Defence Policy: Deterrence

Question for Short Debate

Asked by

To ask His Majesty’s Government whether deterrence remains a core element of the United Kingdom’s defence policy.

My Lords, I will not detain the Committee for all the time allocated to me but will do my best to be clear and precise. Deterrence covers a wide range of defence activity. Nuclear is at the top. We have never fired a nuclear weapon in anger, following the two weapons fired by our US allies to end the Second World War. Nuclear weapons are to be used only when our “supreme national interest” so requires. So far, that has not occurred. I hope I can be assured that the new Defence Ministers in post have accepted briefings on these matters, whatever their inclinations may be.

At the other end of the scale, we cast our minds back to 1982 when HMS “Endurance” was on patrol in the south Atlantic. We withdrew it, somewhat unwisely, and the rest is history. The noble Lord, Lord West, who is not here this afternoon, played an important part in the Falklands conflict all those years ago, as I believe did the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Stirrup. Are any British forces deployed to the south Atlantic at present? It seems that potential enemies there are again making unhelpful noises about the Falkland Islands. They were easily deterred last time by a single vessel; when we withdrew it, the rest became history.

Yesterday we heard from the Chancellor about defence spending generally. I felt that her remarks were not wholly awful. But deterrence has to be credible, and I hope that point is made to Chancellor Reeves as well as to the rest of us. There are also threats elsewhere in world, not just in the south Atlantic, and I hope we are taking account of those. I do not intend to detain your Lordships any longer.

My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Trefgarne, for giving us the opportunity to debate this important issue. I will talk about deterrence in the broadest sense. In so doing, I declare my interest as chair of the National Preparedness Commission.

Deterrence is not just about the ability to hit back hard against an aggressor, thereby making that aggression less likely. It is also about demonstrating a level of preparedness against the threat posed and a degree of resilience to recover quickly from any attack mounted. The first duty of government is to keep the country safe and protect its citizens. That is an essential platform on which the nation’s economic growth and prosperity depend.

Increasingly, hostile states pursue their objectives in the grey zone between peace and open conflict. Conventional campaigns are supplemented or preceded by tactics of hybrid warfare involving cyberattacks, campaigns of misinformation and disinformation, and disruption to civil infrastructure, the economy and the vital services on which citizens and communities depend. For example, we have seen a spate of unexplained fires in installations around Europe, and in the past 24 hours have read the news with great interest in that context.

Such grey-zone operations may take place without any associated conventional military activities. They are often conducted by proxies, non-state actors or groups that may be state-controlled, state-sponsored or state-tolerated; or they may be conducted by covert means. They may be plausibly deniable and, although they may fall below the threshold of armed conflict, their consequences are likely to be just as serious as those of a more conventional attack.

Recent years have seen attacks on undersea cables and fuel pipelines; cyberattacks by state-sponsored actors, such as those leading to the SolarWinds hack in 2020 or the Hafnium attack in 2021; the jamming and spoofing of navigation satellite systems; and various sorts of drone activity, which of course can be conducted from hundreds of miles away. A preparedness to respond effectively to such attacks, or to recover quickly from them, makes them less worth while for the adversary and therefore helps to deter them.

My Lords, it is a pleasure to follow the noble Lord, Lord Harris of Haringey, with whose remarks I entirely agree. The noble Lord, Lord Trefgarne, has asked whether deterrence is still at the core of the UK’s defence policy; the Minister’s answer will surely be yes, so I shall use my allotted time to highlight just four of the many consequences of that anticipated affirmative.

It is quite clear that this Government, like the last, are committed to the maintenance of our strategic nuclear deterrent, through the continuous at-sea deployment of our Trident-armed submarines. But as we transition from the Vanguard to the Dreadnought, we shall for some time need to operate both classes of boat. However, the two types are very different and will require different crews and different logistic support chains. This will place a considerable strain on the Royal Navy and on defence resources in the round. What planning has taken place to ensure that the strain can be borne without damaging other areas of defence capability?

Of course, nuclear deterrence by itself is not nearly enough. Effective conventional deterrence exercised through NATO is essential if we are to have any chance of avoiding future war. But almost everyone, perhaps most importantly the Secretary of State for Defence himself, recognises that our Armed Forces are too small and inadequately equipped to constitute much of a deterrent at present.

Remedying this will be a long, difficult and expensive task, but, as the saying goes, it is the job never started that takes longest to finish. The substantially increased investment in our fighting capability, our combat sustainability and the defence-industrial capacity that underpins both needs to start now. When will the Government give clear evidence that the security of this country and its people really is their top priority?

I have mentioned nuclear and conventional deterrence, but these cannot be considered in isolation. The NATO doctrine developed during the Cold War recognised the need for a so-called escalation ladder that provided for a graduated response to increasing levels of aggression. One important element of graduated response was the provision of an increased element of choice in the boundary between conventional and nuclear war. Moving from conventional fighting to an all-out strategic nuclear exchange was seen as far too big a step. It would present politicians with almost impossible choices and would leave little or no room for second thoughts on either side. NATO’s tactical nuclear capability is greatly reduced from the Cold War, and the UK’s is now non-existent. What thought have the Government given to these missing rungs on the escalation ladder, which are an important contribution to the overall effectiveness of a deterrence posture?

My Lords, it is a pleasure to follow the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Stirrup. I declare my interests as a serving Army Reserve officer and a member of the APPG for Climate, Nature and Security. I congratulate my noble friend Lord Trefgarne on securing this important and timely debate. As noble Lords have already alluded to, deterrence is a broad subject, so I shall focus my remarks on the High North.

Due to climate change, natural resources and shifting geopolitical interests, the Arctic High North region has gained significant strategic importance for the United Kingdom. As the region warms, the melting sea-ice creates new opportunities and challenges, establishing the Arctic as a hot zone of environmental degradation, international competition and heightened insecurity. Opening new sea routes makes previously inaccessible resources such as oil, gas and minerals available, transforming the Arctic into a theatre of contest.

The Arctic region is home to critical shipping routes, such as the Northern Sea Route, which are becoming more viable due to melting ice. The NSR runs along Russia’s Arctic coast, providing a shortened connection between Europe and Asia. These routes could shorten global shipping times by nearly 40% and bypass traditional choke points such as the Suez Canal, offering significant economic advantages.

The region contains vast untapped natural resource reserves, including oil, gas and minerals. Control over these resources has become a geopolitical priority for nations with Arctic interests, including Russia, the United States and China, with China self-identifying, despite geographical terms, as a near-Arctic state. The Arctic’s proximity to critical defence zones makes it an area of military interest, particularly nuclear deterrence, early-warning radar systems and missile defence installations. In short, Arctic militarisation is amplifying strategic competition.

Russia has significantly ramped up its military presence in the Arctic, reopening old Soviet bases, building new ones and deploying advanced military capabilities, including nuclear-powered submarines and long-range missiles. The Arctic Trefoil base on Franz Josef Land is one of the most advanced installations, designed to operate all year round in extreme Arctic conditions, equipped with advanced radars, missile systems and infrastructure to support hundreds of personnel.

My Lords, there is direct deterrence and extended deterrence. The noble Lord, Lord Trefgarne, spoke about the credibility challenge that arises when states question the reliability of a defender’s commitment to protect allies, impacting extended deterrence.

The UK’s continuous at-sea deterrent, the CASD, has kept a nuclear-armed submarine patrolling undetected since 1969 to deter aggression. The nuclear policy in 2024 maintains a minimum credible and independent deterrent, used only in extreme self-defence and authorised solely by the Prime Minister. In 2023 the previous Conservative Government updated and prioritised an integrated multidomain deterrence strategy to counter state and transnational threats, with NATO as central. The UK’s nuclear deterrent pledged to NATO’s defence would be used only in extreme self-defence.

The Labour Government have affirmed NATO as a core to European and global security, and have committed to a new UK-EU security pact and improved defence ties with France, Germany and the Joint Expeditionary Force partners. The current Government pledge absolute support for the UK’s nuclear deterrent, including a triple-lock commitment to four nuclear submarines, continuous at-sea deterrence and future upgrades. Can the Minister confirm all this? Foreign Secretary David Lammy and Defence Secretary John Healey highlighted NATO’s role against Russia’s aggression and reinforced nuclear defence capabilities only in July this year.

Engaging with the moral implications of deterrence policy can lead to responsible decisions regarding the UK’s nuclear arsenal. Effective deterrence requires understanding and addresses complex motivations and perceptions. There are two strategies: deterrence by denial, which seeks to make aggression infeasible and relies on military presence, and deterrence by punishment, which threatens severe consequences but may be perceived as less credible. Historical evidence suggests that denial strategies are generally more reliable than punishment strategies, as they provide clearer signals of intent and capability to potential aggressors. The United States used deterrence effectively in Europe during the Cold War, leveraging its presence to complicate aggressors’ calculations and act as a trip-wire.

I am grateful to my noble friend Lord Trefgarne for introducing this Question for Short Debate. I used to read my father’s Hansard when my noble friend was a Minister in the Foreign Office and in the Ministry of Defence.

The noble Lord, Lord Harris of Haringey, is absolutely correct: this is not just about conventional military deterrence. He is right to be worried about the home base and society’s sentiments. If those things were damaged in a conflict, in the grey area, it could have devastating effects on our conventional operations.

I am sure that the answer to my noble friend’s Question is “yes, but”. Many noble Lords have touched on nuclear deterrence, where our defence posture and signalling are absolutely clear and effective. As we have seen, we have not been cowed by President Putin’s nuclear sabre-rattling in the conflict in Ukraine. I am pleased to observe that this Government are as sound as their predecessor on nuclear deterrence but, several years ago, the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Craig of Radley, observed that an inadequate conventional deterrent will result in the nuclear trip-wire being set too low. The noble and gallant Lord, Lord Stirrup, just asked the Minister about tactical nuclear weapons and deterrence; I look forward to his answer.

In conventional deterrence, our signalling is not positive or clear to any potential adversary. For instance, it is easy for a potential adversary to measure our land logistics capability and intent. They will note that we are still selling off perfectly serviceable, brand-new logistic vehicles to meet resource accounting and budgeting requirements. In the current situation, at the large scale of effort we ought to be able to deploy on land in 12 weeks, but I do not think we can do it at all at the moment.

I keep banging on about the essential need to undertake large-scale exercises out of area and overseas to demonstrate and test our conventional capability—or the capability that we should have. My noble friend Lord Harlech touched on the fact that the Russians regularly exercise with large numbers of troops. Yes, it is expensive to do and you can save money by not undertaking such exercises, but it is cheaper than increasing your capability and provides much more conventional deterrence. It also exposes any unrecognised weaknesses in your current capability. Currently, we have too few big exercises and the exercises we undertake are too short in duration, in order to save money.

My Lords, my interest in this area arises from my early academic research on the principles of discrimination and proportion in the just war tradition and their applicability in a nuclear age. This interest was further intensified in my time as dean of King’s College London during the 1980s, when I had the privilege of being a member of a number of think tanks reflecting on the nature of nuclear deterrence, many of them under the influence of the much-missed Sir Michael Quinlan, the architect of British defence policy in its strategic and ethical aspects.

I continue to support a policy of deterrence which contains a nuclear component, but I do so with moral fear and spiritual trembling. It is a morally awesome policy to support. It can be supported only in the belief that it is in principle fundamentally stable, not because human beings are any better than they were—far from it—but because, for the first time in human history, it could not conceivably be in the interest of any power to go to war with another which possessed nuclear weapons. In the words of President Reagan, a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought.

I was never a supporter of CND, but it performed an important role in reminding the world of the horrific nature of these weapons. I was appalled a few years ago when there was a period of tension between India and Pakistan to listen to some of the generals involved talking about using nuclear weapons as though they were like any other weapons. They are not like other weapons, and we must never forget that.

We must also not forget that the moral principles which apply to the use of all armed force are equally applicable in a nuclear age: I mean the principles of discrimination and proportion. There are very distinguished ethicists who believe that even the threatened use of nuclear weapons would violate these principles, but when I was most involved, British defence policy was built on the conviction that this was not inevitably the case. I trust that this is so. In that connection, I want to identify with the question raised by the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Stirrup, about graduated deterrence and the ladder of escalation, because that is fundamental to not only British deterrence policy but the possibility of maintaining the use of weapons which are discriminate and proportionate. It is a vital question to which I hope the Minister will be able to give a satisfactory response.

My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Trefgarne, for initiating this debate, and I hope that the Hansard is sent to the noble Lord, Lord Robertson of Port Ellen. Of course, deterrence must remain a cornerstone of our defence policy, otherwise there is no reason to have one at all. But it is also important to realise that other countries have a very good grasp of our defence capacity. I do not know whether other noble Lords watched the American series, “Corridors of Power”, a PBS production, from which you could see that the Americans had a much clearer grasp of the limitations of European power than we appear to have.

We need to define much more clearly what we wish to do, then we need to find the resources to do it. I am not terribly impressed with the 2.5% or 3% argument. What we need to look at is what we need and a pathway for achieving it. I was struck last Friday in our debate when the noble Lord, Lord Stevens of Birmingham, pointed out that we had given Ukraine £172 million-worth of equipment, but that it would cost £2.7 billion to replace it. That shows how out of date it was, but it also shows how much money we need to spend to bring our forces up to a level where they can do their job. That is far more important than percentages.

We need to define clearly what our role is in defence. First, it is clearly to defend the home territory. Secondly, I suggest that we need to keep our garrison in the Falklands. Thirdly, we need to keep our bases in Cyprus, which are quite valuable for operations in the Gulf. Finally, we need to pull our resources together with our Baltic allies to look at both the High North, referred to by my noble friend Lord Harlech, and the Baltics, which are within Europe but certainly threatened by Russia. Only by getting together Finland, Sweden and all the countries around the Baltic, including Poland, Germany, the Netherlands and Denmark, are we going to be able to put forward a credible defence. We have to work together and exercise together; we have to have joint exercises and revive the Arctic Council as a viable organisation to talk to the Russians, but also to protect the High North.