Crime and Policing Bill

Report (6th Day)

My Lords, we are about to start the final day on Report of the Crime and Policing Bill. There are 13 groups of amendments to complete today, and multiple votes are expected. I will briefly remind the House of some key parts of the Companion that are particularly relevant to Report. This is intended to help us make progress and proceed to votes.

First—this is every Whip’s favourite line—the House has resolved that speeches should be shorter. Secondly, and importantly for today as we are on Report, the Companion states:

“Arguments fully deployed in Committee … should not be repeated at length on report”.

Thirdly, I remind your Lordships’ House that, while interventions are in accordance with the customs of the House, they should be brief questions for clarification; lengthy and frequent interventions should not be made.

Finally, some of the topics we will discuss today are emotive and very important to many noble Lords. As my noble friend the Chief Whip has frequently reminded the House, it is in the best traditions of the House that these debates are conducted with courtesy and respect.

Amendment 409FA not moved.

Clause 183: Power to make youth diversion orders

Amendment 409G

409G: Clause 183, page 235, line 3, at end insert— “(2A) In determining whether to make a youth diversion order in respect of the respondent, the court must be provided with evidence relating to—(a) the alternative interventions that have been considered or previously applied,(b) the reasons why such interventions were considered inappropriate, unsuitable, or unsuccessful, and(c) consultations undertaken by the police with relevant individuals, experts or agencies, which may include youth justice services.”Member's explanatory statement This amendment requires the court to be provided with evidence of any alternative interventions considered and any consultation undertaken with relevant individuals or agencies in respect of a child or young person subject to a youth diversion order application. This amendment strengthens the provision of multi-agency evidence to assist the court when undertaking the ‘necessary’ test and when making a youth diversion order.

My Lords, in moving this amendment, I will also speak to Amendment 417A.

Amendment 409G would ensure that, before a court imposes a youth diversion order, it has clear evidence of any alternative interventions that have been tried or considered, why they failed and what consultation took place with the child and the relevant agencies. The point of the amendment is to ensure that there is proper multi-agency input and that these new orders are used only when they are genuinely appropriate. It would also help the court to judge whether the order is proportionate and whether the necessity test has truly been met. The amendment is designed to make them more effective by clearly showing why other interventions have not worked. Early consultation will mean fewer orders being rejected, less wasted court time and conditions that are practical and linked to the services available locally.

Crucially, the amendment learns the lessons of the Southport case. There, a failure to share information meant that decision-makers were left without a full picture of the young person’s background. That led to an ineffective referral order in 2021, three years before the tragedy occurred. The amendment would help stop such failures from happening again. By requiring all relevant information to be brought together before a single decision-maker, it would ensure that multiple referrals and early warning signs are not missed. We know that proper multi-agency working, involving police, youth offending teams, social services and the voluntary sector, produces more reliable risk assessments and helps prevent serious harm. My amendment would embed that joined-up approach. It also encourages consultation beyond statutory agencies, extending it to parents and carers where appropriate. In the Southport case, the failure to consult the perpetrator’s parents was another missed opportunity. The amendment would help ensure that those closest to the child are properly involved from the start.

My Lords, before I speak to my amendment and the others in this group, I just say that, as the Green Peers are not part of the usual channels, we were not able to give our views on the fact that this very important piece of legislation is being bullied through this House by the Government. It is absolutely outrageous that we do not have another day for Report. I hold both Members of the Front Bench accountable for this. It is not acceptable. This is no way to make good law, when we are going to be very tired in the later hours and possibly in the early hours.

However, on group 1, my Amendments 409H and 409J on youth diversion orders are supported by a wide range of organisations, including the Alliance for Youth Justice, the Centre for Justice Innovation, MLegal, the National Youth Advocacy Service, Sheffield Hallam University, INQUEST, the Children’s Rights Alliance for England, Just for Kids Law and the Runnymede Trust. That is quite a lot of very experienced organisations that support these amendments. Their collective expertise in youth justice, children’s rights and legal practice adds considerable weight to the concerns that underpin these proposals.

There are broader and very serious questions about the suitability of youth diversion orders themselves. Amendment 409G in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, rightly asks whether a youth diversion order is necessary in the first place. This amendment addresses the equally important question of what happens next. It aims to take a practical approach to working with what we have in the Bill. If such orders are to be introduced, the framework governing them must be rooted in what we know actually works for children. As drafted, Clause 185 gives the courts extremely broad discretion to impose conditions, without any clear duty to consider whether those requirements are suitable or achievable in practice. This amendment intends to address that gap. Proposed new subsection (4A) would require courts to consider evidence of suitability, taking into account a child’s

“age, maturity, and individual circumstances”.

It would also require consideration of whether conditions are practically available, whether they can realistically be enforced, and whether multiple requirements are compatible with one another.

This reflects what evidence from youth justice practice already tells us. Evaluation of diversion programmes, including work by the Suffolk Youth Justice Service, shows clearly that outcomes improve when conditions are tailored to the individual child, realistically enforceable and do not interfere with education or access to support services. Without those things, there is an obvious risk of children being set up to fail. When failure leads to breach and a breach is a criminal offence, we are not diverting children from the justice system; we are actually drawing them further into it.

Proposed new subsection (4B) reinforces another essential principle: that orders should not disrupt education, health appointments or support services. This is based on the fact that they are factors that help prevent harm and reduce reoffending. Undermining them could be damaging.

The amendment would also introduce a requirement for the terms of the order to be explained in language that the child can understand. Again, this is strongly supported by evidence. Studies of diversion programmes show that children are far more likely to engage when they understand what is required of them and why. Youth offending teams that take the time to explain decisions in accessible language achieve significantly better outcomes. By contrast, many children struggle to recall or understand formal processes. As one 10 year-old boy said of a formal warning, “I forgot it straightaway”.

This issue is particularly acute for children with additional needs. Evidence suggests that a significant proportion of children in the youth justice system have speech, language and communication difficulties, and many have special educational needs or mental health challenges. Research presented to the All-Party Parliamentary Group for Children highlights how such difficulties can affect a child’s ability to understand instructions, regulate behaviour and engage with processes. Crucially, many of these children will not ask for clarification because they simply do not understand what they have heard. They may appear compliant but, in reality, be confused and unsupported. If we do not take that into account, we risk further criminalising vulnerability.