To move that this House takes note of the Report from the European Union Committee Brexit: the proposed UK–EU security treaty (18th Report, HL Paper 164).
My Lords, it is a pleasure to be speaking in the calm and thoughtful end of the Palace of Westminster. As chair of the EU Home Affairs Sub-Committee, which prepared this report, I thank the members and staff of the sub-committee, and our specialist adviser, Professor Steve Peers, for their support and advice.
This report was published on 11 July last year, six months ago, and we received the Government’s response in September. But much has happened in those six months, and many of the issues we covered in our report, such as the Government’s ambition to negotiate an overarching security treaty with the EU, have been largely overtaken by events. So I will not rehearse those issues at length this evening. Instead, I will focus on the key issue of UK-EU security co-operation, and reflect on one or two more recent events.
Of course, much has happened in the last 24 hours, too. But none of it, alas, makes the future any less opaque; nor, at least at this stage, does it greatly change the options before us. The analysis and recommendations in our report remain valid. In our report, we supported the Government’s three principal areas for future UK-EU security co-operation—extradition, partnerships with EU agencies such as Europol, and access to law enforcement databases—and considered how the UK’s engagement with the EU in each of these areas may be affected during the transition period and under the future UK-EU security relationship.
We emphasised:
“The UK and the EU share a deep interest in maintaining the closest possible police and security cooperation after Brexit: protecting the safety of millions of UK and EU citizens must be the over-riding objective”.
We further stressed:
“Negotiations on security are not a ‘zero sum game’: we all stand to gain from agreement, and we all stand to lose if negotiations fail”.
The EU Commissioner for Security Union, Sir Julian King, told the committee that,
“security cooperation should be unconditional”,
and I agree with that. I pay tribute to the excellent work carried out by Sir Julian King as our commissioner, and to President Juncker, who does not always get much of a mention, for giving the British commissioner a portfolio of real substance at a time when he could easily have made him a cypher.
As noble Lords will know, the withdrawal agreement and political declaration were agreed by negotiators in the closing weeks of last year. Let us assume that they remain valid, although I suspect the political declaration, at least, may change in the weeks ahead. First, I will say a word about the transition period. Under the terms of the November 2018 withdrawal agreement, the UK would continue to participate in EU agencies, mutual recognition instruments and information-sharing mechanisms until the end of the transition period. The UK would not, however, be able to participate in the management bodies of EU agencies or opt in to new measures in the areas of freedom, security and justice, although the EU may invite the UK to co-operate in such measures under the conditions set out for co-operation with third countries.
My Lords, I am delighted to be able to follow our committee chairman, the noble Lord, Lord Jay, and to support his remarks about the recent report on the prospects, post Brexit, for our continued security co-operation with our EU friends. I do not dispute for a moment that the Government and our many police and intelligence agencies accept and desire the need for an ongoing close relationship, but intentions are not enough: to maintain a seamless and effective co-operation we need to have some basic structures and agreements in place, and that is where I have serious doubts as things stand today.
When I was serving for 17 years as an MEP in Brussels, I was engaged as a spokesman for justice and home affairs issues for a large portion of that time, being responsible, with others, for numerous measures enhancing the pan-European close workings of intelligence and police forces to the detriment of major criminals and would-be terrorists. This included those measures referred to by our chairman: the European Criminal Records Information System, SIS II—the Schengen Information System—the European arrest warrant, the money-laundering directive, the data protection regulation and, just before I came back to the UK, the passenger name record agreement, of which I was in charge in the EU and which, incidentally, took eight years of negotiation to conclude.
These vital tools have the power to protect our safety and have indeed been doing so, but they are totally dependent on common standards, equal redress, agreed levels of openness and transparency and, of course, real-time exchange of information. I am sure that noble Lords are aware that millions of exchanges of vital data take place every day between authorities and agencies, with the protections in place ultimately interpreted by the European Court of Justice. The current government red line that rules out that body as an ultimate arbiter of common standards means inevitably that, if we maintain that position in any future arrangements, we will necessarily lose the benefits, especially of immediacy or that real-time information exchange, as well as the confidence of our neighbours in Europe.
My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Jay, for tabling this very timely debate. We are in very confused times, as he mentioned, and we do not have any idea where we stand over Brexit at the moment, so I intend to highlight a few truths about the UK’s security and defence capabilities, with some reference to the political declaration.
First, any security union should be unconditional. There is little doubt that security links, particularly over the last 12 years, have improved by leaps and bounds. This is primarily because the UK has had some key governance roles in the EU agencies. Apparently in the future, if Brexit goes wrong, this may not be the case and Europe will be considerably less safe—increasingly so as time passes. Europol, for example, was an absolute mess before we put a Brit in charge in 2008. I was there and involved as a Minister. Since then, it has come on in leaps and bounds, as the noble Lord, Lord Jay, said. The disparate agencies in European countries at that stage did not even talk to each other, let alone with the agencies of other countries.
As for secret intelligence, the UK is in an absolutely different league to our European allies, and we must not forget that. They need our intelligence warnings. We have saved countless European lives ever since we made that final decision in 2007 to pass on all intelligence on these issues immediately: we have done it ever since. There is no doubt that passenger data is crucial, as was mentioned by the noble Lord, Lord Jay, and I hope that, whatever the outcome of what is going on, the EU does not try to cut us out from this information: that would be in no one’s interests. Similarly, the European arrest warrant, despite its detractors, is actually extremely valuable in terms of extradition but, once again, it cuts both ways and it is not in anyone’s interest to cut the UK out, whatever the outcome of Brexit.
One area that merits particular attention is the protection of data and the rules over the length of time that data should be held. This is a highly complex area and one we cannot afford to get wrong. It has taken huge negotiation, not least in its relation to cybersecurity. Once again, we are streets ahead of the EU in cyber. I had great difficulty as a Minister even getting them to take it seriously. They have done that now, but one needs only to look at current cyber events in Germany and France to see their huge vulnerabilities, and the same is true of a number of other EU nations. They need to work with better-prepared nations, of which the UK is one. Even we are having difficulty keeping up and are slightly behind the power curve. I say again that whatever the outcome of the Brexit debacle—I do not apologise for calling it that—there is a need to maintain some form of security union. The fact that without it the EU will lose more and be more dangerous for its citizens is not the point. By working together, all of us, including the UK, will be safer over the next couple of generations and we may even be able to defeat terrorism.
My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord West of Spithead, said that this is a timely debate. In some ways it is very timely, and in other ways it feels somewhat out of date.
We have just finished a debate on a report about treating students fairly from the Economic Affairs Committee of your Lordships’ House. It too was published in the summer of 2018, and has aged quite well in the last six months—very little has changed. In terms of the report from your Lordships’ European Union Committee on the proposed UK-EU security treaty, everything and nothing has changed. The noble Lord, Lord Jay, said when he opened this debate that in many ways he was not going to look at the report precisely because so much has changed.
When that report was written, it was very clear that security co-operation was essential, as we have heard from across the Chamber this evening. But it was also clear that security co-operation was not guaranteed. The idea that it is not a zero-sum game is important, but it is also important to understand that the law of unintended consequences—as the noble Lord, Lord Kirkhope, suggested—is a real risk. In July last year when the report was written, the Government and the committee were working on the assumption that there would be a withdrawal agreement and a transitional arrangement which would take us to the end of 2020. The report, and the Government’s response, were written in that vein.
What we have seen in the last two weeks in the other place suggests that neither of those things may happen; we may not have a withdrawal agreement, and if we do not then we will not have a transitional arrangement. If security needs to be continuous, if there should not be a single minute between the arrangements that we have now and where we are when we leave the European Union, what is the Government’s plan if, on 29 March at 23.01, we are outside the European Union and we do not have a deal?
My Lords, as the noble Lord, Lord Kirkhope, specifically said—and as the noble Baroness, Lady Smith, adopted and applied—the security of our citizens is the paramount responsibility of the Government. The security implications of Brexit have not been debated nearly enough, and I believe the Government should have found time for a comprehensive debate about it so that our citizens could be fully informed of the implications of this decision that they in the majority have asked us to make.
I commend and thank the noble Lord, Lord Jay, for the thoughtful way in which he introduced this report. I also congratulate the noble Lord and his committee on this excellent report. I will not be able to do justice to it in the time that has been allotted, but I will do my best. In so doing, I remind your Lordships that on 9 January in the debate on the EU withdrawal Bill I made a speech which was confined to internal security matters. That speech can be found at col. 2258 of the Official Report. Noble Lords will be relieved to hear that I do not intend to repeat it, as I went on longer than I should have, but I will repeat the theme of the speech—whether we leave the EU with no deal or with the Prime Minister’s deal, our internal security would be significantly diminished.
I was not the only speaker to make that point. In the closing stages of the debate, on 14 January, the noble Baroness, Lady Manningham-Buller, who has significant experience in security, also made reference to this inevitable consequence of Brexit. In winding up the debate, the Advocate-General for Scotland—the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen of Elie—managed, in a speech which as I recollect made only passing reference to the actual debate, to find one paragraph in which to make reference to our future internal security. Referring to the contribution of the noble Baroness at col. 101, he was willing to concede that there is an issue of “police co-operation”, asserting that it could be maintained,
My Lords, I am a member of my noble friend Lord Jay’s sub-committee. I want to take issue partly with the noble Baroness, Lady Smith of Newnham, when she says that the report we produced last July has now been largely overtaken. It has taken six months to reach the Floor of your Lordships’ House, and we are shooting at something of a moving target—I know the Royal Navy has always found that difficult—but it is still relevant.
My Lords, I meant absolutely no criticism of the noble Lord, Lord Jay, or the committee; it was just the result of the way these things work. I understand that timeliness is not necessarily in the hands of the committee.
I understand. I was going to say that the report is still very relevant because it is a powerful and evidence-based assessment of why it is vital that we maintain close security co-operation with the EU, whether or not—and on what terms—we leave. As such, it is important to have that on the record.
My own judgment, as the UK’s first National Security Adviser, like that of the noble Lord, Lord West, is that the security of this country and its citizens is best provided for by staying in the EU. If that is not to be, the,
“broad, comprehensive and balanced security partnership”,
set out in the political declaration is a lot better than a no-deal outcome. No deal would immediately exclude us from the whole range of EU security co-operation set out in the report, which has saved British lives. Speaking of no deal, I note that there is nothing, so far as I can see, in the technical notices issued by the Commission on no-deal contingency planning on its side about continuing co-operation on security.
I realise that the view I have set out on the importance of EU security co-operation is fundamentally at odds with that of some distinguished retired practitioners. Yes, I refer in particular to Sir Richard Dearlove and the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Guthrie, who sent a joint letter last week to the chairmen of Conservative Party associations—not, I suppose, an address list chosen completely at random—which mysteriously found its way into the media. This letter thundered that the withdrawal agreement would,
“threaten the national security of the country in fundamental ways”.
It spelled out that the proposed security partnership would cut across the Five Eyes alliance, and put control of aspects of our national security in foreign hands. These are serious charges. However, the letter did not explain why the authors took such a doom-laden view. It may be relevant that both writers had retired some time before the EU developed the full range of co-operation we now see. As a more recent security practitioner, I want to touch on why I believe the EU plays a vital role, and to reassure the House that we in the sub-committee have not somehow missed an important area that threatens our security co-operation.
My Lords, I must first thank the noble Lord, Lord Jay, for introducing this debate with such rigour and for his excellent chairing of the EU Home Affairs Committee, of which I enjoy being a member. The past two years have been exciting, busy and sometimes perplexing, and he has handled the many Brexit-related issues with enormous skill and determination.
Many of those issues, processes and priorities are still relevant at this time of kaleidoscopic uncertainty. We know that issues regarding Brexit are complex, and need time and due process to be considered properly. Security is one of the most complex. Our report expresses concern about timescales; this problem is being demonstrated by colleagues working on statutory instruments. There are hundreds to consider, with so little time to do it well. We know from experience that the time needed to negotiate EU agreements with third countries is long, in view of the density of the issues. My noble friend Lord Browne described this graphically.
Among our witnesses during the inquiry for the report, considerable variation of opinion was offered on the issue of a treaty. For example, one witness doubted that a treaty could adequately replace existing instruments because it is unlikely that European law will stand still. Other witnesses felt that a treaty would be the best way to ensure an effective security relationship between the UK and the EU and show political commitment.
Sir Rob Wainwright, a former director of Europol—the excellent Brit noted by my noble friend Lord West—has expressed the view that in an,
“ideal world there would be no change to the UK’s current arrangements”,
on security. However, he also recognised that this scenario was “not realistic”. The delicacy of agreements and negotiations on security was apparent in both our inquiry and the one we carried out in 2016 on policing and security. For example, as stated in our report, the EU’s JHA covers a wide spectrum of police, judicial, criminal, civil and family law matters. Some EU member states have negotiated balances between retaining certain powers and sharing others with the UK. This sharing and co-operation may of course continue, whatever happens.
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Extradition arrangements could also be disrupted. Article 185 of the withdrawal agreement would authorise EU 27 states such as Germany to refuse to extradite their nationals to the UK during the transition period in accordance with their domestic constitutional requirements. Germany apart, we do not know how many will do so. While the practical impact of that change remains unclear, including on cases pending on the date of the UK’s withdrawal, the Government must surely publish a contingency plan that addresses any disruption to UK extradition arrangements. We urge them to do so.
As for the future relationship, the political declaration envisages,
“a broad, comprehensive and balanced security partnership”,
for law enforcement and judicial co-operation. However, as the European Union Select Committee’s report on the withdrawal agreement and political declaration noted,
“this may fall short of the Government’s ambition for a single comprehensive treaty”.
In any case, as our report concluded, it is unlikely that an overarching internal security treaty can be agreed before the end of 2020.
The Select Committee’s report also noted that:
“The depth of the future relationship in law enforcement and judicial cooperation … will depend on ‘an appropriate balance between rights and obligations’ and on the UK’s willingness to continue to follow EU rules and to accept that the CJEU, as the sole interpreter of EU law, will have continuing influence over the application of those rules”.
Can the Minister confirm the Government’s view of the role of the CJEU after we leave the European Union?
Extradition arrangements after the end of the transition period look increasingly insecure. The Government aim, rightly in our view, to retain all the benefits of the European arrest warrant. The alternative is to fall back on the 1957 Council of Europe Convention on Extradition, which would lead to delay, higher cost and potential political interference. This would be a bad outcome for both the UK and the EU. Perhaps unsurprisingly, as no non-EU member state is currently a participant, the political declaration does not mention the European arrest warrant. The declaration states simply that “effective arrangements” on extradition will be established. We urge the Government to bring forward detailed proposals as soon as possible.
It would be in the interests of both the UK and the EU to secure a future relationship with Europol that as far as possible maintains the operational status quo. We were hugely impressed by the evidence we received on the sheer volume of data exchanged between the UK and Europol on transnational crimes. It makes early agreement necessary.
The committee is concerned by the Government’s “transactional approach” to Europol negotiations. Simply because the UK is a major contributor of data to Europol, the Government should not underestimate the impact of Brexit on the UK’s role and influence within Europol. The political declaration states that the UK and EU will identify how the UK will co-operate with Europol and Eurojust. That is good as far as it goes, but it does not go very far. Both agencies are essential for UK law enforcement; I hope that the Minister will confirm that.
Future UK-EU security co-operation will be underpinned by an agreement on data. If the UK loses access to EU security databases, information that can be retrieved almost instantaneously may take days or weeks to access, creating a hurdle for policing and a threat to public safety. The political declaration suggests that the UK and EU seek reciprocal arrangements for exchanging passenger name record—PNR—data and DNA, fingerprint and vehicle registration data through the Prüm system. These are extremely valuable to UK law enforcement. We welcome that.
The declaration also contains commitments to consider other arrangements for data exchange that could “approximate” EU mechanisms, but there is no mention of either the SIS—Schengen Information System—II or the European Criminal Records Information System, or ECRIS, database, to which no non-EU country currently has access. This is worrying and I would welcome the Minister’s comments.
I will say a word about Ireland. Close co-operation between the United Kingdom and Ireland on security matters is fundamental. The appointment last year of the deputy chief constable of the PSNI as Garda Commissioner is welcome and imaginative. I hope that the Minister can assure us that, whatever happens, this essential close co-operation between the United Kingdom and Ireland on security matters will continue.
In their response to the committee’s report, the Government agreed with our conclusions about the importance of maintaining UK involvement in JHA measures during the transition period and our assertion that security is not a zero-sum game. The Government also agreed that existing third-country relationships with agencies such as Europol are an inadequate model for the UK’s security needs and that falling back on pre-EAW extradition arrangements would not be desirable. The Government disagreed, however, that a comprehensive security treaty would be too difficult to agree before the end of the transition period. In November 2018, we wrote to the Government asking for further clarity on the basis for their assertion that a comprehensive treaty could be negotiated more quickly and provide more flexibility than a series of ad hoc agreements. We also asked what planning the Government had done to avoid an operational cliff edge at the end of the transition period. I much look forward to a reply to that letter.
We cannot, alas, rule out leaving the European Union without a deal, although, as I have said in other debates in your Lordships’ House, I believe that that would be a disastrous outcome. As the European Union Select Committee highlighted in its Brexit:Deal or No Deal report:
“A complete ‘no deal’ outcome would be deeply damaging for the UK. It would bring UK-EU cooperation on matters vital to the national interest, such as counter-terrorism, police, justice and security matters, nuclear safeguards, data exchange and aviation, to a sudden halt”.
None the less, on all these matters, it is essential that internal security practitioners prepare for an operational cliff edge in the event of no deal or at the end of the transition period. We therefore commend the contingency work undertaken by the Crown Prosecution Service, National Crime Agency, Metropolitan Police and others in planning for these possibilities.
Much of the debate about the implications of Brexit is arcane, but the potential implications of Brexit for security are only too clear. The security of our citizens here, and indeed in the EU, is at stake. Brexit risks dismantling agreements and arrangements that have been built up over a generation, and which work. It is no wonder that so many of those who gave evidence to us—the police, members of the legal profession and the Director of Public Prosecutions—were genuinely and seriously concerned about the possible implications of Brexit not only for their work but for the security of our citizens.
I hope that the Minister can give us a convincing assurance that she and the department recognise the challenges that Brexit poses for the security of our citizens and will do their utmost to meet them, whatever the future holds. I beg to move.
We cannot compartmentalise these issues either. Unless we subscribe to the control mechanisms for data exchange, we lose access to all those areas I have referred to as well as access to the co-operation agreements with Europol and indeed other elements of cross-border structures. Of course we can strive to obtain bilateral agreements, which certainly might be easier than multilateral ones, but the other 27 states are obliged by treaty and law not to treat a third country equally, unless it accepts their controls, and that is not apparently acceptable at the moment to Her Majesty’s Government.
There are many issues on which those of us who have great experience of Europe would prefer the status quo to the plans currently pursued by the Government. Trade, the environment and transport are indeed also very important issues but—for me, and I have reason to say so—the most important by far is our security. I have said before in this House that even one minute of any form of gap or vacuum in our arrangements to exchange data relating to those who could do us harm would be—not could be—completely disastrous. At all costs and in all circumstances this must be avoided.
On defence and foreign policy, the first thing to say is that UK defence intelligence is on a par with that of the US. Our close links with the US—for example the GCHQ-NSA 1947 agreement—are so close that most people in both our countries do not even realise how close it is. Our long-standing AUS/CAN/NZ/UK/US agreement—I can never pronounce it with the NZ in the middle—is a club that we belong to that gives us all sorts of data not available to the EU unless we pass it on. No EU nation has anywhere near our capability; we must not forget that. I say as an aside that it makes a nonsense of the EU’s position regarding the UK’s involvement in Galileo. It has said that we cannot be trusted with certain things: I have to say that I consider that decision to be completely disgraceful. It is very unfortunate that Europe did that.
We need to be very clear that our foreign policy does not always align with that of Europe. The fact that we are responsible for 14 dependencies, some of which EU nations object to, is sometimes problematic. We are a separate permanent member of the UN Security Council. We are a nuclear power. We have a far more global vision than do most countries in the EU, so we need to be wary when it comes to issues of European foreign policy. In defence terms, we and the US have ensured Europe’s defence and safety since 1945, throughout the Cold War. Our expenditure on the military was second only to the US. The US clearly contributed the vast amount, but our expenditure was more than that of all the EU nations combined, apart from France, right up until about 15 years ago, and although it has been cut dramatically in the last 10 years we still spend more than any of those nations. We have been willing to deploy forces abroad in support of our NATO allies and I have to say that a number of EU nations found that problematic when it was clear that heavy fighting and casualties would be involved.
There is a lot of talk about the need for interoperability, and of course there should be interoperability, but that is an area that NATO has been very successful in for many years, with its STANAGs, for example. That is why we can go alongside another ship and refuel. That is why aircraft can land at another airbase and operate from there. Are we really saying that military interoperability within Europe is more important than with Canada and the United States? Many of the enablers that allow theatre entry operations to take place are owned by the United States, and the EU does not have them. If the EU were not interoperable with them, it could not take part in those operations.
The PESCO project and the European Defence Agency also worry me. Although we are major contributors to the European Defence Fund, it is quite clear that our European allies are trying to cut UK defence firms out. This, and a major part of President Macron’s push for an EU army, is not to do with being able to fight better—which is what it is meant for—but rather to do with supporting Europe’s industrial base, bloated headquarters and command structures, and trying to make a political point, not least to the United States. It is worth noting as an aside that a number of EU nations do not meet the NATO commitment to 2% spending on defence, and have not done so for years.
The defence of Europe is crucial for the defence of the UK. Twice in the last century our nation has expended vast quantities of blood and treasure ensuring just that. It is not in the EU’s interest, or our interest, not to keep us fully involved and integrated. If we are not, I fear we will yet again have to expend blood and treasure saving them from extinction.
I am speaking from the Liberal Democrat Benches, and your Lordships might think that I should not even be speculating that there might be a hard Brexit by 29 March—after all, that is certainly not what we are calling for, and is not what the House of Commons voted for last week. There was a vote that said the Government should not even be preparing to look at a no-deal Brexit—in other words, a no-deal Brexit cannot happen because the House of Commons will not allow it.
However, unless we amend the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018, we are leaving the European Union on 29 March. There may not be a majority in favour of a no-deal Brexit, but, unless in the next nine weeks there is some other arrangement, we are going to have a hole in our security. While the noble Lord, Lord West, is absolutely right that the United Kingdom has significant defence capabilities and has been one of the two main defence components of the European Union—along with France—and that it is in no one’s interest to have a no-deal situation on security, the fact that we want something to happen does not mean that it will. The whole concept of a Brexit on terms the UK wants has already been proven to be somewhat fallacious. The report that was drafted in July 2018 was written at the time of the Chequers agreement—so-called—before the withdrawal agreement—so-called—and before the House of Commons said that it did not want the deal.
Even if a withdrawal agreement of some sort can be salvaged between now and March, what confidence can the Government give us that there will then be a security treaty in place leaving the United Kingdom and EU 27 as safe then as we are today?
Finally, can the Minister begin to tell us how we would get to that situation, given that some of the key aspects, as the noble Lord, Lord Jay, has made absolutely clear would be essential, include the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice of the European Union? That was one of the key reasons the deal was voted down in the other place; it was not just about the Northern Ireland backstop. That is going to be an issue for a security treaty as much as the withdrawal agreement. Can the Government give us any assurance at all that we will be secure?
“beyond the EU by reciprocal arrangements—for example, in the case of Norway and Iceland”—[Official Report, 14/01/19; col.117.]
by specific agreements which will apparently,
“maintain the sort of relationship that we would intend to have going forward”.—[Official Report, 14/01/19; col.117.]
I remind your Lordships that, in the words of the Prime Minister—specifically, her Statement when she came back from the December European Council—this will be,
“the deepest security partnership that has ever been agreed with the EU”.—[Official Report, Commons, 17/12/18; col. 527.]
That clearly implies an agreement that is better than the Norway and Iceland agreements.
As a simple aide-memoire, I have with me Norway’s official brochure, which can be found on its Government’s website, on what Norway’s partnership with Europe means. If anybody takes the trouble to look at it, they will see that pages 18 and 19 cover justice and home affairs and the Schengen agreement. I do not intend to go through this shortened version, but it has a number of agreements with the European Union. To get access to EU police co-operation, Norway had to join the “Schengen co-operation”, as it refers to it, in 2001. In order to beat that, do our Government intend to join the Schengen co-operation or to make some similar arrangement with the European Union to meet the challenges of the political declaration? The brochure goes through all the agreements on another page.
The important thing is that this is the result of what appears to be 13 years of negotiations, and even the co-operation with regard to the European arrest warrant, which was agreed in 2014, has not, four years later, entered into force. That seems to echo many of the recommendations in the report that we are debating, which are probably expressed more temperately than I have put them. The Government may think that they can do it another way, but the evidence does not suggest that they can.
The report that we are debating was published, as we have heard, in July. Since then, the negotiations with the EU on withdrawal have concluded, and on 25 November the Government published their agreement and the accompanying political declaration. On 28 November, the Government marked their own homework, publishing their assessment of the part of the political declaration which dealt with policing, judicial co-operation, foreign policy, security and defence. Not surprisingly, they passed. Their assessment was that the Prime Minister’s deal is better than no deal. Importantly, what was missing and what has been missing consistently from the Government’s engagement on this issue is an assessment of what that will be compared to what we already have. No Minister will ever utter those words or explain it to anybody. I am therefore offering the Minister the opportunity to answer the question I put in the debate. In the compromise negotiations that will be necessary in the event of any form of deal, what parts of our security are the Government willing to compromise on, and to what extent? The people of this country need to know that and deserve to know it, and even if they voted for Brexit, they certainly did not vote for that.
Defence is not the subject of today’s debate—although the noble Lord, Lord West, has touched on it—but since it is a major point of the letter, let me say that if Britain were to participate in some EU military missions after leaving the European Union, as I hope we would, that would be a sovereign decision of this country. Nothing in the withdrawal agreement would bind us to do so; it would be a voluntary choice.
On intelligence co-operation, nothing proposed in the security partnership with the EU would cut across our vital Five Eyes intelligence sharing. That is for the simple reason that co-operation between intelligence agencies in Europe happens outside the EU treaties and will continue to do so. Do not take my word for it: the noble Baroness, Lady Manningham-Buller, to whom reference was made in the debate in your Lordships’ House on Monday, described it as “nonsense” to suggest that co-operation with the EU on security would upset the Five Eyes community. Indeed, she said that its members have always valued our link with the EU. This reflects the key point that intelligence is useful only if it is followed up with good, effective police co-operation work. The whole thrust of our committee’s report is that it is the measures and instruments that have grown up in EU co-operation that enable UK law enforcement to operate effectively across borders. The police consulted the SIS II database 539 million times in 2017.
Of course, the EU takes the same view, and the political declaration makes that very clear. In a proliferation of adjectives, it refers to the need for a,
“comprehensive, close, balanced and reciprocal … future relationship”,
on security. That is fine as a prenuptial contract, but it now needs to be translated into reality. I share the concerns expressed by other noble Lords and set out in the report over whether a vast, overarching security partnership across many areas can be agreed even in the course of a transition period, to say nothing of what would happen in the event of a no-deal departure.
My experience is that the wheels of Brussels grind awfully slow, and certainly on such a sensitive issue. The report is right to suggest that work should be done on ad hoc security arrangements to mitigate, if necessary, any reduction in operational co-operation while a longer-term agreement is negotiated. I hope that is already under way and the Minister will be able to reassure us that it is the case, even if we have an agreement and a transition period. Like others, I will be interested to hear what the Minister has to say about no-deal contingency planning. We cannot afford to take risks with the safety of people in this country.
What also struck me was how great the role of the UK has been on various committees in Europe. We have led in several fields. This is likely to diminish. We may get co-operation, but we will not have the leadership we have had—what a pity. It is recognised that the EU benefits from security co-operation with the UK. On 19 June, the director of GCHQ stated:
“These threats are more complex and more global and none of us can defend against them alone”.
The European arrest warrant, a key element in security issues, raises particular concerns. I cannot go into the intricacies now, but I ask the Minister to qualify the UK’s likely position on the EAW post Brexit, given the committee’s concern in its conclusion on page 24 of its report.
The House of Commons Exiting the European Union Committee report states at paragraph 88:
“The Political Declaration appears to rule out continued UK participation in the European Arrest Warrant”,
as the warrant,
“is linked to EU membership, including free movement of people, the Charter of Fundamental Rights and EU citizenship”.
The political declaration states that the two sides will seek replacement extradition arrangements instead, establishing procedures,
“to surrender suspected and convicted persons efficiently and expeditiously”,
as a replacement for the European arrest warrant. What does that mean? What procedures are we talking about and under what timescale? Our committee concluded:
“We have, however, seen no evidence that sufficient progress has yet been made towards negotiating a comprehensive security treaty”.
Is the Minister confident that within the next few months, we will have a security treaty that will sufficiently protect our country? What does she think the Government should do, given that we seem unprepared to guarantee security measures? I look forward to her reply.