My Lords, I will contribute briefly on this group. In general, the amendment produced by my noble friend the Minister is to be applauded. It is massive and detailed—but this is one of the issues. We are on Report in the House of Lords. The House of Commons will never get the chance to discuss this. When the Lords amendments go back, the Commons will have an hour, or two hours at most, for the Bill, without any amendments, so there is a real issue about our procedures.
It is not the first time this has happened. It is a regular occurrence that when we get massive changes at the end of a Bill—
This amendment has just turned up here. It is for this House; it was not dealt with in the Commons. That is why we are debating it. It is a brand-new amendment. It is extensive—two or three pages.
I know I am a bit out of date, having been here so long since I left the other place, but the Commons will not have the chance to debate this amendment, simply because of the procedure for dealing with Lords amendments. So, while I agree in general with what my noble friend the Minister has brought forward, let us not kid ourselves. At the end of the day, the Commons has the last word on everything—but it does not have all the detailed words on everything. So, we have to be really careful in the way we scrutinise something that turns up here at the last minute and cannot be looked at again in the other place. If we start a Bill in this place, it is different, but we did not. We therefore have to be careful about what we are doing.
My other point is that, in general, I agree with the speech of the noble Lord, Lord Young. I am not in favour of discrimination against anybody on any grounds whatsoever, but he raised the point, as did the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, that in general, the discrimination on misgendering is basically anti-women, because they will be the majority who might have the complaint. There is no question about that. Therefore, the issue should not be left nor criminalised. It may be that my noble friend the Minister has a perfectly straightforward answer. I certainly hope he has, because although I do not propose to vote for any of the amendments of the noble Lord, Lord Young, he has raised a very fair point. Again, there will be no chance to discuss this in the Commons, so we need to have a bit more of the detail here in this House.
My Lords, I declare an interest as a paid adviser to the Metropolitan Police. My understanding is that the Government’s amendments simply create a legal level playing field, with deterrents currently available on the grounds of race and religion being extended to other protected characteristics. It is far more serious if you are targeted for attack because you are a member of a vulnerable group than if you are attacked at random, and the law should reflect that.
There has been debate today about free speech and non-crime hate incidents, but these provisions are about actual crimes targeted at vulnerable people. I completely agree with the remarks of the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, and those of the Minister.
My Lords, I am grateful to the Minister for the way he introduced these amendments. As he said, this is a government manifesto commitment, and it was evident in the pride with which he moved this amendment. However, I agree with concern raised by the noble Lord, Lord Rooker, and others—that it is regrettable that we are seeing the drafting of this provision at this late stage in this House. We have had long debates on the principle as the Bill has gone through, but in this particularly vexed area of the law, the devil really is in the detail, so it is regrettable that we are coming to it fairly late.
In his introduction, the Minister said with clear passion that he wants to level up the protections afforded to people under the law when it comes to hate crime. My concerns are slightly different from some that have been expressed so far in the paused debate: that this amendment as drafted in fact treats some groups of people differently from others and leaves a bit of levelling up still to do.
In part, that is because of the slightly uneasy settlement that we have because of the Equality Act 2010, which, as a Bill, went through Parliament in wash-up. I think it is ripe for a bit of post-legislative scrutiny; it is often prayed in aid in all directions without people fully understanding it. It used to be a bugbear of mine in government when people came to me with a submission talking about people with protected characteristics. I would say, “But that’s everybody”—anyone with an age, a race or a sex has protected characteristics. There is no such person as a person with no protected characteristics. But the way the Equality Act 2010 describes and applies them is not wholly equal, and when it comes to this area of the law, that causes some problems.
We all have a sexual orientation. Section 12 of the Equality Act defines that for us. We may choose different terms ourselves, but it tells us that we are attracted to “the opposite sex”, “the same sex” or members “of either sex”. Accordingly, that is reflected in the amendments that the Government have brought forward vis-à-vis hate crime and hostility on the basis of sexual orientation.
I am very grateful to the noble Lord. Can he give a practical example of when there has ever been a relevant criminal offence committed against a person because they are not deaf?
I cannot—not as a lawyer; I cannot refer to case law on this—but I would not rely on past example alone. If we are passing laws that seek to apply equality, we should seek to apply it on the basis of somebody’s disability status, whether they are disabled or not. It is not implausible—though I accept it is far less likely and far less numerous in past occurrence—for that to be the case. In some of the other areas in the heated debates that we see, it is not as implausible as many of us would like to assume. If it is possible to tighten this up in the drafting, I think it would do the job the Government are seeking to do in a complete way.
That would not prevent the Government fulfilling their manifesto commitment for delivering protections to trans people and disabled people; it would simply ensure that everybody was treated in this area of the law on the basis of protected characteristics in the same way. At the moment, there are greater protections for everybody of every conceivable sexual orientation and people of either sex, but there are not on each of the areas set out in the Equality Act. More pertinently, it would avoid fuelling what is already a very unhelpful public discourse about two-tier policing and laws, or some of the more charged debates that we have in the darker corners of the internet or from the more far-fetched foreign critics who have been mentioned previously.
On Amendment 336 from my noble friends Lord Davies of Gower and Lord Cameron of Lochiel, while it is understandable that they are probing this area, I do not think that their amendment is warranted. It probes the question of whether protections for transgender people should apply to people who are “proposing to undergo” a process of gender reassignment. In fact, Section 2 of the Gender Recognition Act 2004, which has been the law of the land for 22 years, requires somebody applying for a gender recognition certificate to undergo that process to have
My Lords, I am very grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Parkinson, for raising the issue about someone who was not deaf. Unfortunately, he has forgotten that the Disability Discrimination Act 1995 set out exactly why people with disabilities were disadvantaged in society—and, frankly, still are. That is why some people—whether we are talking about someone who is deaf, someone who is in a wheelchair, someone without sight or someone with severe autism—need some support to have equality. That is not what these amendments seek to do. What these amendments seek to do is to say that someone who is disabled should now be included with other people as someone who can be targeted simply because of their disability. I want to give two brief illustrations to explain why it is important.
Two years ago, a man launched a racist tirade at passengers on a packed London train. He started shouting extreme racist abuse at a woman in her 70s, using language that I could not possibly repeat in your Lordships’ House. When passengers tried to intervene and support this elderly lady, they were then shouted at and attacked and became scared. Indeed, one person left the train. The police were able to use aggravated charges because the words he used to describe her were clearly racist. She was chosen because of the colour of her skin. It was not because she was just sitting there.
Contrast that with last autumn when comedian Rosie Jones was attacked on a train from Brighton to London Victoria. She was hit with a wine bottle—luckily, it was only plastic; she said that only a comedian could do that. She was hit only because of her cerebral palsy and probably, she thinks, because she is well known to be LGBT. At the moment, those people could not be considered for an aggravated sentence—and that is what these amendments seek to do. That is the point. Therefore, I have no problem whatever in saying that we should support these amendments.
My Lords, it is a pleasure to follow the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton. That she spoke as powerfully as she did—and I hope to echo some of her words—draws attention to the fact that so few of us in this House have a severe disability and therefore look at these issues from first-hand experience.
I was not intending to speak on these amendments—Amendment 334 in particular—and I obviously let my Chief Whip know, but I have listened very carefully to the debate and, as I say, I come at this from a purely personal experience. The noble Baroness mentioned the Disability Discrimination Act, which, of course, your Lordships’ House passed about 30 years ago. It was so exciting, because it was meant to herald a new dawn of non-discrimination and equality. Thirty years later, discrimination on grounds of disability is rife—and I know that because I experience it several times a day, day in and day out. It may be low-level abuse—smirks, nudging as I go past, laughter—but the effect it has on a person’s self-esteem and morale, when they are having to cope with so many other challenges in life, cannot really be described. It has to be felt to be believed.
I simply say to the House that this is a new development. I referred to the Disability Discrimination Act coming in 30 years ago this year. I was on the National Disability Council, advising the Government on its implementation, so we were developing codes of practice 30 years ago, almost to the day. I would say that the law is inadequate and needs this amendment. It needs to be updated for this simple reason: the message needs to go out from your Lordships’ House that the sort of behaviour the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, has described, and the case studies she has shared with the House, are completely unacceptable. I do not believe a single member of your Lordships’ House would disagree with that. They are completely unacceptable. This amendment sends that message. Notwithstanding my personal support for the wonderful work that the Free Speech Union and my noble friend Lord Young of Acton do, I support this amendment.
My Lords, I want to acknowledge and thank the Minister for the introduction of this amendment. It is a vast improvement on the amendment laid in the other place. We discussed it at Second Reading and in Committee, and it is great to see it on Report.
However much we might like to reconsider the wording of the Gender Recognition Act, the way in which we consider hate crime, and the Equality Act, that is not what this amendment does. We can talk about the GRA, we can talk about hate crime and we can talk about the Equality Act, but that is not what this is about. This is about extending to disability and LGBT people and sex aggravated offences that already exist for race and religion and belief. That was a recommendation made by the Law Commission in 2021, which feels like a different country was indeed only five years ago.
What aggravated offences do that is different from increased sentencing is very specific. First, it leads to stronger sentences and a higher maximum penalty. However, in order to do that, hostility must be proven as part of the offence itself and not just considered at sentencing, so you need significantly stronger evidence than you currently do. For those who are concerned about the lacklustre way in which people are accused of discrimination on the grounds of sexual orientation and gender identity, that will have to be put through a much more rigorous process to be tested before this kicks in. You also get a longer time to report because it is considered in the Crown Court, which gives victims more time to report and gives the police more time to investigate. Therefore, again, there is a much stronger need for substantive evidence before those cases can be considered and people can be found guilty. It is changing in the sentencing, but the nature in which that investigation takes place will be much more rigorous than the current provision that is made on the grounds of sexual orientation and gender identity. That increased sentencing was introduced circa 2020—forgive me, but I do not know exactly when—as an easier way of kind of levelling up the law, because this was too tricky to do then. This is now about just levelling up.
My Lords, I draw attention to my entry in the register of interests. I chair the College of Policing, but I am not speaking in that capacity, nor have I spoken to policing colleagues about this matter.
I want to make a couple of observations about the debate that we have had. It is a pleasure to follow the noble Baroness, Lady Hunt of Bethnal Green, whose comments I agreed with entirely. The issue that she was seeking to draw attention to was in response to the argument that we have heard that there is no need for the provisions that the Government have set out because the courts can apply a sentencing uplift already for crimes involving hostility to gay or disabled people. Yes, they can, but for the reasons the noble Baroness explained, we are talking about a separate architecture of aggravated offences, which are stand-alone criminal charges, and which are therefore investigated as such from the outset and recorded separately. That sends a much more potent signal about the seriousness of these crimes. These aggravated offences also extend the statutory time limit for cases to be submitted to the Crown Prosecution Service, which the regime of mere sentencing uplift does not. That potentially provides additional protection for victims.
I have a concern with the arguments that are being advanced about the Government’s proposal. If, for instance, the issue is that police time will be wasted by this change in the law and that it is the wrong use of resources, that is an argument for the existing aggravated offences to be swept away. The principled argument to take, and one that would be advanced by my noble friend Lord Moynihan, who is nodding vigorously, would be to say that if aggravated offences are wrong, a waste of time and do not matter—I think they matter a great deal for the reasons that the noble Baroness, Lady Hunt, set out—then we should sweep them away for offences in relation to religious hatred or racial hatred, because those also are protected characteristics under the Equality Act and this architecture is worthless because it corrodes free speech, and so on.
That is the second or third time that the 2021 report of the Law Commission of England and Wales has been referred to in this debate. To clarify, that report clearly and strongly recommended not including sex as a protected, aggravated characteristic in the charging or sentencing regime. It set out some extremely good reasons for why sex should not be included from a clearly feminist point of view. By all means, cite the Law Commission’s recommendations to support the inclusion of the other three aggravators that the Government want to add to the charging regime, but it was explicitly not recommended that sex be added as an aggravator.
But my argument was against the proposal that these offences in their entirety should be rejected by this House—that the Government’s proposal in its entirety should be rejected by this House. I was not engaging with my noble friend’s argument. I have some sympathy with his point, and in particular that merely misgendering someone should not become a criminal offence. It might be a thoroughly unpleasant thing to do but whether it should be an aggravated offence is worthy of discussion. My concern is that we may be getting ourselves into the position of opposing an amendment that makes an aggravated offence in relation to disabled people, as well as to LGBT people, and we reject that and yet we do not for the other offences.
There is also a danger of attempting to trivialise this matter and a confusion with the debate on non-crime hate incidents. We will come to that. I have taken the strong position that we need a much higher bar in relation to those incidents and that the whole regime needs sweeping away. We will come to that. However, we are not talking about that. We are talking about potentially very serious criminal offences. We are talking about GBH and criminal damage, and are saying that where those offences are motivated by hostility against a group, it does not make sense that the offence can be aggravated in relation to racial or religious hostility but not in relation to disabled people or to LGBT people.
That is the argument. We are not talking about whether people should be able to say disagreeable things on Twitter. This is not the moment for that debate. We are talking about serious offences and whether they should be aggravated, which would result in a more serious penalty and would send a signal to wider society.
There has been a quite concerning increase in hate crimes in relation to LGBT people, particularly transgender people. I have taken for some time a position, which finds me out of step with most of the groups in the LGBT lobby, that there is a very legitimate discussion to have about how women’s rights are affected by transgender rights and that there needs to be a recalibration of the law and the movement’s positions on this. I happen to take that position. However, I know that the way in which this debate is being conducted outside of this Chamber is resulting in an increase in hate against transgender people. That is deeply concerning. It is vilifying people because of ideological positions that are being taken. It is particularly wrong when people in positions of responsibility start using this debate for political purposes.
It is not allowed on Report. You are allowed to ask a question.
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We all have a race or a religion. Again, the descriptions in proposed new subsection (6) talk about
“references to a racial group”,
which could apply to Black people, white people, Asian people, Welsh people—everybody is covered by that provision. In proposed new subsection (6)(b), the
“references to a religious group”
talk explicitly of a “lack of religious belief”. It does not matter whether you are an adherent to a certain religion, you are covered by that. The difficulty in this area comes when we start to apply it to disability or to people’s gender reassignment status, and that is where we start to see the problem in the descriptions in the government amendment. Proposed new subsection (3)(b) talks about
“hostility towards persons who have a disability or … hostility towards persons who are transgender”.
Does that mean that an offence committed against somebody on the basis that they are, for instance, deaf, could be treated as an aggravated offence, but that an offence committed against somebody on the basis that they were a hearing person could not be? I would be grateful if the Minister could explain whether that is the case and whether that is really what the Government are seeking to achieve here.
Similarly, when proposed new subsection 3(b)(v) specifies
“hostility towards persons who are transgender”,
and we have seen many horrible examples of crimes that are aggravated on that basis, does that mean that an offence committed against somebody on the basis that they are transgender, or presumed to be so, could be treated as aggravated, but an offence committed against somebody on the basis that they are cisgender—that they are not transgender—could not be? Again, it would be useful to have the clarification.
I am aware that both of those examples are less numerous and, arguably, far less likely to occur, but they are not implausible, and they should not be neglected by laws that we pass in the name of equality. I know this is a difficult area of the law when it comes to drafting—I think that lies behind some of the delay that the Government have had in bringing forward this amendment—but surely it would be possible to avoid these lacunae by stating, for instance, “a disability or lack of disability” or “a person who is transgender or who is not”. Surely that would allow this to be applied in other ways.
“lived in the acquired gender throughout the period of two years”
preceding their application. Signalling an intention to propose to go through that process is an important part of the law as it stands, and therefore Amendment 336 is not needed.
I have reported in your Lordships’ House before that people have said to me on a train, when I have been commuting in the rush hour, “Why are you taking up space? People like you don’t work”. That is not an aggravated offence. But when someone tried to kick me on a platform because they felt I should not be there because I was in a wheelchair and in her way, that would have been an aggravated offence if they had caught her.
I am really struggling with all these debates going on at the moment. Yesterday, the leader of the Conservative Party made a big announcement about getting rid of equalities, and everyone is talking about identifiers. I do not have an identifier; I am disabled—and sometimes people take it out on me. I can live with most of it, but sometimes it goes beyond the right place. Frankly, members of our judicial system should be able to make up their minds about whether it is an aggravated offence. That is the subject of the amendments we are debating today.
The world feels more hostile. This amendment demonstrates that the Government, and indeed this House, take that very seriously. It incentivises people to provide better evidence of crime. A tweet misgendering would, I think, not likely pass muster, but misgendering while you kick someone’s head in possibly might be an aggravating factor in sentencing, and that feels quite reasonable.
I would say that being counted matters—these crimes being counted matters. I said at Second Reading and in Committee that, when the hate crime law did not exist for people like me, I presumed that the crimes I was experiencing were an okay thing to experience. When Governments from both sides—I say that as a loving Cross-Bencher of all of you—have introduced legislation that protects me, that makes me feel more like I belong in this country. This amendment therefore signals that, as a member of the lesbian, gay, bi and trans community in this country, I am protected from hate crime and that will be taken seriously. I can report it and the police will do their job to find substantive evidence if it exists. If it does not exist, they should send me on my way. This does not give us an opportunity to unpick that, but I absolutely welcome this amendment.
Make that argument if that is what you believe. However, the reverse argument was put by the Law Commission. Extending this protection for some offences to some groups but not others—to groups that are already recognised as being worthy of protection by the criminal law because of their vulnerability, because they are minority groups—creates a “significant disparity” and causes significant injustice and confusion. A Law Commission report, hundreds of pages long, examined these issues in depth and concluded that there should be an extension.
I have great concern about the climate in which this debate is being—