Defence Policy (International Relations and Defence Committee Report)

I also welcome the greater clarity provided in the IR refresh regarding the nature and aims of the Indo-Pacific tilt. Furthermore, I welcome the clarity of the Defence Secretary’s statement in his letter to the committee regarding the UK’s policy on Taiwan, in which he stated:

“We have clear interests in the peace and stability of the Taiwan Strait and do not support any unilateral attempts to change the status quo”.

I endorse the Government’s view that Russia represents the most acute threat to the UK, and that China represents a long-term systemic challenge to our interests. However, our report noted that the Middle East was not given the same level of prominence as other regions in the IR, and this was not corrected in this year’s refresh. The Middle East is home to several ongoing UK military commitments, as well as several key partners. It remains an important region for UK engagement. In evidence to the committee, the Defence Secretary strongly rejected concerns that the Middle East had been neglected in UK strategic planning. Nevertheless, we feel that more work is needed to reassure long-standing partners in the region that it remains a focus for UK diplomacy.

The nature of the war in Ukraine calls into question the emphasis on strengthening capabilities to tackle so-called “sub-threshold” threats and underlines the need to maintain and develop the UK’s conventional capabilities. The committee expressed concerns about the UK’s hard defence capabilities, notably in the land domain, and questioned whether the British Army had sufficient resources to ensure that its capabilities and contribution to NATO remain credible in the eyes of its allies.

The conflict in Ukraine has shown how quickly ammunition and other key assets can run out in conventional warfare, and how inadequate “just-in-time” supply chains can be. The committee found that the UK’s weapon and ammunition stocks were inadequate across all three services, and we recommended that remedying this situation should be the highest priority for the Government. We also called on the Government to build greater resilience into their stocks, supply chains and industrial capacity.

In their response to our report, the Government stated that they would review the Defence and Security Industrial Strategy alongside the update to the IR and defence Command Paper. I look forward to the results of that review.

No discussion of defence strategy can avoid the question of defence spending and whether we have sufficient resources to meet the security challenges identified by the Government. While the IR announced a substantial uplift to defence spending, our report found that the current defence spending plans mean that the Government may not be able to deliver on the aspirations of the IR and the defence Command Paper. The Defence Secretary has been disarmingly frank regarding the impact of spending constraints on the UK’s military capabilities, describing the British Army as “hollowed out and underfunded”. I have no illusions of course regarding the extraordinary pressures on the public finances. Nevertheless, defence spending must be set with a view to meet the threats we face and the capabilities we require. The IR refresh noted:

“We are now in a period of heightened risk and volatility that is likely to last beyond the 2030s”.

When the Committee was finalising its report, the Defence Secretary described spending 3% of GDP on defence as

“an aspiration or a planned marker”.

Since then, this aspiration appears to have been cut back somewhat, and the Government now pledge to spend 2.5% of GDP

“as fiscal and economic circumstances allow”.

In addition to committing sufficient funds to our defence, it is of course essential that these funds are well spent. Our report makes recommendations regarding parliamentary scrutiny and effective procurement. One of the committee’s key concerns is that the Government can be reluctant to be a little more transparent about their spending on defence. I am disappointed that the Government did not respond to the committee’s request for an update on the ongoing impact of inflation on defence spending. As the Defence Secretary told us, high levels of capital spending mean that the defence budget is particularly vulnerable to inflation.

Given the tendency of UK defence procurement to run over budget and behind schedule, it is essential that Parliament is given the opportunity to scrutinise defence spending plans adequately. The committee therefore believes that the Government should consider granting relevant parliamentary committees, on a confidential basis, access to information setting out how funds are allocated and spent.

In view of the intense pressure on the defence budget, it is also vital that the MoD has robust procurement mechanisms in place and an effective relationship with the defence industry. In this context, I welcome the fact that the Government have conducted a full “lessons learned” review of the troubled Ajax programme, led by Clive Sheldon KC. As the Minister for Defence Procurement noted in another place, the report makes for difficult reading. I welcome the fact that the Government have accepted its findings, and most of Mr Sheldon’s recommendations.

I also hope that the Government will act on the findings of our report regarding the MoD’s co-operation with the defence sector, in particular those companies working with cutting-edge and experimental technologies. The IR places heavy emphasis on investment in innovation and technology as a means to maintain military power in the context of diminished land forces and limited conventional capabilities. Whether or not such a bet on technology is wise, given the enduring relevance of conventional forces in the war in Ukraine, it is vital that the UK effectively leverages its research and development capabilities to maximise its defence capabilities.

However, I regret to say that the committee heard evidence of significant problems in the way the MoD manages its relationships with private enterprises—particularly SMEs that do not have an established relationship with the Ministry of Defence and are often more likely to be among the most innovative firms that abound here and overseas. One defence firm noted that the barriers to entry remained “stubbornly high,” and described the MoD’s approach to innovation management as “byzantine”. Another told us that, from the perspective of a tech company, the MoD remains

“one of the worst customers in the world”.

As a result, the committee concluded that the MoD must consider changing fundamentally its approach to smaller high-tech and start-up companies.

As our report noted, the security circumstances facing our country are now graver than anything the UK has experienced since the height of the Cold War—and I am of an age that I can remember that period. The Government can be rightly proud of the leading role they have taken in supporting Ukraine, and through that support, helping to uphold the European security order. Nevertheless, the war in Ukraine has raised challenging questions regarding the UK’s conventional capabilities and the resources it has available for defence. To maintain credibility with our allies we must ensure that we invest sufficiently and effectively in defence capabilities and improve how we engage with the defence industry through a major culture change in our approach to procurement. I beg to move.

This is the Parliament of our country, and it seems obvious to me and to many others that we should be debating, discussing, challenging and deliberating on that “fundamental change” and the Government’s acknowledged misjudgment of the risks we face. The people of this country, in my view, are being short-changed by the Government denying Parliament the ventilation of the crisis, which is what a debate here and in the Commons would represent, because—this is the second issue I wish to raise in this very short and very rare debate—we need to recognise the gravity of the stakes at play in Ukraine today.

This war is not just about saving Ukraine as a sovereign, independent nation state and the survival of its people, important and life-saving as those are. It is about our safety and security as well. Make no mistake at all: if Vladimir Putin prevails in this bloody, unprovoked attempted conquest, the resulting world will be a very different place—and not a very comfortable one. There will be a new rules-based order, that is for sure, but it will be written by the Chinese and a subordinate Russia. It will have the acquiescence of what we have come to know as the Global South—those countries such as India, South Africa and Brazil which are, almost unbelievably, sitting on the fence but edging towards Russia, ignoring as they do the stark fact that, if the principle of nuclear blackmail and of borders changed by force prevails, it will devastate them as much as us in Europe. That new world order assuredly will not enshrine the values and principles we have adopted throughout my life.

Authoritarians do not believe in the rule of law, free speech, a free press, free elections or private property. That is amply on display today in Russia, China, North Korea and Iran. We neglect at our peril the present manoeuvrings of those authoritarians—for example, meddling in the Middle East. As the report says, and the refresh underlines, in this region that is almost ignored by the integrated review, meddling is now on vivid display.

Who here would have imagined the day when China would be the midwife to the rencontre between Saudi Arabia and Iran? Just look at the western Balkans; I know the noble Baroness, Lady Helic, will speak on this authoritatively later on. Neglected as it has been by the West, this area, which we did so much to settle and save, is being used today by Russia and China as an adventure playground for their deadly mischief. I ask noble Lords to imagine for a bleak moment what these two areas will be like if Putin succeeds in Ukraine.

What about the Arctic, the subject of the committee’s present investigation? Russia has long protected and projected its strategic and resource role in the region, but now, as Russia has become the little brother, China has become an Arctic nation—avariciously watching the opening northern sea route and the data-rich domination at the very top of the world.

Eastern Ukraine is on our TV screens every night that something dreadful happens, but its plight and its umbilical connection to this country’s safety and security are amazingly absent from the serious deliberations of our Parliament. That should be unacceptable to all of us. I believe that the Government’s support for Ukraine is justified and praiseworthy. A debate in Parliament would emphasise that point and produce a signal to Putin, in the cracked glasshouse he now inhabits, that our collective resolution is strong, unanimous and durable. When he knows that, even his fevered mind might change. He cannot, and must not, succeed.

The central importance of Europe in purely military terms must be reflected in the balance of defence investment, and the evidence on this score is not good. Our ability to defend our own airspace, to achieve air superiority over the battle space and to contribute effectively to the defence and, if necessary, restoration of NATO territory is all at risk. Our bases and infrastructure in the UK—including our undersea infrastructure—are vulnerable to long-range attack, and the concentration of our forces in fewer locations means that we lack the resilience we once had.

Meanwhile, the course of the current conflict in Ukraine has underscored the importance of air superiority: fail to achieve it, and you risk something resembling a First World War battlefield on the ground. Our inability to field an armoured division that can fight effectively and enduringly in high-intensity conflict has become something of a national embarrassment as well as a strategic weakness.

All three services have some good equipment, but they lack many key enablers and, most importantly, adequate stocks of the appropriate weapons to fight intensively for anything other than a very brief period. The Royal Navy, Army and Royal Air Force are all too small, but enabling our current force structure to undertake sustained operations must be our highest priority for investment.

This is not just a matter of more money for the defence budget. We must also strengthen and expand the Western defence industries that we have allowed to atrophy over the many years of budgetary cuts and on which we and the rest of NATO rely for our sustainability. However, if we are to secure the necessary private sector investment in those industries, we will need more predictable, longer-range procurement plans. The frequent changes currently made in response to short-term budgetary pressures are simply not designed to inspire the necessary investor confidence.

The usual official response to these kinds of criticisms—I expect to hear it again today—is to assert that the Government have recently delivered the largest increase in defence spending since the end of the Cold War. That may be true, but it follows, and only partly ameliorates, some of the largest cuts, made by the same Government. It is rather like pushing someone into a river and then claiming credit for helping them to keep their head temporarily above water. We need serious, sustained and increased investment in our military capability and sustainability, and it must be focused on our ability to fight and win in Europe and northern waters.

The other issue I will touch on is the emphasis the Defence Command Paper places on technology and innovation. It sees these as a substitute, at least in part, for mass. In a sense, this is right. Throughout history, there are many examples of smaller but more capable forces succeeding against larger opponents. Once again, Ukraine has shown the advantage to be gained from innovation and novel uses of technology, civilian as well as military. Effects are what matter, but those effects need to be created in enough places and on a sufficiently enduring basis to achieve the desired ends, so size does matter.

Beyond this, though, we need to ensure that novel ideas make it through to front-line capability. A great deal of innovation comes from small, high-technology enterprises rather than large defence contractors. The very size of the latter, and their resultant bureaucratic processes, often robs them of the agility and independence of thought necessary for solutions that fall outside the box.

Fortunately, we have no shortage of such small, imaginative enterprises in this country. Unfortunately, those smaller companies face enormous obstacles in translating their ideas into marketable products—or, in defence terms, into front-line capability. For them, there exists something called the valley of death, where good ideas go to die. This is not a new phenomenon. How often have we seen something invented in this country, only for commercial exploitation and the associated economic benefits to move elsewhere? I see insufficient evidence that this problem is being addressed.

There are some welcome initiatives in the Defence Command Paper to develop unconventional thinking, but unless there are mechanisms and processes to encourage substantial private capital investment in new technology and innovative ideas, defence is unlikely to realise their benefits. This goes beyond the Ministry of Defence and requires a wider government focus, but it is one of the biggest risks in the Defence Command Paper, and therefore should be a very high priority for action.

Finally, with war raging in Europe and all the dangers to this country’s security, I am deeply disappointed that a debate on the UK’s defence policy has been tucked away on a Friday afternoon. The Whips will no doubt pray in aid the pressure of government business. The defence of this country and its people is government business; it is the Government’s most important business and it deserves much better than it has received in the scheduling of this debate.

Only today, we learned that, despite the events earlier this month, it is business as usual as far as Wagner is concerned. As we speak, Wagner is recruiting in Moscow and St Petersburg. Whether those recruits will be deployed in Ukraine or not remains to be seen, because it may well be that Wagner’s forces are integrated with Russian forces in Ukraine, but we know that they continue to be deployed in Africa. Africa is at the centre of Wagner and Russia’s policy—a policy of enrichment and aggrandisement. It is about both those things: the aggrandisement of Russia and the enrichment of Wagner and the plutocrats that lie behind it.

As we speak, Wagner’s forces are deployed in Sudan, Mali, Burkina Faso and the DRC. In all those places, they are seeking to destabilise and, wherever possible, defenestrate the natural resources of those countries, both metaphorically and literally, because the impact on the environment is as grave as the impact on peace, security and development.

We need a response to that, and it must build on our soft power and, importantly, our military engagement and our military defence diplomatic network—the network of military attachés and peacekeepers who do such good on the ground but who, all too often, are forgotten when it comes to deployment and resource. We seek assurances from the Minister on this. I speak from the experience of my time in South Africa here; they are a critical part of what happens in any mission. They are at the heart of our diplomacy and of development. They should not be forgotten, and we seek a clear and categorical assurance that in Africa, at least—but not just in Africa, and I shall come to that in a moment—that network is being enhanced and strengthened. If it is not, we will pay a price.

We are already paying a price and we see that in the deployment of Russian and Chinese naval assets off Simon’s Town. That ought to give us cause for concern. We ought to be concerned that the People’s Liberation Army is the fastest-growing military presence in Africa, as we speak. We ought to be concerned that our impact on the Caribbean is diminished by our failure adequately to provide scholarships at the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst and the Britannia Royal Naval College in Dartmouth, where Caribbean forces have traditionally been trained. I urge the Minister to assure us that those scholarships will once again be available to Caribbean Governments and that we will use the soft power we possess to the benefit of this nation and the wider world.

In reflecting on the weakening of Putin and the law of unintended consequences in Ukraine, the Chinese Communist Party needs to understand that, when you trigger a war, the outcome may never be certain. While there is much to admire about China’s rich culture and heritage, the entrepreneurship of its peoples and the contribution it has made to the world, Xi Jinping’s Chinese Communist Party regime poses a threat to us all. This is an important distinction.

In two reports, the International Relations and Defence Committee makes it clear that the UK’s response to that threat represents what the committee calls “a strategic void” and what the noble Lord, Lord Patten of Barnes, calls “cakeism”—trying to have your cake and eat it. One slice of the Government’s cake is iced with the following: that the CCP regime represents the

“most significant geopolitical factor in the world today”.

But another slice is iced with “business as usual”, as exemplified by the recent ministerial meeting with Liu Jianchao, a CCP operative responsible for the shocking operations Fox Hunt and Sky Net, and another Minister going to Hong Kong to deepen business links while 1,200 lawmakers and pro-democracy activists, such as the British citizen Jimmy Lai, are incarcerated by a regime accused by the House of Commons of genocide against the Uighur Muslims.

This week I met Peter Humphrey, a British national and former Reuters foreign correspondent, who became a due diligence investigator with 48 years of experience in China. He and his wife were locked up in outrageous conditions in a Chinese prison, experiencing detention and psychological torture and witnessing prison labour being used in the supply chains of global multinational brands. Why are we so silent about cases like this? In addressing the strategic void, can the Minister tell us when the Prime Minister will respond to the Intelligence and Security Committee’s China report? What has caused the delay?

Threats come from spy balloons; in cyberspace and space technology; from surveillance cameras trained on government buildings, including army barracks, Sandringham and even MI6; from intimidation, threats and violence directed towards critics of the regime abroad, including Hong Kongers now resident in the UK who have escaped, and towards parliamentarians—I declare an interest as one of seven who has been sanctioned; and on the battlefields of illegally invaded Ukraine, the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea.

On 6 June, China and Russia conducted a joint aerial patrol over the Sea of Japan and the East China Sea, the third such joint air patrol since Vladimir Putin invaded Ukraine. They have confirmed that they will hold further joint military drills this year. The CCP is not a neutral bystander, but a clear ally and accomplice to Putin’s war in Ukraine.

As part of the committee’s inquiry, the noble Baroness, Lady Anelay, the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, and I were briefed on a joint military exercise in the Gulf involving China, Russia and Iran—something of an unholy trinity. While AUKUS is a significant step in strengthening our ability to defend our allies and interests in the Asia-Pacific region, I ask the Minister for the Government’s current assessment of the threats to Taiwan, and what steps the UK and its allies are taking both to prevent an escalation and to prepare for the possibility of one. A military invasion of Taiwan by China would have truly catastrophic consequences, not only for the region but for the world. Taiwan is a vibrant democracy that shares our values of human rights and the rule of law. It has never been part of the People’s Republic of China, something I would have liked to hear the Defence Secretary say to the committee.

Taiwan is of vital economic and geopolitical importance. The Taiwan Strait is the main shipping route from China, Japan, South Korea and Taiwan to Europe and the US. According to Bloomberg, almost half the world’s container ships and 88% of larger container ships transited the Taiwan Strait in 2022. Taiwan holds a crucial position in the global supply chain due to its manufacturing capabilities. It produces over 60% of the world’s semiconductors and over 90% of the most advanced semiconductors, the chips that power our electric gadgets. Any attempt by the CCP to seize Taiwan by force would plunge the world into an economic, and perhaps literal, dark age.

It is therefore in our national interest to do everything possible to prevent such a catastrophe. That surely means doing two things: strengthening our relations with Taiwan and being clear to the CCP what would happen if it did invade. When will we act on Sir Iain Duncan Smith’s call for an economic impact analysis of a potential blockade or invasion of Taiwan? It was clear from an Answer to a Parliamentary Question from him that none has been done so far. Why not?

I have one other question. Next month we will sign the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership—good. Will we encourage the accession of Taiwan to the CPTPP, as well as its acceptance—even if only with observer status—to the World Health Organization and World Health Assembly? What is the Government’s response to yesterday’s call by the New Zealand Prime Minister that China should be allowed to join the CPTPP?

Finally, on Monday the BBC’s “Panorama” broadcast a powerful film detailing the extent of China’s espionage and infiltration activities. These range from Hikvision cameras to infiltration of university programmes involving national defence. There is a threat from without and a threat from within. I ask the Minister to please tell us what we are going to do to counter that threat, to de-risk any business and trade with China, to diversify our supply chains, to reduce strategic dependency in everything from its dominance in lithium to electric cars, to deter an invasion of Taiwan and to strengthen our defences—militarily, economically and technologically—to confront the growing threats to come.

“We look forward to receiving a more detailed response on issues relating to the UK’s defence capabilities”.

He went on to say:

“In particular, we would be grateful for further information on how Defence plans to refresh its relationship with industry, replenish equipment, and build greater resilience in its weapons and ammunition stocks”.

There are a lot of unanswered questions in the Government’s response, and I very much hope that my noble friend will have some more information for us today. The House holds her in very affectionate regard and respect, but I hope she will be able to give us some glad tidings when she comes to wind up.

One thing that gives me concern is the size of the Armed Forces in general, but of the Army in particular. It really is extraordinary that there are almost as many civilian personnel employed by the Ministry of Defence as the 72,000 target for the Army. That cannot be right, particularly in view of some of the evidence given to the committee of the noble Baroness, Lady Anelay, on the less than agile competence of some of the defence procurement people. It is disturbing that on the very day that we are debating this report, we have in the Times an account of Sir Patrick Sanders, Chief of the General Staff, head of the Army, leaving early because he is unhappy with the way in which the Government are tackling things. That is a very disturbing commentary, at a time of such seriousness.

We enjoy the benefit of cross-party support for the Government’s approach to Ukraine, and indeed one of the characteristic marks throughout my 53 years in Parliament is that there has never been a real divide between the political parties on great issues of defence and foreign affairs. That does not mean that we should be complacent about that. On the contrary, we should together be putting pressure on the Government to recognise that the questions raised in this report are significant questions of far-reaching importance, and that we need some answers to the direct questions that have been asked and the specific recommendations that have been made.

I hope we will move forward through the reply we shall receive from the Front Bench today. I repeat what I said earlier, and what the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Stirrup, and the noble Lord, Lord Robertson of Port Ellen, said: I hope, above all, that before the House rises in four weeks’ time, there will be a whole day of prime parliamentary time to debate these far-reaching issues, which affect not only us but generations to come.

These cases all emphasised the need for alliances. I recall us debating in the 1990s the need for 40 destroyers and frigates. Now we are down to 18, and next year it will be 17 or even 16. Yes, we still have a key role in the JEF, Five Eyes, AUKUS and so on, but over the past 10 years there have been so many warnings from experts. In recent weeks there have been warnings from insiders; for example, General Sir Tim Radford, who is about to retire as Deputy SACEUR, perhaps demob liberated, forecast in the Daily Telegraph on 20 June that we risk losing our “fortunate” position in NATO if we do not invest for the future and said that we are “just holding on” to our NATO influence. Again, I invite noble Lords to read the evidence of 20 June to the Defence Select Committee from the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Houghton of Richmond, the former CDS. He argued:

“It beggars belief to me that we have a reduced size of army … We don’t have a properly functioning reserve. To me it’s a national embarrassment”.

My second reflection is this: hindsight gives 20/20 vision. Forecasting is particularly hazardous in the defence field, as we have seen recently in the attempted putsch in Russia, which could not really have been forecast. The world is moving on from western dominance. Just look at the voting in the United Nations General Assembly on the invasion of Ukraine. So much for those who yearn for Commonwealth political solidarity. We have to seek alliances, even with imperfect partners.

Yes, Russia is reduced as a threat. It is weakened, but the threat remains because so many assets have been unused in Ukraine. It seeks western vulnerabilities—for example, underwater cables—and is increasingly dependent on China.

China has moved from a regional to a world superpower, powerful across the board. The point about Taiwan was well made by my friend, the noble Lord, Lord Alton.

The Middle East has been neglected by the IR, but there are major changes. Saudi Arabia is distancing itself from the US in relation to Iran and, indeed, to China.

NATO is not brain-dead but has a new vitality and relevance. Finland and Sweden will both be major contributors of personnel and equipment. Think of the new contract with Saab over NLAWs.

The US is our major key ally. It is dominant, but we will nevertheless have to look to a possible Trump presidency and the effects of that in our contingency planning.

I have two final reflections. The first is the looming financial question posed by defence inflation. Can we continue to seek excellence across the board, or must we increasingly look for co-operation with allies, which will assume niche roles for us?

Secondly, the committee argued for cultural change in planning and defence in terms of openness, including openness to Parliament. When I chaired the Foreign Affairs Committee, I used to ask our own intelligence people to please recognise, like the CIA, that we are on the same side, even if we need positive vetting and special private sessions in relevant parliamentary committees.

I recall being one of the new entrants to the senior branch of the Foreign Office 63 years ago. We were lectured by the head of the security department, who sermonised on 1 Peter, chapter 5, verse 8, advising us to be vigilant, as the devil, our enemy,

“prowls around like a roaring lion looking for someone to devour”.

Today, at a time when the future of Europe will be determined by the outcome of the war in Ukraine, we need not only vigilance but resilience and resources. The report highlights many of the key problems we face and merits a very serious response from the Government.

The Government will rightly say that the defence budget has been increased and they aspire to further increases; but, with inflationary pressures, even these increases may not mean that there will be any real-terms growth in the budget. I stress that long-term past performance is the determinant of where national defence capability is now. As night follows day, there is no short-term fix. Even a massive, immediate increase in funds could not be transformed overnight into new equipment, more trained personnel or weapon stocks.

News reports give no sense that replacements of our gifts of weapons and supplies to Ukraine are being pressed as UORs—urgent operational requirements—to speed up the procurement process. Apart from a recently placed order in Germany for 115 millimetre ammunition, almost 18 months on what else has been ordered? If anything has, it has not been well publicised. More importantly, when will it, or other, orders be delivered? Surely these operational requirements need real priority.

I welcome the all-party support for this Government’s commitment to provide massive practical help to Ukraine. I would welcome, too, bipartisan support for the nuclear deterrent force. It would be equally welcome if such cross-party support could be devised to work collaboratively on solving the many problems faced with procurement, for example. Both main parties, while in office, recognised that there were difficulties. They devised and promoted new schemes to overcome them. I have seen at close hand most of them come and go without ever achieving any long-term success; rather, party-inspired criticism prevails. Year after year, too, the National Audit Office or another Treasury watchdog mounts excoriating criticism of failures or of projects that have been much delayed and have grown in overall cost.

There needs to be a long look ahead—maybe more than political realities would normally allow—to address these shortfalls in defence capabilities and the essential weapons spares and stocks. I will single out just a couple of these shortfalls. Front-line numbers of fighting forces in all three services are too low to maintain conventional control in conflict for more than a few days if they suffer even modest rates of attrition. Recent practical experience of the Ukraine conflict has demonstrated, in spades, that weapon stock consumption is high, far higher than industry could be expected quickly to replace one for one. There are also novel threats from cyber, and in space, to grapple with.

The deterrent is often stressed as our greatest safeguard, but it must be credible to be that safeguard. In turn, its credibility rests on an ability to stand one’s ground conventionally and not to be seen by the enemy as a one-trick pony having to contemplate deterrent use or surrender in the opening stages of conflict. Defence capabilities and strength are not as they should be. The climate of threat is real, and in spite of this week’s upheavals in Russia, will not diminish. Defence needs long-term attention, real growth and greater cross-party support. What we now have is tissue-paper thin.