Crime and Policing Bill

Report (5th Day) (Continued)

Amendment 393

393: After Clause 167, insert the following new Clause— “Suspension of chief constables(1) The Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act 2011 is amended as follows.(2) In section 38 (appointment, suspension and removal of chief constables), after subsection (2) insert—“(2A) Before suspending a chief constable under this section, the police and crime commissioner (or their successor) must—(a) be satisfied on reasonable grounds that the chief constable’s continued exercise of their functions would present a serious risk to the efficiency or effectiveness of the police force, or seriously undermine public confidence in the policing of the area, and(b) consult His Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire and Rescue Services (or any relevant successor inspectorate) and have regard to its views.””Member's explanatory statement This amendment would require a police and crime commissioner (or their successor) before suspending a chief constable under section 38 of the Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act 2011, to consult His Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire and Rescue Services and to be satisfied that suspension is necessary to avoid a serious risk to the efficiency or effectiveness of the force or to public confidence.

My Lords, Amendment 393 seeks to protect the operational independence of chief constables by introducing vital safeguards at the point of suspension—the moment when they are most vulnerable to political pressure in practice.

In Committee, I tabled an amendment addressing a later stage of the formal dismissal process. However, after listening to police representatives, it has become clear that the real problem arises much earlier. The unilateral power of suspension currently exercised by police and crime commissioners, without any duty to seek independent input, is a significant driver of the leadership instability we see today, with nearly one in five forces losing their chief constable every year.

Under the current framework, the independent inspectorate must be consulted before a chief is formally removed, yet suspension often pre-empts this and can be triggered on relatively vague grounds, including simply that a chief constable’s continued presence may be detrimental to the efficiency or effectiveness of the force. In practice, this suspension loophole means the mere threat of suspension is often enough to force a chief to resign just to avoid a very public confrontation.

This leadership churn has real-world consequences. In Devon and Cornwall, the disruption of having three chief constables in 18 months led to service shortfalls and diminished morale. The Government’s own recent White Paper admits that the PCC model has often “not facilitated effective management” and acknowledges

“tensions in the one-to-one relationship”,

which ultimately harm communities.

My amendment proposes two modest but critical adjustments. First, it would require the PCC to be satisfied on reasonable grounds that continued service poses a serious risk to efficiency or to public confidence, replacing the current vague thresholds. Secondly, it would extend the duty to consult HMICFRS at this earlier stage, creating consistency between the decision to suspend and the decision to remove.

This is also about a wider leadership crisis. In several recent rounds, there have been few and even no applicants for chief constable roles. Potential candidates are deterred because they fear being removed for reasons of political convenience rather than genuine failure. We on these Benches believe that no single individual—whether a PCC, a mayor or indeed the Home Secretary—should wield unilateral power over a chief constable’s career. If the Government proceed with plans to restore the Home Secretary’s powers of dismissal, these independent safeguards must be the baseline to prevent a drift towards political control.

This amendment would restore balance. It would not prevent swift action where a chief presides over grave failures or faces credible allegations of serious misconduct. However, it would ensure that any such reckoning is fair, proportionate and independently informed. I beg to move.

My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, for her amendment. It is a measured proposal that would simply require a police and crime commissioner, before suspending a chief constable, to be satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for doing so and to consult His Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire & Rescue Services.

Chief constables occupy one of the most demanding leadership roles in public life. They are responsible for operational policing, for thousands of officers and staff, and for maintaining public confidence in the rule of law. Therefore, decisions to suspend them are of the utmost seriousness, not only for the individual concerned but for the stability and effectiveness of the force they lead.

Recent events remind us why clarity in these processes matters. The policing of the Maccabi Tel Aviv fixture generated significant public and political debate about policing decisions and leadership accountability. In that context, the actions and judgments of the then chief constable of West Midlands Police, Craig Guildford, have been the subject of rightful scrutiny and commentary. There is potential concern about the necessity for the amendment, but I look forward to what the Minister has to offer on it.

I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, for her amendment. I say at the outset that she has a point: the process by which police and crime commissioners may suspend a chief constable should be looked at.

The noble Baroness has suggested that His Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire & Rescue Services should be involved in this process. As I discussed in Committee, the inspectorate already has such a role for the enforcement of resignations or retirements of chief constables under the Police Regulations 2003. I am pleased to tell the noble Baroness that the Government agree with the suggestion she has made; I do not wish to surprise the noble Baroness.

Amazed is the word.

I hope she can recover from that shock. I ask her to look at paragraph 134 of the White Paper, From Local to National: A New Model for Policing, which we published on 26 January. It says:

“We will reform the process for the appointment, suspension and dismissal of Chief Constables to introduce greater fairness, transparency and balance into the process. This will include introducing a requirement for Mayors and Policing and Crime Boards to seek views from His Majesty’s Chief Inspector of Constabulary before taking any action to suspend the Chief Constable”.

I confirm that we intend to bring forward the necessary legislation as soon as parliamentary time allows. We want to do that as part of the wider police reform package, so that it is not a piecemeal approach. There will be a wider police reform follow-through on the White Paper as soon as parliamentary time allows. It is a very ambitious programme. I want to make sure that we do not just deal with it in isolation. That reassurance is on the record, and on that basis I hope the noble Baroness will not push her amendment.

The noble Lord, Lord Pannick, tells me that it is a victory. I thank the Minister for that confirmation, and I am very pleased that it is not just when some chief constables are going to be sacked; it is actually at the stage I asked for in my speech. That is the key point. If they can be suspended and that does not require consultation with anyone, the fact is that practically all of them have just taken the view that they do not want a big public outing, so they have just resigned anyway. That is what I am trying to stop. The Minister has said that he is going to do exactly what I have asked for. Can someone write that down? I am delighted, and I therefore withdraw my amendment.

Amendment 393 withdrawn.

Amendment 393A not moved.

Clause 168: Anonymity for authorised firearms officers charged with qualifying offences

Amendment 393B

393B: Clause 168, page 219, line 13, leave out subsections (3) and (4) and insert— “(3) The court may, on application by or on behalf of D and on notice to the media, make an order—(a) withholding from the public in proceedings before the court—(i) D’s name, (ii) D’s address,(iii) D’s date of birth,(b) giving a reporting direction (see section 170) in respect of D (if one does not already have effect), or(c) making an anonymity order (see section 171) in respect of D.(4) To make an order under subsection (3) the court must—(a) be satisfied that the order is necessary—(i) to protect against a real risk to the safety of D or another person arising from D being identified as the person alleged to have committed the offence, or(ii) to prevent real harm to the public interest, and(b) be satisfied that the order includes the least restrictive measures possible to address the conditions in (a)(i) or (ii) and is proportionate having regard to the principle of open justice.(4A) Where the court considers that giving notice under subsection (3) would defeat the purpose of the application, it may make a temporary order without notice, which must be reconsidered at the earliest opportunity after notice has been given to the media.”Member’s explanatory statement The amendment would replace the presumption of anonymity for firearms officers in Clause 168 with a power for the Court to grant anonymity where it is necessary to protect against a real risk to the safety of the officer or another person arising from D being identified as the person alleged to have committed the offence, or to prevent real harm to the public interest, having regard to proportionality and the principle of open justice.