Northern Ireland legislative consent granted, Scottish and Welsh legislative consent sought. Relevant documents: 11th Report from the Constitution Committee, 33rd Report from the Delegated Powers Committee, 5th Reportfrom the Joint Committee on Human Rights.
1: Clause 1, page 1, line 6, at beginning insert “Subject to a review of existing anti-social behaviour powers under the Anti-social Behaviour Act 2014 being conducted and completed by an independent person appointed by the Secretary of State within six months of this Act receiving Royal Assent,”
Member's explanatory statement
This amendment requires the Government to review current anti-social behaviour powers within six months of the Bill becoming law, before the new measures proposed in the Bill take effect.
My Lords, in moving Amendment 1, I will speak to other amendments in my name and that of my noble friend Lady Doocey.
I welcome the start of Committee and the opportunity to engage in detail with Part 1 of the Bill concerning anti-social behaviour. We on these Benches recognise the imperative to make our streets safer, and we support measures designed to tackle genuinely persistent and disruptive anti-social behaviour. However, the Liberal Democrat approach to public safety demands that new laws be not just tough but fair and proportionate. We reject measures which risk the erosion of civil liberties or the criminalisation of the vulnerable. This debate on respect orders goes directly to that principle.
Clause 1 introduces the respect order for adults, which partly replaces the old anti-social behaviour injunction. The fundamental difference is severe. While breach of an ASBI was treated as a civil contempt, breach of a respect order is explicitly categorised as a criminal offence that can lead to an unlimited fine or up to two years’ imprisonment. If the state intends to use a civil tool granted merely on the balance of probabilities to impose prohibitions whose breach results in criminal sanctions, that tool must be subject to the most rigorous safeguards. Unfortunately, respect orders currently risk replicating and arguably worsening the problems and abuses associated with past anti-social behaviour regimes.
The Manifesto Club—I declare an interest as a member of its advisory board—highlights several fundamental flaws in the previous regime under the 2014 Act, which civil liberties advocates argue must be addressed before new anti-social behaviour powers such as respect orders are introduced.
The core legal powers underpinning PSPOs and CPNs are inherently flawed due to their low legal threshold and vague scope. PSPOs can be implemented if activities are deemed to be having a detrimental effect on the quality of life in a defined public area. The Manifesto Club notes that this is an unprecedentedly low legal test for criminal intervention and argues that there is often no requirement to show substantial evidence of this effect. PSPOs are vague and subjective restrictions and are often drafted broadly, which leads to them functioning more as a tool applied at the discretion of officers than as a precise law, and this has resulted in what the Manifesto Club calls
My Lords, I have added my name to Amendments 1 and 21 in the names of the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, and the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, which have just been moved so well. I agree with all the amendments in this group, although I am not quite sure and have reservations about Amendment 2 on lowering the age to 16.
The proposition seems to me straightforward. The powers to tackle anti-social behaviour are currently contained in the Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014. So, before the state affords itself even more powers—which, by the way, often duplicate what we already have—should we not assess whether what we have actually works in improving outcomes for victims and fundamentally reducing anti-social behaviour, which is what we want? We should note that 82% of anti-social behaviour practitioners surveyed by Justice have called for such a review of existing powers and criticised the lack of proper consultation, or even engagement, by the Government. It is shocking that there has never been a formal review of the 2014 Act, and that data on the use of existing orders is not collated centrally, nor their use monitored, by government. Surely the Minister agrees that the Government should be working to identify and address problems that are inherent in existing anti-social behaviour powers and orders before creating more, and that that would be an evidence-based approach to this question.
We are largely focusing on respect orders in this group. They are almost duplicates of anti-social behaviour injunctions but will provide, the Government has argued, more effective enforcement. Experts and practitioners in fact suggest that they could confuse enforcement agencies. What is more, as respect orders are so close to ASBIs, the fear is that they will just reproduce and increase the problems with those injunctions, which research shows are overused, inconsistently applied and sweep up relatively minor behaviour problems alongside more serious incidents. At the very least, can the Minister explain why the discredited ASBIs are staying on the statute book? Why not just dump them?
My Lords, I add my support for Amendment 1. There should be a review of all these orders before layering another one on. In fact, some of that work has been done: freedom of information data demonstrates that people from minority ethnic communities are far more likely to be subject to this range of orders—Gypsy and Irish Traveller people are also more likely to receive disproportionate criminal punishments on breaching the orders—so the lack of monitoring of the use of behavioural orders is disturbing. I am sure that my noble friend the Minister does not want to continue this cycle of criminalising vulnerable and disadvantaged communities, so please can we have a formal review of the impact of the orders currently in place?
My Lords, I find myself in agreement with many of the genuine human rights concerns already expressed around the Committee. I find myself in a bit of a time warp because these concerns were evidenced by the use, abuse, disrepute and ultimately disuse that anti-social behaviour orders fell into all those years ago. The criminalisation of vulnerable people, people with addiction problems, people with mental health problems, homeless people and so on is not hypothesis; it was evidenced by the practice of the original anti-social behaviour orders.
I therefore hope that, in his reply, my noble friend, who I know to be a very thoughtful Minister, will go some way to expressing how he thinks these new respect orders will improve on the very unhappy history of ASBOs. Other members of the Committee have already set out what happened in the interim. It would be useful if my noble friend the Minister could explain what will be different this time, why and how.
In a nutshell, my concerns are, first, that the threshold of behaviour likely to cause harassment, alarm or distress is low and vague. To be blunt, some people are easily alarmed and distressed. Harassment is the more objective, higher part of that threshold. That is the entry point at which vulnerable people can first fall into this quasi-civil criminal order that can sweep them into the criminal justice system rather than diverting them from it.
The second concern is that, once one is under the jurisdiction of such an order, it becomes a personal, bespoke criminal code for the individual. I remember the suicidal woman banned from bridges and the pig farmer who was given an ASBO because the pigs wandered on to the neighbours’ land. Is it really appropriate to have bespoke criminal codes for different people in different parts of the country? The postcode lottery point was made well, but there is also the issue of vulnerable people and minorities, who find themselves disproportionately affected.
My Lords, I will speak to my Amendments 3 and 10. Superficially, Amendment 3 may look radical, in seeking to reduce the age from 18 to 14. The noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, certainly might not like it, but, if we want to tackle the lack of respect or anti-social behaviour of those aged 18-plus, that will not be possible unless we tackle all the anti-social behaviour that has built up from age 10 or even younger.
We cannot get into pre-14 behaviour today, but I discovered some frightening statistics from the Met Police, which it was forced to publish under an FOI request last year. They show that, for the year ending December 2023, 879 crimes were committed by children aged 10 to 17. Of these, 173 were violence against the person, 64 were robbery, 81 were theft, 28 were arson, 385 were drug offences and 81 involved possession of weapons. That is fairly frightening. But if that was not bad enough, the Met also published a breakdown of crimes committed by children aged one to nine, of which there were 653 offences. Some 128 were theft and 95 were arson and criminal damage, but the really frightening statistics were the 85 sexual offences and—the largest group—191 crimes of violence against the person. As I say, we cannot deal with that age group today, but I simply ask what kind of sick society we are becoming when in the Met area alone we have 85 children aged between one and nine accused of sexual offences and 191 accused of violence against the person.
5:15 pm
These statistics are important background, because we all know there is almost always a progression in the level of criminal behaviour. Very few people commit rape as their first sexual offence. Very few criminals—indeed, I suggest none—commit an armed robbery without starting first with some anti-social behaviour or a bit of shop theft, then burglary, more serious theft and a bit of violence, before running up to full-scale armed and violent robbery. That is why I want 14 to 18 year-olds included in the respect orders, as it just possibly might lead to fewer violent crimes when these people are older.
It is difficult to get accurate statistics for crimes committed by children, since the Office for National Statistics and the Youth Justice Board seem to hide them away in dozens of tables. There seems to be a concerted effort to make it difficult to find important statistics. If you google the number of children aged 14 to 18 convicted of homicide, you get referred to FOI requests and vague, inexplicable government statistics in the Office for National Statistics.
In October 2024, Sky News ploughed through all the tables and discovered that the number of convictions of children for murder have doubled since 2013 to one in 25 of all homicides. Commenting on this, Dr Simon Harding, a criminology expert, said there has been an
“increase in serious violence in young people”,
and that there is a greater
20 of 142 shown
“absurd, stigmatising and authoritarian orders”
that ban diverse and sometimes anodyne non-criminal activities.
A major criticism centres on the weak governance and poor assessment of these powers. Manifesto Club research found that nearly half of all PSPOs issued by local authorities in one year were signed off by a single council officer, without passing through scrutiny procedures within the council, such as approval by cabinet or full council. Despite legal requirements for consultation, the Manifesto Club points out that the legislation requires consultation only with the police chief, the landowner and whatever community representatives the local authority thinks it appropriate to consult, meaning that there is no requirement for any public consultation or minimum standards for one.
There is a significant lack of official data collection and central government scrutiny on the use and effectiveness of anti-social behaviour powers such as CPNs and PSPOs. The broad and unchecked nature of the powers creates inconsistency of enforcement across the country, leading to postcode lotteries for victims, where enforcement depends on location rather than circumstances.
PSPOs and dispersal powers are often unfairly imposed on or enforced against homeless people, including bans on rough sleeping and begging. Homeless individuals report being moved on by police multiple times a day and feeling that the system is set against them. Examples of arbitrary and overzealous enforcement include fines issued to an 82 year-old man for cycling his bike in a town centre, for the feeding of stray cats, for the flying of model aircraft, for keeping a wheelbarrow behind a garden shed and for using foul language. Community protection notices have been issued with restrictions on how people conduct themselves in their own home, sometimes based on weak evidence reliant on hearsay.
There is increasing commercialisation of enforcement of anti-social behaviour powers. Many councils outsource the issuance of fixed penalty notices for PSPOs and CPNs to private companies. The most common contractual arrangement involves companies receiving a percentage of FPN—fixed penalty notice—income, which directly incentivises officers to issue as many penalties as possible.
This practice is explicitly stated to contradict statutory guidance, which notes that enforcement should in no circumstances be used as a means to raise revenue. Private officers employed under this system have been accused of setting daily targets, hiding badges, intimidating people and ticketing minor offences or non-offences. This intensification of busybody offences and penalties risks increasing injustice, particularly for vulnerable people.
Amendment 1, tabled in my name and that of my noble friend Lady Doocey, and signed by the noble Baroness, Lady Fox of Buckley, would require the implementation of respect orders to be delayed until a comprehensive review of existing anti-social behaviour powers under the anti-social behaviour Act 2014 is conducted and completed by an independent person within six months of Royal Assent.
Before we introduce a new measure, we should assess whether the myriad existing tools—ASBIs, community protection notices and public space protection orders—are truly fit for purpose. The process of anti-social behaviour governance is already widely criticised as confusing, inconsistent and prone to arbitrary enforcement.
Without undertaking this vital review, we risk merely layering a new, complex civil order onto a system that is already confusing, ineffective and unjust, leading to overlapping powers and making enforcement decisions more difficult. Additional support for this delay, and an independent review, comes from key stakeholders, including Justice and the Victims’ Commissioner. We must pause, review what we have and then legislate effectively.
The core legal test for imposing a respect order is dangerously permissive. It rests on two conditions: the civil standard of proof—the balance of probabilities that the individual has engaged in anti-social behaviour—and the judicial belief that it is merely just and convenient to make the order. This is an alarmingly low threshold for an order that can severely restrict an individual’s liberty and lead to imprisonment. We must insist on a higher standard.
Amendment 5, in the name of my noble friend Lady Doocey and signed by me, proposes to replace the vague phrase “just and convenient” with the essential standard of “necessary and proportionate”. This change is essential to ensure that the restrictions imposed align strictly with the principles of the Human Rights Act 1998, ensuring that the conditions are tailored and appropriate to the specific case.
Amendment 4, also in my noble friend’s name, probes the wording that allows an order to be made if a person “threatens to engage in” anti-social behaviour. This vague phrasing gives excessive scope for judicial speculation, allowing the state to impose serious orders based on future suspicion rather than concrete, proven past behaviour.
Amendment 7, also in my noble friend’s name, seeks to specify a maximum length of time for an order, challenging the Bill’s proposals that a respect order can be imposed for an indefinite period. An indefinite order, based on a civil standard of proof, is inconsistent with the framework of other behaviour control orders. We propose a maximum duration, such as two years, to align respect orders with other established orders and requiring judicial review for any extension.
We must ensure that these powers cannot be weaponised against those struggling with homelessness or mental health issues, as seen with past anti-social behaviour powers targeting people for begging, sleeping rough or feeding the birds. Amendment 12—I thank the noble Lord, Lord Meston, for signing it—seeks to remove the power to exclude a person from their home. This power, introduced in new Section C1, is disproportionate; exclusion from one’s home is an extremely severe sanction. While the Bill limits this to cases involving violence or a significant risk of harm, such threats should be handled exclusively through the criminal justice system or specific protection orders to ensure that the necessary safeguards and standards of proof are met. We on these Benches are particularly concerned about the risk of this power being used inappropriately against victims of domestic abuse, potentially leading to their eviction instead of the perpetrator’s detention.
Amendment 18 would remove the provision creating interim respect orders. Interim orders lack proper procedural safeguards and carry the inherent risk of disproportionate interference with liberty, particularly when they are made without notice to the respondent. If a situation is so urgent that it requires immediate prohibition, a more specific or criminal intervention is warranted. Anti-social and behaviour measures must possess strong democratic and public accountability to counter the risk of arbitrary local restriction.
Amendment 9 in my name requires respect orders to pass through full council and be subject to a full public consultation before the relevant authority makes an application to the court. This would ensure that elected representatives approve decisions that directly impact civil liberties, which would mitigate the democratic deficit seen in the implementation of other local orders such as PSPOs.
Amendment 21, in my name and signed by my noble friend and the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, mandates that the Secretary of State must conduct a full public consultation exercise prior to issuing any statutory guidance on respect orders. This guidance must be informed by groups including the police, victims’ interests groups, housing providers and, crucially, homeless persons and legal practitioners. This would prevent guidance aimed at curbing behaviour being developed in a vacuum and ensure that it is practical and trauma-informed, especially when dealing with those struggling with addiction or homelessness.
In conclusion, these amendments collectively seek to address the historical weaknesses of the ASBI regime —weak judicial thresholds, arbitrary enforcement, indefinite application and a lack of accountability—before they are codified in a new measure that carries the full weight of the criminal law. If respect orders are to succeed where previous civil orders failed, they must be founded on evidence, necessity and transparency. I urge the Minister to recognise the fundamental importance of these safeguards. I beg to move.
If, as the Government tell us, the key difference with respect orders is to deal with persistent and serious anti-social behaviour, that should be made explicit in the legislation. Otherwise, the danger is that they just become another overused part of a toolkit, handed out promiscuously. That is a particular concern because of the use of the phrase by the Government and in the Bill that these orders are “just and convenient”.
“Convenient” is chilling, because—here is the rub—respect orders are formally civil orders but, in essence, are criminal in character. I am worried about the conflation of civil and criminal in relation to respect orders, which the noble Lord explained so well. The Government are removing that rather inconvenient problem of a criminal standard of proof because it has all that tiresome “beyond reasonable doubt” palaver that you have to go through. However, if you are found guilty, as it were, there is a criminal punishment doled out via a respect order and you can, as we have heard, receive up to two years in prison, which rather contradicts some of the emphasis in the Sentencing Bill on trying to stop people going to prison and keeping them in the community—so this is not entirely joined-up government either.
At Second Reading I quoted Dame Diana Johnson, who made clear the “convenience” point by explaining that the problem with a civil injunction such as an ASB is that,
“if a civil injunction is breached, the police officer has to take the individual to court to prove the breach”,
and she complained that there was no automatic power of arrest. That bothersome inconvenience has been overcome by creating a new respect order, which Dame Diana enthusiastically states
“combines the flexibility of the civil injunction with the ‘teeth’ of the criminal behaviour order”.—[Official Report, Commons, 27/11/24; cols. 795-96.]
However, that convenient mash-up of a legal solution is something that we should be wary of. It has a dangerous precedent, showing that a cavalier attitude to legal norms and justice can lead to great injustice.
When I read all this, I thought of the single justice procedure, which we were told would allow public authorities to bring cheap and speedy prosecutions for law breaches, such as not paying the BBC licence fee or dodging transport fares. However, with quick prosecutions conducted in such a way—and, in that instance, behind closed doors, as exposed brilliantly by Tristan Kirk, a journalist at the Evening Standard—we have seen thousands of people on an industrial scale being found guilty, often of small unintended mistakes. We have to remember that, if you try to bring about justice quickly and using these new methods, you can cause huge amounts of problems. There are harrowing stories of people who are very ill, people who have dementia and even people who have died, who have been victims of these single justice procedure issues.
I hope the movers of the amendments in this group will recognise that fast-track systems of convenience can lead to some terrible unintended consequences. I am reminded, in similar vein, of the growth of those monstrous non-crime hate incidents—again, a legalistic mash-up that have caused so many problems for free speech, using paralegalistic language and confusing us over what constitutes guilt. I was therefore glad to see the amendments by the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, in this group, and I look forward to his comments later.
This group of amendments is one to which I would like to hear the Minister respond positively. They are well intentioned—no one has been dismissive of anti-social behaviour—but we do not think respect orders are fit for purpose and, on the other hand, anti-social behaviour orders in general are in a mess. At least let us review what works and what does not before we move forward.
Once you breach your personalised criminal code—which could be to keep away from a part of town where your close relatives live—you are then swept into the system. That is my third concern about these quasi-civil criminal orders: the ease with which vulnerable people with chaotic lives who have been let down by social services and society in general are now swept into the criminal justice system rather than diverted from it.
Finally, I share the concerns about making such orders available to even younger people, who really should not be anywhere near the criminal justice system. In a much later group—sometime next year, I think, when we will still be in this Committee and will be older, if not wiser—I have tabled an amendment, with the support of the noble and learned Baronesses, Lady Hale of Richmond and Lady Butler-Sloss, to tackle the shockingly low age of criminal responsibility, 10 years-old, that we still have in England and Wales.