1: Before Clause 1, insert the following new Clause—
“Purpose(1) The purpose of this Act is to—(a) cede sovereignty over the Chagos Archipelago,(b) dissolve the British Indian Ocean Territory,(c) provide for the continued British administration of Diego Garcia, and(d) limit the citizenship rights of the Chagossians.(2) Nothing in this Act grants or recognises that Mauritius has sovereignty over the Chagos Archipelago.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment seeks to add a purpose clause to the Bill to demonstrate more clearly the Government’s intentions in bringing forward this legislation.
My Lords, as my noble friend Lady Noakes said at Second Reading, this Bill is right up there in contention for the title of “worst Bill of this Session”. It is a surrender Bill and the Government should be ashamed of having brought it before your Lordships’ House. The sparsely populated Labour Benches—congratulations to the three Members who have turned up—illustrate how unpopular it is on all sides. We now begin the detailed scrutiny to seek to improve the Bill and to see just how far the Government are willing to move, if at all, to deliver a better deal for the British people and, crucially, for the Chagossians.
My Amendment 1 would put a clear statement of the Bill’s purposes on the face of the Bill. In essence, it is a clear and faithful description of the effects of the provisions of the Bill. It delivers clarity. The Bill does cede sovereignty over the islands, seek to dissolve the British Indian Ocean Territory after 200 years, provide for the continued British administration of Diego Garcia and limit the citizenship rights of the Chagossians.
Strangely, the Bill is completely silent on who shall have sovereignty over the Chagos Archipelago in the future, which is against the precedent set in previous Bills where territory has been conceded. By bringing this Bill, the Government are saying that presumably all these changes are good things that they are justly proud of. I therefore see no reason why the Government should resist this amendment on the grounds of fact. The Minister always seeks to be constructive in her work in your Lordships’ House, so I am sure she would not resist an amendment that delivers essential legislative clarity simply for the sake of delivering an unamended Bill at the end of the scrutiny process.
Against this context, should the Government oppose my amendment we will be led to assume that the Government are in fact embarrassed by the reality of their legislation being set out in simple terms. If they are indeed proud of the Bill, they will have no cause to be embarrassed and should accept the amendment.
I am grateful to the noble Lord for giving way. Given that the Bill is to give effect to the treaty, I wonder whether the noble Lord could say a little more, because in introducing his amendment he did not, about how his amendment interacts with Article 1 of the treaty that Parliament has ratified?
It has been ratified; Parliament has ratified the treaty. It has not been brought into effect, but the treaty, which states that Mauritius is sovereign, has been ratified by Parliament. That is the treaty that the United Kingdom has entered into, and which Parliament has ratified. What is the interaction between that and proposed new subsection (2) of the noble Lord’s amendment, which says:
“Nothing in this Act grants … that Mauritius has sovereignty”?
He is seeking to have an amendment to a Bill which overrides a treaty commitment that Parliament has ratified, is he not?
It is a statement of fact that this legislation gives up British sovereignty of the Chagos Archipelago, but it does not say who should have sovereignty—the treaty is a separate matter. The treaty cannot come into effect until the legislation is approved, as I said.
The noble Lord is just factually wrong. The treaty has been ratified—it is now a treaty. His amendment is seeking to alter the treaty. Article 1 of the treaty, which Parliament has ratified, says that Mauritius is sovereign over the Chagos Archipelago in its entirety, including Diego Garcia. Is he seeking for Parliament now to try to change the treaty which it has ratified?
I am saying that we have every right to oppose this legislation. The legislation has come as a result of the treaty that the Government have agreed. We opposed the treaty; we think it is unnecessary. We also oppose the legislation, and we are entitled to table amendments to it because, as the Government have stated, the treaty cannot legally come into effect until the legislation is approved. I beg to move.
My Lords, Amendments 8 and 9 are in my name. Amendment 8 says that the treaty shall not come into force until a binding case in an international court requires us to cede sovereignty over the Chagos Islands. Amendment 9 requires the Government to spell out their legal position on why they believe such a ruling to be possible, let alone likely.
The whole basis of the Government’s case is that
“without this deal … within weeks we could face losing legal rulings, and within just a few years the base would become inoperable”.—[Official Report, Commons, 22/5/25; col. 1284.]
At Second Reading, the possibility of such a ruling was contested not just by me but by several other noble Lords, on the basis that there is no international court which can rule against our sovereignty in this way. Yet Ministers failed to address that issue and those arguments. Even noble Lords who have held the highest office in the FCDO—mandarins of our diplomatic corps who tenaciously defended this deal—failed to answer or address the question of which court could reach a binding judgment against us.
First, everyone acknowledges that the ruling of the International Court of Justice was purely advisory and not binding on us. Secondly, it was based on resolutions of the UN General Assembly which themselves are not legally binding; nor have they ever been endorsed by the Security Council. Thirdly, when Britain signed up to the ICJ, it specifically precluded disputes between the UK and present or past members of the Commonwealth. So the ruling was triply non-binding, and the ECJ cannot rule against us on this in future because it is a dispute with a Commonwealth country.
Ministers have chosen to ignore these arguments and not dispute them, although it is not clear that they were aware of this situation when they plunged into these negotiations. I rather suspect they were not. They have tacitly acknowledged the truth of these arguments by moving on to assert that the tribunal of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea could rule against Britain and in favour of Mauritius on the issue of sovereignty. As the noble Lord, Lord Murray, spelled out in forensic detail, the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea has no such power. Britain has invoked Article 298 of the convention, which excludes military matters, so it is outside its wherewithal.
How far back is the noble Lord going to go in his historic examination of British Governments? Is his position that the British Government should never ever cede sovereignty to any former colony? I am thinking of Australia, South Africa or Canada. How far is he going back in saying that it is absolutely wrong to cede sovereignty?
If the noble Lord wants me to go back further, I think it is a shame that we did not follow the advice of Edmund Burke and reach an agreement with the American colonists to give them independence earlier on.
But we are not talking about giving independence to the inhabitants of the Chagos Islands; we are talking about giving the Chagos Islands to a country which has never ruled them and is 2,000 kilometres away. To do that simply on the basis of long-standing Foreign Office doctrine is, surely, unwise. I hope your Lordships’ House will consider seriously these amendments because, if they are passed, we will know once and for all whether the Government have a strong case or not. If they are rejected, we can be certain that they do not have a strong case for giving away these islands.
Before the noble Lord sits down, I wonder if he could correct some remarks he has been making about people he has given a Chinese name to. I am not quite sure why he thinks that that is so telling. The arguments advanced were drawn from the testimony of Sir Christopher Greenwood, a former British member of the International Court of Justice. If he read his testimony—which, of course, is all available in the report from the International Agreements Committee of this House, which is being totally ignored by him and the noble Lord, Lord Callanan —he would see what the case is, which was set out very fully. It was set out not by the FCDO but by Sir Christopher Greenwood.
I am certainly very happy to mention that the noble Lord himself mentioned Sir Christoper Greenwood’s testimony in his speech, but his primary reasoning was that we should accept even purely advisory rulings of foreign courts in order that we be able better to uphold the rules-based international order. I remind him that the chairman of the committee that heard that evidence said in the debate that, although the committee was divided on the evidence it heard, he was inclined to agree with the arguments I had put forward.
My Lords, I shall speak briefly to Amendment 1 by the noble Lord, Lord Callanan. I take it that he was not entirely serious when he dreamt up this particular innovation, which is right at the start of the Bill, whereby the purpose of the Bill should be presented in the way that the opponents of the Bill would find most attractive. It is a novel constitutional idea. In his reasons for the purposes of the Act, he has included only things that obviously he agrees with, but he has not included, for example, that this will secure the base for the UK and the USA for the next hundred years. There are arguments for and against, as there with any piece of legislation, but to think that you should state at the beginning of a Bill that the purpose of the legislation is what the Opposition would like to see enacted is novel. The only parallel I can think of would be if the sundry privatisation measures that were passed by the Thatcher Government had said, “The purpose of this Act is to sell off at knock-down prices the assets of the British people”. I do not know whether the noble Lord, Lord Callanan, would have been in favour of that kind of constraint when that legislation was going through. I do not take this as a serious amendment, and I am sure he will not press it to a vote—it might be fun if he did, but we will see anyway.
One part of the noble Lord’s proposed new clause that is contentious—well, a lot of it is contentious—on which I would certainly like to hear more from my noble friends on the Front Bench is paragraph (d), which suggests that the Bill will
“limit the citizenship rights of the Chagossians”.
I do not think the Bill as it stands does that, and I want to be clear about that, but I think it raises an issue which we will come to later in the Bill, which is of concern to a number of us here, about what further rights for the Chagossians are appropriate, given the appalling way in which—we are all agreed—they were treated when they were basically thrown out of their own island.
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Amendments 8 and 9 in the name of my noble friend Lord Lilley put the Government’s fundamental motivations under scrutiny. I certainly will not presume to make my noble friend’s argument for him before he has spoken to his amendments himself, but the question of whether a court exists that could deliver a binding and enforceable judgment on the sovereignty of the Chagos Archipelago is essential to the fundamental purpose of the Bill. I am not aware of such a court, and without such a court the Government’s argument for the necessity of the Bill falls apart.
As we all know, this Bill is not necessary or essential. It may have been framed as such by the international lawyer friends of the Prime Minister and the Attorney-General. It may be the deep conviction of the Foreign Office officials who seem determined to act against Britain’s interests on this issue. It may even be the view of the Attorney-General. But ultimately it is a political decision of this Government. Ministers should not hide behind legal advice. They should come to the House with a positive message of whatever benefits they think the Bill provides to the British people and the Chagossians. That is what normally happens with any other Bill before this House.
While we are debating the subject of international law, as I am sure we will be, I would like to ask the Minister a question. I draw her attention to a 1967 international agreement concerning the availability for defence purposes of the British Indian Ocean Territory. This is an agreement between the United Kingdom and the United States in which we agreed that the British Indian Ocean Territory
“shall remain under United Kingdom sovereignty”.
Do the Government accept that their proposals to cede sovereignty over the territory to Mauritius would involve a breach of their obligations in this treaty? They are always lecturing us on the importance of abiding by international agreements and treaties, so I assume they would not wish to be in breach of an international treaty. I would be grateful if the Minister could tell me what they are proposing to do about that international agreement.
Amendment 21 is designed to improve parliamentary scrutiny of the Government’s actions on Chagos by requiring a ministerial Statement to Parliament when the treaty comes into effect. We know that the Commons were, in fact, denied a substantive debate on ratification, despite long precedent under CRaG requiring that debates should indeed be granted. We know the Government are likely to press ahead with the treaty irrespective of any opposition from these Benches, but their conviction to deliver a deal that is good for no one but Mauritian taxpayers should not mean that we have less parliamentary scrutiny. In fact, as I have said before, if they are so proud of their record, I am sure they would be delighted to come to Parliament to talk about exactly how they are pressing this issue.
Finally, I have indicated my intention to oppose the Motion that Clause 1 stand part of the Bill. In my view, this is a bad Bill that should rightly be consigned to the pile of other uncommenced legislation. If it lacked a commencement clause, I think that would be a very sensible outcome.
Before I give way to the noble Lord, I give Ministers advance notice that I intend to degroup Amendments 14, 64 and 84, and I believe my noble friend Lord Lilley will add Amendment 25 to that, on the subject of a referendum. We will take them out of the next group and talk about them when we get to them. I give way to the noble Lord.
Even when the Philippines brought a case about artificial islands built in the South China Sea, ITLOS ruled that it cannot rule on the sovereignty of the area around those artificial islands—that is not within its purview. It can rule whether the islands are artificial or real and therefore have some territorial waters or not, but not whose they are and who they belong to.
We wonder why the Government got into this position. If the court has no power to rule on matters of sovereignty and the UK insists on exercising its rights under Article 298 of the convention, it just cannot do so. The Government’s silence on all these arguments must be deemed tacit acceptance that they are true. If there is some court or some hidden clause in the agreements that none of us knows about which overrides the points I have made, Amendment 9 will be no problem for them because they can implement it. According to them, within weeks, an adverse ruling will occur in a court which is binding on us. Since they have quite a long time before they can complete even these processes, we will get to know the answer to that conclusion. Alternatively, they could accept Amendment 9 and spell out the legal basis on which they believe an international court—which international court, why and on what grounds—could find against us.
If the Government reject this amendment, we will know that they do not even believe their own case. We will be forced to conclude that they are following, wittingly or unwittingly, the long-standing view of the Foreign Office—expressed very eloquently by the noble Lord, Lord Hannay, in the Second Reading debate—that, unless we accept even an advisory ruling, we will not be able to persuade other countries to accept legally binding rulings. That is perhaps how diplomats think, but it ought not to be how this House thinks.
We ought to reject that doctrine and be very cautious about allowing ourselves to be driven along by long-standing arguments of the Foreign Office. Thinking back, it was very keen on us giving up the Falklands to the Argentines, so it is perhaps no surprise to find that it is very keen nowadays on us giving up Chagos to Mauritius. But none of them—and none of the great mandarins who spoke in the debate—spelled out why we are legally obliged to do so. It was all on the basis that the Foreign Office position would be easier to maintain logically and would be more persuasive with Governments that, otherwise, we were recklessly following.
My specific query, which if my noble friend cannot answer at the moment I would certainly like to hear later on in subsequent amendments, is that I still cannot understand why the military requires the whole of the island of Diego Garcia without any other settlement on it other than what is required for military purposes. I have asked that question of Ministers. The last time I asked my honourable friend Stephen Doughty, the Minister, he answered by saying,
“it is impossible for that to take place”—
that is, to have permanent settlement of Chagossians on Diego Garcia—
“operationally. It is not suitable or appropriate”.
I am very fond of the Minister, but just saying something is not suitable or appropriate, without any further clarification or explanation, is not good enough, as far as I am concerned.
The best I have got so far is to be told that, operationally, it is very difficult if you have civilians alongside the military, and it is much more convenient to the military if they have it all to themselves. In response to that, I can say only that repeatedly, in all parts of the world, including in my former constituency, civilian workers at a base quite happily live adjacent to the base and do a job that is of mutual benefit to the military and the civilian workers.
I think it would be a huge step forward to be able to say to the Chagossians—there may not be many who would want to do it—that those who would really like to settle in the land of their forefathers on Diego Garcia would be able to do that and work at the base or, if necessary, work in other activities as well. So far, I have not had a good argument against that happening, and I hope that at some stage during the passage of this Bill my noble friends can provide me with one.