Crime and Policing Bill (Eleventh sitting)

The Committee consisted of the following Members:

Chairs: Sir Roger Gale, Mark Pritchard, † Emma Lewell, Dr Rosena Allin-Khan

† Barros-Curtis, Mr Alex (Cardiff West) (Lab)

Bishop, Matt (Forest of Dean) (Lab)

† Burton-Sampson, David (Southend West and Leigh) (Lab)

† Cross, Harriet (Gordon and Buchan) (Con)

† Davies-Jones, Alex (Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Justice)

† Johnson, Dame Diana (Minister for Policing and Crime Prevention)

† Jones, Louise (North East Derbyshire) (Lab)

† Mather, Keir (Selby) (Lab)

† Phillips, Jess (Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for the Home Department)

† Platt, Jo (Leigh and Atherton) (Lab/Co-op)

† Rankin, Jack (Windsor) (Con)

† Robertson, Joe (Isle of Wight East) (Con)

Sabine, Anna (Frome and East Somerset) (LD)

Sullivan, Dr Lauren (Gravesham) (Lab)

† Taylor, David (Hemel Hempstead) (Lab)

† Taylor, Luke (Sutton and Cheam) (LD)

† Vickers, Matt (Stockton West) (Con)

Robert Cope, Claire Cozens, Adam Evans, Committee Clerks

† attended the Committee

Public Bill Committee

[Emma Lewell in the Chair]

Crime and Policing Bill

We continue line-by-line scrutiny of the Crime and Policing Bill. I have a few preliminary reminders for the Committee. As it is warm today, Members may take their jacket off if they wish—I will probably take mine off. Please switch all your electronic devices to silent. No food or drink is permitted during sittings of the Committee, except for the water provided. Hansard colleagues will be grateful if Members could email their speaking notes to hansardnotes@parliament.uk or, alternatively, pass them to one of the Hansard colleagues in the room. If Members wish to speak, I remind them to bob to catch my eye.

Clause 78

Electronic devices for use in vehicle offences

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

With this it will be convenient to consider clause 79 stand part.

Good morning, Ms Lewell. It is a pleasure to see you in the Chair on this glorious day.

Clause 78 introduces two new criminal offences in relation to electronic devices used in vehicle-related theft. The first will criminalise the possession of such devices, and the second will criminalise the importing, making, adapting, supplying or offering to supply such devices. Both offences require a reasonable suspicion that the device will be used in connection with the theft of a vehicle, theft of anything in a vehicle, or taking a vehicle without authority.

A significant proportion of vehicle theft is driven by serious and organised crime groups, and it costs millions of pounds in social and economic harm each year. Given the high demand for stolen vehicles and vehicle parts, this is an attractive and lucrative area for criminals to profit from. Criminals find ways to overcome security measures, even in the latest vehicle models, by using electronic devices to exploit vulnerabilities in vehicles and new technologies. The Metropolitan Police Service estimates that electronic devices are used in approximately 60% of vehicle thefts in London.

The clause does not define specific electronic devices, but uses a broad definition to cover any electronic device that could be used in vehicle theft. That ensures that the legislation is future-proof for any new devices that may be developed and used by criminals. The offence will be triable either way and, on conviction on indictment, will carry a maximum sentence of five years’ imprisonment, an unlimited fine or both.

We have also provided a defence for a person charged with this offence to show that they did not intend or suspect that the relevant article would be used in connection with the theft of a vehicle or anything in a vehicle. The clause also outlines that the court may assume that the defendant possessed the relevant article where it is on any premises at the same time as the defendant, or on premises at which the defendant was the occupier or an habitual user otherwise than as a member of the public. The defendant will have a defence where they can show that they did not know of an article’s presence on the premises or had no control over the article. During proceedings, a court can also assume that the articles in question are intended to be used in vehicle theft. That reflects the fact that the specified articles have few legitimate uses.

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Ms Lewell.

Clause 78 rightly introduces new offences aimed at preventing the misuse of electronic devices such as signal jammers, signal amplifiers and devices used to access vehicle wiring systems for committing vehicle-related crimes. The offences include the possession, importation, manufacturing, adaptation, supply or offer to supply such devices when there is reasonable suspicion that they will be used in connection with crimes such as vehicle theft, stealing items from a vehicle or taking a vehicle without authority.

The subsections provide a defence for individuals who can prove that they did not intend or suspect that the device would be used for a relevant offence, and they allow a court to presume possession of a device if it is found on premises occupied or habitually used by the accused, unless the accused can demonstrate that they were unaware of its presence or had no control over it.

Clause 79 clarifies the evidential burden in cases under clause 78, which deals with electronic devices used in vehicles. It explains that where a defendant seeks to rely on such a defence—for example, that they did not intend the device to be used in a crime—they must provide enough evidence to raise the issue, and the prosecution must then disprove it beyond reasonable doubt.

Clauses 78 and 79 are needed to strengthen the legal response to the growing threat of tech-enabled vehicle theft, which has become increasingly sophisticated with the use of electronic devices such as signal jammers and relay attack tools. Clause 78 creates targeted offences around the possession, manufacture and supply of such devices, recognising the role they play in modern vehicle crime. By focusing on intent and suspicion, the clause allows for earlier intervention and prevention even before a theft occurs.

We support the measures, but what consultation was done with law enforcement, manufacturers and cyber-security experts to develop the provisions? Does the Minister expect this designation to lead to more asset confiscation from organised crime groups involved in vehicle theft?

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Ms Lewell, as always.

The Liberal Democrats very much welcome the measures in clauses 78 and 79 to give the police and courts more powers to reduce vehicle theft. It is disheartening to see so much car theft in our cities, particularly London. In south-west London, a regular complaint of residents is that the police are not able to do anything about it. The police themselves are struggling. The technology has become an arms race, and these clauses are needed to keep up with thefts that are becoming so much more technologically advanced.

It is depressing that a litany of old-fashioned manual theft prevention measures are now necessary again—people are having to use steering locks and wheel clamps—because the police cannot keep up with the technology that thieves employ. We are very supportive of these measures to give the police the tools they need to crack down on this incredibly distressing form of theft.

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Ms Lewell.

Signal jammers and other electronic devices are a real problem, and one that many of my residents did not realise exist until they were hit. I will never forget knocking on a door one Saturday morning, when the resident opened and said, “Where’s my car gone?” She said, “I’d locked it. It should be here,” but it turned out, again, that her car had been stolen using such a technique. The immediate inconvenience of a theft is significant, but it is not the only consequence. The victim may have to rearrange plans as they no longer have their car, and there are longer-term issues such as increased insurance premiums because of the theft.

Keyless cars, which once seemed super-convenient, are now seen by many as a significant security flaw. I will never forget watching on CCTV after my neighbour’s car was stolen a few years ago using this exact method. The individual walked up to the car, gained entry and drove off, all in 45 seconds. Essex police has said that its stolen vehicles intelligence unit recovered £13.5 million-worth of stolen vehicles and parts in 2024—this is a real issue. I welcome clauses 78 and 79 and the tough new penalties for those who consider it appropriate to commit this crime, which is so disruptive to people’s lives.

It is a pleasure to speak under your chairship, Ms Lewell. I rise to speak in favour of clause 78, which tackles the growing scourge of criminals using high-tech devices to steal from hard-working people, because I know how important this is in my community. For 14 years, between 2010 and 2024, crime in my patch doubled. These thieves no longer need a crowbar; they use laptops, signal boosters and hacking tools to rob families of their vehicles, their livelihoods and their sense of safety. Enough is enough. Clause 78 strikes directly at those parasites by making it an offence not just to steal but to possess, import, manufacture or supply the very devices that make these thefts possible—it cuts off the tools of their horrific trade.

I recently heard from a Hemel resident who, back in December 2023, had his truck broken into and all his work tools stolen. Then, in November 2024, his family’s disability car was also stolen. Later, two of their neighbours’ cars were stolen along with hundreds of pounds-worth of equipment, having been parked side by side in a lay-by by their homes.

This clause sends a message: “If you are gearing up to commit a crime, this country will come down on you like a ton of bricks.” Let us be clear that this is not about targeting legitimate businesses or technology users; it is about targeting criminals, gangs and the shadow economy that thrives on stealing from working people and laughing as they do it. Subsection (3) rightly offers a defence for those acting innocently, but it removes the cloak of plausible deniability that too many criminals have hidden behind for too long.

The people of Hemel Hempstead are fed up. They are tired of waking up to find their cars stolen, they are tired of seeing criminals treated as an inevitable part of life, and they are tired of seeing their vans broken into and their tools stolen. They expect and demand that we act, and act we must. We have to stand up for the delivery driver who loses their van, for the care worker who needs her car to get to her patients, and for every family who fear that they will become a victim of crime. It is not enough simply to chase stolen vehicles after they are gone. We must prevent these thefts from happening in the first place, and we must choke off the supply of tools that fuel this criminality. We must make it clear that there are no easy pickings for those who prey on working people.

I welcome the support for the two clauses. We all know the devastation that the theft of a motor vehicle and its contents can cause to our constituents. I want specifically to address the questions posed by the shadow Minister, the hon. Member for Stockton West. As he may recall, vehicle crime was raised in the previous Government’s serious organised crime consultation. After that, conversations with law enforcement, vehicle manufacturers and Ofcom have confirmed that this is a key issue. I know from speaking to car manufacturers that they welcome the legislation.

We are also working closely with the National Police Chiefs’ Council lead for vehicle crime to reduce vehicle crime through the national vehicle crime working group and the recently established, industry-funded national vehicle crime reduction partnership. The vehicle crime action plan was formed through the national vehicle crime working group and in conjunction with the Home Office, and it includes commitments to work with motor industry representatives to consider crime prevention measures that can be taken to prevent thefts.

The hon. Member for Stockton West also asked about the effect of the clauses on offending. As I indicated, designating the new offence as a lifestyle offence under POCA will support the increased confiscation of the proceeds of vehicle crime, which chimes well with sending a clear message to criminals that enough is enough and that we will come after them.

With that, I commend the clauses to the Committee.

Clause 80

Possession of a SIM farm

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

With this it will be convenient to consider the following:

Clauses 81 and 82 stand part.

Schedule 10.

Clauses 83 to 85 stand part.

This group relates to SIM farms. We know that criminals abuse telecommunications networks, including texts and calls, to target people and defraud victims at a significant scale. We most likely all know of a friend, family member or constituent who has received such a text, or we have even received one ourselves—I certainly have. Such scams prey on the public, particularly those who are vulnerable. They can have a devastating emotional impact and can inflict serious financial harm on victims.

Scam texts are frequently traced back to SIM farms—electronic devices that can hold sometimes hundreds of physical SIM cards, which can be used to send out thousands of scam texts and calls in seconds. They are currently legal for anyone to buy, and it is easy to find suppliers online, making it easy to commit telecoms fraud on a very large scale. Clauses 80 and 81 therefore provide for new offences that criminalise the possession of SIM farms without good reason, and their supply without undertaking adequate due diligence.

Clauses 83 to 85 will also allow the potential extension of the ban to further technologies that may be exploited by criminals to scam the UK public, with any such extension subject to a high level of scrutiny and checks. The new offences will make it difficult for criminals to access and use these devices for the purpose of fraud. They will give the police the necessary tools to disrupt fraudsters, even before they start using SIM farms to commit fraud.

Clause 80 bans the possession of a SIM farm without good reason. A person can possess a SIM farm if they can prove that they have a good reason or lawful authority to do so. The Government have identified several legitimate uses of SIM farms, such as multi-SIM devices used in broadcast and programme-making to facilitate the production and delivery of live and pre-recorded broadcasts.

SIM farms are also used by transport providers to offer wi-fi—I am sure most hon. Members who have to travel frequently will welcome the availability of wi-fi—not only on trains, but on trams, buses, coaches and ferries, as the devices switch between mobile network operators, depending on which has the best reception where the device is located at any particular moment. We have worked closely with stakeholders to develop a defence that will allow such legitimate use to continue uninterrupted, while stopping criminals using SIM farms for criminal activities.

To supply a SIM farm, suppliers will need to demonstrate they do so in the course of business, or that they had good reason or lawful authority to possess the SIM farm in the first place. Suppliers will also have to undertake reasonable customer checks to ensure that the customers they are supplying with SIM farms have the right to possess one. They will also have to show that they have made a record of those checks.

Both the offences created by clauses 80 and 81 will be summary offences, subject to a maximum penalty of an unlimited fine in England and Wales, or a fine not exceeding level 5 on the standard scale, currently £5,000, in Scotland and Northern Ireland.

Clause 82 provides for the definition of “SIM farm” for the purposes of the offences in clauses 80 and 81. The definition captures devices that contain or incorporate five or more physical removable SIM cards for the purpose of making calls and sending or receiving texts. It seeks to avoid capturing any data-only devices that are not capable of making calls or sending texts.

The pace of technological change is rapid and fraudsters are quick to adapt their methods to take advantage of emerging capabilities. Clause 82 therefore includes a regulation-making power that will enable the Secretary of State to amend the definition of “SIM farm” if future SIM farms or equivalent devices fall outside the definition, thus ensuring that criminals do not take advantage of emerging capabilities.

Building on that, it is important to ensure that the ban on SIM farms is not circumvented by the development of new technologies and that we have the power to rapidly prohibit other types of technology used to facilitate fraud where those are identified in the future. Therefore, clauses 83 and 84 make it an offence to possess or supply a “specified article” that uses electronic communication networks or services to perpetrate fraud. Clause 85 confers on the Secretary of State a regulation-making power to specify the articles for the purposes of clauses 83 and 84. The Secretary of State will be required to consult before laying regulations and any regulations will be subject to the affirmative procedure.

Finally, schedule 10 provides the police a power of entry to search for SIM farms and specified articles used in connection with the new offences created by clauses 80, 81, 83 and 84. I must stress that schedule 10 does not introduce novel or unprecedented police powers. It replicates powers already in the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 in England and Wales, and equivalent powers elsewhere, and applies them to these new offences. I commend the clauses to the Committee.

A SIM farm is a system used to manage and operate a large number of SIM cards simultaneously, often using multiple mobile devices or modems controlled by central software. Farms can contain hundreds or even thousands of SIM cards, and they are typically used to send or receive a high volume of messages, calls or mobile data across networks.

While there can be legitimate uses for SIM farms, such as in telecoms testing or large-scale communication platforms, they are commonly associated with illicit and fraudulent activities. One of their most concerning uses is in the spread of spam and phishing texts, where mass messages with links to scams or malware are sent to unsuspecting individuals. They are also frequently used to bypass verification systems by creating large numbers of fake accounts on social media, messaging apps or online services. In other cases, SIM farms are employed in SIM box fraud, a scheme in which international calls are rerouted and disguised as local calls, depriving telecom providers and Governments of revenue and making the original caller harder to trace.

According to research carried out by Ofcom in August 2022, the scale of nuisance and potentially fraudulent communications across UK mobile networks remains alarmingly high. An overwhelming 75% of mobile users reported receiving suspicious texts or calls in just a three-month period, highlighting the widespread nature of the issue. These figures demonstrate the persistent and pervasive threat posed by scam communications, underlining the urgent need for more robust protections and enforcement mechanisms to safeguard the public.

SIM farms pose serious risks to national security and digital infrastructure. Their use can lead to network congestion, overwhelming mobile networks and disrupting legitimate communications. More critically, they are often exploited by organised crime networks to co-ordinate illegal activity as they are cheap, disposable and difficult to trace. That makes it significantly harder for law enforcement to monitor communications or link messages to specific individuals. The previous Conservative Government committed to banning SIM farms as part of their fraud strategy announced in May 2023. They subsequently launched a consultation on how best to implement the ban, although, interestingly, there were only 50 responses, many from businesses or individuals identifying as legitimate SIM farm users who opposed a ban.

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Ms Lewell. I support the clauses, which outlaw the use of SIM farms and the supply of SIM farms to others.

It is a defence for a person to show that they have “good reason” to use a SIM farm. Examples are given in the Bill, including providing broadcasting services, operating or maintaining a public transport service and tracking freight. I do not suggest that amendments are necessary, but I wonder whether the Minister can help us understand the provisions. What are examples of legitimate use in broadcasting services or tracking freight? These are areas of legitimate commercial activity that lay people are not particularly familiar with. I would be interested to know why a company would want to use multiple SIMs and phone numbers to track freight, for example. It is not meant to be a complex question.

I am glad that there is cross-party support for these measures. The clauses were, on the whole, included in the Criminal Justice Bill introduced by the previous Government.

Fighting fraud is a top priority for this Government and tackling it is really important not only for our safer streets mission but for our growth agenda. We want to address the full range of fraud threats that occur. We want to close the systemic enablers that criminals are able to exploit to operate at scale and without detection, such as SIM farms.

The hon. Member for Stockton West is right that such a provision was included in the Criminal Justice Bill, but we have updated the definition of SIM farm to reflect newly emerging use cases. In response to feedback from stakeholders, we are creating an additional offence for the possession and supply of additional technologies, to be specified in the future, with appropriate exceptions to avoid unnecessary restrictions on legitimate businesses and professionals. I hope that goes some way to reassuring the hon. Member about why we are trying to future-proof these clauses. On the issue of review, the provisions will be reviewed two years after commencement.

On the point about legitimate activity, as I said, the list in the Bill is not exhaustive; it gives some indication of legitimate reasons why a business or organisation might have a SIM farm in its possession. Whether a reason is reasonable and stands up to scrutiny will obviously be a matter for the court to decide. The list is not exhaustive, in order to provide flexibility; as I said, this area is changing rapidly. In the coming weeks, months and years there may be new legitimate reasons for businesses to possess a SIM farm to assist them in providing a service or selling something. The clauses are constructed as they are in order to allow that flexibility.

I beg to move amendment 51, in clause 86, page 98, line 2, at end insert—

“(3) The defence described in subsection (2) is only applicable if a person has given written notice to a police station nearest to the public place that is in a locality designated under section 87(1).

(4) Where it is not reasonably practicable to deliver written notice under subsection (3), a person must inform a constable within the locality designated under section 87(1).”

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Clause stand part.

Clauses 87, 88 and 91 stand part.

New clause 34—Meaning of serious disruption to the life of the community—

“(1) Section 12 of the Public Order Act 1986 (imposing conditions on public processions) is amended as follows.

(2) In subsection (2A), for the words from ‘, the cases’ to the end substitute—

‘(a) the cases in which a public procession in England and Wales may result in serious disruption to the life of the community include, in particular, where it may, by way of physical obstruction, result in—

(i) the prevention of, or a hindrance that is more than minor to, the carrying out of day-to-day activities (including in particular the making of a journey),

(ii) the prevention of, or a delay that is more than minor to, the delivery of a time-sensitive product to consumers of that product, or

(iii) the prevention of, or a disruption that is more than minor to, access to any essential goods or any essential service,

(b) in considering whether a public procession in England and Wales may result in serious disruption to the life of the community, the senior police officer—

(i) must take into account all relevant disruption, and

(ii) may take into account any relevant cumulative disruption, and

(c) “community”, in relation to a public procession in England and Wales, means any group of persons that may be affected by the procession, whether or not all or any of those persons live or work in the vicinity of the procession.’.

(3) In subsection (2B), for ‘subsection (2A)(a)’ substitute ‘subsection (2A) and this subsection—

“access to any essential goods or any essential service” includes, in particular, access to—

(a) the supply of money, food, water, energy or fuel,

(b) a system of communication,

(c) a place of worship,

(d) a transport facility,

(e) an educational institution, or

(f) a service relating to health;

“area”, in relation to a public procession or public assembly, means such area as the senior police officer considers appropriate, having regard to the nature and extent of the disruption that may result from the procession or assembly;

Clause 86 will criminalise the act of wearing or otherwise using an item as a face covering that conceals someone’s own identity or that of another person when in an area that the police have designated. A designation can be made only in relation to an area where the police reasonably believe that a protest may take place or is taking place, that the protest is likely to involve or has involved the commission of offences, and that a designation would prevent or control the commission of offences. The offence will carry a maximum penalty of one month’s imprisonment, a £1,000 fine, or both.

Current legislation gives police the power to direct people to remove their face coverings in designated areas, as well as to seize face coverings where they reasonably believe people are wearing them wholly or mainly for the purpose of concealing their identity. However, individuals can follow the direction of an officer to remove their face covering but then move to a new area and put the face covering back on. With growing frequency we have seen protesters using a face covering to conceal their identity, clearly with the aim of avoiding a conviction for criminal activity in a designated area.

Whether I or any individual hon. Member agrees with each protest is beside the point. The right to protest has long been at the heart of British democracy, but there are legitimate ways to protest and illegitimate ways to protest. In particular, since the onset of large-scale pro-Palestinian demonstrations, the Metropolitan police have made hundreds of arrests in connection with the protests. Those arrests encompass a range of offences, including breaches of Public Order Act conditions, public nuisance, assault of emergency workers and support for proscribed organisations. Notably, during the protest on 18 January 2025, over 70 individuals were arrested after attempting to breach the agreed protest conditions. The Metropolitan police described it as

“the highest number of arrests we have seen, in response to the most significant escalation in criminality.”

The cost of policing the protests is reaching enormous levels. The Standard reported in May last year that the cost in London had reached over £40 million, an average of £6 million a month between October 2023 and March 2024—eyewatering sums of money that I am sure most people and most Members of this House would prefer the police were using to crack down on shoplifting, mobile phone theft and violent crime.

Can the hon. Gentleman give examples of how this will be enacted? Would the person who has permission to wear a face covering be given notice by the police? Would they be given a permission slip that they will wave above their head when they are taking part in a march, or does he imagine this as a tabard that they wear that allows them to cover their face? Can he give some examples of how he imagines this would be implemented in practical terms?

I thank the hon. Member for his constructive question. The problem with this defence is that it will obviously be abused. People who are malicious will claim these things after the fact; my amendment is an attempt to change the emphasis slightly. I appreciate that there will be difficulties with enforcement, but the point is that people should have to do this in advance. People who are malicious will not do so, and will not be given permission, so the police can then take action, as opposed to a crime happening, only for the police to go to the CCTV footage of the moment and find that there is nothing to be done.

I am listening carefully to the hon. Member. I agree with what he started with, but I am curious to know how he thinks this will work in practice. What practicalities do the police have in place, resource-wise and operationally, in order to deal with this? Similarly, how feasible will it be for the police to deliver notice orally, under proposed subsection (4), in the midst of a protest, when they are busy managing the protest and ensuring that it is safe and secure?

I appreciate the operational challenges; I would suggest that this would simply be automated online. My aim is to stop whole groups of protesters wearing masks. My view is that police should reject those applications if they are not legitimate, at which point they can treat it collectively as an offence.

I have a broader question for the Minister. I was thinking about when I would consider it legitimate to wear a mask at a protest. The only instance that I could think of—I am not saying that there are not more—is when, outside the Chinese embassy for example, those protesting what is happening in Hong Kong wish to protect themselves from being targeted by the Chinese state. With my amendment, those individuals should be able to declare that to the relevant police forces ahead of the event. I do wonder how we give proper protection to Hong Kong activists such as Tony Chung and Carmen Lau, who have both had threatening letters sent to their neighbours offering 1 million Hong Kong dollars— 100 grand in our currency—for information about them, or for delivering them to the Chinese embassy. Legitimate protest is in the great spirit of democracy and we need to ensure that we defend people exercising that right properly, particularly in this instance, which would be a legitimate use of face coverings.

I wish to raise concerns, as I did in my intervention, about the practicalities of the amendment. Although the hon. Member for Windsor did come on to discuss the case of Hong Kong protestors, we have seen an increase in surveillance by the Chinese state and the Hong Kong authorities of overseas protestors, and transnational repression of democracy activists is an increased worry for many of our residents. I worry that the amendment hinders the freedom to protest without worry of identification and family and friends being targeted elsewhere. This is not only about Hong Kong practising transnational repression in our country, but that is a useful example on which to base my objection. Under amendment 51, those seeking to come to a protest and exercise their democratic right would be required to register in advance and have some sort of certificate or permit that would then have to be checked, one by one. I think that puts an additional barrier in the way of exercising our democratic rights. On that basis, I invite the hon. Member to withdraw his amendment.

We are all too familiar with those who use protests and the anonymity of face coverings to commit criminal acts and intimidate others. When individuals conceal their identity, whether through masks, scarves or other objects, it becomes much harder for police to identify suspects involved in criminal activity such as violence, vandalism or intimidation. That anonymity can embolden a small number of individuals to commit offences, in the belief that they will not be held accountable. In 2024, masked individuals were reported to have attacked police officers in Rotherham during protests, leading to discussions about banning face coverings at such events. Members might recall that in Birmingham, a group of men wearing balaclavas and waving Palestinian flags stormed a pub, assaulted a patron and caused property damage. That incident was part of wider unrest across the UK, prompting investigations by law enforcement.

My hon. Friend the Member for Windsor has ably set out the purposes and benefits of amendment 51, which seeks to provide a framework requiring those concealing their identity to provide advance notice. We heard during our evidence sessions about the legitimate reasons why people may wish to conceal their identity, and we are also aware of the need to protect the public from those who exploit such concealment to do harm to others. The amendment could provide a great opportunity for law enforcement to assess and monitor situations properly, offering a more flexible and accountable approach to managing exemptions. Does the Minister feel there could be enforcement benefits to having a more flexible power to assess the use of face coverings?

Clause 86 rightly introduces a new offence aimed at individuals concealing their identity while attending public protests in designated areas. It recognises and provides for certain legitimate reasons that a person might have for covering their face, including those related to health, religious observance or occupation. It also rightly sets out obligations on the authorities to ensure public awareness of the rule when it is in effect, as well as the sanctions for those who fail to comply. The clause sends a clear message that protest should be lawful, peaceful and safe. When used appropriately and with the public properly informed, the measure could greatly enhance the safety of both demonstrators and the wider public by discouraging those who intend to use anonymity as a cover for criminal acts.

New clause 34 aims to provide a clear, precise definition of what constitutes serious disruption to the life of the community in the context of public processions and assemblies under the Public Order Act 1986. It seeks to address the impact of public gatherings on day-to-day activities, essential services, and the delivery of critical goods, providing a more robust framework for assessing the level of disruption caused. The new clause introduces an expanded definition of what constitutes serious disruption, specifying that public processions or assemblies could cause serious disruption if they obstruct day-to-day activities such as making journeys, delay the delivery of time-sensitive products, or block access to essential goods and services, such as healthcare, food, water or transport. This makes it clear that any event disrupting the basic functioning of society can be subject to this regulation.

By focusing on disruptions that are “more than minor”, the amendment ensures that the threshold for intervention is not too low, preserving the right to protest while protecting vital services. The new clause further requires authorities to consider the combined effects of multiple public events happening in the same area. This could involve multiple protests or assemblies that might overlap in time or space, creating a larger disruption than any single event alone. By considering cumulative disruption, the new clause gives authorities greater discretion and foresight in managing public order, ensuring that overlapping events are appropriately regulated to minimise community impact.

One of the key reasons for the new clause is to address concerns raised by the Ziegler judgment, which many would argue has limited the ability of authorities to regulate public gatherings effectively. The judgment may have hindered efforts to impose conditions on public events that were causing significant disruption, but this new clause would clarify the legal framework and provide stronger grounds for intervention, particularly when events cause disruption to essential services or public safety. By doing so, it would help to ensure that law enforcement can act decisively to maintain public order while respecting individuals’ rights to protest.

The new clause would provide better protection of public interests by ensuring that essential services and the normal functioning of society are not unduly disrupted by public gatherings; it would also offer a clearer, more predictable legal framework, reducing ambiguity for both law enforcement and protest organisers, so that everyone knows the boundaries of acceptable behaviour during public events.

Clause 86 introduces a new criminal offence for a person

“wearing or otherwise using an item that conceals their identity or another person’s identity”

in a public place that has been designated by the police. It is a defence for a person to prove that they wore or used the item for a purpose related to either the health of the person or others, religious observance or the person’s work. Clause 87 provides that

“A constable whose rank is at least that of inspector may designate a locality in England or Wales that is in their police area for a specified period not exceeding 24 hours if they reasonably believe that—

(a) a public assembly, or public procession, which constitutes a protest may take place or is taking place in the locality,

(b) the protest is likely to involve or has involved the commission of offences, and

(c) it is expedient, in order to prevent or limit the commission of offences, to designate the locality”.

Earlier we heard evidence—the hon. Members for Windsor and for Sutton and Cheam raised this example—about people, perhaps from the Hong Kong community, protesting against the Chinese authorities, and how this provision could affect those who legitimately want to cover their faces because of the reprisals and repercussions that might be threatened against their families back in Hong Kong. I want to be clear: this measure does not create an offence of concealing identity at every protest. The offence applies only to a protest in a locality designated by the police, and they can designate a locality only where they reasonably believe that

“the protest is likely to involve or has involved the commission of offences,”

and that

“it is expedient, in order to prevent or limit the commission of offences, to designate the locality”.

The shadow Minister spoke about an incident that happened in my constituency. I want to assure everybody that the people who committed those criminal offences, which were not part of any protest, were held accountable and sent to prison.

It is always good to hear when people are held accountable for their criminal actions and punished accordingly, so I am very pleased to hear that.

I want to explain fully how clause 86 will work. At the moment, the police have existing powers to require individuals to remove disguises in designated localities where criminality is likely, but those powers have not always worked in the way that we all want them to, with individuals complying with directions to remove disguises, but then later putting them back on. In a large protest, it is difficult to prevent that from occurring, which is why the new offence makes it a criminal offence to conceal an identity as soon as the locality has been designated.

I want to make it clear that the police have to take all reasonable steps to notify the public that a designation has been made, including the nature of the offence, the locality to which the designation applies and the period during which the designation will be enforced. A designation must be in writing, except for where that is not reasonably practicable, such as in a live and rapidly moving public order situation, in which case the police can make an oral designation instead and record that in writing as soon as reasonably practicable. The maximum penalty for this offence is one month’s imprisonment or a level 3 fine not exceeding £1,000.

Let me turn to the amendments in this group. Amendment 51 seeks to limit the defences in clause 86 to those who have given written notice to the police or, if not reasonably practicable, oral notice. While I understand the motivation behind the amendment, we believe that clause 86 already provides a sufficient and specific statutory defence for individuals who wear or use identity-concealing items for purposes related to health, religious observance or work. Crucially, this defence is subject to a reverse burden of proof, which means that the individual must prove on the balance of probabilities that their use of such an item was for one of these legitimate purposes. This mechanism already ensures that only those with genuine reasons can rely on the defence without placing an undue burden on the prosecution.

I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Clause 89

Possession of pyrotechnic articles at protests

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

During recent protests, the police have observed that protesters are increasingly using flares and fireworks. Although there is existing legislation that prohibits the use of fireworks in public places and the possession of explosives other than for a lawful purpose, it does not consistently cover the mere possession of flares and fireworks during protests. The clause therefore creates a new criminal offence of possession of a pyrotechnic article for those taking part in a protest.

The misuse of pyrotechnic articles has implications regarding public safety. This new measure will enable the police to take the necessary preventive action against such behaviour during protests. It is a defence for a person to show they had a reasonable excuse for having the pyrotechnic article, such as a flare or firework, in their possession at the material time, or, in particular, to show they had it in their possession for use in connection with work.

The offence applies only to those taking part in a protest. It does not capture a person who is taking part in, for example, a cultural or religious event where pyrotechnic articles are customarily used. The maximum penalty for the offence will be a level 3 fine of £1,000. I commend the clause to the Committee.

I am content.

I am grateful for the hon. Member’s support and hope the Committee will agree to the clause standing part of the Bill.

Clause 90

War memorials

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

With this it will be convenient to consider schedule 11.

We all understand and accept that war memorials play a vital role in commemorating those who have made the ultimate sacrifice, including those who have no known grave. They offer a place of reflection and should be protected.

In some recent protests, protesters have climbed on war memorials, causing anger and outrage among the public. The new offence will provide greater clarity for policing. In particular, the measure makes it clear that the act of climbing on specified war memorials is unacceptable. It gives police the powers they need to ensure that justice is delivered to those who engage in such disrespectful conduct.

A war memorial is an object that preserves the memory of a war or conflict and those involved in it. It can take any form and be created by anyone at any time. It can be permanent or temporary; it can be a living thing such as a tree; it can a building or a more traditional plaque, monument or sculpture. The offence is intended to ensure that our most significant war memorials are used for their intended purpose of providing remembrance for those who have died and have no grave to be visited, and are not to be disrespected.

Schedule 11 specifies 25 war memorials, including the Royal Artillery memorial and the Cenotaph in London, the Portsmouth naval war memorial, and the Liverpool Cenotaph. The clause includes a power to amend the list of specified war memorials in schedule 11 by regulations.

The penalty for the offence will be a level 3 fine of up to £1,000 or imprisonment for a term not exceeding three months. It is a defence for a person charged with the offence to provide that they had good reason for climbing on the specified war memorial, or had the owner or occupier’s consent to climb on it. That will ensure that activities such as maintenance approved by the owner will not be criminalised. If a war memorial has a base or steps that are designed for individuals to climb, individuals will not be criminalised. On that basis, I commend the clause and schedule 11 to the Committee.

The clause introduces a new offence targeted at individuals who climb on designated war memorials without lawful justification. It is designed to protect sites of national remembrance and ensure that they are treated with appropriate respect and dignity. The act of climbing on such memorials, often during protests or large gatherings, can be seen as disrespectful, provocative or even intentionally inflammatory, particularly when shared on social media.

For example, at a pro-Palestinian demonstration in London in 2023, a group of protesters climbed on to the Royal Artillery memorial at Hyde Park Corner, which honours the tens of thousands of Royal Artillery soldiers who died in the first world war. The Metropolitan police described the actions as inflammatory, but noted that at the time no specific law prohibited climbing on war memorials, so no arrests were made.

The introduction of the offence reflects growing public unease about the perceived disrespect towards war memorials during certain protests in recent years. It is right that this measure should be put in place to protect the memory and legacy of those who made the ultimate sacrifice.

I am pleased with the cross-party support for the measure.

Clause 90 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Schedule 11 agreed to.

Clause 91 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 92

Suspension of internet protocol addresses and internet domain names

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

With this it will be convenient to consider schedule 12.

The clause introduces schedule 12, which provides for a new power for law enforcement and certain investigative agencies, such as the National Crime Agency and His Majesty’s Revenue and Customs, to apply to the court for an order to suspend internet protocol addresses and domain names when they are used to facilitate serious crime.

All too often, criminals use IP addresses and domain names to facilitate crimes such as fraud, the distribution of child sexual abuse material, malware and phishing. Currently, law enforcement agencies do not have the legal power to mandate the suspension of IP addresses and domain names, so in some scenarios the UK public continue to be at risk of falling victim to crime.

Law enforcement agencies currently utilise voluntary arrangements with industry to request the suspension of IP addresses and domains. In the majority of domestic cases, voluntary arrangements are successful, and the Government are clear that they should continue to be the first port of call in the United Kingdom. However, most of the organisations responsible for providing the IP address or domain name are situated in foreign jurisdictions and often require a formal request, such as a court order, before they will take action. The measure will provide for such a court order to be obtained. Domestically, the provision will empower law enforcement agencies to compel the small number of organisations that do not co-operate with voluntary arrangements.

The measure will protect the public by giving law enforcement and certain investigative agencies the tools they need to tackle crimes facilitated by IP addresses and domain names, and to prevent individuals from becoming potential victims. It will ensure that the UK cyber-landscape continues to be one of the safest in the world. On that basis, I commend the clause to the Committee.

The clause rightly provides a legal framework for suspending IP addresses and domain names linked to serious crime. This is a valuable measure in the fight against cyber-enabled criminal activity, including fraud, child exploitation and unlicensed online gambling.

By allowing appropriate officers to apply to a judge for a suspension order, the clause ensures that access to digital infrastructure used for criminal purposes can be swiftly and lawfully disrupted. It will be particularly effective in cases where traditional enforcement is difficult because of the borderless nature of online platforms. Crucially, safeguards are built in to ensure that the powers are used only when necessary, and proportionately. The involvement of a judge, strict criteria for suspension, and provisions for variation or appeal ensure a fair balance between enforcement and civil liberties.

I am grateful for the Opposition’s support.

Clause 93

Electronically tracked stolen goods: search without warrant

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

With this it will be convenient to consider clause 94 stand part.

Clause 93 amends the Theft Act 1968 to create a new power for the police to enter premises to search for and seize stolen items that have been electronically tracked to the premises, without requiring a warrant from a court if it is not reasonably practicable to obtain one. Clause 94 makes the same change in respect of the service police.

Under the safer streets mission, the Government are determined to crack down on acquisitive and street crimes, antisocial behaviour, and other crimes that make people feel unsafe on our streets. Crimes such as phone theft and snatch theft are deeply invasive and can have a profound impact on those whose possessions are stolen.

Tackling mobile phone theft is a priority for the Government. According to the crime survey for England and Wales, in the year ending March 2024 an estimated 235,000 people had their mobile phone stolen. Around half of stolen phones are taken through snatch thefts or pickpocketing, known as theft from the person offences.

The latest crime survey estimates show that street crime, which includes theft from the person offences and personal robbery, increased by 43%, driven by a significant rise in snatch theft. Data published by the Metropolitan police shows that theft from the person offences involving a mobile phone increased by 30% in London during the year to January 2025. Those figures are extremely concerning.

In recent years, the ability to track valuable items such as phones, bicycles and vehicles has become vastly more sophisticated. If items fitted with GPS or other trackers are stolen, it is now far easier for victims to know where their stolen property is located. However, victims have raised concerns that when they share that information with the police, they are not always able to act. This is extremely frustrating for victims of crime and for the police.

Those who commit the offences are not just petty criminals and opportunists. There is clear evidence of organised criminality and profitability, with stolen devices often being trafficked internationally, particularly to China and Algeria. That is why, at our mobile phone summit on 6 February, my right hon. Friend the Home Secretary brought together law enforcement agencies and the mobile phone industry, and secured their commitments to working jointly to tackle mobile phone theft and to breaking the business model of the organised criminal networks that drive it.

The clause strengthens the police’s ability to act quickly, and the new power will enable them to maximise the golden hour of investigative opportunity. This can help to prevent stolen goods from being moved out of the country or being used to facilitate other crime, particularly in the case of vehicles and other machinery. The new power is intended to provide a significant deterrent by increasing the likelihood that criminals will be caught and punished as a result of swift, decisive action, and by reducing the opportunity for thieves to profit from their crimes.

The new power will not be restricted to stolen phones or bags. Rural police forces have shared examples of a £30,000 generator, which was tracked to a back garden, and a stolen Range Rover left on farmland that took considerable police time and effort to retrieve. With this new power, if obtaining a warrant would render the entry and search ineffective, such as where the goods would be moved on, the police will be able to enter a property to retrieve the stolen goods immediately.

We recognise that powers of entry are, by their nature, intrusive, and we have built in safeguards to ensure that the new power is used lawfully, proportionately and in specific circumstances. The new power, exercisable by police constables, will therefore require authorisation from an officer at least of the rank of inspector, who must be satisfied that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the specific item reported by the victim is on the premises and that it has been stolen.

This is not a catch-all power to circumvent the warrant system. It is intended for use only when a victim of theft is able to electronically track the location of a specific stolen item, when the police have reasonable grounds to believe that the stolen item is on the premises, and when it is not reasonably practicable for the police to obtain a warrant.

The clause requires at least one stolen item and the premises to be linked by electronic tracking data, which restricts the circumstances in which the power can be exercised and provides an additional safeguard against the police using the power to access properties disproportionately or incorrectly, as it is intended to provide a further layer of reliability.

Use of the new power will be subject to the existing safeguards in the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 and its codes of practice. It will be exercisable only by a constable in uniform, and the authorisation to use the power will last for only 24 hours. We will update PACE code B, which covers police exercise of powers of entry, search and seizure, to reflect the new power and to provide further, more detailed guidance to the police on its use. Any use of the new power and the items seized under it must be recorded in writing.

To prevent the police from using the power to seize items on spurious grounds, these clauses also include a specific seizure power, which is limited to items on the premises reasonably believed to be stolen or evidence of theft offences that are necessary to seize to prevent damage or disappearance.

The clauses provide a targeted and proportionate extension of police powers to enter and search premises without a warrant. They respond to understandable public concerns about the scale of mobile phone theft and the effectiveness of the police response. We have ensured that these provisions are subject to appropriate safeguards, on which basis I commend the clauses to the Committee.

Clause 93 is hugely important and rightly allows the police to search premises for electronically tracked stolen goods without a warrant, offering a fast and efficient way for the police to recover stolen items before they are further distributed or sold, with the clause defining the authorisation procedures and limitations on the powers.

The clause empowers senior officers at the rank of inspector or above to authorise searches based on reasonable grounds and electronic tracking data. This is particularly useful in cases where obtaining a warrant in time could risk losing crucial evidence or missing the opportunity to seize the stolen goods. It is designed to enable law enforcement to act quickly when there is clear electronic tracking evidence that stolen goods are present on the specified premises. It seems like a common-sense measure that will allow law enforcement to act swiftly in recovering electronically tracked stolen goods, making it a highly effective tool in the fight against crime.

When stolen items are equipped with tracking devices, the ability to bypass the often time-consuming process of obtaining a warrant can be crucial in preventing further harm, such as the sale or distribution of the goods. The clause will ensure that officers can quickly respond to real-time data, reducing the window of opportunity for criminals to move or hide stolen goods.

The clause adopts a narrower approach to these powers than that proposed by the Criminal Justice Bill. I have always been of the view that, wherever possible, we should look to further enable our police officers and law enforcement agencies to tackle crime. Will the Minister comment on the rationale for narrowing the scope of the powers being given to our police by this measure?

I broadly back the powers in the clause. However, I have been involved in two cases in which an item was tracked but the tracking was not sufficiently accurate to ascertain the address. I was witness to a neighbour banging on the door of another neighbour’s home, demanding that he be let in to retrieve his phone, which he claimed had been tracked to that address. The police had been called, but they were not able to enter. When the resident came home, it was demonstrated that the phone was not at that address; it was actually five doors down. The individual had dropped the phone while walking home, and another resident had picked it up, brought it home and was looking after it until they could take it to a police station.

That individual had been incredibly agitated. Under these measures, if the police were called and the tracking information showed that the phone was at a particular address, the inaccurate data would have allowed the police to enter the property incorrectly. Are there appropriate safeguards in relation to the accuracy of the location information that is used? What measures are in place to compensate people when errors are made?

The second example is that, when my bike was stolen, I followed its tracker and went to the house where it seemed to be located. I called the police, who attended. The bike was not in the house; the tracker was actually in a van that was parked on the street outside. Again, if entry to the property had been obtained under these measures, there would have been damage and an incorrect entry to a resident’s home.

These powers seem like a good idea. The hon. Member for Stockton West called them common sense, but what seems to be common sense usually omits serious thought. Without an additional step of scrutiny, I do not think tracking information is sufficiently accurate to ensure these powers are used appropriately. I therefore invite the Minister to provide a bit more reassurance that thought will be given to accuracy and that mitigations will be in place to compensate residents when the measures are used incorrectly. We must not put residents and citizens at risk of property damage for reasons beyond their control.

As I look around the room, we all have our mobiles glued to our hands. They do everything for us now: payments, emails, leisure and, occasionally, phone calls. These devices are massively important to us. We all know the feeling of leaving home without a mobile device—many of us would have to turn round because we cannot live without it.

There has been a significant rise in snatch-and-grab crimes throughout the country, and I know many constituents, friends and colleagues in this place who have been impacted. Given that these devices can be tracked, it is madness that the police are not currently able to go in and recover them. I take the point raised by the hon. Member for Sutton and Cheam about the accuracy of tracking. I do not think it is as big an issue as he makes out, but perhaps it is something for the Minister to consider.

The biggest thing is that knowing the police can enter to recover these items will act as a deterrent. We need to drive down this crime. The prevalence of snatch-and-grabs in this country is simply unacceptable, so I welcome clause 93.

I will deal with the questions that have been raised in this short debate. First, the new measure differs from the previous Government’s proposed reform as it provides the police with specific targeted powers to retrieve electronically tagged stolen items that have been tracked to premises using the geolocation data and intelligence, and it will equip the police with tailored powers to act quickly to retrieve items, bringing offenders to justice and providing a swifter resolution for victims. We are also introducing robust safeguards, including the requirement for an officer of at least inspector rank to authorise the use of the powers, so that they are used proportionately and lawfully.

I take very seriously the issue raised by the hon. Member for Sutton and Cheam about the accuracy of data. With these new powers, as I tried to set out in my opening remarks, the police will need to be satisfied that at least one item of property in question has been electronically tracked to the premises, and that there are reasonable grounds to believe that it is stolen and on the premises before entry is authorised. We would expect the police to undertake due diligence and, as far as possible, to use additional information or intelligence to ensure that the location is accurate. As I said, any use of the power has to be authorised by at least an inspector.

I thank the Minister for giving way, because I think this is a helpful query: will there be any differentiation between last known locations and live tracking? Obviously, tracking devices can be removed and batteries can run out. Will a last known location be considered sufficient evidence of an item’s current location, or will a live location be needed to prove that the item is currently in that position?

The hon. Gentleman raises legitimate questions about how this will work operationally. As I said in my opening remarks, there will be guidance on how this will function.

The hon. Gentleman also asked about the possible redress for householders when things perhaps go wrong. There are existing provisions under which individuals may be able to claim compensation where the police have caused damage to property by, for example, forcing entry. Any compensation will obviously depend on the circumstances of each case and will be for the police force to determine, and it is unlikely to be paid if the damage was caused by the police acting lawfully on the evidence and information available to them.

On that basis, I commend these clauses to the Committee.

Clause 95

Access to driver licensing information

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

Clause 95 deals with access to driver licensing information. It will facilitate automatic access by the police and other law enforcement officers to Driver and Vehicle Licensing Agency driver information, at the point of need, for all policing and law enforcement purposes.

The police and other law enforcement officers are frequently required to deal with unpredictable circumstances, often operating under significant time pressure, as they strive to protect the public, maintain order and investigate complex criminality. The police have provided compelling operational examples of where they could better deal with the threats and harms faced by individuals if direct access to DVLA driving licence data were provided.

Protecting our communities from the threat of sexual violence, stopping drug gangs preying on the vulnerable, safeguarding people from harassment and stalking, and informing relatives of the death or serious injury of a loved one are duties that our police officers frequently undertake. Unfortunately, those are some of the activities for which police officers cannot make effective use of DVLA driving licence information within the current data access regime.

Currently, automatic access to the DVLA driving licence database is limited to enforcing road traffic offences and other Road Traffic Act 1988 purposes. That restricts the police’s ability to use driver licence records for preventing, detecting and investigating wider types of crime. The clause builds on the existing legislative framework, which goes back 25 years and requires the Secretary of State to make regulations specifying the circumstances in which the police can automatically access the DVLA driving licence database, which may include all policing and law enforcement purposes. Through the clause, we are delivering on our commitment to support the police by providing them with the tools needed to tackle crime and keep the public safe.

We are also taking the opportunity to make the legislation more transparent. Unlike the current system, where some law enforcement staff have access to the DVLA driving licence database and others do not, this clause, through proposed new section 71A of the Criminal Justice and Court Services Act 2000, clearly lists all the persons who are permitted to access DVLA driver information.

In the process, we are adding a number of bodies that do not currently have access to DVLA data. We have added the three bodies responsible for oversight of police forces in the UK: the Independent Office for Police Conduct in England and Wales, the Police Investigations and Review Commission in Scotland and the Police Ombudsman for Northern Ireland. We have also added the Service Police Complaints Commissioner, which provides oversight for the work of the military police. Finally, we have added the Royal Gibraltar police and the Gibraltar defence police to extend to Gibraltar the same public safety benefits that accrue from Crown dependency forces policing British drivers.

Proposed new section 71A of the 2000 Act collectively defines those permitted to access DVLA driver data as authorised persons. Regulations will set out the process for those individuals to become authorised. We are conscious that police access to personal data needs to be reasonable and proportionate. That is why the clause will bolster the governance arrangements surrounding access to DVLA driving licence data while making the arrangements more straightforward and transparent.

The governance framework on the use of the data will be established through regulations and a code of practice to ensure that officers have the best possible advice and guidance on using DVLA driver data appropriately. The chief officer of each organisation will be responsible for ensuring that authorised individuals are provided with the appropriate training and oversight for access to that data.

We will continue to seek the views of appropriate organisations, including the Information Commissioner’s Office, when drafting the regulations and the code of practice. The significant existing audit capabilities set out which officer accessed the DVLA driving licence information so that subsequent checks on the appropriateness of each access can continue. The clause also requires the publication of an annual report about the use of the information it makes available.

Before I close, I want to touch on one further point. Members may have read that the powers conferred by the clause will enable the police and others to access the photographs of driving licence holders for the purposes of facial recognition. Let me set out the actual position: police forces do not conduct facial matching against images contained on the DVLA database, and the clause will not change that.

As I said on Second Reading, facial recognition is an important tool to help the police to identify offenders more quickly and accurately. It is showing significant potential to increase police productivity and effectiveness, and it could substantially contribute to our safer streets mission. We need to support the police by ensuring they have clarity, especially when there is a balance to strike between ensuring public safety and safeguarding the rights of individuals. We will set out our plans to do that later in the year but, as I have said, this clause is not a Trojan horse to facilitate access to driver photographs for facial recognition purposes.

I hope we can all agree that this clause provides for a sensible clarification and updating of the legal framework governing law enforcement access to driver licensing information in order to investigate crimes, protect the vulnerable and keep communities safe. I commend the clause to the Committee.

Clause 95 updates and expands police and law enforcement access to driver licence data held by the DVLA. It replaces the existing section 71 of the 2000 Act with a revised framework, adding proposed new sections 71A and 71B. The modernised provision allows authorised individuals including the police, service police and other specified law enforcement bodies to access driver licensing information not just for road traffic offences but for a wider range of policing and law enforcement purposes. The Secretary of State is given power to regulate access, impose conditions and consult relevant bodies before issuing new rules or codes of practice. The clause also introduces oversight measures, such as a statutory code of practice and an annual report to Parliament, ensuring transparency and responsible data use. I welcome the Minister’s comments on the role of facial recognition technology and on the safeguards put in place to ensure the power is not used disproportionately or inappropriately.

I commend the clause to the Committee.

Clause 96

Testing of persons in police detention for presence of controlled drugs

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

With this it will be convenient to consider the following:

Schedule 13.

Clauses 97 to 100 stand part.

These clauses relate to drug testing. There are a number of provisions we wish to introduce. Clauses 96 to 100 and schedule 13 amend existing legislation to expand the powers of the police to drug test people aged 18 or over on arrest, or aged 14 or over on charge, where the offence they have been arrested for or charged with is a “trigger offence” or where a police officer of at least the rank of inspector reasonably suspects that their drug use caused or contributed to their offending.

These clauses expand the police’s powers to drug test in three clear ways: first, by expanding the range of drugs that can be tested for, from specified class A drugs only to any specified controlled drug; secondly, by expanding the list of trigger offences which may automatically trigger a drug test; and thirdly, by expanding the power to take an additional sample for drug testing when the first is unsuitable or insufficient, and up to a maximum of two samples. The clauses also expand the regime for subsequent assessments for misuse of controlled drugs following a positive test result.

As we all appreciate, drugs can have wide-ranging and devastating impacts on individuals and society. Addressing the drug use that is linked to crime is key to the Government’s safer streets mission. The purpose of drug testing on arrest is to reduce reoffending by referring those whose offending is believed to be at least in part caused by drug use into assessment for treatment and support services. The intention is not to further criminalise drug users, although refusing to provide a sample or to attend or stay for an assessment is an offence. Nor does it mean that they will receive treatment instead of a sentence. Drug testing on arrest is a discretionary power, subject to the safeguards included in the existing legislation, the PACE codes of practice and other relevant guidance. How it is implemented and funded is a local decision made by the police and crime commissioner and service providers.

Clause 96 amends the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 to expand the existing police power to drug test in police detention to include any “specified controlled drug” as opposed to just specified class A drugs. The list of controlled drugs will be specified in secondary legislation, subject to the negative procedure. To be specified, drugs must be controlled drugs within the meaning of the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971.

Clause 96 and schedule 13 significantly expand the existing powers of the police to conduct drug testing on individuals in detention. Currently, the police can test only for class A drugs under certain conditions. The clause amends sections 63B and 63C of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 to enable testing for any specified controlled drug, broadening the scope beyond class A to include class B and C substances. The change allows for testing following arrest for those aged 18 and over, or charge for those aged 14 and over, where the arrest relates to a trigger offence or where a police inspector reasonably suspects that drug misuse contributed to the offence.

The clause also inserts new schedule 2B into PACE to define the list of trigger offences, replacing the outdated schedule 6 of the Criminal Justice and Court Services Act 2000. The updated schedule retains many existing offences, particularly theft and drug offences, but removes fraud and vagrancy offences. It adds a range of new offences such as common assault, certain violent crime and public order offences. The Secretary of State is given the power to amend the list of drugs and offences through regulations subject to either the draft affirmative or negative resolution procedures, depending on the nature of the change.

Clause 97 makes related changes to the Drugs Act 2005 to align the drug assessment framework with the new expanded testing regime. Sections 9 and 10 of the 2005 Act, which govern the process for initial and follow-up assessments following a positive drugs test, are amended to refer to specific controlled drugs rather than just class A substances.

Clause 98 amends section 63B of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 to provide police with the authority to take an additional drug testing sample from a person in police detention. This change supports the broader drug testing powers introduced in clauses 96 and 97, which extended testing beyond class A to also include specified class B and C drugs. The new provision allows an additional sample to be taken if the original sample was insufficient or not suitable for the type of analysis required, such as where a different testing method or kit is used to detect other drugs, including synthetic ones.

Clause 99 removes police powers under the Police and Criminal Evidence Act that previously allowed continued detention for the purposes of taking a drug testing sample under section 63B. Specifically, it repeals subsections 37(8A) and (8B), which allow detention before charge for testing, and amends section 38 to remove the ability to continue detention after charge for the same purpose. Those powers are deemed unnecessary due to updates in operational procedures streamlining the legal framework in line with current police practices.

Clause 100 removes the requirement in section 63B of PACE and in the Drugs Act for the Secretary of State to notify the relevant chief officer of police that appropriate arrangements are in place before drug testing or initial and follow-up assessments can be carried out. In practice, since 2011 Home Office guidance has advised police forces that they do not need separate case-by-case authorisation to conduct drug testing in custody. These changes bring the law in line with that guidance by formally removing the notification requirements from both Acts. The clauses significantly expand the existing powers of the police to conduct drug testing on individuals in police detention. They are the right thing to do, empowering our police forces and making custody suites a safer place for all present. They further reflect a simplification of the administrative process, removing outdated or redundant applications so as to streamline drug testing procedures in custody.

I rise to support clause 96, a necessary update to the law that reflects the reality facing many of our communities. Drug misuse comes in many forms and continues to drive crime, harm and deep personal suffering. Hemel Hempstead has a long-standing drug issue going back several decades. Indeed, drugs were a significant cause of the deaths of two members of my own family, my aunt and my cousin, so I am particularly motivated to see the clause enacted to help tackle the causes of drug crime. Currently, police can test detainees only for class A drugs. Clause 96 rightly extends that power to all controlled drugs, including class B and C substances such as cannabis or illegally traded prescription drugs. Those are not harmless. They contribute to the cycles of reoffending, antisocial behaviour and exploitation, and too often go unnoticed in the system.

The clause is not about punishment; it is about awareness and intervention. Testing can be the first step forward towards treatment. It allows the police to respond more effectively and open the door to support for those struggling with addiction issues. With proper safeguards and parliamentary oversight, these changes give our officers the tools they need while protecting people’s rights. Communities, from major cities to towns like mine, will benefit from a smarter and fairer approach. This is about being honest about the harms that drugs cause, about how we help users and how we prevent the crime that drugs cause. I urge Members to support the clause.

I pay tribute to my hon. Friend the Member for Hemel Hempstead for his speech. He talked about his experience within his family, and how devastating drugs can be to families, individuals and communities. That is why extending the testing regime with these clauses is so important to try to assist those people who have got themselves into problems with drugs and are involved in criminality. They are not excusing that at all, but finding a way of testing and offering that support and help if people are ready to access treatment. I commend the clauses to the Committee.

Clause 101

Cautions given to persons having limited leave to enter or remain in UK

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

Clause 101 expands the current criteria for foreign national conditional cautions to encompass foreign nationals with limited leave to enter or remain in the United Kingdom. A foreign national conditional caution requires a foreign national to be removed from the UK as an alternative to prosecution. It will also specify that they may not return within a specified period of time.

Presently, foreign nationals may be given a foreign national conditional caution to secure their removal from the UK if they do not have existing leave to enter or remain here. The clause extends that to apply to foreign nationals with limited leave to be here. The clause will extend the pool of persons to whom a foreign national conditional caution may be given with a view to securing the removal from the United Kingdom of more foreign nationals who commit crime. On that basis, I commend the clause to the Committee.

The clause expands the definition of a “relevant foreign offender” in both the Criminal Justice Act 2003 and the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022, to include individuals who have limited leave to enter or remain in the UK as defined by the Immigration Act 1971. By doing so, it ensures that people with limited immigration status are treated as relevant foreign offenders for the purposes of issuing conditional or diversionary cautions, enabling those cautions to carry immigration-related consequences, such as potential removal from the UK.

Clause 102

Confiscation

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

With this it will be convenient to consider the following:

Schedules 14 and 15.

Clause 103 stand part.

Clause 102 introduces schedules 14 and 15 to the Bill, which make the most significant reforms to the confiscation regime in England, Wales and Northern Ireland, as contained in the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 since that Act was passed over 20 years ago. The confiscation regime allows courts to place confiscation orders on defendants to repay the benefit gained from criminality and to make it clear to offenders that crime does not pay.

The Government have been aware that confiscation has been in need of reform for some time. In 2018, the Home Office commissioned the Law Commission of England and Wales to review the confiscation regime and make recommendations for reform. The Law Commission’s final report was published in November 2022 and contains 119 recommendations, which have shaped the measures we are introducing in the Bill. Reform is necessary to improve enforcement of confiscation orders and streamline processes by law enforcement and court services, so that the regime operates as efficiently and effectively as possible.

Reform will be achieved by rationalising court processes, creating streamlined confiscation orders, expediting the enforcement of unpaid orders and returning more funds to victims. In particular, the Bill contains a new measure to return funds to victims following an uplift of the amount that is to be paid towards a confiscation order. If a confiscation order is uplifted, money can be redirected towards existing victims to compensate for their outstanding losses. The Home Office has consulted extensively.