Diego Garcia Military Base and British Indian Ocean Territory Bill

There has been much speculation in recent weeks about the state of the Diego Garcia treaty and the associated Bill, and—with your permission, Madam Deputy Speaker—I will take this opportunity to update the House.

We have debated at length the critical importance of the military base on Diego Garcia to the national security of the United Kingdom and that of our allies. The base allows us to project the full array of military capabilities in one of the most important regions for international stability and global trade. It is vital to the countering of terrorism and threats from state adversaries, and protects Britons at home and overseas.

As the House knows, the operation of the base has been under threat for decades. The Government inherited a situation in which there was no legal certainty for future operations, and the threat of the UK losing our ability to operate effectively for us and our allies was and remains real, as those on the Opposition Benches know full well. The status quo is untenable, and ignoring the situation would have been reckless and irresponsible. The previous Government knew that, which is why they opened negotiations with Mauritius, why they put sovereignty on the table, and why they had 11 rounds of talks and agreed the vast majority of the treaty. [Interruption.] I know the Conservatives do not want to hear this, but it would be better if we had some quiet and I could make the statement.

I am proud that this Government completed the process in May last year. The Diego Garcia treaty puts the base on a secure legal footing for the first time in decades. It gives us complete operational freedom, and puts in place important safeguards to protect the base from outside threats. In short, the treaty ensures the continued contribution of the base to UK national security, and to the security of our allies, for generations.

The Diego Garcia military base was founded as a jointly operated base by the UK and the United States. It is one of the foundation stones on which our close defence and security partnership was built. Of course, the previous Government knew that, which is why they took action to start the negotiations when they did. For that reason, the treaty to protect the base was negotiated in close co-ordination with the United States, under both this and the previous US Administration. The treaty was tested thoroughly at all levels of the United States system under two Administrations, and found to be robust.

Throughout this process, we have always been clear that we could not let the treaty enter into force without US support. We had that support when the treaty was signed, and we have had it consistently since. President Trump called it “very strong” and “powerful”. Secretary Rubio welcomed it as a “historic agreement” that

“secures the long-term, stable, and effective operation of the joint US-UK military facility at Diego Garcia”.

I call the shadow Foreign Secretary.

Let me start my remarks by saying that the Minister has done the right thing by coming to the House to give this statement, rather than being dragged here through an urgent question, and by stating the factual and accurate position that the treaty will not go forward. However, once again he has been left carrying the can for the Prime Minister’s epic failure of statecraft. Labour’s Chagos surrender has been wrong from the start, and instead of making excuses, the right thing to do would have been to tear up this dreadful treaty and commit to keeping Chagos British. The news that the ratification of the treaty is now done and dusted is a humiliation for the Prime Minister and this Government.

Let us be clear: the surrender treaty is Labour’s mess. As the House knows, within days of coming to office, the Prime Minister’s top foreign policy priority was to exceed the wishes of his left-wing lawyer friends and surrender the Chagos islands, at an enormous cost to British taxpayers. He met the Mauritian Prime Minister, appointed Jonathan Powell to conclude the negotiations, and rushed and blundered into the treaty. The Government inexplicably announced it to the world just before Mauritius went into an election. When the Mauritian Government with whom they agreed the deal got kicked out, the new Mauritian Government—guess what?—demanded more concessions from Britain, and Labour rolled over and got eaten for breakfast. The Government put one of our most important defence and security assets at risk. They compromised the special relationship with the United States, they ignored and betrayed the wishes of the Chagossian community, and they were prepared to hand over £35 billion of taxpayers’ money to lease back a land that we own. Then they went ahead with the deal before receiving the critical exchange of notes from the United States.

Having been to the United States recently, I am not in the least surprised that the Administration have sought to stop the deal, because they can see what we have been saying for a long time. It is the Conservatives who have opposed this Labour deal at every turn. While Labour has spectacularly failed to defend British sovereignty and Reform has gone from suggesting that we sell the Chagos islands to the US to suggesting that we give them to the Maldives, the Conservative party has been effectively scrutinising and opposing this surrender at every step of the way, to make sure that we keep Chagos British and that we protect our sovereignty and our taxpayers.

I will start by thanking the right hon. Lady, who has rightly scrutinised many different aspects of this matter over many months. I have come dutifully to answer many questions, I have met with her privately, and the subject has been scrutinised by many Committees. It was right to update the House today on these developments, and I am glad that she acknowledges that point.

Of course, it is not for the Government simply to choose easy paths. It is for the Government to choose the right path: the path that is in the interests of Britain and our national security, and that of our allies. At the heart of this is a fundamental question. The Opposition know that there is a huge challenge. They knew that there was a problem, which is why they started the process. Throughout all the exchanges we have had, they have never been able to answer that simple question.

I cannot recall a time when we have seen so much misinformation and, quite frankly, negligent disregard for the national interests and security of the British people. It is regrettable that the official Opposition and indeed the Reform party—I see that only one of its Members has turned up today—have been at the heart of this. Of course, they will say that this is just politics and that the Government should be thick-skinned, but quite frankly the British public deserve better.

The national interest is what drives this Government and our national security, as the Conservatives well knew, which is why they started the process. We have seen frankly ludicrous disinformation about the operations of the base, about the genuine threats that it faced, and about the security provisions in the treaty, which of course we strengthened. We also seen it about the costs: no matter how often they give false figures, that does not make them any more accurate. We have also seen it about the views of Chagossians—I accept that they are wide and varied but, conveniently, the Opposition always ignore the views of the significant numbers of Chagossian communities and groups who feel very differently about the treaty and have supported it since the start. Indeed, we have seen it about the protection of the environment.

I thank the Minister for working over many months with our allies on this issue to reach agreement in our national interest and theirs. He has remained consistent on this issue and has given many updates on it. I wish I could say the same about the Opposition. Their short memory, their flip-flopping and their complete disregard for national security are very similar to the position they have got themselves in with Iran—very, very similar. They are laughing in the face of real threats to our national security.

I am actually quite concerned, because it seems to me that the status quo is not in our national interest. What does being without a treaty mean for the long-term access to the base, for us and for our allies?

My hon. Friend sets out the fundamental issue: the risks to the operation of the base, which the Opposition knew all along. That is why they started the process, to which we have responded with this treaty, which protects our security and that of our allies. I will not speculate about the coming of those risks, but we know that we need to put things on a secure footing. We know that the treaty was the best way to do that. We know that this was agreed under two Administrations across the United States in an inter-agency process. We continue to believe that it is the right way forward, and we will announce our business in the usual way.

I call the Liberal Democrat spokesperson.

I genuinely thank the Minister for his statement, for advance sight of it, and for his long engagement with me on these issues.

The process for negotiating this treaty has been, I am sorry to say, utterly shambolic, from its beginning under the previous Government to its demise under this one. [Interruption.] From a sedentary position, an hon. and gallant Gentleman says, “Why did we finish it?” I am sorry to tell him that they did not. There is no evidence at all that this statement was finished by the previous Government.

As this Government shelve the legislation, they must now reckon with the litany of failures that have plagued the process, specifically their inability to secure fundamental legal guarantees from the US through the necessary exchange of letters; their reluctance to adopt measures that would enable genuine parliamentary scrutiny over the planned vast sums of money that would be sent to the Government of Mauritius; and their wilful reluctance to work with or to secure the rights of Chagossians, including but not limited to the right of return to the Chagos islands.

Aside from the Government’s apparent ignorance of the legal prerequisites for the passage of the treaty, the most objectionable aspect of the process has been the woeful engagement with the Chagossian community. The British state has long denied Chagossians a meaningful say in their own future. The provisions of this treaty, shamefully, failed again to affirm those rights, so if the treaty ever does return to this House, the Government would do well to observe and understand the amendments tabled by the Liberal Democrats in the other place to secure genuine rights for Chagossians and help to buck the historical trend of that community being left out of decisions about its own future.

I have one very simple question for the Minister. Given that the Government have now abandoned their proposed deal with Mauritius over the Chagos islands, can the Foreign Secretary set out what this means in practice for the long-promised right of return for Chagossians? Will the Government now commit to supporting resettlement under continued UK sovereignty? If so, how does the Minister assess the implications of that return for the evidential and legal basis underpinning the 2019 International Court of Justice advisory opinion?

Order. I call the Minister.

I thank the hon. Member for his comments and for his continued engagement in good faith throughout the process. I can absolutely assure him that in due course we will return to the issues that he and his colleagues discussed with us and the concerns that they expressed in amendments in this place and the other House, but I have to reject his assumption that the process has somehow met its demise. It has not been abandoned. We have always been clear about the need for agreement on the US-UK exchange of notes. I refer the hon. Gentleman to the comments of my noble Friend Baroness Chapman in the other place on 18 November:

“Before the UK can ratify the treaty, we will need to do the following: pass both primary and secondary legislation, update the UK-US exchange of notes, and put in place agreements on the environment, maritime security and migration.”—[Official Report, House of Lords, 18 November 2025; Vol. 850, c. 713.]

We have always been clear about the processes that need to be followed in parallel. It is regrettable that there has been a delay and that we have run out of time in this parliamentary Session, but the facts have not changed as to the need for the treaty or the need for the processes and legal provisions to be put in place.

The hon. Gentleman rightly raises concerns about the Chagossians. He and I have discussed those concerns on a number of occasions. We have engaged extensively with the Chagossian communities. There are a range of views in the community; there will be many Chagossians who will be deeply disappointed by the delay with the treaty, not least for the very reason to which he refers, which is that we believe that this is the best route, under Mauritius’s guidance, leading to resettlement. I re-emphasise our commitment to restarting, at an appropriate time, the heritage visits, which are so important. The hon. Gentleman will understand why the current situation does not allow that, but we will seek to do so at the earliest opportunity. We know how important it is, particularly for heritage reasons.

The test of bad legislation is always whether it contains carte blanche Henry VIII powers—in this case in a thin and flimsy Bill—that grant the Government the right to do anything they like with the legislation, even after it has passed. That made it a dog of a Bill, but now the Government have paused it—or returned it, or U-turned, or whatever they are calling it. The Chagossians’ rights lie at the heart of this matter, so can I take the Minister back to the statement he made about the Chagossians? He talked about them wanting to come to some conclusion about their ability to return to the islands. The BIOT Supreme Court ruled that section 9 of the British Indian Ocean Territory (Constitution) Order 2004, which barred the right of abode to Chagossians, was illegal, so why have the Government mounted an appeal against that, to ensure that it is illegal for them to go to their islands? Does he think the Chagossians have no right to go to the islands, or that they do have a right? Which is it?

The right hon. Gentleman is clearly familiar with the history, so he will know the judgments in the courts of England and Wales on the matter of the right of abode. I am not going to comment on ongoing legal proceedings, save to say that we were disappointed by the position that was taken. Our understanding is that the BIOT is appealing that judgment and we have taken an interest in that matter.

The Minister talks about convenient amnesia, but he did not go back to discuss what the previous Labour Government did. All the way back in 2008, Gordon Brown met Navinchandra Ramgoolam, when he was the Prime Minister of Mauritius for the first time, and agreed to establish a dialogue on the British Indian Ocean Territory. The first official meetings took place in January 2009—Wednesday the 14th, to be precise—and the topic of sovereignty was discussed. I appreciate that the Minister might not have the details to hand, so he is welcome to write to me, but will he outline exactly what discussions took place with the previous Government, up to the end of their time in 2010, that set the conditions for the subsequent ICJ appeal that Mauritius put in following that discussion?

I will happily write to the hon. Gentleman on that matter, but what I am absolutely clear about is that it was his Government who started the process of negotiations, under the former Foreign Secretary, the right hon. Member for Braintree (Sir James Cleverly), who conceded the principle of sovereignty and conceded a financial element, and did not put in place some of the key security provisions that we were able to secure in the negotiations. I will happily write to the hon. Gentleman.

The US navy began a blockade of Iran at 2 pm this afternoon. Has the US been granted permission by the British Government for the use of the deepwater port at Diego Garcia as a staging post for the imposition of that blockade?

The hon. Gentleman will understand that I am not going to comment on operational details from the Dispatch Box, but the Prime Minister has been absolutely clear about which requests from the United States have been acceded to and which ones have not. He answered an extensive statement on that this afternoon, and I hope that that suffices.

I thank the Minister for confirming that this Parliament has not ratified the treaty. As Parliament and the British public heard more about the deal, one of the things they found most inexplicable was that it involved us paying a substantial amount of money—how much has not yet been confirmed to Parliament—to the Mauritian Government. Will the Minister confirm from the Dispatch Box today that, because Parliament has not ratified the deal, he will not be paying any money to the Mauritian Government?