To ask His Majesty’s Government what progress they have made towards drafting the Defence Readiness Bill recommended by the Strategic Defence Review; and whether they intend for the scope of the Bill to include national resilience more broadly to encompass preparations for other risks contained in the National Risk Register.
My Lords, I remind the House of my registered interest as chair of the National Preparedness Commission. The starting point for today’s debate is that we live in a turbulent, uncertain, volatile world. The need for the nation to be better prepared and resilient is ever more pressing. We are closer to widespread war in Europe than we have been for over 60 years. We have seen the Russian invasion of Ukraine and the routine targeting of civilian infrastructure with cheap drones and cyber attacks.
But this country is already subject to hybrid and grey-zone aggression: the Salisbury poisonings, using nerve agents; arson attacks on industrial sites, Jewish premises and even properties associated with the Prime Minister; cyber attacks such as those on Marks & Spencer, the Co-op and JLR; and submarines taking an unhealthy interest in the undersea cables and pipelines on which we rely.
The SDR recommended a defence readiness Bill with a framework of powers to improve the preparedness of key industries and to ensure sufficient supplies to support critical national infrastructure and the defence forces. An essential part of our commitment to Article 3 is the need to ensure continuity of government and vital services, requiring resilience against all types of shock, including natural disasters and cyber attacks, as well as military threats.
A defence readiness Bill, although originally promised for early this year, was not in the King’s Speech, but my noble friend the Minister has assured us that work on it is progressing. Inevitably, legislation that codifies how to prioritise the supplies and support needed in the event of a national defence emergency is complex. The Bill must include national resilience more broadly and address what, as a nation, should be our core preparations to equip us for the acute risks contained in the published national risk register, and for the longer-term, slow-burn threats in the Government’s chronic risk analysis.
My Lords, it is customary to say what a pleasure it is to follow the previous speaker, and I do so with genuine enthusiasm. The noble Lord, Lord Harris, has chaired the National Preparedness Commission with great vigour, and it has produced a great deal of extraordinarily detailed and high-quality work. Much of it, it seems to me, is oven-ready for government to take on. We have a good start there, but, as the noble Lord’s own speech has pointed out, there is still an awful lot of work to do, and I have one or two questions for the Government as well.
On Tuesday, there will be the Second Reading of the cyber security and resilience Bill, which is an important and necessary part of wider resilience. One might say that we have waited quite a long time for that. It does not, however, answer the question of what we mean when we talk about the whole of government, or for that matter, more ambitiously, the whole of society, which is phraseology about resilience that has taken hold in the last couple of years. There is a great question mark around what it really means.
If we are going to make it mean something, it seems to me that the whole of society implies a general strengthening of the sinews of society, a lot of it physical as well as digital, and much wider participation, beyond government, with organisations and individuals involved in the development of the security itself and its maintenance. This is not virgin territory. There are models, which the noble Lord, Lord Harris, has mentioned, notably in Scandinavian countries, where, among several of them, there is a form of national service of various kinds and household preparation for emergencies, including emergencies of a kind that do not necessarily involve conflict. There is extensive shelter provision in some countries. The most obvious example of that is to be found in Finland, where life for a wide segment of society can, in extremis, be maintained underground. The roots of such extensive provision lie in that country’s geography and history.
My Lords, I commend the noble Lord, Lord Harris of Haringey, on securing this important and timely debate and introducing it in such a persuasive way. I confess to being somewhat daunted to be following the noble Baroness, Lady Neville-Jones, whose experience is so relevant to this debate and whose speech was full of questions that need to be answered. Coming after the chairman of the National Preparedness Committee and a former Secretary of State for Security, I am a mere amateur in this area.
I start from a different point of view: that of someone who has studied and been active in business. In that capacity, I have encountered many a risk register. I have noted a tendency to believe that once a risk is identified and placed on the register, it has been dealt with. In the Government’s latest incarnation of the National Risk Register, 89 specific areas of risk are identified. I wonder whether the Government are in any way confident that each of these is being addressed.
In his foreword to the document, Pat McFadden—then the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, who chairs the Cabinet committee on resilience—stressed the need for transparency about risks and said:
“We need everyone to play their part in building resilience”.
My Lords, it is a great pleasure to follow the noble Baroness, Lady Wheatcroft. I was listening to her speaking about the 89 lines of the risk register. I am perhaps inspired by the fact that I was yesterday with the campaign group More Than a Score doing SATs exams. Perhaps we could set an exam for when we have a new Cabinet and Government. A couple of months afterwards, they could all sit down and do an exam on the risk register to prove that they understand it and then tell us what they are going to do about it.
Like all speakers already, and no doubt all coming speakers, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Harris, for securing this debate and for the brilliant work that he and the preparedness committee do. We begin this debate in a bad position. There are many concerns about the lack of resilience and defence capacity in the UK, but I am referring to a much more specific issue—an issue for this House, this Parliament. We do not have the information we need to understand the crucial basic problem of food security, and the lack of it in the UK.
I am referring to the joint intelligence chiefs’ report on the impact of nature’s collapse and food security—a problem around the world. I note that just yesterday, Mary Creagh, a Defra Minister, told MPs that a redacted 14-page version of some of the findings, published after repeated freedom of information requests in January, should provide enough information. The Cabinet Office refused to send a Minister or official to the Environmental Audit Committee to answer these questions.
My Lords, it is a pleasure to follow the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett of Manor Castle. She is right: I was with her up until the divergence of growth and resilience. Like other noble Lords, I am truly grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Harris of Haringey, for tabling this Question and for the authority he brings to the debate through his work at the National Preparedness Commission. I declare an interest as a serving officer in the Army Reserve and as vice-chair of the All-Party Group for Climate, Nature and Security.
The core purpose of a defence readiness Bill is right. The power to mobilise our reserves and industrial base before a crisis becomes a conflict is precisely what the strategic defence review was correct to demand. However, the question before us is not only when the Bill will come but what it should contain. On that, the noble Lord is asking exactly the right question.
The instinct to keep the Bill narrow and treat it as a purely military instrument for a purely military emergency misunderstands the threats set out in our national risk register. The register draws no neat line between hostile state action and everything else. It lists pandemic influenza, severe flooding, prolonged power failure and the cascading loss of critical national infrastructure. When any of those materialises, the mechanisms we reach for are strikingly similar to the ones the Bill would create: we call on the reserves, we lean on logistics and private sector capacity, and we depend on the local resilience forums to hold the response together on the ground. It makes little sense to build those powers for one category of shock and leave them unavailable for the others.
My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Harris of Haringey, has brought forward a very timely debate. If we were in any doubt of that, we need only to think about the business of the House today, where there was a Statement on the independent review into countering foreign financial influence and interference in UK politics. One might think that that issue could be contributing, if not to hybrid warfare, to something of which politicians and ordinary members of society need to be aware.
We have heard about hybrid threats. The noble Baroness, Lady Wheatcroft, reminded us of the poisonings on our soil. Other noble Lords may, like me, have received an email this morning from Cyber Security, which is the Lords’ phishing education programme. It sent me a little email saying, “We sent you the email below to try to make sure that you wouldn’t get caught out by phishing”. Again, that is not something we would necessarily think of as defence readiness, yet it is the sort of issue the whole of society needs to think about.
There was a set of questions from the noble Baroness, Lady Neville-Jones, about what we mean by the “whole of society”. I had assumed from reading the SDR, from listening to the noble Lord, Lord Robertson, from other contributions today and from the Minister’s past speeches that the “whole of society” means what it says on the tin: that we need to be prepared—not just policymakers, the Ministry of Defence and people dealing with specific issues concerning security, cyber security, hard security and critical infrastructure, but every individual.
My Lords, I say to the noble Baroness, Lady Smith, that I would not take when I arrive for a debate as a model for anything. I can say without fear of contradiction that my Whips will endorse that sentiment. I, too, am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Harris of Haringey, for enabling this debate. It is not just timely; it is important. I thank him for the persistence with which he has pursued these critical issues of resilience and preparedness. I will structure my contribution around three simple propositions: the defence readiness Bill is not ready; the national conversation that was supposed to accompany it is currently mute; and the Treasury’s purse strings, as evidenced by the DIP, remain bleakly closed. Each failing compounds the others, and together they explain why, a year on from the strategic defence review, we are still debating proposals rather than debating action.
On the first point, let me be blunt about the timeline. The strategic defence review recommended this legislation over a year ago. It was absent from the King’s Speech in May. Ministers have told this House and the other place that proposals are being developed, that officials are working at pace and that the Bill will come forward later in this Parliament. We have words, but no date. The authors of the review have made no secret of their frustration at the yawning gap between the urgency of their conclusions and the glacial pace of their implementation—a frustration that I think we all inferred from the remarks of the noble Lord, Lord Harris, today. Speaking before the Defence Committee this week, the noble Lord, Lord Robertson of Port Ellen, said:
I certainly never resort to rhetoric, so the noble Baroness has my assurance on that. I thank my noble friend Lord Harris for introducing such an important debate, and everyone who has contributed to it. The MoD is developing this work, and I will say a bit more about that, but the overall responsibility across the whole of government is with the Cabinet Office. I know noble Lords understand that, but it is important to lay down again that the co-ordinating function is for the Cabinet Office. Notwithstanding that, the Ministry of Defence has a crucial role and will do what it can to accelerate the progress that many have mentioned.
I say to the noble Baroness, Lady Goldie, and other contributors to the debate that the defence readiness Bill will be introduced in this Parliament. I cannot go any further than that. I cannot remember who it was, but somebody said it would be introduced in the next Parliament. The Government’s intention is to introduce it in this Parliament, which is as far as I can go.
In terms of the scope of the Bill, which goes to the heart of the question and is the point of the debate introduced by my noble friend Lord Harris, what the defence readiness Bill should contain is under discussion, so there are talks going on about what the scope should be. Many of the other points that have been raised are the responsibility of other government departments. At the same time, other pieces of legislation which deal with some of this are being looked at. One example that has just come to mind for me is the Civil Contingencies Act, but there are all sorts of other pieces of legislation which are important as well.
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So what is needed is a national resilience and defence readiness Bill, and the unfortunate delay permits that wider focus. The country’s resources may have to be mobilised not just in the event of hostilities against the nation but of other civil emergencies not necessarily arising from nation state action. Mechanisms are needed to respond to another pandemic, to extreme weather events precipitated by climate change, and so on.
We know that the Swedes, like those in most other European countries, have a booklet that goes to every household, “If Crisis or War Comes”. What do we have in the UK? We have the GOV.UK Prepare website, a separate story to which I might return. The Swedes also have a booklet for companies. It recognises the decisive role of businesses in ensuring that society continues to function. Its message is:
“When your company is prepared to operate under the threat of war, it is also better equipped to manage pandemics, natural disasters, and other peacetime crises”.
That message should apply here: it is not just about geopolitics and the threats from Russia or wherever; it is about being ready for everything else as well.
We have just seen the highest temperatures ever recorded in May, and again in June. This had consequences: the largest number of category 1 call-outs ever for the London Ambulance Service, train disruptions and IT failures. Last year’s hot temperatures saw wildfires, with the busiest night for the London Fire Brigade since the Blitz. Then there were the unprecedented 12 named storms in the 2023-24 storm season, to say nothing of West Nile virus being found in mosquitoes in Britain.
What should such a national resilience and defence readiness Bill encompass? It should set the framework to enable us to make the best use of the nation’s resources in the event of hostile action—importantly, not just above but below the threshold of war. It should systemise how to maintain military and civilian reserves—I see the noble Lord, Lord Harlech, in his seat. But just as importantly, that framework should be readily activated in the event of other emergencies. Like the Climate Change Act, which has some parallel provisions, it needs to place a duty on government departments, public bodies, local authorities and large businesses and organisations to build their resilience and bolster their preparedness to respond to all sorts of threats and emergencies.
Such a Bill should place reporting obligations on the Government and other agencies to report back regularly on what they are doing in respect of their resilience and preparedness. It should establish an independent, arm’s-length body, a bit like the Climate Change Committee, to monitor the adequacy of the progress made. It would, in effect, be marking the Government’s homework—which I appreciate my noble friend the Minister may not like but it is an important component. It should mark that homework to see what is being done to build the nation’s resilience and the progress being made on defence readiness and national preparedness. It would need annual reports to Parliament, and this House and the other place would need to set up committees to scrutinise progress.
As the world becomes more transactional—or, dare I say it, deals-based—with increasing competition for strategic raw materials, we will need to mandate stockpiles and take action to protect our sovereign capacity in key areas. We have, after all, the most open economy among the G20. Our food supplies and our pharmaceuticals, plus key industrial materials, are imported and vulnerable to blockades and embargoes. We need to be ready for those imports to be disrupted or even shut off. In the event of conflict, we will need to be able to divert the nation’s resources to the support of our military and homeland defence.
Legislation is needed to create the mechanisms to deliver the collective national endeavour needed to defend our country and make it resilient against all the other shocks that we may face. Every part of government, every part of society and every business, large and small—indeed, every one of us—have to see resilience and defence preparedness as part of their responsibilities. It must be designed in. It must be part of the national fabric. We might not have long. That is why we need the national resilience and defence readiness Bill as soon as possible.
In the spirit of the outgoing Mayor of Greater Manchester’s article in today’s Times, we must deliver that
“concerted action to enhance our resilience, starting at the local level”.
I am not sure that this country would go for that. Our historical experience has been different, where our planning has largely focused on the continuity of government and essential services. However, in adopting whatever model we do, there is still much—I really do mean much—that we could learn from the Scandinavian approach. My questions for the Government are the following. What model are we going for? Do we use the phrase “whole of society”, and, when we use it, what do we mean by it? Do we have anything in our mind's eye when we use the phrase?
As far as I can see, we have not done a great deal so far under the heading of resilience, beyond the sort of work that the preparedness commission has been doing, with the aim of any particular model emerging. I do not mean by that to say that we have been idle. That is not the case; as the noble Lord, Lord Harris, has cited, climate work has been done, and there are other examples. But none of that has been drawn together or, as far as I can see, yet taken any legal form, nor do we have any settled machinery of government to take implementation forward.
The role and organisation of the Cabinet Office and its relationship to COBRA has in recent years been altered and then changed back, while yet other forms of resilience are going to be located elsewhere. To my surprise, it is DSIT that has found itself not just promoting science, technology and innovation but responsible for ensuring secure structures for cyber in government. Dotting responsibility for security around government seems pretty odd, when it has previously had a home in the Cabinet Office. The Cabinet Office is a welcome antidote to one of the other problems that we face in the structure of our Government, which is the shortcomings that arise from the “lead government department” model.
The strategic defence review specifically mentioned the need to increase the protection of our vulnerable critical national infrastructure and called for a defence readiness Bill, as the noble Lord, Lord Harris, mentioned. We need to enable the mobilisation of our reserves and our industry to war-readiness levels, but there is a problem about delay. Mr Luke Pollard, in another place, has said that the Bill will come only towards the end of this parliamentary Session, and the way he put it rather suggested to my ears that it might not come even then. I hope we can have some reassurance from the Minister. After all, NATO’s assessment is that, by 2030, Russia may decide to step up its existing level of aggression in Europe to something that is truly frightening.
We need to be ready, but we are cutting it fine with all our preparations, are we not? I would say too fine. The Government talk about a national dialogue on defence, and I think this House agrees strongly with that, but they need to start ASAP. To make sense and to be clear and honest with the electorate about what they may be involved in, that needs to include aspects that come under the heading of resilience. That should include questions such as whether there is going to be some kind of national service.
I come back to my questions. What are the Government going to propose to the country by way of a whole-of-society approach? What is going to be asked of us? A significant chunk of the picture still seems to be missing. In his reply, could the Minister begin to fill in some of the detail?
Of course, he was absolutely correct. If businesses are to be successful in navigating their way through risks, they need to involve all their people in the effort. It is no good if the chief risk officer identifies the risks and the risk committee pores over them and nods, and so it is with the country. In a company, everybody has to be involved. They have to know the risks and they have to be involved in addressing them. It is the same in the country. My concern is that the Government are failing to involve the public.
Pat McFadden referred to the guidance for the public at the Government’s Prepare website; the noble Lord, Lord Harris of Haringey, made reference to it. But can the Minister tell the House how many people have visited that site? How many even know of its existence? If they were to take a look, they would find that it refers to:
“Emergencies such as flooding, fires and power cuts”.
The noble Lord, Lord Harris, has made the case for such risks to be integral to any national resilience plan, and he is right, but we have to stop being so squeamish about the fact that we face another increasingly real risk: war.
The noble Lord, Lord Robertson of Port Ellen, who wrote the pivotal strategic defence review, spelled out the danger:
“We are under-prepared. We are under-insured. We are under attack. We are not safe”.
This is not an easy message to hear, but it is the truth. There should be no further delay in ensuring that the public are made fully aware of this. A national conversation or national dialogue has long been promised, but this is not the subject for a cosy fireside chat or interminable consultations. The Government need to tell the public about the risks of warfare that we now face, and ensure that people are prepared. Talking about it just does not do the job.
Other countries face up to the problem. They are very effective in getting their message across without unnecessarily scaring people. Some, such as Taiwan and Finland, can see the threat because it is in such close proximity. But technology means that the enemy need not be visible. Russia has assassinated people on our soil and infiltrated our electoral process. It has made its presence well and truly felt. As the noble Lord, Lord Robertson, said, “We are not safe”. When will the Government take their responsibilities seriously, trust the public and tell them to be ready, to prepare?
National resilience and defence readiness are not different things. They should be addressed together, and a joint Bill is clearly the answer. After all, how often have we seen the military called in to help in civil situations? Public involvement is crucial. Reserve forces must be recruited, volunteers lined up and trained, and businesses and the education sector brought into the effort.
In Finland, senior business leaders train alongside government officials in how to build resilience and schools prepare their pupils. We shy away from being frank with our children, yet they regularly see images of war and violence. Are they supposed to think it could never happen here? Might it not be far more reassuring to be told that the threat is there but we can deal with it, and this is what you have to do to help?
In a recent essay, Foreign Secretary Yvette Cooper admitted that successive Governments have failed to level with the country. On defence, we have not yet had the kind of public engagement we need. Now is the time to put that right. The national resilience and defence Bill should kick off a concerted effort across the country to be prepared. Benjamin Franklin said that by failing to prepare, you are preparing to fail. He was not only a founding father of the United States but the man who invented bifocals—so a man of vision. If we have a vision of peace and security, we need to start working for it now.
This is a serious cause for concern. As the noble Baroness, Lady Wheatcroft, just said, this appears to be in a context in which the Government are focused on trying not to scare people, specifically on food security. I have heard testimony from multiple experts who have been trying to get the Government to warn the public about the insecurity of our food supplies and about the need, where they can—for many, it is not financially viable—to create some private food stores and stores of fresh drinking water kept up to date.
I have been asking the Government about whether they will consider holding public government stores of food. Switzerland holds three months for the whole country and is looking to go to 12. I got a very clear answer to a Written Question from the Government: “No, we are not considering that. We think the market will provide”. I am afraid that is not what the experts are saying. Like others, I do not think that keeping the public in ignorance is the way to manage this situation. That produces fear. It produces anger—something we are seeing a great deal of. Being honest and open with the public about the fact that we have a huge food security issue and need to think about changing our entire food system to tackle this, and in the meantime providing points of security along the way, is crucial.
Coming back to the Question tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Harris, noble Lords can now see very clearly where I and the Green Party stand on the question of whether we need just a defence readiness Bill or a much broader defence and resilience Bill. As the noble Lord, Lord Harris, said, we face many threats in this age of shocks, as we have now shifted our global climate from the very stable Holocene into the very unstable Anthropocene. We have a great many health threats, many of them associated with biodiversity collapse. To cross-reference the previous debate on space, we have a society and an economy that are hugely dependent on satellites. We heard about the risk of the Kessler effect and the cascading loss of the satellites on which we are entirely dependent. These are all risks we need to understand, assess and manage.
I thought the contribution from the noble Baroness, Lady Neville-Jones, was really interesting. She is absolutely right: we have not defined “the whole of society”. That term is thrown around, but I suggest that we need something broader. We have seen a very obvious example of this in Finland and Poland both considering rewetting their peatlands as a potential defence against Russian aggression. We have to think about the state of nature—yes, I am cross-referencing my Bill from last Friday—as part of our security and resilience. The peatlands are very obvious, but if we have healthy soils, clean rivers and clean air then we are a much stronger and more resilient society that is able to take whatever is thrown at us. More than the whole of society, we have to think about the whole of the system—human and more than human. The resilience of all those systems together is a measure of our security as a society.
This is where I am going to lose some people who have been with me up to now: although we keep chasing growth, growth and resilience go in two different directions. A seedling that is growing at great speed, is heavily fertilised and receives lots of irrigation water is not going to survive in tough conditions if you have not looked after the soil or ensured that it can stand up against the wind. We need something that is tough, strong and can take knocks. Simply chasing growth means going in the opposite direction to that, and it is a dangerous direction.
There is a further dimension that this House should not overlook: the state of the infrastructure on which all our resilience ultimately rests. Much of it is ageing and some of it is, frankly, crumbling. We cannot be resilient against a pandemic, flood or hostile act if the pipes, grid and water storage that the country depends on are already failing under ordinary conditions.
I think it was on the Sporting Events Bill that the noble Lord, Lord Foster of Bath, talked about the London 2012 Olympics and how the traffic lights could be controlled positively to let sportspeople and officials through without delay. Conversely, that could be cyber attacked or gridlocked. Anyone trying to drive through London not in the middle of the night may think that we are already under some sort of traffic light attack.
Renewing infrastructure is itself an act of national preparedness. Here lies the opportunity: when we rebuild, we can design in security and resilience from the very start, hardening assets against both the storm and the saboteur, rather than bolting protection on afterwards at far greater cost. Upgrade and protection are not competing claims on the budget; done together, they are one investment.
To take one example, we desperately need new water storage, yet no major reservoir has been completed in England since 1992. The nearest new scheme, the Fens reservoir, is not expected online until 2036 and the Lincolnshire reservoir not until 2040. That is more than a decade away for infrastructure that we need now. I do not accept that a reservoir should take the better part of 15 years to deliver. With the will and a planning regime built for urgency rather than delay, there is no reason why a scheme of this kind should not be built in more than two or three years. If we are serious about resilience, we must be serious about the pace at which we build the things that make us resilient.
This is not scope creep for its own sake; it is a matter of coherence and our treaty obligations. Article 3 of the North Atlantic Treaty requires each of us to maintain the resilience to withstand and recover from major shocks, and that resilience is not distinguished by the origin of the shock. The noble Lord, Lord Harris, proposed that the Bill should follow the model of the Climate Change Act 2008, with a statutory duty to assess our baseline preparedness, set targets for improvement and report annually on progress. I find that a persuasive architecture.
We do not need to start completely from scratch. We can build a national resilience framework that is a benchmark to our preparedness, using means already at our disposal. As a starting point, we could use the military framework of fighting power. The conceptual is how we think about resilience: what are our strategy and tactics for dealing with such a shock? The moral is the national conversation that other noble Lords have spoken about, understanding why we need to be resilient and the motivation. Then there is the physical: the flood defences, the back-up generators, the stores of bottled water. The concepts are already there; we just need to implement them and do so at pace.
I put two questions to the Minister. First, will the mobilisation powers in the forthcoming defence readiness Bill be capable of activation for the civil emergencies listed in the national risk register and not solely for escalation toward armed conflict? Secondly, will the Government commit to a breakdown of the £4.2 billion allocated to the reserves between now and 2030—on page 61 of the DIP, for anyone who is checking—given the importance to the reserves of in-year funding?
We heard today how some countries, particularly our new NATO allies Finland and Sweden, do a very good job in preparing their citizens. What lessons have His Majesty’s Government taken from our partners and allies? Circulating booklets to households and businesses, as the noble Baroness, Lady Wheatcroft, suggested, is one thing, but will that really do the job? Will people really say, “Oh, a leaflet has come through the letterbox. I’d better read it, make a note of it, get my wind-up radio and my battery torch, and make sure I’ve stocked the cupboards and got clean water”? They could do something else. Obviously, as a Liberal Democrat, I do not want to believe this, but I understand that, when we put leaflets through letterboxes, sometimes they do not get read. Sometimes, they go directly into the recycling bin—if we are lucky. Obviously, if leaflets went out on national resilience and preparedness, they would have a measure of gravitas and weight, coming from the Government. But equally, there is a real danger that people will not necessarily read a document.
So we need to be very open to a whole range of different approaches to how we have the conversation the Government and the noble Lord, Lord Robertson, talked about. It cannot just be leaflets through doors, and a conversation in and of itself is not enough either. A conversation is useful, but we need that to be the start, not the end. It needs to be an opportunity to persuade people—wherever they are in the United Kingdom, whatever their background, whatever their work interests and whatever their personal interests and circumstances—that they need to stop and be much more aware. I understand that there are parts of the country where people still feel that they can leave their front door unlocked and nobody will walk in. Most of us do not feel like that, and we need to make people aware that there are all sorts of other aspects of their lives where they need to be aware and mindful of what may come forward.
In order not to cause an unwelcome emergency on the Liberal Democrat Benches, the Whips like us to arrive many minutes before the start of the next item of business. I noticed that the noble Baroness, Lady Goldie, arrived 15 minutes after me, but when I arrived on my Benches, I could see a look of relief from one of our Whips. I thought I had timed my arrival well, because I was thus able to listen to the noble Viscount, Lord Camrose, speak in the previous debate on space. It was interesting because, as I listened to him, I thought that if I did shorthand and transcribed what he said at the end of the debate, it would have been perfectly suitable for a debate about national and defence readiness and resilience. The noble Viscount talked about businesses needing certainty, which the noble Baroness, Lady Wheatcroft, also referred to. That is crucial for our defence readiness. Businesses need to know what the Government’s priorities are. They need to know when contracts are likely to be let.
As the noble Viscount, Lord Camrose, also said, there is an increasingly crowded marketplace. He was talking about space, which is one aspect of defence, but it is also true in other aspects of defence. This is the point where, like the noble Lord, Lord Harlech, I beg to part company from the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett, because dual-use technology is hugely important. The whole-of-society approach should be about persuading individuals, and it also needs to be about working closely with businesses, partly on defence investment and R&D.
My final point is on reserves. As the noble Baroness, Lady Dacres, pointed out in the debate on Monday, the role of reserves is crucial. We need to prepare businesses to be aware that their reserves may be called up. That needs to be part of a whole-of-society planning process.
“We are running out of years, and the reality is the challenge is now bigger and more serious and earlier than we anticipated, and yet the defence investment plan itself does not come up to it”.
These words of the noble Lord should bring the Government up short.
The second point is on the national conversation. The noble Baroness, Lady Wheatcroft, is correct to say that this is not some fireside chat. The review was explicit that a whole-of-society approach requires the Government to level with the country about the threats we face, the sacrifices that resilience may demand and the roles that reserves, industry, local authorities and ordinary citizens might all be asked to play, as the noble Lord, Lord Harris, so eloquently—indeed, chillingly—described.
Instigating at least the planning for how that conversation should be structured, followed by rollout, could have started a year ago. Where is it? Is the Minister still the lead on it, or is that to be found somewhere else in government? I hope the Minister is the lead on it. If there is any ambiguity, I have a piece of advice for him: you plough the furrow and make the others follow, because I happen to think the Minister would make a good job of it.
Quite apart from the financial implications of all of this, my noble friend Lord Harlech rightly pointed out that if the Government intend to ask the public to accept new obligations, whether on mobilisation, infrastructure or preparedness in their own communities, the public have to be brought into this discussion long before the legislation is passed, not presented with it as a fait accompli. This vacuum, in my opinion, is doing damage and potentially creating danger because complacency is filling the void. The watchword should be “urgency”.
Thirdly, and perhaps most tellingly, there is the Treasury. Every government document on this subject is written in the conditional: commitments when circumstances allow, ambitions for the next Parliament, targets that recede as the calendar advances. The 3% ambition remains an ambition. The gulf between what the review says is needed and what the Treasury is willing to make available remains. If anything, fiscal pressures have made that gulf wider and starker. The same timidity that produced 10 months of delay on the defence investment plan is stamped all over this Bill. A readiness Bill that arrives without the resources to make readiness real will be a Bill in name only, a framework, a skeleton with no functioning limbs. I ask the Minister to give an assurance to the House that this legislation will not become simply another unfunded commitment layered on top of all the others.
I have three questions for the Minister. When precisely will the Bill be introduced? What concrete steps are being taken to start the national conversation that the SDR said was indispensable? Can the Minister confirm whether the Treasury has agreed to fund the powers the Bill will create or are we again being asked to legislate first and pay later? I think we are all agreed that the country’s resilience is critical and it cannot be built on aspiration alone, however worthy. I hope the Minister can offer some comfort and provide some details of substantive proposals, rather than rhetoric.
I also draw noble Lords’ attention to the fact that NATO has seven resilience requirements and, as part of NATO, we and all the members accept them. They deal with many of the points that have been raised: continuity of government, energy supplies, dealing with uncontrolled movement of people, food and water resources, mass casualties, civil communications systems and civil transportation schemes. All of those deal with some of the infrastructure problems and challenges that the noble Lord, Lord Harlech, mentioned. They are part of a readiness programme which all member states in NATO will be looking at.
My noble friend Lord Harris and others mentioned the important point about the changing nature of warfare and the importance of understanding that war is about cyber, climate and information and all the things we have talked about. We need to address those as well in any plan that we bring forward.
The noble Baroness, Lady Neville-Jones, asked when the Bill would be introduced. I answered that. She asked me to define “the whole of society”. I think the noble Baroness, Lady Smith, did it quite well. We can tie ourselves in knots about what the whole of society means but we all know that what we are talking about is everybody’s responsibility. Every part of society has a part to play, whether it be business, industry, government agencies, voluntary organisations, the military, individuals or groups of people—the list goes on—the devolved Administrations, local authorities and local resilience forums. All those have to be involved in bringing a plan together and in any conversation. The challenge is how you do that in a constructive and co-ordinated way that is not fragmented. As I say, the whole of society—