Crime and Policing Bill

Report (6th Day) (Continued)

Amendment 422DA not moved.

Clause 208: Removal of women from the criminal law related to abortion

Amendment 422E

422E: Clause 208, page 254, line 25, leave out from “1929” to end of line 26 and at end insert “— (a) proceedings for an offence shall not be instituted against a woman acting in relation to her own pregnancy except by or with the consent of the Director of Public Prosecutions, who must exercise personally any function under this section of giving consent;(b) proceedings to which this section applies may not be commenced after twelve months from the date of the offence to which the proceedings relate.”Member’s explanatory statement This amendment seeks to add the requirement of DPP consent for the institution of the criminal proceedings in Clause 208 against a woman acting in relation to her own pregnancy and reduces the limitation period for the offence.

My Lords, I will speak to Amendment 422E and, additionally, do so on behalf of the noble Lord, Lord Verdirame, KC, who has a prior appointment in The Hague this week. He was the author of the probing amendment on this topic in Committee. At that stage, the Minister signalled some reservations about it and subsequently wrote to him with additional data, which has proved to be most helpful, so we thank her. The noble Baroness, Lady Wolf of Dulwich, has appended her name to this amendment and will speak to it, along with her other amendment.

Noble Lords will be aware that Clause 208, which was inserted into this Bill in the other place at a late stage, has attracted numerous amendments. Our intention with Amendment 422E is that, where opinions are a matter of individual conscience, we should attempt to offer the House a compromise between the Commons position—Clause 208—and Amendment 424, which seeks to leave out the clause entirely. I point out that Amendments 423, 423ZA and 423A would be pre-empted if this amendment was agreed on Division.

The amendment would do two things. First, it would require the personal consent of the Director of Public Prosecutions before any proceedings may be instituted against women acting in relation to their pregnancy. Secondly, it would provide that such proceedings must be commenced within 12 months of the alleged offence. The version we debated in Committee provided for the consent of the Attorney-General rather than the Director of Public Prosecutions. The Minister observed that offences where Attorney-General consent is required tend to be in the national security or international spheres, while DPP consent is required to address a wider range of concerns, including, as the Minister explained, where there is a risk that the institution of proceedings might violate convention rights or cause a defendant “irreparable harm”. There are some offences in areas other than national security or international matters where AG consent is required, as the noble Lord, Lord Verdirame, argues—for example, contempt of court under the strict liability rule, pursuant to Section 7 of the Contempt of Court Act. Nevertheless, on balance, it seems proportionate and in keeping with existing practice to replace Attorney-General consent with the consent of the Director of Public Prosecutions.

The second component of the amendment, proposed new paragraph (b), would impose a 12-month limit for commencing proceedings. We have added that in since Committee. It would be an additional check on prosecutions; the pregnant woman involved might, as things currently stand on the basis of Clause 208, have faced anxiety or uncertainty for years after the termination of the pregnancy. The limitation period of 12 months provides a measure of certainty. The possibility of being drawn into criminal processes long after the event compounds the stress and stigma that can accompany adverse pregnancy outcomes. A clear 12-month boundary strikes a proportionate balance; it allows for legitimate cases to be investigated but prevents open-ended exposure.

We understand the concern arising from some cases of appalling investigations, which have caused enormous and unnecessary distress to some women. We discussed these at length in Committee—and they are indeed harrowing. One thing that we were keen to understand after Committee was about the data on investigations. The Minister wrote to the noble Lord, Lord Verdirame, in that regard, and we are grateful, as I said, for her detailed response. However, it is difficult to discern a clear trend from the data. Under Sections 58 and 59 of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861, there were five investigations in 2019-20; eight in 2020-21; and 13 in 2024-25—so there appears to be an increase. The problem is that this available data on investigations does not disaggregate by the sex of the person who is being investigated—so you have a trend of increase, but you cannot tell whether the increase can be attributed to a man or a woman. We also could not tell whether the women in the data were related to women acting in relation to their own pregnancy rather than other women assisting.

When you turn to prosecutions and convictions under Sections 58 and 59 Offences Against the Person Act 1861, the picture is clearer, as the data is disaggregated into male and female. In 2025, six people were proceeded against, with five convictions. When that was broken down into male and female, of the six proceeded against, four were men, of which all four were convicted, and two were women, of which one woman was convicted. It would therefore suggest that coercion may well be coming into play or, as in the Worby case that we discussed in Committee, deception was a ploy to procure an abortion for a woman who wished to continue with her pregnancy.

The number of prosecutions and convictions under the Infant Life (Preservation) Act 1929 is very small. There have been two prosecutions against women since 2019, although again we do not know if these were women acting in relation to their own pregnancy. None of them was convicted. There were seven prosecutions against men in the same period, and there were three convictions.

The question for us and for broader society is whether policy and law resolve both sides of a problem. Would we wish to pass a law that entirely removes any criminal sanction from rare but nevertheless potentially criminal acts, or not? As the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, said, when the police find a lifeless body which could be either a small infant or a late-stage foetus, they must investigate, because the police—

My Lords, I should like to ask the noble Baroness—

I do not think that we take interventions on Report, if I may refer to the Companion—but perhaps the Whip could assist us.

I can clarify for your Lordships’ House that the noble Baroness is able to take interventions, or not, as she wishes.

I would like to proceed and conclude my argument. I will be happy to listen to the noble Baroness once I have finished.

Because the police do not know when they find a lifeless body which of the situations they are confronted with, even with decriminalisation of abortion offences for the women acting in relation to her pregnancy, she may still be investigated. If it was a case of stillbirth, for example, for that woman the investigation will inevitably be a cause of stress. She might be worried that the evidence will not support her or she will not be believed. However, what else are the police supposed to do in these cases, other than try to establish the facts?

Therefore, it is not possible to remove women acting in relation to their pregnancy from any criminal process, even if you decriminalise abortion offences for them. What is possible is to introduce further guarantees, as we are attempting to do with this amendment, that would add an additional layer of personal assurance from the DPP that the facts in context of terminations are taken into account, and that after 12 months, in any event, proceedings will not be brought against the pregnant woman. It ensures that the decision to prosecute in relation to the woman is taken at the highest level—the DPP—and applies the certainty of a limitation period.

No solution in this area will ever be flawless, but when the evidence before us is so limited and the broader picture so uncertain, wholesale decriminalisation would be a disproportionate response to a problem which, in any event, needs careful and thoughtful steps for resolution. This amendment offers a more balanced and workable path to the problem that we all want to resolve satisfactorily. It provides meaningful safeguards for women, ensuring that any decision to prosecute is taken at the highest level, as well as the certainty of a limitation period, while not upending the balancing of principles and values underlying the Abortion Act 1967. I hope that both those who oppose criminalisation and those who are rightly troubled by the distressing cases we have discussed will see that this approach represents a principled and proportionate compromise, and will feel able to support it.