To ask His Majesty’s Government what assessment they have made of their ability to protect Parliament from Chinese espionage in light of the collapse of recent legal proceedings.
My Lords, the UK Government remain steadfast in their commitment to reducing the threat from foreign espionage targeting UK domestic institutions and continue to drive cross-government work to respond to the threat through the Defending Democracy Taskforce. The National Cyber Security Centre and the Centre for the Protection of Critical National Infrastructure produce advice and guidance for Members of both Houses of Parliament. MI5’s National Protective Security Authority has today—22 minutes ago—launched new guidance to protect the UK’s democratic institutions from foreign interference.
My Lords, I welcome and will look at the action she has recommended and mentioned. I am sorry that the noble Baroness the Leader of the House is not in her place to answer this Question.
Will the noble Baroness agree that no step must be left unturned to safeguard the integrity of our Parliament from espionage by foreign state actors, and notably the malign and relentless activity of China? Any suggestion of executive action—or inaction—that may have led to the collapse of these proceedings must be investigated thoroughly and unequivocally condemned.
Will the noble Baroness give the House a categorical assurance that, if any evidence occurs of Chinese targeting of Members of your Lordships’ House—past, present or future—she will press colleagues in government at the highest level to ensure that those involved will be brought to court and made to answer for their actions: no ifs, no buts and certainly no secret quid pro quos?
I thank the noble Lord for his question. He is absolutely right that of course we would expect full prosecution of anybody who undertakes espionage against Members of your Lordships’ House or anyone else working in Parliament. I want to make it very clear that we are very disappointed by the CPS’s decision; it was made by the CPS as an independent body. Noble Lords will be aware that a Statement will be made by the Security Minister this afternoon, which we will have the opportunity to discuss later this week, about the actions that this Government are taking.
My Lords, the former director-general of the Security Service has warned the country that Chinese espionage has been carried out on an industrial scale, including by seeking influence over Parliament, as well as on industry and education. That is why I and these Benches warned that exempting China from the enhanced tier of the foreign influence registration scheme under the National Security Act was a strategic mistake by the Government. The Government made another strategic error by deciding, with the Conservative Party’s support, to exempt government, administration and public bodies in their entirety from the FIRS scheme—I warned them about that on 5 June. Does the Minister not agree that new guidance is fine, but it is hamstrung if the Government and the Official Opposition continue their support for the exemption from the FIRS scheme of the very areas we know China seeks to influence?
The noble Lord has consistently made these arguments. I confirm what has previously been said in your Lordships’ House: no decision has yet been made on specifying China on the enhanced tier of the scheme. As noble Lords would expect, my officials continue to consider whether and how the enhanced tier can be used to provide greater protection for areas where China and other countries pose significant threats. Adding countries to the enhanced tier requires the consideration of a broad range of interests and any decisions will be brought before Parliament in the usual way.
My Lords, the Government stated that the decision not to proceed with a prosecution was entirely that of the Director of Public Prosecutions. Will the Minister acknowledge, in the light of the director’s subsequent statement, that the Government were being economical with the truth?
While I have huge respect for the noble Lord, I absolutely will not. This was an independent decision made by the CPS: there was no ministerial or special adviser involvement. The Deputy National Security Adviser, without interference, gave three different witness statements to the CPS for its use. This is not a matter of us not assisting the case: this is an independent matter for the CPS.
My Lords, does the Minister agree that, while all embassies have spies in them, the larger the embassy, the more spies can fit in? Is it appropriate to have an embassy the size of the one that has been proposed for China?
My Lords, I never thought I would be discussing real estate and espionage, but we find ourselves in a strange set of circumstances. I thank my noble friend. As he is very well aware, the decision about the future location of the Chinese embassy is a matter for the Secretary of State for Housing, Communities and Local Government, and a decision will be brought forward in due course.
The noble Lord is famous for asking such straightforward and easy questions. The Government are clear that our relationship with China is complex: we are to compete, to challenge and to co-operate. Choosing not to engage with China is no choice at all. Let us be clear: state agents of the Chinese Government have acted in ways that pose a potential threat to the United Kingdom. We continue to have conversations and to engage in a collaborative way with our Five Eyes partners to counter that challenge.
The Lord Bishop of Leeds
My Lords, can the Minister confirm that spying by the Chinese is not a new phenomenon but has been conducted under previous Governments as well?
The right reverend Prelate makes a very important point, including in relation to this case, which allegedly occurred under the previous Government. China and other nations seeking to get information and access to Members of your Lordships’ House is nothing new.
The Minister said in answer to my noble friend Lord Butler that the decision not to continue the prosecution was entirely a matter for the DPP, with no involvement whatever from any special adviser. Surely it is the role of the National Security Adviser to advise in relation to such a matter, and for that to be taken strongly into account by the DPP.
As I have previously said, the Deputy National Security Adviser, on behalf of the Government, gave three different witness statements, as requested by the CPS and the DPP. We gave, and will continue to give, for all prosecutions, full evidence as available. It was a matter for the DPP to determine whether there was enough evidence to proceed and in this matter it chose not to.