My Lords, I am grateful for the opportunity to debate the EU Committee’s report, Brexit: The Customs Challenge, this afternoon. As chair of the EU External Affairs Sub-Committee, I extend my thanks to the members of the committee for their important contribution to this report, to Members speaking today, and to everyone who provided written and oral evidence to the committee. I also thank the committee’s secretariat, as it was constituted at the time—Jennifer Martin-Kohlmorgen, Julia Ewert and Lauren Harvey—for its assistance with the inquiry and preparation of this report.
Last year, the EU External Affairs Sub-Committee investigated the customs challenges in the event of no deal and considered the Government’s Chequers proposal for a facilitated customs arrangement. I strongly regret that—even though the committee published its report in September 2018, and despite the rule that commits the Government to respond within two months of a report’s publication—more than six months on the committee is still awaiting a response. Not only is the response outstanding, but the Government have not proposed an alternative date for its submission. I urge the Minister, who I know will take this seriously, to provide the official government response as soon as possible and ask him to confirm when he expects to provide it to the committee.
The first half of the report covered what trade with the EU under WTO rules, commonly referred to as “no deal”, would look like. Despite the various votes in the Commons on avoiding no deal, a no-deal Brexit will continue to be a risk unless and until a withdrawal agreement is passed. I also remind the House that, even if there is a transition period, if the two sides fail to agree on their future relationship, there could still be a delayed no-deal Brexit.
Our report warned that no deal would cause significant disruption and be costly. Tariffs would apply and traders would be required to make customs declarations, with customs and regulatory checks also to be carried out. Overall, HMRC has estimated that if customs declarations were introduced between the UK and the EU, there would be a cost to businesses running into billions each year. The completion of customs declarations would raise the cost of UK-EU trade by £13 billion a year. Half of that—£6.5 billion— would be shouldered by UK businesses. There would also be additional tariff costs. HMRC originally estimated an additional £5 billion per year in such costs, though the UK Government’s intention to reduce 87% of tariffs by value in the event of no deal should lower the amount somewhat. Having said this, UK businesses will still face tariffs on most exports to the EU by value. Although EU tariffs are generally low, some sectors, such as the agricultural and automotive sectors, will be disproportionately affected.
I also emphasise the report’s finding that no technology currently exists, or will be available in the short term, which would dispense with the need for border checks. In all cases, some form of physical infrastructure will be required. This is of particular relevance to the Northern Ireland/Ireland border, where trade under WTO rules risks reintroducing a hard border. We also found that the introduction of new customs checks at the border under no deal would cause congestion and delays at roll-on roll-off ports. The Port of Dover’s ability to handle its trade volume, for example, depends on vehicles flowing through the port without stopping for customs controls. Even if the UK adopts a light-touch approach to these checks, roll-on roll-off ports such as Dover operate in a closed loop with their French counterparts in Calais or Dunkirk. Congestion on the French side will inevitably have a knock-on effect on the UK. This poses a significant challenge to just-in-time production and agri-food businesses, and could lead to the disruption of highly integrated supply chains. In turn, this could make UK businesses that are part of such supply chains less attractive.
My Lords, it was a pleasure to serve on the sub-committee chaired so effectively by the noble Baroness, Lady Verma, whom I thank.
After all these months of delay, waiting for the Government to respond, we should consider where we are overall. The Government are hardly prepared for the customs arrangements that would be needed for any version of hard Brexit, and the businesses and individuals who will have to operate in this environment have few clues as to what to expect. People in haulage, ports and administration have a sense of application to do their best, but nobody has been able to tell them which best they should do.
All the time, the clocks are ticking. Complex supply chains face multiple difficulties without any real prospect of resolution. With the small cavalcade of lorries in Kent, the appointment of a ferry company with zero experience, zero ships and zero port agreements, the emergency plans for food and medical shortages and the declaration of the possible need to contain civil unrest with military deployments, it is hardly surprising that nobody is oozing confidence. The sunny uplands are a fantasy. We Brits are a pragmatic and phlegmatic lot, but this has felt to me like launching Eddie the Eagle down a precipitous slope to jump against seasoned athletes, our best aspirations amounting simply to hoping he will survive.
In the area of customs, I still do not know what our national vision is. How does that vision, if there is one, link trade and customs provisions with economic performance, and thus with other vital interests such as security, defence, foreign policy, justice, home affairs and other key sectors? Customs and trade are essential components of a successful economy, and a successful economy holds the key to everything else.
In all markets between nations, including the WTO’s often dysfunctional system, we generally acknowledge that there must be rules so that everybody knows the standards within which they will trade. Even outside the EU’s customs union, checks and intrusive procedures are still inevitable. How else will we deal with, for example, the enduring compliance with preferential rules of origin? If we are to enjoy the frictionless benefits of being inside, do we really think it right to do so without accepting that there are both rights and responsibilities?
My Lords, I too thank the noble Baroness, Lady Verma, for introducing this extremely useful and comprehensive report this afternoon. I also thank the members of the excellent committee secretariat for all their hard work and commitment, as well as for their dogged determination to seek out the facts in this constantly rather opaque process.
When I was rereading the report yesterday afternoon, ahead of today’s debate, as well as reading my own notes from our committee’s extremely informative visit to the port of Dover last July, it was difficult not to feel both angry and depressed. The lack of progress since the report was published last September is shameful. Clearly, the debate taking place at the other end of the building this afternoon, and the second set of indicative votes, will have a direct impact on these issues, not least if the proposal on the customs union passes.
The fact that more than 6 million people have now signed a petition calling for Article 50 to be revoked shows just how concerned people are by Brexit, and in particular by the prospect of a no-deal Brexit. As the Brexit debate has increasingly taken on the quality of a quasi-religious fundamentalist debate rather than an analysis of the facts, it is not surprising that people—most especially people working in small and medium-sized businesses—are increasingly in a state of despair.
I shall focus my remaining remarks this afternoon on the impact on businesses and the preparations for a no-deal Brexit. An estimated 145,000 businesses in the UK trade only with the EU, and an estimated extra 100,000 more may be in the same situation. These are businesses which, over past decades, and certainly since the creation of the single market in 1992, have been accustomed to trading with our EU partners without barriers or friction. Trading with Hamburg or Lyon has been little different for those companies from selling their products from Newcastle to London.
I congratulate the noble Baroness and the other committee members on the report. She mentioned the current delays at Dover. I noted in the report that they relate to lorries from Turkey, which is in a customs union. Last week, I met a number of customs agents who told me that the paperwork involved in trade with Turkey, with its customs union, is worse than that for trade with America or China. Do the noble Baroness and her party think that a customs union would solve these problems?
I do indeed—not least because of the figure I just gave: 1% of all traffic currently going through the port of Dover comes from non-EU member states. The other 99% goes through in a slick operation. With a no-deal Brexit, that will change overnight—not necessarily because of the Dover side but because of the Calais side, which will have to introduce restrictions.
To conclude, as the report makes clear, the consequences of a no-deal Brexit would be not merely “a bit bumpy”, as some Brexiters have claimed. They would have a real and damaging impact on businesses and the lives of ordinary people for generations to come.
My Lords, I join other noble Lords in congratulating my noble friend Lady Verma on her excellent chairmanship of our committee. I thank my colleagues and our ever-diligent staff for their contributions to our long and sometimes exhausting —but sometimes rather exhilarating—meetings.
This is our third report on customs and trade. It is right that we concentrated so much attention on this, because whether we remain in a customs union or not, the issue is central to the binary choice that the Government are, I am afraid, not making at the moment, and which we will have at some stage to make. The noble Baroness, Lady Suttie, has just made the point that down the Corridor a very important debate on indicative votes is taking place. The most popular Motion so far, as we saw last week, was moved by my right honourable friend Ken Clarke in favour of remaining in the customs union.
On the point just made in an intervention, I make a distinction between remaining in the customs union and, like Turkey, having a customs union with the customs union. That is a different and separate point. As I understand it, Ken Clarke was arguing for us remaining in the existing customs union, which is the only way to maintain the entirely frictionless trade we have enjoyed with our colleagues in European Union countries for 45 years—and the only way to avoid a hard border in Ireland and keep the United Kingdom together. I fear that if there were a hard border in Ireland, the problem of Scottish independence would loom its hoary head. Therefore, this is a way of keeping the United Kingdom together.
We should not forget the value of inward investment into this country. As an economist, I am extremely aware of this. It exists simply because we are part of a huge market of 500 million people. It is the jewel in the United Kingdom’s crown. We have far more inward investment than Germany, and twice as much as both France and Italy. That would undoubtedly be threatened—indeed, is already being threatened—if we removed ourselves from these arrangements. Politically, this may well be the ultimate compromise we have to make. I voted remain; if the remainers can accept that we will leave the European Union, as we are targeted to do, perhaps the Brexiteers could accept a soft, sensible Brexit that we could support. The 52% to 48% split in public opinion suggests that that is one possible way forward, and I note that the Chief Whip is going to be revealed on television this evening as saying that it is something which the Prime Minister should have thought about when the results of the last general election became apparent.
My Lords, in this House we are fortunate to have had many reports about Brexit and all its complications from the various sub-committees and the main European Union Committee. I am sure we are very grateful to all Members who have worked hard on those reports. They are of immense detail and complexity, but also immense conviction and persuasion. That does not gainsay my feeling at the end of reading them all carefully, which I try to do if I can: one comes to the inevitable conclusion that there is no substitute for actually staying in the European Union.
I very much congratulate the noble Baroness, Lady Verma, on leading this discussion of the report and the other three members of the committee who have spoken so far. I thought the concluding remarks of the noble Baroness, Lady Suttie, on the numbers were very relevant and need looking at again. I also thank the noble Lord, Lord Horam, for his words highlighting the dangers and difficulties of producing the customs union concept in the way that my great friend Kenneth Clarke was trying to explain properly on the radio this morning. He did a very good job but there are many minuses as well as many pluses.
On the report itself, I agree very strongly with all the remarks made by the three ensuing speakers, with their worries and anxieties about what this all means. I hope the Minister will kindly look at the report’s conclusions, on page 48. I am particularly concerned about paragraph 191, which states:
“The UK Government’s estimate that 96% of UK goods trade would be able to pay the correct or no tariff up front and not go through the repayment mechanism has been challenged. We call on the Government to clarify the methodology it used to arrive at the 96% figure”.
Then, on a totally different subject, paragraph 193 states:
“We welcome the Government’s stated intention to uphold current UK food standards and not lower them in free trade agreements with third countries”.
Will the Minister address the difficulties arising from the lack of infrastructure for customs dealings between Ireland and the UK using the UK as a land bridge, particularly at Holyhead? I do not think it was visited by the committee; nor did witnesses from Holyhead come before the committee.
This is not the first time I have agreed with the noble Lord, Lord Wigley, on these matters, and I do so strongly—partly in the nervous realisation that I know much less about Holyhead than he does. The noble Lord has referred to this in a number of speeches; I agree with the broad outline of his comments and thank him for intervening today.
The background to what is happening is a tragedy and a matter of great sadness for this country. No Prime Minister with any wisdom and good sense would have set out to totally ignore the wishes of almost 50% of those who voted in what was only an advisory referendum, even though David Cameron said he would abide by the decision. Even after the futile election of 8 June, after she had lost her mandate and was able to carry on only artificially via a dubious deal with and huge bribe to the DUP, the Prime Minister defiantly carried on. She chose not only to ignore the wafer-thin majority in the first referendum but to deal just with the ERG—not even with the whole of her own Conservative Party. The ERG came first in all her dealings and all her discussions. This again reveals the huge weaknesses in our now totally dilapidated political and parliamentary system, which can be removed only with drastic and radical reforms, which should not be done by politicians—they would never agree—but by sensible outside experts and professorial characters of distinction, men and women. We have to get rid of this bandit politics disease in Britain and come back to reassuring the public.
In that context, I conclude by saying something in contrast to the miseries we are all experiencing with this Brexit process—Brexit is on the verge of being registered with the NHS as an official disease, and anti-Brexit is part of it. However, public opinion has changed, and it was, at last, reassuring to go on the march on 23 March with over 1 million like-minded people from all over the country, including many former leave voters who now grasp the looming disaster of Brexit. The 6 million-plus signatories to the petition underline the huge change in public opinion on this matter. None of these reports is rendered less important and valuable because of this, but that is the reality.
My Lords, I did not have the privilege of being a member of the committee responsible for this excellent report, but it is a very interesting read. It is, unfortunately, a historical document, and it would have been a lot more appropriate to debate it some months ago. It is striking that, in the six months since it was published, although we have learned a lot more about the problems associated with customs arrangements, there have not been any solutions. Therefore, what the committee advises is as relevant now as it was then.
The report draws attention to the fact that, as my noble friend said, there are 145,000 VAT-registered businesses in the UK, and a further 100,000 under the VAT threshold, that currently trade abroad but exclusively with the EU. That means that they have not had to deal with the paperwork and bureaucracy associated with international trade. In addition, the report draws attention to the huge cost to business of no deal, estimated by HMRC at £18 billion per year. It is a pity that figure was not on the side of a bus.
The report also emphasises that all the talk of using technology to overcome border issues, particularly in Northern Ireland, is basically so much hot air—those are my words, not the report’s. There is no technological solution. Essentially, there are bound to be hold ups at the border, and, however brief they are, they will have a huge impact. Since the publication of this report, we know quite a lot more about the details of that impact.
I will start with Dover, which has already been mentioned, the largest roll-on roll-off port in the UK. Noble Lords will be familiar with the expectation that there will be long queues. The report acknowledges that there is no space for additional checks, examination sheds, checkpoints or additional barriers, and no space for lorries to park as they wait. Of the UK’s total trade in goods, 17% goes through Dover, and it depends on going through without stopping. Indeed, both Dover and Eurotunnel market themselves as a continuous, non-stop motorway to Europe. Some weeks ago, I met the Road Haulage Association. Its representative told me that an Amazon lorry can have 8,000 individual shipments on it, and would normally have an individual customs declaration for each of those 8,000 shipments. Each customs declaration has 36 different fields that must be completed. The RHA estimates that it would take 170 staff one day’s work to process that lorry. The implications on a grand scale are serious.
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Mitigation options are limited, but it is critical that the UK Government have contingency arrangements in place to manage the negative impacts of no deal. While no specific plans were in place at the time of publication of the report, I welcome the fact that the UK Government have now set out their contingency arrangements and provided guidance to businesses. Last month it was announced that, in the event of no deal, the UK would set temporary tariff rates that would be in place for up to 12 months from exit date, leading to the elimination of tariffs in 87% of imports by value, which compares with 80% before Brexit. Consequently, in practice many importers will be exempt from paying customs duty, yet this approach is not without risks. While there are some protections for the car industry and the agricultural sector, this unilateral reduction of tariffs, which under WTO rules applies to EU and non-EU goods, could affect the competitiveness of UK production. Will my noble friend confirm when the Government intend to publish an impact assessment of their tariff reduction plan?
The elimination of 87% of tariffs will go hand in hand with simplified customs procedures for traders importing goods from the EU into the UK. These simplified transitional procedures will be in place at least until July 2020. However, they will not eliminate the need for customs declarations altogether, but simply reduce the amount of information that importers will have to provide during a defined period. In summary, the costs, the disruption to the flow of goods and, potentially, the imposition of customs checks on the Northern Ireland/Ireland border in the case of no deal all underline the need for the Government to reach an agreement with the EU on the terms of our withdrawal and the future economic relationship.
As regards the future economic relationship, a facilitated customs arrangement was put forward by the UK Government in July last year. However, the initial reaction from the EU has been sceptical at best, and the parliamentary deadlock over the terms of the UK’s withdrawal has all but sidelined it. Since the proposal, the political declaration setting out the framework for the future relationship between the EU and the UK has been published, even though it has not yet been agreed. The section on customs calls for “ambitious customs arrangements” and is worded in a way that could be used to support a wide variety of negotiation outcomes. Can my noble friend say whether the facilitated customs arrangement is still the Government’s preferred option? What further thinking, if any, has taken place?
Other members of the committee will raise a number of further questions, so I will leave it at that. However, many of the witnesses who gave evidence to us were very concerned that this uncertainty was having a large impact, not just on businesses but on supply chains.
Customs arrangements underpin many of the things the United Kingdom values very highly: mitigating risks to public health, reducing environmental risk, food safety, the operation of financial regulation, the social market and decent workers’ rights. None of these is a second-order issue for the quality of our social fabric.
The sub-committee pulled me back to thinking about our national strategy. The United Kingdom may no longer be a great power, but we can be a very good second-tier power and project ourselves internationally with effect. To do so we need to demonstrate our ethical trustworthiness, and this must be underpinned by serious intellectual endeavour. We need credible forces, as the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Stirrup, and my noble friend Lord West often remind your Lordships’ House, and the foundation for it all is a sustainable economic capacity to deliver on these other interlocking attributes. No nation on earth can do these things on its own—not one.
Let the House be candid about the economic world we inhabit today. Customs problems are not the only problems on the economic horizon, and we had better understand the cumulative effect of all the problems we may well face. China’s growth is now far weaker than it was before 2007, and in essence has been driven only by the injection of a $586 billion stimulus in 2009. That is now impacting on much of the world’s economic prospects. The recovery of the United States is evidently unstable. The poor are becoming poorer. Average wages last year retreated to the purchasing power of 1978, and US retreats always have their effects in Europe and Japan. Europe is sluggish at best. Germany had zero growth in Q4 last year and barely sidestepped recession. Italy has negative growth, and the UK’s growth was the weakest since 2012. There is a correction as the post-2007 recovery regimes are changed and monetary tightening takes effect. The yield curve has inverted, showing how anxious investors have become—always a warning of recession. The eurozone crisis deepens.
Private debt once again threatens the stability of many major economies. In the United States, private debt is higher than before the housing and mortgage crisis of 2007, and is now fuelled by borrowing to speculate. Global debt is three times global GDP. It impacts on corporations and individuals, and in China on just about everything and everybody. Growth is squeezed out by unsustainable and unpayable debt. Investment in wages and productivity continues to be in grim decline. In short, the predictive indices that have preceded past financial collapses are as visible today as the queues once were outside Northern Rock.
This is the economic climate into which we want to add the uncertainties of trading without proper customs arrangements, reintroducing significant friction between us and our nearest huge markets, and our political, trading and security partners. It is hard to believe that anyone would take such a course willingly. Of course, there may be no certain and smooth economic path open to us, but following the worst options could well be the straw which breaks the camel’s back.
Our country has been served very poorly, both by its Government and by the Official Opposition, but it would surely prefer to meet its global and domestic strategic objectives in leadership and values, intellectual capability, security and defence through a viable military—to meet its obligations in the world as it has always tried to do. While customs may appear to be just a piece of this jigsaw, it is about economic capability and therefore about the interplay of the overall strategic fabric. We can do without cutting unmendable holes in that fabric.
A no-deal Brexit would involve those companies acquiring expertise in customs procedures that they previously never needed. It would involve them facing urgent training, delays and costs. Indeed, as the report makes clear, HMRC estimates that the cost to UK businesses of a no-deal Brexit would be £18 billion per year. Given the reports over the weekend that a number of Cabinet members are now actively calling for a no-deal Brexit, what measures are now being put in place ahead of the new date of 12 April to help small and medium-sized businesses prepare for this situation?
As the report sets out very clearly, roll-on roll-off ports such as Dover will be particularly strongly impacted by a no-deal Brexit. The evidence we heard from the experts on the ground at the port of Dover was extremely powerful. Currently, in the eastern dock in Dover, lorries coming in to the UK from the EU take an average of two minutes to process. In the western dock, where non-EU lorries are processed, the average time for a lorry to be processed is one hour and 15 minutes. At the moment, only 1% of the traffic coming through Dover is non-EU. The port currently handles up to 10,000 trucks per day.
It is a slick operation at the port of Dover, which has developed over many decades, and it currently works as a well-oiled machine. There are 60 crossings per day, and, as the noble Baroness, Lady Verma, said, any delay at either Dover or Calais has a direct impact on the other port. A no-deal departure without any transitional arrangements in place could, it is estimated, result in up to 17 to 20-mile queues of traffic in Kent. The knock-on impact to just-in-time deliveries, food, pharmaceuticals and other industries is of genuine concern to both businesses and ordinary people.
I declare an interest as a resident of the very beautiful town of Broadstairs on the Isle of Thanet in Kent for the past five years. Broadstairs is next to Ramsgate, where the now infamous Seaborne Freight—the ferry company with no ferries—is based. In recent years, Ramsgate has lost its channel ferry crossing to Ostend and its international airport at Manston. Both of those losses have had a very negative impact on the local economy. The Isle of Thanet voted strongly to leave the EU, and it is one of the ironies that, like many other regions, such the north-east of England, it is those areas that voted strongly to leave the EU that are now most likely to be negatively impacted by a no-deal Brexit.
One of the relatively few visible signs of contingency planning for a no-deal Brexit in Kent has been Operation Brock. The results so far have been mixed. The trial run carried out at the abandoned Manston international airport in Ramsgate in January this year saw only 89 of the planned 150 lorries turning up. Given that Dover deals with up to 10,000 lorries a day, a rehearsal with only 89 surely cannot be seen as anything other than tokenistic. The rollout last week of the new contraflow system under Operation Brock on the M20 has also caused concern locally, not least regarding access for emergency vehicles. Can the Minister—who I fully appreciate is one of the good guys and in no way responsible for this mess—update us on contingency planning in the light of these recent events?
The solution to this is in the hands of the other end of the building as we speak. Remaining in the European Union, or at least remaining in the customs union and single market, would solve this customs challenge.
However, it has to be acknowledged, and I do so now, that important arguments can be made against remaining in the customs union. We would not be able to have our own independent trade policy, and of course we would be a rule taker—the “vassal state”, as it is called: the “servile state” is another phrase that is used—but I would argue that these are overrated as disadvantages. The idea of no independent trade policy is too strong a point to make. In fact, having an independent trade policy from where we are now would be a disadvantage. That is because, if you have an independent trade policy, you are selling entry to a market of 65 million people, whereas at the moment we are selling entry to a market of 500 million people. That is a hugely easier sale than if we had our own independent trade deal. So that is not really an argument that can be sustained.
The other argument is about the vassal state and how we would have to accept regulations decided by the European Union. That is to misunderstand the way in which regulations are made inside the European Union. They are made in expert committees. On those expert committees sit not only Members of the European Union but Members of European countries that have an interest outside the European Union. Norway has been represented on 200 expert committees, even though it is not in the customs union. Britain, given its size, could expect to be on expert committees of that kind, making the rules as we go along—even though ultimately we would not have any say in the parliamentary committees.
However, as the House will fully appreciate, it is very rare for a parliamentary committee to get involved in the detail of what is put before it by experts. Such committees tend to accept the proposals, with only the occasional disagreement. The fact is that, as long as we were in the customs union, we would have a strong position inside the system of making regulations in Europe even if we were not actually in the European Union. Fundamentally, when the question of sovereignty and the right to rule ourselves is discussed, you have to make a trade-off in business between access and sovereignty. If you want access, you have to give up a bit of sovereignty. If you have no access, you can keep all your sovereignty but you will have no access. That is the trade-off you have to make, and we should recognise the reality of that.
A bigger objection to remaining inside the customs union is that others in the European Union may not agree to give us such a deal. They may argue that it is too good a deal for Britain, because once again we would be getting many of the advantages of being inside the European Union without actually being a member. That is something which would have to be explored in the negotiations which I hope would take place. The EU could say, for example, that the UK has to remain inside the single market, and it may want to retain control of our fisheries and agriculture. Once we go down that path, I agree that the issue of “Brexit in name only” is raised. At that point we would have to consider whether we wanted a clean break and a free trade area. Another factor is that the Cabinet is split on this and there is no sign of a resolution.
Finally, I bring good news to noble Lords. Agreement was reached before lunchtime today on the “Politics Live” programme on BBC television between a hard Brexiteer, a remainer who is willing to be a Brexiteer, and a remainer. The three people involved were Steve Baker—there is no harder Brexiteer—Margot James, the industry spokesman, and Jonathan Powell who was Tony Blair’s chief of staff when he was Prime Minister. They agreed—that is the good news. The bad news is that they agreed that there is bound to be a long extension—so I am afraid that, whether we like it or not, we are in for further debates on this subject.
All that is a danger if we go ahead with this matter. I beg to differ, and conclude with a few remarks about the broader scene now facing us in what is yet another—although not the final—emergency, drastic week for this House, and particularly for the House of Commons.
This is especially true for our precious and increasingly internationally minded younger generation, and often, at the other end of the age scale, for the many thousands of UK citizens working and living elsewhere in the European Union—perhaps a more relevant union for us than that other union Mrs May refers to. The European Union is precious to the modern populations of its modern member states.
Finally, I want to quote Margaret Beckett, speaking in the Commons debate on 27 March. She said,
“I invite colleagues who … resist a confirmatory vote to look starkly at … what they are saying. They are willing … to terminate our membership of the European Union even if it may now be against the wishes of the majority of the British people”.—[Official Report, Commons, 27/3/19; col. 391.]
The Government have sought to combat these problems in two ways. One is by saying, essentially, that we will ignore the need for border checks and everything will continue as it always has. There are a couple of problems with that. First, why are we leaving if we are going to continue exactly as we have done? Secondly, as a representative of the freight industry said to me, the moment we do not apply the rules we lose control of the border. That will lead to various kinds of smuggling—of people, drugs, armaments and so on, as well as ordinary, everyday goods. It will also lead to the introduction of substandard goods—a serious issue for those trying to produce good-quality goods in the UK.
The Government have also attempted emergency preparations—the M20 being turned into a giant lorry park and the use of Manston Airport for emergency long-term parking—and we are all familiar with the fact that they have not gone well. Then there is the Seaborne ferry company with no ferries, which seemed to think it was providing the Department for Transport with pizzas rather than ferries.
The serious point is that the subsidy for ferries led to Eurotunnel seeking compensation for its products and services being overtaken by the subsidy for ferry services. Last week we discovered that the contract the Government signed with the ferry operators started on 29 March, even though we have not left the EU. I am told that tickets for these additional ferries are now being sold on the open market. It might be a good time to catch a ferry in the next week or so but, if you meet a tall, bald man called Chris trying to flog a few tickets in the ferry terminal, it would not be good value for money.
It has already cost £89 million for the ferries; £6.5 million for the extra weeks of the ferry subsidy that the Government have to cover until we leave the EU; £800,000 for the financial advice; £33 million in compensation to Eurostar; and £30 million for the design, build and operation of Operation Brock on the M20. By my calculations, that is almost £160 million, and counting, as the cost of Brexit to the DfT alone.
I have dealt with the costs to us—the taxpayer—but most importantly we should remember the costs to the businesses of Britain. The SMMT referred to the production of a single fuel injector. To make it takes 35 components from 15 countries and it requires 39 border crossings between the UK and the EU. Now we can see why the automotive industry is thinking of leaving this country fast and why the producers in the supply chain are extremely concerned about their future.