.
Although we have been successful so far in the tech sector in this country, we have the talent and the potential to do so much more. But we have a problem, as we have already heard, which is that our digital markets are not working properly. The financial clout and sheer computing power of the US tech giants are creating significant, often insurmountable barriers to entry for alternative providers. I want to be clear that the Bill should not be about bashing big tech. We should not penalise these businesses because of their size. Their success and innovation also create other business opportunities, providing products and services that millions of people use and love. But that does not mean they should control the way markets develop and who else gets the chance to succeed. Like most, if not all, of my noble friends on the Conservative Benches and my erstwhile noble friend Lord Tyrie, I believe that free markets drive growth when they allow for effective competition. When markets are not creating that competitive landscape on their own, Governments should step in—hence the Bill before us.
Noble Lords have already heard that the Communications and Digital Select Committee, which I am privileged to chair, has started to call for legislation to empower the CMA with a new ex ante regime under the chairmanship of my predecessor and noble friend Lord Gilbert of Panteg. Through several committee inquiries, we have heard evidence of many things— we have heard about some of them today—including: unfair dominance and control of the immensely powerful and increasingly important digital advertising market; non-negotiable fees and terms applied by Apple and Google on thousands of businesses that rely on app stores, even though the terms of trade prevent some of those businesses providing a more streamlined experience and cheaper prices for their customers; and big players using their dominance in one part of the digital market, such as search, to damage the prospects of a potential competitor in another, such as online shopping or travel bookings. In our committee, we also continue to learn more about the failing of our digital markets as more firms, previously reluctant, are now willing to speak publicly about their experiences. So, as much as I would rather that the Bill was not necessary, the case for it is clear.
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Noble Lords from across the House have also investigated these competition challenges and called for action. My noble friend Lady Stowell of Beeston and the Communications and Digital Committee conducted a review of the Bill earlier this year, for which I am very grateful. They consulted a broad range of stakeholders, including tech firms of all sizes. The committee recommended some further actions for the Government’s consideration, and I have no doubt that we will discuss these in detail during the passage of the Bill. I was, however, very pleased to hear its conclusions that the Bill’s objectives are “sound” and its measures “broadly proportionate”.
The noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Whitchurch, and the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, also expressed their strong support for the Bill and provided suggestions for improvement, which I also look forward to discussing further. The advice of the noble Lord, Lord Tyrie, on legislative and institutional reforms to safeguard the interests of consumers and public confidence in markets, is also at the heart of the Bill’s measures.
The Bill is divided into six parts. Part 1 establishes a new pro-competition regime for digital markets, which will be overseen by the Digital Markets Unit. The Digital Markets Unit is an administrative unit within the Competition and Markets Authority. The Bill gives the CMA tough new powers to force the most powerful tech firms to treat businesses in the UK fairly, including through targeted action to address the root causes of competition issues, and to create opportunities for innovative start-ups in the UK to compete with these powerful firms. Greater competition in digital markets will lower the prices of everyday online goods and services, giving consumers more choice and control over the fundamental services they use online. This came across clearly during the Communications and Digital Committee’s evidence sessions. For example, the consumer advocacy organisation Which? noted that the Bill will benefit consumers through “more competition” and “more innovation” in digital markets.
Part 2 concerns competition. Competitive markets deliver a variety of good-value, high-quality products for their customers, because firms which fail to deliver will be overtaken by their competitors. They also enable innovative, dynamic companies to enter markets more easily, compete on level terms, and grow and gain market share. Measures in Part 2 of the Bill will refine the CMA’s competition tools, making investigations better targeted and its enforcement action faster and more effective. These changes will allow the free market to operate more efficiently. Market inquiries will become more efficient, flexible and proportionate, while the merger regime will be updated to focus on transactions with the greatest potential to weaken competition. The measures will also grant stronger powers to investigate illegal anti-competitive conduct.
Parts 3 and 4 deal with consumer enforcement and protection. Alongside effective competition, well-functioning markets require strong consumer protections. Such protections give people confidence to spend their money, safe in the knowledge that they have the right information to make sound purchasing decisions and have ways to seek redress if something goes wrong. Noble Lords on all sides will likely have had first-hand experience of the difficulties surrounding subscription contracts, including unexpected charges and unduly complex cancellation processes. Such subscription traps cost consumers £1.6 billion a year. A host of other unfair trading practices and consumer rip-offs also remain far too common, particularly online. Research commissioned by the Government has found that, for example, on the nine most frequently used platforms by UK consumers, up to 15% of reviews are fake, with consumers more likely to unknowingly rely on well-written fake reviews when purchasing products. Moreover, many Christmas and similar savings schemes are not protected in the event of business insolvency, so if a business enters insolvency, consumers face losing the money they had deposited.
At present, public consumer law enforcement lacks teeth: the UK is currently the only G7 country not to have any civil penalties for common consumer protection breaches such as mis-selling. Enforcers can apply for court orders to stop or prevent breaches and to obtain compensation for consumers. However, businesses may still profit more than they lose from breaches of consumer law, because no financial penalties can currently be imposed for such wrongdoing.
The measures in Parts 3 and 4 beef up enforcement of consumer protections and address these consumer rip-offs. Part 3 creates a model that will allow the CMA to act faster against breaches of consumer protection, tackle more cases and protect consumers’ interests, while creating a level playing field for businesses. Part 4 includes a raft of measures to help consumers keep more of their hard-earned cash. New rights to subscription reminders and easier cancellations will help consumers exit the contracts they no longer want. This part of the Bill includes a power to add to the list of banned unfair commercial practices. This will ensure that the legislation keeps pace with changes in online consumer harms, which will give consumers greater confidence when spending and reward businesses which treat their customers fairly. Moreover, there are new protections for consumer payments to consumer saving schemes. These will ensure that financial failures such as the collapse of the Farepak Christmas savings club, which leave vulnerable consumers out of pocket, can never happen again.
Parts 5 and 6 contain cross-cutting and general provisions, including new information-gathering powers for the CMA to help boost competition in the road fuel market and protect consumers from unfair fuel prices. In addition, the Government recognise the importance of international co-operation for effective cross-border enforcement in a globalised economy. Measures in Part 5 will enhance the ability of UK regulators to co-operate internationally on competition and consumer matters, including introducing new powers to provide investigative assistance.
I come now to the Commons Report stage amendments. The Government engaged closely with parliamentarians and stakeholders throughout the Bill’s passage in the other place. Based on this engagement, a number of amendments were brought forward on Report in the House of Commons to strengthen the Bill. These amendments had two overarching aims. First, the amendments sought to strike the right balance between accountability over the CMA’s regulatory decisions and the flexibility needed for targeted and proportionate action to tackle the unique competition challenges in digital markets. Secondly, the amendments aimed to ensure that the Bill is strongly focused on consumers with the new and improved rights to deal with bad business practices, such as subscription traps, in ways that will not disproportionately burden businesses and potentially reduce consumer choice.
At a briefing I chaired last week with my noble friend Lord Camrose, I promised my noble friend Lady Stowell of Beeston that I would provide some assurances regarding the digital markets regime. First, I turn to consumer benefits. Amendments brought forward by Ministers in the other place reinforce the regime’s focus on consumers, by clarifying how the DMU will consider consumer benefits when imposing conduct requirements or taking enforcement action. Requiring the CMA to explain the consumer benefits that it expects to result at these points ensures that its decisions to impose conduct requirements are transparent and carefully considered. Clarifying the wording of the countervailing benefits exemption will improve legal clarity, and I reassure my noble friend that it maintains the same high threshold. These changes make sure that consumers get the best outcomes possible.
Secondly, I turn to the appeals of penalty decisions. Appealing penalty decisions on the merits will allow firms to challenge the value of potentially significant fines, but will not allow firms to frustrate the regime or delay regulatory intervention. This brings the regime in line with the Enterprise Act 2002, and will provide reassurance to firms that the value of a fine imposed on them is appropriate. To be clear, all other decisions, including whether or not a breach of the regime occurred, remain appealable on judicial review principles. I hope this helps address my noble friend’s concerns.
The amendments agreed in the other place bring further clarity about the DMU’s approach to regulation. Together, they ensure that the DMU’s interventions are proportionate and drive the best possible outcomes for consumers.
In closing, this Bill will drive innovation, grow the economy, and deliver better outcomes for consumers throughout the UK. It is a hugely important piece of legislation and I thank noble Lords for their involvement in and support for the Bill so far. I look forward to hearing their views today and throughout the rest of the Bill’s passage. I beg to move.
“certain characteristics, such as low variable costs, high fixed costs and strong network effects, that result in high market shares for a small number of firms”,
so that:
“Firms in these concentrated markets may possess market power, the ability to unilaterally and profitably raise prices or reduce quality beyond a level that would prevail under competition”.
The ONS has reported that between 2008 and 2020 the percentage of adults reporting shopping online had risen from 53% to 87%. Those figures would have been given an extra twist since the impact of Covid. This trend will undoubtedly have led to greater exposure to the downsides of the digital economy, in particular the misuse of consumer data, misleading information and unrestrained marketing. We need, as our Labour colleague Seema Malhotra argued in the Commons, to deliver
For that reason, we need to recognise the harm that can come from the creation of monopolies in a digital economy and ensure that innovation is fostered. This will enable us all to share in the benefits of new and emerging technologies and use them to grow the economy and promote economic and social progress.
The challenge is to get the balance right in the framing of the legislation. On these Benches, we seek assurances that the Government will not resile from the current drafting of the Bill and the commitments made in another place. So, first, in terms of our asks today, I say no watering down of the Bill’s original intent. We will be seeking reassurance on that point and would like to hear that commitment on the record today. Secondly, while it is clear that the CMA and the DMU have the capability to deliver the Bill’s aims, we wonder whether they have the capacity. Can they, for example, communicate their policies, programmes and priorities effectively to stakeholders and legislators? Will they be sufficiently independent of the sponsoring department to be able to get on with the job? Furthermore, will they have the tools to undertake the necessary enforcement work to make the regulatory function effective?
On these Benches, we worry that, as with other regulators, they are hobbled from the start by a lack of the forensic investigatory skills necessary and trained personnel required. Can the Minister assure us that the CMA will have staff in place fully trained for the job and resourced to make it work? Perhaps he can outline the growth plan for staffing and put on record some details today demonstrating a workforce strategy. It is of little value to have a regulator with all the necessary powers if it cannot effectively exercise them—a quick look at the water industry makes that plain.
Earlier, I referenced our concerns about the potential dilution of the Bill. Two examples readily come to mind and I have no doubt other noble Lords will pick up on them. First, the changes to the appeals test on the penalties regime will surely undermine the DMU’s primary purpose, which is to protect competition in the UK. Secondly, we are concerned that the addition of explicit proportionality obligations will create uncertainty in terms of the impact on the enforcement regime. Why have these changes been introduced so late in the legislative process and who asked for them?
Moving on from concerns about the weakening of the Bill’s measures, we want to make it clear that we have a long list of areas where we and, no doubt, other noble Lords want to see the Bill strengthened, so we give notice today that we will be tabling amendments to tackle the Bill’s most egregious omissions.
I am sure it will come as no surprise that we will be seeking amendments to the subscription contracts arrangement—moving from the opt-out principle to opt in—and seeking to tighten up the approach to fake reviews, drip-pricing and greenwashing. We cannot understand why the Government are reluctant to do more on product safety to ensure that fake products and counterfeits are fully covered. We also wonder why Ministers are so reluctant to use the Bill as a way of tackling the forever issue of ticket touts, digital fraud and the theft of creative content.
Tech platforms benefit enormously from the work of creatives, so why is it that platforms in particular are able to avoid properly and fairly paying them? Few of the rewards to the platforms themselves get passed on. That cannot be right or fair. It begs the question: should we be looking again at the law surrounding copyright in this context?
We will also want to revisit the countervailing benefit exemption issue. Currently, the exemption surely benefits the big tech companies with monopoly power more than it does consumers, even where some short-term benefit is claimed. By claiming an exemption, the platforms can easily evade conduct requirements and obligations. Perhaps the Minister can provide instances of anti-competitive behaviour where there are more benefits than harms; we have yet to find any of great significance. It might be the case that there is a need to develop a more rigorous test of the countervailing benefit claims made, and a measure of consultation with the public to ensure their validity. In this light, we will want to discuss the need for an interests of citizens duty to be inserted into the Bill to strengthen the hand of consumers.
Finally, there are issues that relate to how the CMA operates. Is there not a case for more to be made of the CMA’s co-ordinating role as an enforcer? It is not the only body that will exercise the powers contained in the Bill, but it is the lead regulatory agency. Could more be done to recognise that, so that best use is made of the enforcement regime and regulatory leadership is entrenched?
This is a large Bill, almost too big to summarise and with many issues hidden and tucked away within it. We will listen carefully to the debate today, particularly on subjects such as final-offer arbitration, the alternative disputes resolution scheme, the potential vulnerabilities of the “strategic market status” designation, and the need for a takedown power for trading standards officers to enable them to provide for swifter remedies where there is self-evident harm to consumers and a need to act.
This Bill is much needed and has been for much of the lifetime of this Government. As I said at the outset, we support its direction of travel, but that does not mean that it is not capable of improvement through challenge, or that we will give it an easy passage.
The News Media Association estimates that over 50% of searches are news-related, but Google keeps the value of repeated visits and the value of online footfall that is generated. As such, copyright law looks foolish, as the system is being gamed. Smaller players must try to sue their distributors to enforce their rights, but they cannot risk such a move or indeed afford to take them on. Indeed, the evidence suggests that it is difficult even for Governments to challenge these platforms. After almighty tussles, the Australian and Canadian Governments have won concessions. It remains to be fully appreciated how those will pan out but, as well as highlighting the global dominance of the big two, those fights highlighted an essential difference between Meta and Google when it comes to news content, which is of great interest.
The Bill must make it clear that platforms need to pay properly and fairly, on benchmarked terms and with reference to value for end users. Additional clarification is needed on how a final offer mechanism would work in practice, and we will be seeking that, but really a bigger change is needed. That change should require those using and distributing content to obtain the owners’ permission before they use it, and we will be pushing for that.
I remind noble Lords that that we are discussing the Digital Markets, Competition and Consumer Bill—so competition is a central part of it and we have already heard elements of that. But, in the market that we are looking at, competition is weak—if not frail, to perhaps overstate it. In our view, the pro-competition interventions are one of the Bill’s most powerful features and a big step forward. We must use the Bill process to ensure that the powers are sufficient and Ministers must articulate government support for the ambition that the CMA and its DMU will need in order to start to take on the competition challenge, because that will require a big shift in emphasis from the CMA.
At present the CMA deals with a lot of mergers— 50 to 70 detailed investigations a year—while enforcement typically attracts fewer than 10 cases per annum and there are hundreds of complaints for it to deal with. When looking at competition matters, including acquisitions and mergers, the world’s competition authorities have focused on efficiency and short-term consumer benefit, but, as we have been reminded recently by the Court of Appeal when it found against Apple, the overriding objective of the CMA, as set out in the 2013 Act, is to promote competition in the interests of consumers.
“Promoting competition” does not mean just assessing the efficiency of a monopolist; in digital markets, this approach has delivered global oligopoly. So, while Web 1.0 was an open access—albeit read-only—platform, Web 2.0 has been captured, intermediated and monetised by a very small number of profitable concerns. That has been achieved largely through acquisitions that have been waved through by the authorities. Looking at the publicly disclosed acquisitions between 2008 and 2018, we see that Google has acquired 168 companies, Facebook 71 and Amazon 60. Now, thanks to this and other things, they control the core software in web browsers and device operating systems, and through that control they determine what we see, what we find, what we search on the web and how we pay for stuff.
The Bill is, in many respects, seeking to close the gaping doors of empty stables that this approach has delivered and, to do so, short-term consumer welfare cannot be the sole—or sometimes even the primary—consideration. Promoting competition means taking into account market structure and the ability of players to innovate. When looking at mergers, regard has to be taken of the effect of allowing large companies to buy innovative ones so that they can assimilate or retire their ideas and technology. In that context, we very much welcome the CMA’s approach to the Microsoft acquisition of Activision Blizzard and Ofcom’s decision to refer the hyperscalers in cloud services for an investigation by the CMA. This demonstrates that the CMA is up for a global challenge in this strategic way and that it can play a leadership role.
Looking forward, as well as mitigating the competitive and consumer issues thrown up by the centralised Web 2.0, the Bill should empower the CMA to help usher in a genuinely decentralised Web 3.0. As Professor Furman reminded us in evidence in Committee in the Commons, intervention interoperability is a vital remedy—and we say that interfering with interoperability in all its forms should be policed by the DMU. That means embarking on investigations and actions with the aim of distributing the power and control over Web 3.0, creating a network that spans a large base of independent actors. This speaks to the technology on which the network is based and the standards that are set to deliver that network.
It seems clear that the DMU should be proactive with respect to promoting international standards and aiming to create that interoperability: for a start, by focusing on open access and operational transparency, working for standards that allow unrestricted participation and favouring the technologies and protocols that prevent a single person or group amending or reversing transactions executed and recorded. It would be good to hear from the Minister, when he sums up, on the role that the Government feel the DMU and the CMA should be playing on the standards authorities—the IETF and the W3C. How do we see engaging further and more thoroughly with those standards bodies, because that is where the first fight starts in these technology issues?
So there is a lot resting on this Bill. The architecture of the web is currently threatened by those who would create and preserve their own walled gardens of content that is provided by others, privatise a public resource for their own ends and monopolise all content offered to the public via the internet for their own profit. This is not an abstract need; additional danger is already with us. Big tech is busy wrapping its tentacles around AI, including by co-opting start-ups for investments and partnerships. It is critical that the CMA uses these new powers to keep that technology open before it, too, is intermediated.
To deliver on this, however, there are many issues to be addressed. Your Lordships will no doubt come up with many others; we have already heard a list from the noble Lord, Lord Bassam, who will be pleased to know that there are many coincident issues. I will give a short list before I end of the issues that we will be keeping an eye on: ensuring that the Bill no longer gifts to strategic market status players the opportunity to challenge DMU decisions on the basis of lack of evidence, which means looking at the five-year view that is required; securing the role of judicial review and making sure it is not eroded; strengthening the leveraging principle that denies third-party developers revenue; understanding the Government’s position on data and information-sharing; clarifying how the final-offer mechanism would work in practice; probing the proportionality tests brought in via the latest amendments; challenging the changes to the definition of “counter- vailing benefit”, which also came through the amendments; enabling those with content to be paid properly; and allowing smaller businesses a voice and an ability to bring claims and, where possible, be awarded exemplary damages.
This Bill is a weighty tome, but it has a vital role in shaping the architecture and landscape in which the future digital economy will be built. It will help establish how the value of this economy is created and distributed. It will influence how easy or hard it is for challengers and disrupters to enter the market. Our job, therefore, will be to ensure that the CMA and DMU have the powers they need, but, more than that, our job is to articulate the cross-party ambition we have for this direction of travel and to launch the DMU with our overwhelming support to maximise its success.
The apparent growth in terms of increased demand that comes with planned obsolescence is not sustainable growth. It does not add to people’s quality of life. In fact, it impoverishes consumers and wastes resources, depleting us of the critical minerals we will rely on and need more of in the future. It also creates huge problems of waste disposal.
Globally and nationally, we need to do more to protect both consumers and natural resources by extending product lifecycles. The most recent research from the UN-sponsored but industry-compiled Global E-waste Monitor showed that the UK produces 1.6 million tonnes of electronic and electrical waste each year. This is the second highest per capita amount of waste globally. The UK really needs to do better in terms of expanding our right to repair.
The measures that we have introduced to date have been very limited, focusing on manufacturers of certain larger electrical appliances being required to take very limited steps to make repairing the items easier for consumers. While the UK languishes at the bottom end of the league tables in respect of the quantities of electronic waste that we generate, other countries are racing ahead. The European Parliament just last month voted overwhelmingly in support of the consumer’s right to repair, which proposes banning built-in obsolescence. Three US states are now passing similar legislation.
The Government are aware of the problem. They said in their cross-departmental plan, Maximising Resources, Minimising Waste, that they are considering broadening the existing right to repair requirements under the 2010 ecodesign regulations and Schedule 7 to the Environment Act, to include a wider range of electrical products. Given that the Bill provides the ideal opportunity to do this and, at the same time, strengthen the existing provision to make them work better for consumers, why are there no provisions in the Bill on this area? There is widespread public support for what is proposed. A recent poll, carried out by YouGov, found that 85% of the public support expanding the UK’s right to repair regulations to cover all consumer groups.
I hope very much that the Minister might be able to meet and discuss before Committee how a right to repair could be best integrated into the legislation before us. It is an opportunity for the Government to follow through on their commitment to protect consumers and match or exceed the ambition shown elsewhere in the world. By doing so, they would kickstart a shift to a more circular economy, reduce waste and protect consumers from costly and unnecessary expenditure.
One key issue for me is the appeals standard, because it is vital that the regulator has the opportunity to take on big tech, reach judgments and levy fines. I know from my time as the Telecoms Minister, working closely with Ofcom, that an appeal on the merits was a gift to the big companies and a burden on the regulator. It wildly extended the time in which a proper conclusion could be reached, it cost huge amounts of money and the firepower that could be deployed against the regulator, in terms of the quantity of lever-arch files, was something to behold. So, it is quite right that we have judicial review as the appeals standard in the Bill—which I think only adds to everybody’s confusion as to why the Government appear to have muddied the waters.
The great opportunity, obviously, of a Second Reading debate is to raise these issues, to explore them in Committee and to give the Government ample time to explain why these changes have been made and why they think they are the right ones, because I obviously approach it with an open mind. For example, if there is going to be a merits appeal on fines resulting from an adjudication, that may work provided it is clearly limited, effectively, to the quantum of the fine and no more. Nevertheless, I would still like to know why this slightly confusing change has been made from a simple JR standard throughout the process. Then—and it has already been raised by both opposition Front Benches—there is the idea of proportionality in the JR appeal standard and imposing conduct requirements. Some people say that this, in effect, creates a new appeals standard of JR-plus: again, this is very confusing. It would be much better to keep it simple and straightforward, because, goodness knows, those big companies have enough resources to tie the regulator up in knots without the Government, perhaps unintentionally, giving them a helping hand.
There are numerous other, smaller points within this framework of how the investigative process works which are important to highlight. They have been highlighted, as I am sure noble Lords are aware, by a number of organisations and campaign groups that wish to bring them to our attention. These include the consultation rights for challenger tech firms to be involved from the very beginning of a CMA process to avoid the circumvention of any solutions by strengthening the leveraging principle, so that, in effect, big tech cannot extract rents by using a different method. We have already heard, as well, about the countervailing benefits exemption—the ability for companies to argue that they are benefiting the consumer; and the removal of the word “indispensable”, which I understand is a clear legal term and therefore has a slew of case law on which the regulator could rely, again causes more confusion. My overwhelming message to the Government is that they have got it absolutely right in applying the JR principle; why are they therefore setting these slightly confusing mini changes throughout the process, because they do not really add up?
I also want to talk about a separate issue. I am sure, looking around the Chamber at some of those who are due to speak, that subscriptions will come up. I hugely support the idea that it should be as easy as possible, in a digital age, to cancel a subscription. I remember well once taking out a subscription to an online publication because I wanted to read a particular article and then, when I wanted to cancel the subscription, there was literally no way of doing it—it was a US magazine. Luckily, I knew the chief executive, so I found myself ringing him and begging him to allow me to cancel it: that cannot be the right way.
We all know, with our iPhones, that it is only recently that they have changed the way we can cancel subscriptions on an iPhone. It is, I am afraid, a truism that many companies that offer subscription products have an incredible imagination when it comes to making it as difficult as possible to navigate your way out. Most people should be confident enough about their product to know that they will keep their consumers if they continue to provide a fantastic product, and they will lose them if they do not.
Let me, however, completely contradict myself by asking the Minister—he knows what is coming—to exempt charities from the rules that are coming in the Bill. The Bill treats charitable membership, as I am sure he is aware, as a commercial transaction rather than a donation. That means that memberships or subscriptions would have to be refundable, and it means that charities cannot claim gift aid on the subscription, because gift aid applies only to donations which cannot be refunded.
Numerous charities have contacted me and, I am sure, other noble Lords, including very well-known ones such as the National Trust, the Zoological Society of London and the Royal Horticultural Society—you cannot say no to the Royal Horticultural Society—and Tate finds itself in the same basket. The changes would put pressure on Tate’s budget—I will not read out the cost it has estimated—and therefore could force the Government to look at their grant in aid for not just Tate but many other museums. It would have deep implications for Tate’s ability to fulfil its public service. As well as the financial costs, there would be huge additional bureaucratic burdens.
As I am sure we are all aware, charities are calling for charitable membership organisations to be included in the list of exemptions. For example, Tate is already regulated by DCMS and there are exemptions in the Bill for suppliers of services regulated by Ofcom. In the other place, the Minister introduced an amendment excluding the lottery as having charitable ends and already being regulated elsewhere. Surely, something similar should apply to other charities too. Have the impacts on charitable memberships been considered, in particular the pressures on national museums and their grant in aid allocations? If an exemption is applicable to the lottery as being already regulated and having charitable good, why does it not apply to museums and other charitable membership organisations?
In the digital age, people’s consumption of news has moved dramatically online. Ofcom’s 2021 report showed that 45% of UK adults got their news through social media sites. The number must be much greater now. Much of this is posted by users and viewed on platforms without reference or redirection to the publishers’ websites. The tech companies have their own curated news sites, such as Google’s news showcase and Facebook news, which aggregate news from a wide variety of sites. An article from an extreme magazine can sit alongside FT journalism and the reader be none the wiser. All this is damaging for the brands of the legacy media. Most news publishers have moved online, but the combination of falling advertising revenue and the tech companies’ free use of their news—at best giving minimal remuneration for their provision of it—has led to considerable cost-cutting and redundancy.
There are a few glowing exceptions in America. When Mark Thompson was CEO of the New York Times he invested massively in journalism, and the company is managing to make a profit from digital subscriptions. But to compound the exploitation of media companies, artificial intelligence is also using journalistic content as a free database for training its large language models. An academic paper published recently found that the greatest source of data for OpenAI’s LLMs came from the New York Times. The BBC ranked second, with its content providing 1.6% of the total database, and the Guardian closely followed with 1.5%. This content is so valuable for AI training because the data is of high value and original. Most importantly, it is taken from the publishers by the AI firms for free.
It is not surprising that the exploitation of the media publishers by the tech companies is having a devastating effect. In the last 17 years, more than 271 print titles have gone out of business, and goodness knows how many have become freesheets, sacked their journalists, withdrawn from covering local councils and courts, and mainly publish press releases. Reach plc, one of the biggest publishers of local news, recently announced 450 redundancies, including 320 editorial roles. That was its third round of cuts in 2023 alone, bringing the total number of jobs at risk to more than 1,000. The trend is accelerating.
The power imbalance between tech companies and publishers means that the former are not prepared to move much to reduce their dominance of the digital ad market, provide proportionate remuneration for the use of journalistic content or give publishers more control over how their content is used and provenanced. So I greatly welcome the final offer mechanism and the conduct requirement process set up in the Bill. The threat of the final arbitration by the regulator of two offers of remuneration is obviously a backstop, and I know that His Majesty’s Government hope that the CMA will never have to be in a position where it can make this decision.
However, my concern, and that of many people in the media, is that this beautifully thought out and carefully crafted CR process, which gives plenty of opportunity for the designated SMS companies to abide by a code of conduct, could take a year and a half to complete, if not longer, whereas in Australia it takes six months to come to arbitration. Meanwhile, many small publishers, which are already on the edge financially, will not be able to wait that long.
My fear is that the tech companies have so much to gain from the present situation that they will act in bad faith. In Canada, the Government estimated that the value of news content to Google was 300 million Canadian dollars. However, after exhaustive negotiations it ended up paying just 76 million Canadian dollars. I too ask the Minister to consider whether Clause 38(3), when the SMS company has breached an enforcement order, could be a more effective point in the process at which to pressurise the two sides to agree fair terms.
Like the noble Lords on the Front Bench, I am worried about the introduction of the Clause 29 countervailing benefits, which were inserted at the last minute before the Bill went to the other place. I imagine it was done at the instigation of tech company lobbyists, who will use it to delay the CR process yet further. In the other place, the well-established definition of “indispensable benefit”, set out in the Competition Act 1998 and tested through the courts, has been thrown out. The Bill now has a new definition of benefit. Thresholds are set out in the clause, but the courts will still have to decide what “benefit” now means. Can the Minister explain how that will clarify and speed up the effectiveness of this Bill? The Bill is supposed to be dealing with anti-competitive practices set up by the SMS company, but surely Clause 29 creates an opportunity to give extra lobbying power to companies that already have the most effective and well-paid lobbyists in the world.
I am also worried by Clause 114, on the control that the Secretary of State has over guidance to the CMA in setting up the machinery of the CR process, and then also having power over guidance on setting up an individual SMS process. The noble Baroness, Lady Stowell, fought hard, and with some success, during the passage of the Online Safety Act to try to limit Ministers’ control over Ofcom’s work. Political independence must be the mainstay of a successful regulator. However, this clause as drafted gives the Government endless time and power to send guidance back to the regulator for revision. I am convinced that this will cause unnecessary delays and politicisation of the CR process. At the least, I would like to see a time limit introduced for the Minister to accept CMA guidance proposals.
I am also concerned about powers given to tech companies further down in the Bill, in Part 4. Clause 259 sets out the duties of a trader on the cancellation of a contract, and they focus on providing various types of notices and dealing with potential overpayments by the consumer. Although the retrieval of personal data is covered under the GDPR, there is no provision for the retrieval of non-personal data, which might have been provided to the trader during the subscription period. This could be data about household fuel consumption, cloud-based Word documents, comments on social media or videos uploaded to video-sharing platforms.
The consumer might want the legal right to retrieve their data from the service before the subscription ends. More importantly, the trader might want to keep non-personal data and make it available to other users without the consent of the consumer. In my view, this is an omission that many people would be pleased to have rectified by an amendment to the Bill.
I too share the frustration of the noble Lord, Lord Vaizey, about the difficulty of ending subscriptions. An even more popular option to the Bill would be the introduction of an end-of-contract button labelled “terminate now” on the front page of digital services websites. Often it is hard to find the unsubscribe button on a website. On occasions it has taken me some time to burrow down through the layers of a site to find the unsubscribe button hidden away in a digital corner. German law provides for a compulsory button, which allows the consumer to enter all the essential information needed to end the contract—that would be a benefit to the customer.
This is a huge and complex Bill, and it has been a long time in its gestation. I am very pleased to see our country finally confronting the anti-competitive behaviour of the big digital players and protecting consumers for the long term.
Unless we face up to it, the free enterprise, pro-competition settlement, which has brought so many welfare benefits in recent decades, will be put at risk. Like us, all the democracies are groping their way towards addressing these challenges, to which the noble Lord, Lord Fox, also alluded. The Bill is at least a start but, none the less, the improvements to competition and consumer protection policy proposed will make only a small contribution to the much broader intellectual challenge I am trying to set out.
The Bill is at least intended as a reboot of the CMA’s legislative base. It largely provides it, and it has the potential to improve Britain’s economic performance a great deal.
Of course, it is scarcely surprising that I support the Bill. Much of it draws on the detailed proposals that I put to the Secretary of State nearly five years ago in response to his instructions that, as incoming chairman of the CMA—and I am more or less quoting—I try to shake the CMA up, raise its profile, and advise him on what, if any, improvements to the statutory base might be needed. I was told to get on with it and come back to him in six months, which I duly did.
What did I find? In a nutshell, I found highly motivated and high-quality staff—among the very best in public service. I found good, sometimes outstanding, work being done in two of the CMA’s five major areas of statutory responsibility—mergers and anti-trust—but, in varying degrees, a neglect of the other three: markets, advocacy and consumer protection. Internally, they had become the CMA’s poor relations. I also found a lack of boldness at the top and some substandard governance. Frankly, this is no more than we have seen in recent years in many other regulators.
I reported this to the then Secretary of State, but I told him that we needed to get on with the legislative improvements anyway, particularly on consumer protection and digital. I also said that we would need other improvements for it to be effective: a change in mindset at the top, and a much higher profile taken on behalf of the consumer by the CMA, with much better communication to a wider public. I also said that work was needed to develop a deeper understanding of the state of competition in the UK economy as a whole, and that this needed to be used to target the CMA’s workstreams. Virtually none of this work was being undertaken when I arrived at the CMA.
As far as I can tell, the three problems that I outlined still persist to varying degrees, so it is not just the legislation but, to some degree, the CMA’s approach to implementing its statutory remit that needs a reboot. If we do not secure that, the CMA will not deliver what we expect of it and hope for it. Even more concerningly, the growing sentiment of many of the public that they are victims of a rip-off economy, run for the benefit of the few and certainly not for them, will develop further. That is why the later parts of the Bill, particularly those improving consumer protection, are at least as important, although perhaps less glamorous to talk about, as the digital measures in Part 1.
My impression is that the new chairman and the new CEO are on the case. They both recognise the need for an organisational reboot. They will need our support in that. In any case, these problems are not entirely a matter for them. The CMA has only been responding to the signals that Parliament and others have put before it. Faced with those signals, many of us would have done the same. Parliament needs to send much better signals. In particular, we need to develop scrutiny tools that can get deep into what really goes on in the CMA. It needs to be rewarded with praise and support for improvements in its strategic approach when they come. There have been quite a few recently; I will not list them, for the sake of brevity. Of course Parliament should also flag up the CMA’s shortcomings, but it should always do so on the basis of detailed evidence.
To do that, Parliament will need to develop much more technical expertise than is currently available to it. It needs a specialist group—probably answerable to a dedicated Select Committee and with some of the characteristics of the NAO, but much smaller—that can get into the detail of the CMA’s working methods. By doing so, Parliament can help to shape the CMA’s decision-making framework and its wider public engagement, to which I alluded, just as the Treasury Committee has shaped that of the Bank of England and the FCA over the past decade.
One of the reasons that the Bank of England engages in public discourse and explanation of its role is that Parliament makes sure that it does, but that is currently not the case with the CMA. I asked to appear before the BEIS Select Committee when I was chairman and discovered that, when I appeared, it was the first time that any CMA chairman had ever appeared before it. They had simply evaded, avoided or had somehow been the subject of neglect by the BEIS Committee for many years. Of course the committee is extremely busy and has far too much to do, hence my suggestion for a specialist body. I said earlier that not only Parliament but the Government should act as an enabler of better scrutiny, and I have quite a number of suggestions for the Government but, rather than raise them now, I will try to press them in Committee.
I end with just one further remark. I have tried to put the legislation in a wider policy perspective, and I have lingered on the need for an institutional reboot of the CMA and the responsibility that we carry in Parliament and the Government to secure that reboot. But the CMA is becoming a repository for a good number of the Government’s smelly rats. It has been asked to monitor the internal market and has acquired responsibility for the highly politically sensitive topic of state aid, now travelling under the new name of the Subsidy Advice Unit. That is all before this huge Bill and the new big-ticket mergers that are coming its way post Brexit, which have recently been so controversial. With this Bill, we are going to empower the CMA with huge new responsibilities even as it struggles to do a full job with its existing powers. Government offload is risking CMA overload.
Twenty-five years ago, we overloaded a new body, the Financial Services Authority, with new responsibilities. Offload from the Bank of England and from other institutions became overload at the FSA. It failed spectacularly a decade later. When it failed, it was carved up. We need to put in place the support and scrutiny here for the CMA to accompany this Bill that can give the CMA better protection against such an outcome in the years ahead.
Once the Bill had been published and introduced to the Commons in the summer, my committee held hearings on Parts 1 and 2. I shall speak on only those parts today, but I have been interested to hear noble Lords cover other issues, to which we will no doubt return in Committee. I am grateful for all the briefings that I have received on all parts of the Bill.
I come back to the focus of my remarks. Overall, we as a committee found the Bill’s objectives and principles to be sound and a good basis for regulation. In our subsequent formal letter to the Secretary of State, we highlighted three important measures that we considered proportionate. My noble friend the Minister acknowledged that that is what we said, but he has not acknowledged something else we said: that these measures should not be diluted during the passage of the Bill. The three measures that we highlighted were the appeals process, the countervailing benefits exemption and the leveraging principle.
We knew from our evidence sessions that the big tech firms would lobby hard for changes in these areas. When all is said and done, they are successful businesses that will understandably fight hard to retain their positions. So, in the face of considerable pressure from them over the past few months, there was some relief when the government amendments tabled on Report in the Commons were less extensive than many had feared—but they are changes none the less.
Not only would any further dilution to these measures be unacceptable; the government amendments that have been made deserve proper scrutiny and debate to resolve the uncertainty that they have created. What I mean by that is that, in two or three years’ time, when the Competition Appeal Tribunal is considering an appeal, we need to be sure that judges will be in no doubt as to what the Government and Parliament intended by this legislation. We must avoid delays and outcomes that undermine the purpose of this Bill.
In his opening remarks, my noble friend the Minister anticipated some of my remarks. As he said today, and as the Government have shown in other ways, the Government have been at pains to stress that none of these changes affect the substance of the legislation. I am grateful for the reassurances that my noble friend has been able to offer. However, the fear is that these changes create loopholes for those with the deepest pockets to protract and extend a legal claim. We may require the publication of some new Explanatory Notes to provide that clarity and certainty. From noble Lords’ comments in today’s debate, I feel that we may need to table some amendments to at least probe and get firmly on the record the clarity that we need.
I will explain what I am talking about, which has already been highlighted by others. It is good that judicial review remains the procedure for any appeals against CMA decisions. But can we be sure that the new merits procedure for large firms to appeal against financial penalties will not lead to the CMA’s findings on conduct being reopened? My noble friend Lord Vaizey raised that question.
Indeed, why has the requirement for the CMA to ensure that its decisions are “proportionate” been spelled out in the Bill, when it is already a fundamental requirement of it as a regulator? Why has the decision been made to swap the word “indispensable” for a new form of words in the context of countervailing benefits? As we have heard, “indispensable” has precedent in case law and is well understood by the courts.
The Government have also added a new requirement that any guidance produced by the CMA in relation to Part 1 of the Bill should be subject to Secretary of State approval. I understand why the Government want to ensure sufficient oversight of the CMA, given the very substantial additional powers provided by this legislation, but my main concern with this change is that it will give the big tech firms another chance to lobby and delay. If this new requirement is to stay, we should at the very least include a short deadline in the Bill for the Secretary of State to grant her approval.
There are two other important principles for us to keep in mind here. First, the UK’s new digital competition regime is considered better than Europe’s because it is more flexible, but it will work only if the most dominant players participate in the process from the start to help the CMA decide best how strategic markets should work so that, in the end, all players get fair terms. The word “participatory” has been coined to describe this approach; “co-operative” would have done just as well. The point is that we must avoid deterring the kind of behaviour from big tech that is critical to the regime’s success.
The second principle—this is where I come to some of the comments that were made by my erstwhile noble friend Lord Tyrie—is accountability to Parliament. When it comes to the strategic oversight of the CMA and the work of its Digital Markets Unit, parliamentarians have an important role. Some noble Lords may recall that I raised the importance of accountability and parliamentary oversight during the passage of the Online Safety Bill. My committee, and the Online Safety Bill’s pre-legislative committee, both recommended a Joint Committee of both Houses be established to oversee digital regulation, because of the increasing power and remit we are giving to regulators. The Government, though, did not respond with any enthusiasm. We must return to this, and I thought that other speakers today might raise similar points.
This House passed a Motion only yesterday to establish a new committee of your Lordships’ House to oversee financial regulators. This was news to me yesterday, but I understand that it came about because of a government amendment to the Financial Services and Markets Bill. My noble friend Lord Tyrie suggested something different from what I have in mind, but the creation of this new committee sets a precedent, which is worth further consideration and study.
I support the Bill. It allows the big firms to continue to operate and innovate while ensuring that they do not use unfair tactics to suppress competition and stifle new challengers before they have had a chance to get going. In other words, it creates the level playing field that is critical to effective and fair competition. Ultimately, that is good for the UK economy, businesses of all kinds and sizes, and British consumers. I hope the Bill will pass swiftly because, as others have said, it is long overdue.