Crime and Policing Bill

Committee (12th Day)

Amendment 422A

422A: After Clause 151, insert the following new Clause— “Scrutiny of investigation timeliness(1) The Police (Complaints and Misconduct) Regulations 2020 (S.I.2020/2) are amended as follows.(2) After Regulation 13 (timeliness of investigations), insert—“13A Scrutiny of investigation timeliness(1) A legally qualified person must be appointed to scrutinise any investigations of misconduct or gross misconduct which have not been completed within 12 months.(2) The legally qualified person must determine whether there is good and sufficient reason for the time already taken, and how much time is anticipated to be needed for completion of the investigation.(3) In determining whether there is good and sufficient reason, the legally qualified person may have regard to any relevant matter, and must have particular regard to—(a) whether the investigation has been efficient and effective;(b) whether there has been unnecessary or unreasonable delay, having regard to the complexity and seriousness of the case;(c) the impact upon the officer and others;(d) any anticipated further delay;(e) the public interest and effect on confidence in the police disciplinary system;(f) representations made on behalf of any person entitled to receive a copy of the information provided.(4) If the legally qualified person determines that there is good and sufficient reason to continue the investigation, then the legally qualified person must set a date for the conclusion of all proceedings. (5) Nothing in this provision shall have any effect in relation to any criminal investigation.”(3) The Police (Conduct) Regulations 2020 (S.I.2020/4) are amended as follows.(4) After Regulation 19 (timeliness of investigation), insert—“19A Scrutiny of investigation timeliness(1) A legally qualified person must be appointed to scrutinise any investigations of misconduct or gross misconduct which have not been completed within 12 months.(2) The legally qualified person must determine whether there is good and sufficient reason for the time already taken, and how much time is anticipated to be needed for completion of the investigation.(3) In determining whether there is good and sufficient reason, the legally qualified person may have regard to any relevant matter, and must have particular regard to—(a) whether the investigation has been efficient and effective;(b) whether there has been unnecessary or unreasonable delay, having regard to the complexity and seriousness of the case;(c) the impact upon the officer and others;(d) any anticipated further delay;(e) the public interest and effect on confidence in the police disciplinary system;(f) representations made on behalf of any person entitled to receive a copy of the information provided.(4) If the legally qualified person determines that there is good and sufficient reason to continue the investigation, then the legally qualified person must set a date for the conclusion of all proceedings.(5) Nothing in this provision shall have any effect in relation to any criminal investigation.””Member’s explanatory statement This amendment proposes a 12-month limit, unless extraordinary circumstances reviewed by a legally qualified person dictate otherwise, which would encourage forces and external bodies to complete misconduct and gross misconduct processes quicker, allowing officers to resume duties and limiting the negative impact on their health and wellbeing.

My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Bailey, has made a good suggestion with this amendment. He makes the broad point that the police misconduct process takes far too long, and I agree. To be fair, it is not the only misconduct process that takes a long time, but this one is particularly challenged.

I will particularly mention two things. First, time deadlines would be helpful. There are two ways to approach that. One is that there might be an absolute deadline of 12 months, as the noble Lord, Lord Bailey, suggests, and then some independent, legally qualified person looks at the case. That could work. The alternative is to set some deadlines so that, for example, 90% of cases are resolved in one year, which at least would give the system a kick. At the moment, I am afraid the system is not getting any better—rather, it is getting worse—so either something statutory or some kind of guidelines would be a good idea.

On Tuesday I raised the issue of firearms officers, a group particularly affected by this, and that is what I want to speak to here. I have argued that there should be a higher bar before they are prosecuted for murder, but the Government do not accept that at the moment. They have offered anonymity, and we are to debate that shortly.

Part of the problem, particularly for firearms officers, is the incredible length of time in some cases. There have been two cases over the last 20 years that took 10 years: the case of PC Long, who was prosecuted after a series of legal machinations only to be found not guilty 10 years later, and that of W80, where after a public inquiry—basically an inquest led by a High Court judge because intercept evidence was involved in the case—the High Court judge decided that there was no unlawful killing, the IOPC or its predecessor decided that there should be some gross misconduct, the Metropolitan Police disagreed, the Supreme Court ordered that there would be a misconduct hearing and the legally qualified chair of the independent tribunal said there was no case to answer. After consideration by the Supreme Court, an officer had been under investigation for 10 years. That cannot be right.

My Lords, this has been a short debate. I agree with many of the points made by the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe. I find it almost extraordinary that misconduct investigations linger on for so long; it really is a disgrace for everybody involved. Police professional standards departments have for too long been seen as something of a Cinderella function within forces, chronically underprioritised, underfunded and understaffed, and now they are buckling under the surge in the volume of complaints. This is combined with a narrowing of the remit of the IOPC, which increasingly takes on only the most serious and high-profile cases, resulting in a growing backlog and indefinite drift.

Amendment 422A confronts this head on. Such independent legal oversight could act as a checkpoint, strengthening individual case oversights and extracting timely lessons from failures. Criminal investigations would stay exempt, protecting the pursuit of serious crime.

There are risks in setting time targets for investigations—there is no question about that—not least the incentive for officers to delay co-operation if the clock is ticking. We have concerns that a rigid cap could risk corner-cutting on complex investigations. At the very least, stronger guidance on the expected length of inquiries is now required, as well as real scrutiny when these expectations are missed.

There also needs to be a much sharper focus on leadership and case management. Complainants should not face long waits, especially knowing time will diminish the strength of their evidence; neither should innocent officers endure years in limbo, with their careers stalled and well-being eroded. Taxpayers should not bear the rising cost of suspensions while losing front-line capacity at the same time.

Amendment 422A would restore some balance by prioritising fairness to officers, closure for victims and credibility for policing. We are happy to support it, and I look forward to the Minister’s reply.

My Lords, I thank my noble friend Lord Bailey of Paddington for tabling his Amendment 422A and the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, for ably stepping into the breach to allow it to be debated. It is a very important matter and I am glad we have had a chance to debate it.

I am very sympathetic to the amendment’s goals. It aims to set a 12-month time limit for misconduct and gross misconduct investigations within police forces. As others have said, timely legal restitution is the only way that justice is effectively served. That applies both to those in the police who are under investigation and, obviously, to victims who are let down by delays that are needlessly, but often, the result of administrative workload. Applying a strict deadline for remedies, excepted under only extraordinary circumstances, is an easy way by which institutions can be encouraged to proceed with investigations in a timely fashion.

That said, I am a little wary of fully endorsing a blanket time limit on police forces for investigations. Although in some cases, perhaps even most, misconduct investigations can and should be sped up, it would be heedless to assume that all forces are simply being inefficient in the time that investigations take. There is a vast disparity between forces’ capacity to deal with their primary function of investigating crime, let alone with administrative internal matters, such as misconduct matters. Certain forces’ ability to spare the resources to source, for instance, legally qualified adjudicators should not, therefore, be assumed. Officer numbers are down, crime is up, and we should be careful about placing additional requirements on police forces that expedited conduct investigations might entail.

Of course, we support the aim of increasing efficiency and ensuring justice is delivered. I thank my noble friend for his amendment and look forward to hearing the Minister’s response.

I am grateful to the Committee, and in particular to the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, for moving the amendment. To be fair to the noble Lord, Lord Bailey of Paddington, he stayed here very late—until the end—on the previous day on this. I am sorry that he is not able to be in his place today. He was here to move the amendment when we pulled stumps on Tuesday night at gone 11 pm.

Having said that, the noble Lord’s amendment seeks to introduce a new system of independent legal adjudicators with powers to close down investigations. I think I can agree with the noble Lords, Lord Hogan-Howe and Lord Cameron of Lochiel, and the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, that delays in investigations are in nobody’s interests—of police officers who subsequently are proved innocent, of victims, or of speedy justice for those who have strayed and committed potential offences. Lengthy delays risk impacting the confidence of complainants and the welfare of the police officers involved.

We recognise those impacts, which is why we introduced reforms last year, including a presumption of fast-track hearings for former officers and a broader power for police forces to utilise fast-track hearings. In addition—and I hope this helps the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe—we have committed to establish a wider review to address barriers to timeliness in police misconduct cases as part of the police accountability review we are currently undertaking. I agree completely that timeliness must improve, but I argue that this amendment could potentially add bureaucracy, cost and delay to the system, not remove it.

I am sure the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, will recall that the responsibilities of independent lawyers in the misconduct system were removed under previous Governments, with senior officers replacing them as chairs of misconduct hearings. Lawyers now sit as independent legal advisers on misconduct panels; reintroducing a decision-making role for them would not only blur the lines of independence but come at greater financial cost to policing, which goes to the point that the noble Lord, Lord Cameron of Lochiel, mentioned.

As a Government, we are committed to ensuring that chief constables have the necessary powers to remove those who have no place in policing, but this amendment could have a significant detrimental effect on public confidence. I will give one example to the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe. A timeline on an investigation into gross misconduct could mean that an investigation could be terminated not because it has been resolved but because of an arbitrary time limit being reached. The time limit proposed here could mean that significantly complex, difficult cases are terminated without a resolution for the victim or, indeed, for the police officer against whom any allegations are made.

There is a point in the general thrust of the amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Bailey of Paddington. There is a problem that needs to be resolved, but I suggest that the Government can resolve it without the legislative proposal before the Committee. I ask the noble Lord, who nobly volunteered to move the amendment, to now nobly volunteer to withdraw it.

It is certainly a first for me.

I thank the Minister for his reply and other people for their comments. I thought I might make only a couple of points in response. I indicated that although the amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Bailey, suggests a mandatory limit, there may be difficulties with that. I wonder whether the Government, might consider three things in their review, which the Minister mentioned. First, they could set an expectation so that, for example, cases should be completed within 12 months unless, for example, the director-general of the IOPC or some arbiter concludes otherwise. Secondly, I raised the sequential nature of the decision-making. That compound effect gives a longer time than I regard as necessary.

I am trying to work out now whether I should let the noble Lord, Lord Bailey, speak—

The noble Lord was not here for the start of the group, so I am afraid that he cannot contribute.

I will conclude. I wonder whether, in the review, the Government could consider this sequential decision-making, which I do not think helps speed. Thirdly, if they are really adventurous they could look at whether police officers should be employees, because then you would get lawyers out of the system—I sit surrounded by them, but they never make it quicker or cheaper. Everyone else who is an employee can go to the employment tribunal, but officers cannot; it is on these grounds that lawyers get involved. I am afraid that is one of the major factors in why this takes so long and is expensive. I have taken my life in my hands, so I will sit down and withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 422A withdrawn.