Before I call the hon. Member for North Bedfordshire (Richard Fuller), I inform Members that the Speaker has granted a waiver to the House’s sub judice resolution in respect of the coroner’s inquest into the two deaths connected to the Cleat Hill gas explosion. Members may therefore refer to the inquest in this debate.
I am very grateful to have secured this debate on the impact of the Cleat Hill pump incident on residents, and I welcome the Minister to her place. As she knows, I have a number of questions, some of which she will be able to answer, and a number of which will be for other Departments—although I am sure that she will be able to pass those on to the relevant Minister.
On Tuesday 2 July, during drilling for the installation of a ground source heat pump in a residential neighbourhood back garden on Cleat Hill in my constituency, a reservoir of gas was encountered at a shallow depth of approximately 100 metres. Subsequently, certain discussions, recommendations and actions were made by various parties in response. On Saturday 19 October, an explosion at the property resulted in the death of two people: Paul Swales and Julia Harris. The blast happened close to where gas from the underground reservoir had been venting. By the time of the explosion, gas had been venting from the shallow reservoir for 109 days.
Approximately 50 households were evacuated from their homes on Saturday 19 October, and for nearly five weeks now my constituents have been living with relatives, friends or, in the majority of cases, in temporary accommodation provided by Bedford borough council. I take this opportunity to commend my constituents for their resilience to the disruption caused to their daily lives, and to the anxiety that has been caused and which continues to be felt by many. I also commend the community and spiritual support offered by St Mark’s church in Brickhill, which has provided facilities, fellowship, food and a focus for residents over these five weeks. I pass my condolences to the families of Paul Swales and Julia Harris.
There are currently a series of investigations, including by the police and the Crown Prosecution Service, regarding the period between the encountering of gas on Tuesday 2 July and the gas explosion on Saturday 19 October. Hence, the focus of this debate is on the circumstances and regulations preceding the earlier date and subsequent to the latter date. However, there are some open questions on the minds of my residents regarding the period under investigation, and I believe that they are worth putting on the record in this debate, although I appreciate the Minister will not wish to comment at this stage.
Which agency was in charge of making my residents safe after the discovery of gas on 2 July? Which agency was responsible for signing off the mitigation of venting gas? Who, if anyone, was responsible for the venting of gas for the period between 2 July and 19 October? Did the responsible entity have the requisite expertise to take on those responsibilities? What procedures were put in place to ensure that the venting of gas in a residential neighbourhood remained safe? Were the correct responses made when residents provided concerns about the venting of gas? Which regulations guided the response by agencies from 2 July, and were they sufficient? My residents hope that the various investigations will be able to provide answers to those questions and the many others that they have raised.
Motion lapsed (Standing Order No. 9(3)).
Motion made, and Question proposed, That this House do now adjourn.—(Keir Mather.)
That may strike some people as odd, but it is the normal Commons procedure.
There will be a further meeting tonight hosted by Bedford borough council. I record my thanks for the leadership shown by Laura Church, the chief executive of the council, and my thanks to Craig Austin and the other staff of the council for their considerable efforts on behalf of residents. The meetings are helpful in addressing immediate concerns, but I will raise some other issues.
First, there is the return of residents to their homes. As might be anticipated, there are differences between residents regarding their confidence in returning to their homes. Many are eager to do so, but many residents have considerable anxiety about a return, with concerns for their safety and that of their children or loved ones. I have spoken to residents, and a major assistance in building that confidence would be an accountable, authoritative voice to underwrite the assertion that it is safe to return. However, it seems that none of the agencies have the combination of expertise and authority to make such a call. In the absence of that, the default may be that the risks of returning will be transferred from a responsible body to each resident, with potential implications for future insurance and other liabilities, which clearly should not happen. What steps can the Minister take to end this Mexican stand-off regarding advice on a safe return for residents to their property? Will she urgently investigate in what form a responsible agency or authority could provide the underwritten reassurance that it is safe for residents to return?
Over this period, Bedford borough council has incurred considerable additional costs and diverted many officers and staff to manage the needs of residents. The exceptional demands for expenditure and human resources came shortly after one of the most significant incidences of flooding in the area; in fact, the Met Office reported that Bedfordshire had its wettest September since records began in 1836. Much of that rain came in the very last part of the month and caused significant flooding. As the Minister is well aware, there is a scheme—the Bellwin scheme—that can be used to support local authorities with covering those exceptional costs. I know that the Department has been in discussions with Bedford borough council and is waiting to hear whether a formal application will be made. I also understand that Ministers are empowered by section 155 of the Local Government and Housing Act 1989 to decide whether to activate a scheme after considering the circumstances of each individual case. There is discretion here. Should the council make a formal application, will the Minister ask the Secretary of State to use the powers granted to her under section 155 to approve the application by Bedford borough council?
May I begin by paying my tribute to Lord Prescott and sending my deep condolences to his family? Lord Prescott was a great friend of the east end, where I am a Member of Parliament, and we remember the contribution he made to so many lives in our country.
Turning to this very important issue, I commend the hon. Member for North Bedfordshire (Richard Fuller) for securing this debate on the impact of the Cleat Hill heat pump incident on residents. I want to extend my deepest sympathies and those of the Government to the family and friends of Mr Swales and his sister-in-law, Mrs Harris, who died as a result of an explosion in their home in Cleat Hill. Like the hon. Gentleman, I am grateful to the emergency services for their response to this terrible incident. I also thank the other agencies involved both in seeking to ensure a clear understanding of how this incident occurred and in working to ensure the safety of local residents. I know that the hon. Gentleman, as the local Member of Parliament, has been very much at the heart providing support to the residents affected by this incident, and today’s debate is testimony to that work.
As the hon. Gentleman pointed out, on Saturday 19 October an explosion in Cleat Hill, to the north of Bedford, destroyed a house. Tragically, Mr Swales died at the site and Mrs Harris died six weeks later in hospital as a result of the fatal injuries she sustained. In such incidents, the most important consideration for local partners is of course the protection of life. This meant the evacuation of 43 households comprising some 100 individuals. As a result, 26 households remain in temporary accommodation, with 17 households having made their own arrangements such as staying with friends and family. As the hon. Gentleman pointed out, that is hugely disruptive to the lives of the residents, alongside the added uncertainty and the ongoing issues with not being able to return home.
The initial investigations by the gas distributor Cadent found that gas was detected at the scene; however, it was not the odourised supply that flows through its network and into people’s homes, but rather odour-free natural gas from a pocket underground. The source of the gas was a 100 metre-deep borehole drilled in July in the garden of the property as part of works to install a ground source heat pump, as has been pointed out. This encountered a pocket of natural gas. Following that, an attempt was made in July to plug the borehole to stop gas flowing to the surface, but this work was evidently unsuccessful as subsequently gas continued to leak. After the explosion in October, gas testing of the soil in the area conducted by the British Geological Survey found gas leaking to the surface over a wide area, requiring a 150-metre safety cordon and the evacuation of the homes inside the cordon.
House adjourned.
I turn to the current situation. The British Geological Survey continues to monitor for gas in both the air and soil in and around the 100-metre cordoned-off area. Recent measurements have been consistently at negligible levels, but monitoring continues to take account of various climatic features—
The incident at Cleat Hill should also stimulate a review of regulations to see whether they are sufficient or should be updated. It may surprise hon. Members, as it did my constituents, that it is permissible to drill a hole 100 metres deep in a back garden without any permit or notification required. Such boreholes are considered permitted development. Will the Minister review whether the drilling of a 100-metre hole in a residential area should continue to be classified as permitted development, or whether there should be a permitting or notification requirement?
The Cleat Hill incident also raises some questions about the regulation of the installation of heat pumps more generally. More than 30,000 ground source heat pumps have been installed in the United Kingdom, and this is the first known incident in which a gas reservoir has been tapped during the drilling for a ground source heat pump. However, the UK currently plans to roll out many more heat pumps—a large proportion of which will be ground source heat pumps—in its effort to achieve net zero.
We must remember that boreholes are drilled for a variety of reasons, not just for heat pumps, and that the incident at Cleat Hill was about the drilling of boreholes, not the heat pump specifically. However, the Ground Source Heat Pump Association, which is not party to the investigation, wrote to me to say:
“While this is the first incident of its kind in the UK, and is extremely unlikely to be repeated, we do not feel it would be appropriate to simply wait until the formal investigation has concluded.”
It went on to say:
“On that basis, the GSHPA has communicated with all its members advising them to procure gas monitoring equipment, if they do not already possess it. As a precautionary measure, we have instructed members to go above and beyond present regulations and guidance and to follow the procedures given in the Borehole Sites and Operations Regulations which apply to Coal Authority Areas when drilling boreholes for ground source heat pump ground loops at all sites.”
In light of this, will the Minister ask the relevant Department to review the geographic scope of the Borehole Sites and Operations Regulations 1995 and decide whether they should be extended to cover a broader part of the United Kingdom? More generally, will she ask the relevant Minister to engage with the Ground Source Heat Pump Association to review and, where necessary, update the regulations and official guidance on the installation of ground source heat pumps?
As you might imagine, Madam Deputy Speaker, my residents who have been out of their homes for five weeks have some practical questions about insurance and the impact on house values. I would like to put those on the record, although I appreciate that there is limited scope for consideration of official support by the Minister. The first question is about the variation between insurers regarding the number of days that a policy holder can be absent from their home. For some insurers, that number is 30 days; for others, it is 60 days. I wrote to the Association of British Insurers, which advised me that although those provisions remain in place,
“insurers will take a case by case approach and look to respond sympathetically where customers are likely to remain out of their homes beyond the limits provided for in the policy due to the evacuation.”
The second question is about the impact that the discovery of this shallow gas reservoir and the explosion may have on my residents’ future ability to obtain home insurance, and on the premiums attached to such policies. Again, I put those questions to the Association of British Insurers, and I am grateful for its response. The ABI cannot comment on individual pricing or commercial decisions by its members, but added:
“That said, we have raised the concern with our members, and we are not currently aware of any general issues relating to Cleat Hill that would change the general underwriting approach applied to the area. It will be a commercial decision for individual insurers and a range of criteria unrelated to the incident may impact on an individual household’s future risk. These will continue to be assessed by insurers on a commercial and competitive basis.”
On house values, I am grateful for the response to my question from the Minister’s colleague, which states:
“On your question about the effect on property values, it is possible that there could be some diminution of property values, however our expectation is that property values will return relatively quickly to comparable local levels.”
I am grateful to be able to put those points from the ABI and the Minister’s colleague on the record.
I will close by commenting on the importance of gaining a comprehensive understanding. In July, my residents were alerted to the release of gas, but were content to return to their homes because they believed the situation was under control. Now they face a return to their homes in very different circumstances, with many more questions, much greater anxiety and much less trust in taking people at their word. Currently, the size and scope of the gas reservoir at Cleat Hill is not known. An assessment is being made of the costs of a project to provide this information, but it is likely to be beyond the budget of the local authority.
The central issue remains the lack of a comprehensive understanding of the status of the gas reservoir. How significant is it? What is its geographical scope? Did the period of venting create fissures in the layer of rock that had kept the gas from seeping into the soil? Did the 109-day period of venting release such a proportion of gas as to make the rock layer susceptible to collapse from the downward pressure of the 100 metres of soil above? These are all very important questions to be answered.
There is an emerging plan for the gas monitors and alarms to be available to local residents and connected to a 24/7 response centre. This longer-term monitoring plan is designed to provide an early alert to residents should there be any future change in detected methane levels. However, can the Minister advise us of which agency would be responsible for the ongoing monitoring if such a long-term plan were put in place? Can she assure me that the Department will be able to seek expert advice, so that the correct plan is put in place for both the regularity and duration of testing, including of the stability of the closed borehole and of the rock layer containing the gas reservoir?
To remind the Minister, the incidence of breaking a seal on a shallow gas reservoir is historically extremely rare. It is not exactly comparable, but the drilling in 2007 of boreholes for geothermal energy in Staufen in Germany created significant problems a decade later. In that case, water was released, not gas, but I believe the incident reinforces the need to gather a comprehensive understanding of the situation at Cleat Hill. So will the Minister instruct officials in her Department to liaise with Bedford borough council to assess the proposals to conduct a full survey of the scale and scope of the gas reservoir at Cleat Hill, and see whether the cost of that survey can be borne centrally?
Following the explosion, partners have come together to respond to the immediate aftermath, ensure the safety of neighbouring residents, investigate the circumstances of the incident, and put in place a plan to secure the borehole and stop further gas escaping. The site has been the focus of investigations by the Health and Safety Executive to help determine the cause, as well as by Bedfordshire Police in support of the coroner’s office. Additionally, as part of the Government’s wider response to the tragic events, a number of other specialist agencies, such as the British Geological Survey and the Coal Authority, have been essential in supporting local partners.
There have been several public meetings, attended by agencies, to ensure that residents are informed about ongoing works and the steps being taken to make the area safe. To further reassure residents, Bedford borough council is investigating options to install gas monitors in affected homes. This will allow for early detection of any early build-up of gas in homes. Efforts have been made to support residents affected by the explosion, with Bedford borough council establishing an advice and support centre providing temporary accommodation, emergency financial support, a 24-hour emergency helpline and free office space at Borough Hall to help residents continue to work. I am conscious that the hon. Gentleman, as the local MP, has played an important role in supporting residents. Key partnerships play an important role in such emergencies, as I have experienced in my own constituency, although they were of a different nature.
We understand that residents have faced challenges with insurance and I am glad to hear about the work the Association of British Insurers has begun. I am happy to write to it if further assistance is required. Residents will also be worried about whether this incident will create blight when they sell their home in the future. Local partners are drawing on groups such as the Coal Authority, which has expertise in working with residents to help develop information that can be provided to insurers, mortgage lenders and new purchasers. Our expectation is that property values will return relatively quickly to comparable local levels.
I am aware that such responses mean that local partners incur unexpected costs, creating additional burdens for organisations such as the council. As has been pointed out, the Government’s principal mechanism for supporting costs arising from emergency incidents is the Bellwin scheme, which is administered by my Department. Bedford borough council has registered an interest in making a claim under the scheme for the combined impacts of the gas explosion and earlier flooding in September, which we will consider as soon as the application comes in and officials provide advice.
The hon. Gentleman raised a number of important questions in his speech. I will address some of them; others, as he understands, are the subject of ongoing investigations. First, in response to his important point about advice on the safe return of residents to their properties, the safety of residents is paramount. Partners are working together, taking into account the technical advice on risk mitigation and the assurances that will support the return of residents to their homes, including the use of gas monitoring systems.
The hon. Gentleman’s second point was on an underwritten reassurance. It will be for local partners to determine the conditions that would support residents in getting back to their homes, based on the advice from the technical group advising the strategic co-ordination group. Once the investigation has concluded, we will need to look carefully at the lessons that need to be learned, to help avoid a similar situation arising.
The hon. Gentleman made an important point about drilling a 100-metre hole in a residential area. We must await the outcome of the Health and Safety Executive and police investigations before taking any further action, as we do not know the exact causes of the explosion and the extent of liability or criminality, or what mitigations might be needed to prevent something like this happening again. However, he makes an important point, and we will need to draw on the lessons once the investigations are over.
The hon. Gentleman raised the role of other Departments. We are working closely with the Ground Source Heat Pump Association, which is already reviewing the vertical borehole standard to cover future incidents of gas encounters, and I know that a meeting is planned with the Under-Secretary of State for Energy Security and Net Zero, my hon. Friend the Member for Peckham (Miatta Fahnbulleh), where the hon. Gentleman can discuss the matter further.
The hon. Gentleman raised a number of other issues and I would be very happy to continue the discussion with him about those. Following the outcome of the investigations, it is vital that lessons are learned and that we can be confident about safety and security.
I thank the hon. Member for North Bedfordshire for this important debate on the tragic events at Cleat Hill and their impact on residents. Officials in my Department have close relationships with local partners and the local authority. We will continue to work in partnership with those key stakeholders in his constituency, as well as with him. I thank him once again for the debate.