Comprehensive and Progressive Trans-Pacific Partnership (IAC Report)

The CPTPP is also about imports, particularly agriculture and food. The NFU welcomed the fact that farmers have been shielded from CPTPP imports in most vulnerable areas—an improvement on the deals with Australia and New Zealand—but has

“serious concerns about the cumulative impact of trade deals on British food production, especially … beef, poultry and pork”.

That is a reminder to consider the cumulative effects of successive deals on farmers and food production, not just the impact of each individual deal.

The Government have assured us that the UK’s right to regulate to protect human, animal and plant life is secure under the CPTPP. However, some academics remain concerned about the threat to our precautionary approach to sanitary and phytosanitary, or SPS, regulation. The precautionary principle permits regulation to protect the environment where there is a plausible risk of serious or irreversible damage, even in the absence of complete scientific proof. The CPTPP’s dispute settlement mechanism, as it affects the environment, means that future SPS measures might be challenged via the state-to-state dispute mechanism. The committee therefore asks Ministers to set out how they intend to address these challenges to our regulatory approach. I look forward to the Minister’s response to that.

I turn to the second consideration, the strategic value of joining the CPTPP. It has been something of a challenge to judge this in the continued absence of a cross-government foreign, defence and diplomatic vision into which a sustainable, long-term trade policy might fit. The committee therefore reiterates its call—we hope with a better response this time—for the Government to publish an overall trade strategy with clearly defined objectives. Such a framework would surely help to clarify and guide the Government’s priorities by spelling out their objectives for trade, but it would also facilitate parliamentary scrutiny of the Government’s aims as set against their achievements.

In assessing CPTPP membership, witnesses to the committee made three arguments in support of it. First, while wars in Ukraine and the Middle East, and the risk of reduced US commitment to NATO, create new uncertainties closer to home, CPTPP membership, given the Indo-Pacific’s geopolitical significance, sends an important political signal about the UK’s commitment to that region. The committee views engagement with the Indo-Pacific as positive. However, there is a lack of detail as to how the Government intend to utilise our membership as the trade strand of their so-called Indo-Pacific tilt. Ministers should spell out how they expect membership to contribute to their strategic aims in the region.

Your Lordships’ House does not need reminding that the international landscape for trade is rapidly changing and increasingly uncertain, which brings me to the second argument: that the CPTPP provides membership of a group of like-minded countries committed to free and open trade, high regulatory standards and adherence to the rule of law, together with the ability for member countries to align their standards and governance to promote fair and free trade. The committee agrees that the CPTPP can be seen as a rallying point for a rules-based liberal order, but this objective might be limited in an increasingly protectionist world. We should not forget that the CPTPP’s primary function is to liberalise trade among its members, rather than act as a political or strategic forum, so while we acknowledge value in using the CPTPP to engage with partners in the Indo-Pacific, we should be wary of overstating that potential.

Thirdly, the CPTPP could act as an incubator for new trading initiatives, particularly in emerging sectors such as digital and environmental trade, where the UK has a valuable opportunity to contribute. This possibility is particularly attractive as we grapple with a struggling WTO. We thus welcome this but acknowledge that plurilateral agreements cannot replace co-operation at the multilateral level. In the words of one witness, the WTO is

“really important. We need to keep trying … there is no real substitute”.

Innovation within the CPTPP should be viewed as complementary to, rather than a replacement for, multilateral efforts.

Accession is nevertheless welcome, and it will be important for the UK to take full advantage of its new seat at the CPTPP table. The committee considered potential avenues for UK input to the partnership’s future development and welcomed the invitation, prior to our full accession, for the UK to contribute to the first general review, which is taking place this year. It is aimed at consolidating the trade text and considering how to update and enhance it.

The report in front of your Lordships welcomes the stakeholder consultation and calls on the Government to publish their own priorities, both for this current review and for their longer-term future priorities for CPTPP development, hopefully prioritising areas of UK strength such as innovation in climate and trade in environmental goods and services, together with digital and other services. The House will not be surprised by my—and, in this case, the committee’s—regret at the absence of a consumer chapter, so we hope that its future inclusion could secure consumer protection within the agreement.

The partnership aspires to be a “living agreement”, although in the absence of a standing secretariat the rotating chair carries a heavy burden in marshalling the group. The UK should therefore respond favourably to any move towards a standing—although lean, I hope —secretariat.

There has been much debate on the possible future expansion of the CPTPP, with a number of countries already having applied to join, including China, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Taiwan, Ukraine and Uruguay, with other countries likely to follow suit. The process for any applicant is, first, for the country to demonstrate adherence to the required regulatory standards and a track record of adhering to the letter and spirit of existing international trade commitments. The second part of the process is for all current members to agree the new accession—a high bar, as our own application demonstrated. The IAC would welcome any country that meets these rigorous tests of entry, although, given the evidence received, it is unlikely that China will meet the necessary requirements any time soon.

The committee welcomed the Minister’s commitment that any new joiner would be subject to CRaG, but it calls on the Government to ensure that new accession processes go through the same consultation and impact evaluation as with any FTA partner—I see the Minister nodding. I note that, in the Commons at this very moment, they are trying to get such an amendment to the Bill currently going through. More seriously, it is vital that the Government start complying with the spirit, not just the wording, of CRaG.

Thanks to our Chief Whip, we are having this debate in this House, but the reality is that only the Commons has the power to delay ratification. We learned last week that the Leader of the Commons has denied that House the ability to debate or vote on the accession treaty within the CRaG period, making a mockery of the legislative power included in the 2010 Act. I note that the overwhelming vote of this House on 22 January—that the Rwanda treaty should not be ratified until all the promised safeguards are in place—has, to date, received no response from the Government, as required under the Act.

In addition to CRaG, there are other demands on the Government to ensure that successful trade deals will benefit the whole of the United Kingdom, including all its countries and regions. We acknowledge the improved consultation with the devolved Administrations, and we call on the Government to continue to share information and engage with them in a timely and transparent manner.

In summary, the committee welcomes the UK’s accession to the CPTPP and looks forward to the Government’s efforts to support businesses and consolidate their strategy to maximise the opportunities arising out of our new membership. I beg to move.

I want to talk about one main element from the latter part of the general themes that the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, talked about: the strategic context—not the Indo-Pacific tilt but the question of whether the Government should have a trade policy White Paper and a trade strategy document. When we as a committee asked for one over a year ago, we were right to do so, but it is now late in the Parliament to do that. However, anyone who wants to—not least from these Benches—can look at the Government’s activity in trade policy and deduce what we are trying to achieve. I think one would make a very positive deduction, not least from the fact that we wanted to join the CPTPP in the first place. It was very easy for people to say, “What has that to do with us? We’re not a Pacific country and we weren’t involved in the negotiations that led to the CPTPP, so why would we want to join it?” The short answer is because our trade policy is to support a rules-based system that obtains at high standards and is a broad-ranging and flexible, but also progressive, system of agreement for trade.

At the time that it was negotiated, the CPTPP was cutting edge in terms of digital trade and was quite forward in terms of services trade. A number of years have gone by, and there is now scope in the 2024 general review to remedy that. When they started this process, the Government were demonstrating their commitment to trade liberalisation, open trade, a rules-based trading system and not simply to bilateral agreements but to plurilateral agreements that would bring others into a broader world trading system. In the years to come, CPTPP may well demonstrate itself in that way as by no means confined to the Pacific Rim. We are leading the way, and I hope there will be others that follow. Let us not discount completely —happily, sometimes things change, and they do not always change in the wrong direction—that there might be the day when the United States once again thinks about joining a plurilateral, open trading system in ways that it has not done in the recent past. When it does so, the fact that two of its leading strategic allies, the United Kingdom and Japan, are in the CPTPP and were involved in the early stages of negotiating the agreement may give it greater confidence that this would be the proper step for the United States to take, if it really wants to rejoin a rules-based trading system, and greater confidence on how to go about it.

The only other point that I want to make is that I agree with the noble Baroness and the committee report—I think it is in paragraphs 74 to 76—that the CPTPP is not an alternative to the WTO, but in the recent WTO ministerial conference we have seen that plurilateral agreements in that context have made some progress, on things like the regulation of services, investment facilitation and so on. However, the WTO was not able to get agreement on things like food security and fisheries, or, sadly, on dispute settlement. I do not think that we can rely upon the WTO to make the progress that we need. If we are not careful, in the absence of WTO agreements, everything will be done by way of bilateral agreements, which lead one into a more mercantilist system, whereas what we want is an open, plurilateral trading system.

From my point of view, that means that things like the CPTPP and other plurilateral agreements—which are not just regional but may, as we can see, develop in relation to services, investment facilitation or, very importantly, trade in environmental goods—are all ways in which we can promote a wider, positive, open trading system. If we do not do that, protectionism will increase, and in so far as people are not simply protectionist, they will be mercantilist, expecting—as President Trump was wont to do and China is wont to do—that they can negotiate the outcome of trade, rather than create a system which enables the outcome of trade to be the result of markets and competition. That is what we are looking for, and that is why we are looking for an open trading system.

In that context, our accession to the CPTPP is a wholly positive step. I do not think that we should in the slightest diminish it by reference to some of the current statistics about what the prospective economic impact might look like. By the time we have made changes in terms of digital and services trade, and by the time one takes into account the confidence that is given to investors, the beneficial impacts resulting from our membership of the CPTPP will be considerably in excess of what has presently been predicted. I very much support it, but I am also very grateful to and support the committee in the report that it has given us.

It is a temptation for the Government—as the Minister said yesterday at Question Time—to hype the importance of such deals, and although we welcome the accession, the report is careful to avoid such exaggeration. The report summary says:

“Despite projections that CPTPP will bring limited economic benefits to the UK in the medium to long-term, the accession of the UK could be of strategic importance, especially in shaping the future development of CPTPP and geopolitical influence in the region. However, the effective implementation of CPTPP is key to maximising any potential benefits and building capacity for the future”.

I emphasise the words “could” and “potential”. We already have free trade agreements with nine existing members, although I accept that it is important that Brunei and Malaysia are now within the fold. Therefore, it means that the opportunity for growth is somewhat constrained, and two witnesses described the benefits as “marginal”. The Society of Motor Manufacturers and Traders, for example, stated that the

“potential benefits … should not be overstated”,

and we should generally be alert to the fact that the agreement is only a small part of UK trade. Yesterday I mentioned the Government’s estimate of 0.08% of GDP over the relevant period and the 0.04% estimate of another relevant group.

My second point is that there needs to be a new focus on services in our trade policy, particularly as, from 2021, services have overtaken goods as a share of UK exports. In 2023 services accounted for 54.3% of the total UK exports of £859.2 billion. These figures do not include services provided through our commercial presence in third countries. Our strength is in the service sector and yet the current agreement offers little, if any, liberalisation of services and no effective enforcement mechanism. We can only hope that, as insiders, we can help over time to move the agreement to have a more robust policy on the service sector. In the Government’s judgment, what prospects are there of helping to move the agreement more to the service sector? Have there already been any soundings in that direction?

My final point, already made in part by my noble friend, relates to the devolved Administrations. The Government have acknowledged the failure of consultation in this respect. The committee calls for information to be shared in a timely and transparent manner in and outside the relevant areas of devolved competence. I note that in the Australia deal, which the noble Lord, Lord Lansley, mentioned, Welsh farmers suffered substantially over Welsh lamb. I hope that the lesson of listening more to the concerns of the devolved Administrations has been learned. We should not sacrifice their interests on the altar of greater deals. The information-sharing protocol, which was made early last year, indicates that the Government have learned some of the lessons. But we should watch this space to see whether there are any real improvements. We must understand that the devolution settlement is now only 25 years old. There needs to be a total culture change in Whitehall to consult on and listen to the interests of the devolved Administrations. The Government have acknowledged that this was not the case in respect of this agreement. Let us hope that the lessons have now been fully learned.

The Financial Times humorously said that if the impact of the CPTPP was described in decibel terms, it would be the equivalent of

“a cat sneezing three rooms away”.

Now, it seems as if next door’s cat has the sniffles. Nevertheless, any growth is welcome, given the state of the UK economy. As the committee says, the Government have indicated that it is not just about economic growth. Indeed, that might not even be the primary aim. It is about greater integration with those economies. This is news to many of the nine countries with which we already have an FTA with the purpose of integrating our economy with theirs. What extra integration will the agreement to which we have acceded allow us? It may well be there.

I want to put into context what the level of growth activity would be after the 15th year. The £1.8 billion for the British economy is the equivalent of five and a half days’ trade with Holland. When we put up barriers to our nearest trading neighbours, we do much greater harm than any anticipated long-term benefit we gain from agreements such as this. The noble Lord, Lord Lansley, said that we can perhaps deduce the direction of travel from the Government’s activity. In the foreign affairs debate, the noble Lord, Lord Cameron, said we should never confuse activity with action. Therefore, we have to see not what the Government’s good intentions are but what their resulting actions realise.

In February the Sussex University trade observatory highlighted that

“the UK’s trade in goods with the world has underperformed compared to other comparable countries over the last few years”.

This anticipated growth with the rest of the world, other than the EU, is eluding us so far. Nevertheless, it may come about.

This is where the narrative starts to be challenged. Later in the debate, I suspect we will hear about how we need to be part of the fastest-growing part of the world’s trading economy within the Indo-Pacific area and how this agreement will allow the UK the increased growth benefit that those countries have seen. But the growth in the economies of the countries we are joining in the CPTPP has been almost exclusively because of the growth of the Chinese economy. Strip out the growth of China’s economy and its trade with Vietnam, Malaysia and the other countries in the CPTPP, and the figures look very different. In fact, their growth looks almost static. Now, with the slower growth in the Chinese economy, we will see what that level of trajectory looks like. Are we putting a lot of tariff-free eggs in this CPTPP basket when we are being very shoogly with our European Union neighbours?

This also has to be seen in the context in which the UK, more than any other European country, is now dependent on goods imports from China. The House has heard me say time and again that we have a trade deficit in goods with China of £40 billion. Germany has a trade surplus.

What also frequently goes unnoticed is that the world’s largest trading deal is not the CPTPP but the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership of 15 Asia-Pacific countries, including China, Australia and New Zealand. That represents 30.5% of global GDP, compared with the US-Mexico-Canada agreement at 28% and the EU at 18%. The RCEP’s growth is estimated to be far beyond that of any other agreement that we are acceding to. As much as this is a strategic debate about trade with the CPTPP, it is actually about the UK’s relations with China. The Government have said that this is an Indo-Pacific tilt towards those countries as an alternative to China. But there have been many rounds of negotiation between China, Japan and South Korea for an FTA between those countries. Whatever we do with our trade in the Indo-Pacific, we will be impacting on our relationship with China. We support an industrial and trade strategy because what our trading relationship with China will look like needs to be clear.

Finally, where we have seen bureaucracy, costs and paperwork added is in our trading relationship with the European Union. Yes, we will see a marginal, minimal decrease in bureaucracy with CPTPP countries, but we are seeing it actively increase for our nearest trading bloc—£100,000 of extra costs per typical UK business. That far outweighs even the most optimistic benefits mentioned by the noble Lord, Lord Lansley, that we would see for UK businesses in the CPTPP.

However, as I have said to the Minister, when we tilt towards one area, we are tilting away from another. Our trading partners in the Caribbean in CARIFORUM and in Africa in the African Continental Free Trade Area are seeing and hearing mixed messages from the UK. Therefore, I have called out the Government, time and again. For example, when we have signed an FTA with a Commonwealth country, not a single one has had a Commonwealth chapter for trade facilitation for the Commonwealth, allowed for under the WTO, which I have called for.

There may be one further final aspect. I close with a question to the Minister. It is likely, as the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, said, that our relationship with China will come into more context if it wishes to join and accede. But we have a friendly, free, democratic nation within the region, Taiwan, with which we can see the expansion of UK trade. I have been on a number of occasions. It is a reliable and trusted trading partner which has demonstrated that it can be a stable, democratic and rule of law-based country. I hope that the Minister will agree with me that it is time for a UK Cabinet Minister—a Cabinet Trade Minister—to visit Taipei, sending very clear signals. If we are seeking to tilt to the region and sending signals that it is not towards China, then a Cabinet-level official visiting Taipei would probably be the strongest signal of all.

Finally, noble Lords would not expect me to not mention the Commonwealth. Two-thirds of the countries that have signed up to this agreement are Commonwealth countries. Why has the Foreign and Commonwealth Office not taken the initiative and used this as a spring- board for a Commonwealth trade arrangement? That is the second prize that this Government, in a post-Brexit era, should take.

I thank the Minister for everything he has done in achieving what we have done so far.

In the case of the Pacific partnership, on the other hand, I recall no photo ops, no soundbites. We were spared the obvious soundbites about the merits of selling Bovril to Borneo, and the economic benefits were not exaggerated. The OBR says they are perhaps rather less than the Government had previously suggested, but the Government were putting the figure at under 0.1% of GDP, and the various upside possibilities that the noble Lord, Lord Lansley, mentioned had been taken into account in their calculations.

The deal was not oversold; it was sold on the potential of the partnership to develop. That was quite right, and I believe the partnership will develop. The digital economy deal between Chile, New Zealand and Singapore is a harbinger and a signpost. I hope that is the way it will develop, and I commend the call on the Government, in paragraph 118 of the IAC’s report,

“to set out and publish its priorities”

for this year’s quinquennial review of the partnership.

The Canadians, who are leading on the review, want to see a deepening of the deal, particularly in the area of digital trade. I hope we will row in behind them and help them on that. I also attach importance to the various recommendations to make British business better aware of the new opportunities the partnership opens and how to access them. The task force is a good idea; the roadshow is a good idea; the website clearly needs reform. Other than for command economies, trade treaties only enable: the greater part of their job is making sure that the opportunities for actual and potential exporters are used, and our Government need to do better. Explaining the partnership’s complex rules of origin has hardly begun.

With the indulgence of the House, I would like to offer one more general point—a coda to my time on the IAC, drawing on my experience of it. It serves the House well within the confines imposed on it by the CRaG Act, but I very much hope that the next Government, of whatever political complexion, will be readier than this one have been to look again at these constraints. When CRaG was passed, no one foresaw Brexit. Trade agreements back then were negotiated for us by the European Commission’s experts, most of them British, and overseen by the Council in Brussels and the European Parliament in Strasbourg. It was all very transparent. So the EU Committee, when I served on it, looking at trade agreements, was far better informed back then, pre-Brexit, than the IAC is now.

Brexit meant that Whitehall took back control but Westminster was shut out. Although my past was in Whitehall, I believe that the reduction in Westminster’s scrutiny is actually bad for Whitehall and for the country. Let me explain.

The principal reason why the EU drives harder trade bargains than we do—the contrast between our deal with Australia and its was striking—is that it is holding the keys to a larger market so it can extract greater concessions for handing over the keys. The EU is also more practised, but we may be getting better. It sounds as if we have been more resolute with the Canadians and Mexicans, whose agricultural exporters pricked up their ears at seeing how the Australians and New Zealanders had taken us to the cleaners. Wiser counsels have prevailed on India; I was concerned by the Johnson press for an agreement—any agreement—soon.

However, I believe that the Commission’s hand on trade negotiations is greatly strengthened by the effective scrutiny of its work that the Council in Brussels and the Parliament in Strasbourg hold. American negotiators can and do point to their separation of powers, and congressional oversight and veto rights. When American negotiators reject a proposed concession or a trade-off, they can and do say, “Sorry, Congress wouldn’t wear it. It wouldn’t fly on the Hill”. EU negotiators can and frequently do play the same card. Ours cannot because the world knows that, in London, parliamentary oversight is pro forma and perfunctory. Trade policy in London is a black box and Parliament is put in the picture about treaties only once it is too late to change them.

It is different in Ottawa, Canberra and Wellington, so our weakness is not a function of a parliamentary system; in other parliamentary systems there is far closer scrutiny than we are allowed here. When the IAC tried to find out what was happening in the negotiation with New Zealand, our principal source was the New Zealand Government’s website, which gave a very full account of each negotiating round. In London, the Minister—the noble Lord, Lord Grimstone—was allowed to send us a regular letter saying that there had been a round, a chapter had been opened, a chapter had been closed and there would be another round. He was allowed to give agendas and dates, but not information on substance, issues or trade-offs. There was nothing remotely useful, although it was all available on the New Zealand government website and so available to the committee. This is all a great pity, because greater transparency elsewhere means greater public understanding elsewhere. It means that exporters elsewhere are better prepared for new opportunities when they arise as a consequence of trade deals.

Reform of the CRaG Act, allowing for a real parliamentary role in approving mandates, following negotiations and ratifying trade treaties, would produce better outcomes for the United Kingdom. It is not a zero-sum game, with Westminster’s gain meaning Whitehall’s loss. It honestly is not; it would be a win-win. The IAC does its best for House and country, but I am quite sure that it would be better for everyone if the Government could be more grown-up and trust the country to be more grown-up about trade. We still need a clear trade strategy to be agreed and published. Here I disagree with the noble Lord, Lord Lansley. Grown-up countries do this: the Americans do it, the EU does it, France and Germany do it. Most countries publish their trade strategy, promulgate it, defend it and act on it. We should do so too. Real parliamentary association with the negotiating process would be in everybody’s interest.

Since I have disagreed with him on one point, I end by saying that I disagree with the noble Lord, Lord Lansley, on another. I am afraid I cannot share his optimism about the possibility that a Trump Administration would look again at participation in the Pacific partnership treaty. I am afraid that that ship has definitively sailed.

The noble Lord, Lord Purvis of Tweed, made the case that the RCEP is a more important agreement than the CPTPP. I am not sure he is right there, because it is much shallower. He also said that the CPTPP’s growth was much greater than the EU’s only because of trade with China, but he then said that UK trade with China was massively significant, so he rather contradicted his point.

The committee’s members acknowledged the “potential advantage” of the partnership as part of a British

“‘tilt’ to the Indo-Pacific”,

and

“think there is some, albeit limited, value in CPTPP membership providing access to a forum for members committed to a free, open trade order”.

I think they might have been a bit more enthusiastic about this enormously important and highly significant development. The geopolitical significance of the UK’s accession is already enormous, both for the UK and the CPTPP itself. For the UK, it shows our strong commitment to the Indo-Pacific region, reinforcing the AUKUS pact, the continuing importance of the Five Eyes intelligence pact and the reciprocal access agreement with Japan. For the partnership itself, the UK’s accession goes some way to replacing the intended participation of the United States, and makes the perception of the bloc a bit more global.

Since President Trump turned against US membership, Japan has been strongly encouraging the UK to join, a point which may not be sufficiently appreciated in this country. My noble friend Lord Lansley also drew your Lordships’ attention to this point in his impressive speech. Our Japanese friends recognise that six of the 11 members of the CPTPP are Commonwealth countries —now, with the UK, that is seven out of 12. There has been an active group within the Japanese Government’s Cabinet Office working on the CPTPP for more than six years. It recognises that the UK could become, with Japan, the de facto joint leaders of the partnership and that the UK’s contribution to the way the partnership operates, and to its rules and methods, would be highly valuable. It has also played an invaluable role behind the scenes, in encouraging the other members of the CPTPP to welcome UK accession and in helping us overcome the small number of reservations about our accession that appeared in a few members of the partnership.

Having lived and worked in Japan for 11 years, and with continued parliamentary and business involvement in that country ever since I returned to the UK, I am very pleased that UK accession to the CPTPP has made an important contribution to our excellent relationship with Japan. Indeed, together with our growing bilateral collaboration in defence and security, exemplified by the trilateral GCAP programme with Italy, it can be said that we have entered the age of the second Anglo-Japanese alliance.

More specifically, the report identifies some issues with the rules of origin provisions provided by the CPTPP. I understand that these are working well in some areas, such as the seafood sector, but could my noble friend the Minister comment on how they are working for the automotive sector?

Paragraph 28 of the report celebrates the fact that there is a

“good balance between new market access for food exporters and access to the UK market”.

Are the Government doing enough to encourage farmers to exploit opportunities in those sectors where they have an advantage?

It is interesting that the report suggests at paragraph 29 that the UK can retain its current precautionary approach to SPS controls, consistent with CPTPP rules. Is that the case even where our current standards, inherited from the EU, do not comply with WTO rules? Is it not the case that we may have given too much weight to the precautionary principle as an EU member? Where the evidence suggests that there are no significant risks to human health, does not accession to the CPTPP provide us with an opportunity to permit, in certain circumstances and with appropriate safeguards, the introduction of hormone-fed beef, chlorine-washed chicken and some GM crops, which could significantly lower food costs for hard-pressed consumers? I think that our membership of the CPTPP gives us a good platform on which to work with like-minded partners to restore the reputation and influence of the WTO.

The members of the committee struck me as being a bit sceptical about the significance of our role in the CPTPP and its contribution to the achievement of the Government’s strategic aims in the region. In paragraph 72, the report asks for more detail on this. From my interactions with contacts in Japan, Australia and South Korea, which I hope may soon become an accession candidate, I believe it is already very clear how significant it is, and I hope my noble friend will set out his view on this in his winding-up speech.

Finally, I welcome the proposal that, following the current general review, the Government should set out their priorities in the context of a longer-term plan for the development of the CPTPP. Does my noble friend think this should include a small standing secretariat to assist businesses in maximising the trade benefits offered by the UK’s membership? I look forward to hearing from other noble Lords and to my noble friend’s response to the debate.