My Lords, the Motion before us today asks the House to once again consider the UK’s withdrawal from the EU—which will take place on 31 October, with or without a deal. Of course, this House and its committees have been considering this topic with great scrutiny and interest ever since the 2016 referendum. I pay tribute to the stamina and continued focus of noble Lords in fulfilling this vital constitutional role.
The Government are committed to delivering on this instruction from the British people without any further pointless delay. The outcome that we want, and have always wanted, is a deal with the European Union—but if we cannot agree a new deal, we will have to leave without one.
I must commend noble Lords, including the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, on their excellent timing in scheduling this debate today; events are indeed unfolding fairly rapidly as we speak. I first highlight to noble Lords that, a short while ago, we published details of the Government’s proposals for alternatives to the backstop. A copy of the Written Ministerial Statement and supporting documentation is now available for noble Lords to collect from the Printed Paper Office.
I recognise, of course, that noble Lords would like to take time to review and consider the content of the WMS and documents, the details of which I will set out in a moment. Before I do that, I reassure noble Lords by confirming that they will have the opportunity to discuss this further in a Statement tomorrow.
This Government have made considerable progress in their negotiations with the EU. We have been working hard to negotiate changes to the withdrawal agreement and political declaration. The Prime Minister has been clear on the nature of these changes. We are unconditionally committed to finding a solution for the north/south border which protects the Belfast agreement, the commitments of which can best be met if we explore solutions other than the backstop. The backstop risks—
Will the noble Lord confirm, in the light of the Prime Minister’s speech earlier today and the proposals that have just been published, that effectively the Government are saying, “We won’t impose border controls of a customs check character at or near the border, but since that border is the external customs union frontier of the European Union and the Republic of Ireland, it is up to them to do it”? Is that not a despicable, pass-the-parcel, grubby approach to all this?
The noble Lord makes his point in his normal forthright manner. If he has a little patience, I will come to the details of our proposals in a little while.
The backstop risks weakening the delicate balance embodied in the Belfast agreement between both major traditions in Northern Ireland, grounded in agreement, consent and respect for minority rights. Removing control of areas of the commercial and economic life of Northern Ireland to an external body over which the people of Northern Ireland have no control risks undermining that balance. Any deal ahead of Brexit on 31 October must avoid the whole of the UK or just Northern Ireland being trapped in an arrangement where they are a rule taker.
These discussions with the Commission and EU leaders have intensified, with regular sessions taking place over a number of weeks. The Prime Minister’s EU sherpa, David Frost, has continued to lead a cross-party team for these detailed discussions with the Commission’s Taskforce 50, in line with the Prime Minister and President of the European Commission’s agreement to intensify the pace of discussions. Within the last couple of hours in Brussels, he has delivered to the EU the UK’s proposals on a replacement to the backstop. These are the proposals which we have laid in Parliament today.
I know that your Lordships will probably not have had the time or opportunity to read the document published a short while ago. I will therefore set out the main points of the Prime Minister’s offer to the EU. First, this proposal is based above all on our commitment to find solutions which are compatible with the Belfast agreement, the fundamental basis for governance in Northern Ireland.
Secondly, it confirms our commitment to long-standing areas of UK-Ireland collaboration: the common travel area; the rights of all those living in Northern Ireland; and north/south co-operation.
My Lords, this is the first full opportunity that this House has had to debate Brexit since the Supreme Court told the Prime Minister unanimously that his Prorogation plan was,
“unlawful, null and of no effect”,
because it had the effect, in their view, of frustrating or preventing the constitutional role of Parliament in holding the Government to account. It is right that this House should have the opportunity to debate where we are because the Supreme Court particularly recognised that this House too had a role in holding the Government to account, part of our responsibility under our constitution.
During the short period since that decision, much has already been said, and I am sure much will be said today by noble Lords and that their words will be wise and informative. We will also have to deal with and comment on the new information that the Minister has just provided, and I will come back to that in a moment. However, I shall concentrate on two particular matters. Assuming that this new proposed deal does not get either support from Parliament or agreement from the EU, what are the Government going to do? That is what I want to spend a few minutes on, particularly on how the Government intend to achieve what they, including the noble Lord, Lord Callanan, have repeatedly said: that they will comply with the law yet still leave on 31 October.
That mantra of compliance has been much repeated, but we still do not know what the Government mean. This will be the third time that I have raised the question in the House. Of course, it is not a question of generalised compliance, or compliance with the law in general, but of how the Government will comply with the European Union (Withdrawal) (No. 2) Act. That is what has been termed by the Prime Minister the “surrender Act”, which is his favoured term. Language is powerful, as the Prime Minister in particular, as an experienced journalist, knows; but that is a misuse of language and a dangerous one, as colleagues have pointed out, particularly in the other place. Language has been a political tool, at least ever since Erik the Red misnamed frozen Greenland to attract more settlers to his new land. This Act in fact surrenders nothing. It is Parliament which, in the Act, has set the date of an extension of three months, which is to be triggered. If the EU accepts that date, then that is the extension. If the EU proposes another date, that has no effect unless Parliament accepts it. So it is Parliament that is in control. If there has to be a nickname for this, other than the Benn Act, the “parliamentary sovereignty Act” would be a more appropriate name.
My Lords, these Benches also welcome the debate. A benefit of the purported Prorogation being nullified is that we are able to hold the Government to account on this crucial issue, at such a crucial time—just 29 days before the date, set back in April, for the further extension of Article 50. Donald Tusk was reputed to have advised the United Kingdom not to waste this time.
Today we have learned, and have heard from the noble Lord, Lord Callanan, that the Prime Minister has made what was being trailed this morning as his final offer. It could equally be described as his first offer. We will have to study this in detail. If one looks, for example, at the suggestion that it provides for the potential creation of an all-Ireland regulatory zone on the island of Ireland, it might appear that the Government’s attempt to get around the border problem is to create two borders. Maybe that is why the Prime Minister has the idea of a bridge between Scotland and Northern Ireland—so it can have a regulatory checkpoint half way across.
The Irish border has been a real difficulty ever since Theresa May set out her mutually contradictory red lines: out of the single market, out of the customs union and no hard border on the island of Ireland. The last of these commands widespread support, but the first two amounted to acquiescence to the right wing of the Conservative Party. It treated the outcome of the referendum as if it had been 95:5 and not 52:48. It was in the interest of holding her party together, rather than the national interest. In December 2016, the European Union Select Committee of your Lordships’ House, in its sixth report, said:
“Retaining customs-free trade between the UK and Ireland will be essential if the current soft border arrangements are to be maintained … Nor, while electronic solutions and cross-border cooperation are helpful as far as they go, is the technology currently available to maintain an accurate record of cross-border movement of goods without physical checks at the border”.
My Lords, since we last debated Brexit, much has changed and yet, in many ways, nothing has changed. In some respects, we have gone backwards. We are looking for a new departure arrangement having renounced Theresa May’s agreement, which many of us, however reluctantly, were finally willing to support—including the present Prime Minister. Yet in the gloom, I believe there are some hopeful signs, to which I will return.
Let me first say in parenthesis that I saw nothing surprising or constitutionally revolutionary in last week’s ruling of the Supreme Court. Since the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, was sitting beside me, let me say that in view of the large television audiences for the proceedings of the court and following the ending of the televising of the Ashes contest, my noble friend has a claim to have become the Ben Stokes of the legal profession.
My career was spent in an era when judicial review became established as a means of challenging unreasonable exercises of power by the Executive. Although Prorogation took place geographically in Parliament, it was an act of the Executive: Parliament did not have a chance to vote on it. For me, the crucial sentence in the judgement was:
“It is impossible for us to conclude … that there was any reason—let alone a good reason—to advise Her Majesty to prorogue Parliament for five weeks”.
A five-week Prorogation of Parliament at a crucial time when, as we will see next week, only a few days are needed to prepare for a Queen’s Speech, was an unreasonable exercise of the prerogative by the Executive. That is what the ruling was about; it was not about Brexit.
I have huge respect for the noble Lord and I value his advice. He is arguing that the process of Prorogation did not constitute proceedings in Parliament. Does he think the same is true of giving Royal Assent to Acts of Parliament?
That is a legal issue on which I do not want to reply immediately. I think that is a proceeding in Parliament, but this was an act of the Executive, which happened to take place in Parliament.
The result of the Supreme Court’s judgment is that this House is sitting today and we have an opportunity to make our contribution to the debate, so I welcome this occasion. I hope that the Government get a deal with the EU; and there are some hopeful signs, although perhaps not as many as the Prime Minister claims. The DUP now seems prepared to support a deal on the broad lines the Prime Minister is outlining. The Irish Government, although by no means convinced by the details so far reported about the Prime Minister’s approach, appear to have realised that no deal would be a severe economic blow to them. The European Union wants a deal and is prepared to accept a greater role for the Northern Ireland Executive regarding the arrangements affecting Northern Ireland. As the noble Lord, Lord Howell, pointed out to us in our previous debate, constructive suggestions about alternative arrangements for border controls have been made by the commission established by Prosperity UK.
Yet the prospects of reaching an agreement on all the necessary details by 31 October, let alone 17 October, are so remote as to be impracticable. So what sort of agreement do the Government envisage by that date? I understand that the Minister will not be able to tell us any more tonight, beyond what is in the Prime Minister’s so-called final offer to the EU and the documents that have been placed in the Printed Paper Office. But realistically, we must accept that it seems impossible that an agreement will be reached on 17 October, except perhaps on ways of temporarily mitigating the effects of no deal.
In that case, a request for a postponement under the European Union (Withdrawal) (No. 2) Act seems inevitable. People understandably ask, “What would be the purpose of an extension?”. The Minister described it as “pointless”; I was surprised by that adjective because one benefit would be the general election which the Government have been seeking. It would, presumably, take place in late November or early December and might produce a Government able to hammer out a policy which would command a majority in Parliament, and with whom the EU would have to negotiate seriously. If that were the outcome, it would be a price worth paying for a further extension. It would at least be preferable to the present paralysis and, in my view, greatly preferable to leaving on 31 October without a deal.
My Lords, as the Government are in mid-negotiation with the European Commission, with Belfast and Dublin, and no doubt with other political forces in the other place, it is a little difficult to debate this issue this afternoon with full confidence—particularly as we have had about 10 minutes to absorb the outlines which my noble friend the Minister so kindly gave of the Government’s new proposals. The rest remains not only in negotiation but deliberately veiled. I understand that the Government want Brussels to try to keep these matters secret. That is a pretty forlorn hope but anyway, the veil has not yet been fully lifted so it is a little hard to see the full picture. Nevertheless, I intend to concentrate on that and, as the noble Lord, Lord Butler, said, to try to be positive about these matters rather than getting too bogged down in the sort of endless “What if?” speeches we have had, such as that of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Goldsmith.
It is assumed that there will be no withdrawal agreement and that we will arrive at 31 October with the Government saying that they are determined to leave and the Benn Bill saying that they should not. Let me put that aside to look at the positive prospects and what we can deduce from what has been said in the various capitals about the attempt to find an alternative to the backstop. I note that in this House only a fortnight ago, some of us who dared to raise the idea that there was a question to be asked about an alternative to the backstop were told by all the experts—distinguished former Northern Ireland Secretaries and others whose judgment I greatly respect—that it was out of the question. We were told, “It can’t happen. It’s never happened anywhere else. There is no conceivable alternative to the backstop and nothing else will be considered”.
Since then, even Jean-Claude Juncker has said that there is an alternative. Since then, the Times and the Financial Times have pronounced with great authority that there can be no alternative, it is quite wrong to assume that there can be any possible difference from the past, the backstop is here to stay, and it is all out of the question. Now it turns out to be in the question. I do not say that we have an answer. Maybe the critics and the sceptics on both sides—both the remainers who do not want there to be a deal of this kind and want to stay in, and the super no-dealers who do not want there to be any kind of withdrawal agreement because they want to leave without a deal—will go on questioning and hoping for a negative answer, but I am not so sure at all. I noticed in the speech by the noble Lord, Lord Butler, and in many other comments, a hint of possibilities and that the simple, crude backstop, which was so indigestible, does have alternatives. They are complex and technical and involve very special arrangements of a kind that have never happened elsewhere in the world—but Ireland is special.
My Lords, I fear that we are on the verge of a very great constitutional crisis—probably the greatest since the Conservative Party leadership flirted with defying the law in the last days of the Asquith Government before the First World War on the question of Irish home rule. It was only the First World War that saved us from that, and no one would want to see that as the deus ex machina which saves us this time. What is the crisis? It is that, from what, on a quick reading, we know of the Government’s alternatives on the Irish question today—and of course we have not had a lot of time to look at it—I cannot believe that they are a serious proposition. To me, they come across, I am afraid, as a ruse invented in London to put the blame on the European Union for a no-deal breakdown.
They are not serious for four principal reasons. First, they breach the solemn promise that was made in the December 2017 joint agreement between the EU and Britain—a promise, by the way, to which Boris Johnson was fully a party, as a member of the Cabinet who did not resign at the time—that ruled out the reintroduction of a customs border in Ireland and promised a solution based on full regulatory alignment. It is all very well for Mr Johnson now to claim that these reintroduced customs checks would not be “at or near” the border, whatever that might mean. The central point is that the new Government have changed the whole basis of their approach to the Irish issue from that of their predecessor under Mrs May—from one of how to achieve the full alignment that makes talk of borders unnecessary, to one of how to minimise the disruption of customs controls. The fact is, for all that the noble Lord, Lord Howell, says, there is nowhere in the world where customs controls do not require physical infrastructure.
Secondly, the British Government are expecting the Republic and the whole of the EU to sign off on this principle without detailed agreement on the practicalities. That suggests that the Government do not actually have an answer on the practicalities.
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Thirdly, the proposal provides for the creation of an all-island regulatory zone on the island of Ireland, covering all goods and eliminating regulatory checks for trade in goods between Northern Ireland and Ireland.
Fourthly, and unlike the backstop, this regulatory zone will be dependent on the consent of those affected by it. This is essential to the acceptability of arrangements under which part of the UK accepts the rules of a different political entity. In our view, it is fundamental to democracy. The Government therefore propose that the continuation of the regulatory zone after the transition period will be subject to the principle of consent of the people of Northern Ireland.
Fifthly, the proposal ensures that Northern Ireland will be fully part of the UK customs territory, not the EU customs territory, after the end of the transition period. It has always been a fundamental point for this Government that the UK will leave the EU customs union at the end of the transition period, since control of trade policy is fundamental to this country’s future prosperity.
Finally, in order to support Northern Ireland through our withdrawal from the EU, and in collaboration with others with an interest, this Government propose a new deal for Northern Ireland, with appropriate commitments to help boost economic growth and Northern Ireland’s competitiveness, and to support infrastructure projects, particularly with a cross-border focus. Taken together, these proposals respect the decision taken by the people of the UK to leave the EU while dealing pragmatically with that decision’s consequences in Northern Ireland and in Ireland. Together, we believe that these will allow us to reach agreement with the EU under Article 50 and to leave the EU with a deal that both respects the referendum result and provides a strong platform for our future relationship.
As I am sure noble Lords will agree, leaving the EU with a deal on 31 October is the preferable outcome. However, we have stepped up preparations across government and will be fully ready for Brexit on 31 October whatever the circumstances. As the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster made clear in his Statements to the other place, and as I repeated in this House last month on 3 September and again on 25 September, we have indeed ramped up our no-deal preparations. The Government are committed to prioritising stability for citizens, consumers, businesses and the economy. I know that many noble Lords have previously raised the important issue of citizens’ rights. I yet again reassure noble Lords that this Government are clear that citizens’ rights will never be used as a bargaining chip. That is why the Prime Minister has provided an unequivocal guarantee to the more than 3 million EU citizens living and working in the UK that they can have absolute certainty of the right to live and remain in the UK whether we leave with or without a deal. Under the EU settlement scheme, over 1.5 million EU citizens have secured their future in the UK, and the Home Office continues to process up to 20,000 applications per day.
As well as the smooth flow of people from the UK into the EU and vice versa, our economic priorities include ensuring the continued flow of goods. The Government have committed to a number of steps in order to do this. For example, we have committed to introducing temporary easements for traders and hauliers to smooth the transition to new controls; and to maintain continuity of trade, we have signed or agreed in principle 15 trade continuity agreements to date, covering 45 countries and accounting for 72% of the trade for which we are seeking continuity in a no-deal Brexit. The work that we are taking forward will ensure that businesses are ready for exit.
The precise impacts of a no-deal Brexit are of course difficult to predict but we have taken steps to define the potential impact and develop reasonable worst-case planning assumptions upon which we can build our contingency plans. Operation Yellowhammer is the cross-government programme of work to ensure that the Government are prepared to mitigate the potential impacts of Brexit in the event that the UK leaves without a deal.
The Government are ready for and committed to withdrawal from the EU, with or without a deal, on 31 October and without further pointless delay. We have ramped up all our preparations to deliver that. This Government are clear that people want to see Brexit delivered by 31 October, and we are determined to deliver on their wishes. I beg to move.
Let us look for a moment at what compliance with the Act means. It means more than a bare adherence to the minimal interpretation of the words of the law; it means an acceptance, too, of the spirit of the law—what Parliament, what we, intended by the law. So what are the Government actually doing? From all the statements that have been made, it looks as though, if the Government cannot get this deal through, either with the EU or in the other place, they are looking for a way to circumvent the law, to try to find a way round it. We expect more from people in high office. We expect good faith and respect for the spirit of the law. Mr Johnson has impoverished our society and our politics with his unlawful scheme to shut Parliament up. Let us hope that he does not impoverish it further by looking for shoddy tricks or shabby stratagems to get round what Parliament has ordained.
What will the Government do? The internet has been buzzing with different ideas of loopholes and workarounds. There are none. As the former Supreme Court Justice, Lord Sumption, said on the BBC, the courts disfavour finding loopholes. The earliest of the “loopholes” suggested was that the Prime Minister could accompany the letter of request that he is obliged to send with another letter saying that he does not want an extension at all. However, that would clearly be contrary to the Act. The Act requires that he should “seek an extension”, and you do not seek an extension if, at the same time as asking for it, you say, “Please don’t give it”, or keep your fingers crossed behind your back, as in the playground. This is not playground politics.
My first question to the Minister, when he winds, is on what reassurance he can give about what the Government plan to do in the event that this new proposal does not meet favour with the EU or with the other place. Let me spell out the question more clearly so that there is no room for misunderstanding or, forgive me for saying so, evasion. The Government say that they will comply with the law yet leave on 31 October. The Act allows two ways in which that can happen. First, if, by 19 October, a deal has been agreed with the EU—it will have to be this deal, according to what the noble Lord has said—which the House of Commons has approved and, indeed, this House has debated too. Or, if the Commons has agreed that we can leave without a deal and, again, this House debates that question as well. The clear question becomes: if, by 19 October, neither of those things has happened—there has been no agreed and approved deal and the House of Commons has not agreed that we can leave without a deal—will the Prime Minister “seek to obtain” an extension under Article 50(3), as the Act requires? Secondly, and importantly, will the Government agree not to undermine the request by second letters or other messages or statements which contradict the request?
One of the most disturbing suggestions that we have heard in recent days is that the Government could rely on the Civil Contingencies Act. This is the second “loophole” that I want to mention. That would mean using the powers in the Civil Contingencies Act to override or indeed revoke or set aside the Benn Act. There are a number of reasons why that would be wrong. First and foremost is because the great powers that do appear in the Civil Contingencies Act only arise if there is an “emergency”. That arises only when the Government are satisfied that,
“an emergency has occurred, is occurring or is about to occur”.
According to the Act, “emergency” means,
“an event or situation which threatens serious damage to human welfare … in the United Kingdom”,
or in a part or region of it. It would still be necessary to show that urgent provision has to be made to address that emergency. Noble Lords will agree that that situation does not apply at the moment. However, the suggestion that this Act might be employed is worrying, because if civil unrest or riot, or the prospect of them, were invoked, the Government might then claim that the statutory conditions to revoke the Benn Act were in fact in existence. It is a worry that some Ministers appear to be talking up the risk of unrest, perhaps precisely with that intention in mind. That would be cynical and unlawful.
Another idea which has been floated, and apparently attributed to the Foreign Secretary, is that the Benn Act somehow conflicts with EU law. There is a lovely irony in the Government relying on EU law to get out of this particular problem. However, I do not understand the argument at all. It is no way inconsistent with Article 50 to ask for and agree extensions to the leaving date. That is what we have done at least once already, and it is fully consistent with Article 50. All the Benn Act does is require that a request for an extension is made if certain conditions are fulfilled: namely, that the Government have not persuaded the other place to agree to a deal that they have reached or to agree that we can leave without a deal. What is more, although I do not think it arises, Article 50 requires our notice to leave to be given in accordance with our constitutional traditions. That is what has happened. If it further required that extensions should be requested in accordance with those traditions, that has happened too, because it is pursuant to an Act of Parliament passed by both Houses that the Prime Minister will be required to make this request.
I will not deal with other suggested loopholes, save to say that all, in my view, are wrong. However, even though they are wrong, dealing with such arguments will take time. The worry is that the Government will run down the clock so that there is inadequate time to get decisions from either Parliament or the courts. Therefore, I am not surprised to read that other legal actions are already being planned. Clear answers from the Government today could help to render those unnecessary, so we look forward to hearing what the Minister will say in winding up.
The second issue I will raise—the Minister touched on this in his remarks, but I want to probe him a little further—is what the consequences of a no-deal Brexit would be. If the House of Commons is to approve a no-deal Brexit, clearly the Government are under an obligation to give full, frank and honest advice about the consequences for the British people. How do they intend to do that? We started with the leak of Operation Yellowhammer documents. Will the Government update and release the results of that inquiry? If so, when? We need to know.
I turn now to the subject of the Minister’s opening remarks. Of course, the third important issue is what new terms of the deal there are. If the Government can persuade the EU and the other place to accept those terms, that is one thing. They, and we, will need to examine them closely. During the course of today, others will no doubt comment on them. I want to make some brief initial comments. First, it is telling that this statement is released just as the Conservative Party conference comes to an end. The result of that was that the Prime Minister did not have to debate its contents and merits with the conference itself, which might have been a difficult job. It also means that we and the other place have less time to deal with it. Secondly, as noble Lords will recall, there was a commitment that there would be no more infrastructure or physical checks on the Irish border. I am not at all clear from reading and listening to the Minister whether that is in fact what these proposals will do. That needs to be probed as we go through this. Thirdly, it also seems that this provides for separate regimes for Northern Ireland and the rest of Great Britain. Again, the Minister will no doubt confirm that remark, or otherwise. That is a very important consideration which has been a terrible problem for many people in the past.
Those issues will need to be examined. I will say no more about them at this stage, but I have no doubt other noble Lords will during this debate, including my noble friend Lady Hayter. I am glad to hear—and for this I thank the Minister—the announcement that a Statement will be made tomorrow. The usual channels will have to consider how long to allow for that Statement, as I imagine many noble Lords will want the opportunity to speak to it.
That conclusion of the Select Committee has stood the test of time.
Clearly what we have been seeing today will require analysis, but the real concern with any infrastructure, whether at the border or 10 miles removed from it, is that we will see a reversal of the gains of the Good Friday agreement. It will significantly disrupt all-Ireland trade, as well as impact local communities. When the Minister replies, can he confirm that the proposals that have been submitted to the European Commission today would, if carried through, mean there will be no need to amend Section 10 of the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018 at all? It says that:
“Nothing in section 8, 9 or 23(1) or (6) of this Act authorises regulations which … create or facilitate border arrangements between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland after exit day which feature physical infrastructure, including border posts, or checks and controls, that did not exist before exit day and are not in accordance with an agreement between the United Kingdom and the EU”.
It is important to get that reassurance.
The immediate priority of my party—indeed, of many—is to ensure that the United Kingdom does not crash out of the European Union on 31 October, without a deal. That is why we wholeheartedly supported the legislation promoted in your Lordships’ House by the noble Lord, Lord Rooker, which is now the European Union (Withdrawal) (No. 2) Act 2019. That has sometimes been traduced as an attempt by remainers to frustrate Brexit in its entirety. It is worth pointing out that that Bill was supported by both remainers and leavers. It is fair to say that, in the House of Commons, there were ex-Cabinet Ministers who had voted for the leave agreement more often than the Prime Minister himself had. Therefore, it is wrong to characterise it as being a device or ploy by remainers to frustrate Brexit. It was intended to frustrate Brexit without any deal, which is an important distinction.
When questioned last Thursday, the Minister—as picked up by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Goldsmith —said that the Government would obey the law, but refused to say what the Government understood the law to be. I very much hope that the very detailed analysis the noble and learned Lord has given will be fully responded to by the Minister.
We oppose no deal because, while we believe that leaving the EU at all on any terms would be damaging to jobs, the National Health Service, small businesses, farmers, the aspirations of our young people, to others and to our prosperity, we believe that crashing out without a deal, as foreshadowed in Operation Yellowhammer, would inflict serious damage indeed, not least on the most vulnerable members of our society. Serious job losses, the anxieties of cancer patients, bleak prospects for rural farmers: these were never displayed on the side of buses during the referendum campaign. Indeed, in April 2016, just two months before the referendum, the now Foreign Secretary, Dominic Raab, said on the BBC’s “Daily Politics” that,
“the idea that Britain would be apocalyptically off the cliff edge if we left the EU is silly”.
In March this year, in a newspaper article, Mr Michael Gove said that,
“we didn’t vote to leave without a deal. That wasn’t the message of the campaign I helped lead”.
There is no mandate whatever for leaving without a deal.
In his remarks, the Minister said that the Government have ramped up no-deal preparations. We had a Statement last week on Operation Yellowhammer on the dire consequences of a no-deal Brexit, and the publication of a document about which the First Minister of Scotland, Nicola Sturgeon, said she could see no difference from the one she had previously seen, except that what had previously been described as a “base scenario” had now been changed to “worst case scenario”. But can the Minister tell us about some of the other operations we believe the Government have prepared briefings and detailed analysis of, such as Operation Snow Bunting—the policing response in the event of a no-deal Brexit?
On the subject of policing, will the Minister comment on evidence given yesterday to the Justice Committee of the Scottish Parliament, in which the deputy chief constable of Police Scotland was reported in the Times as having said that Police Scotland has been denied access to sensitive plans to handle civil disruption after Brexit? He said:
“We have, frankly, at times struggled to access some of the more sensitive elements, or layers, of those planning assumptions … Some of those planning assumptions have tended, at times, to be quite London or south of England-centric, and we’ve been constantly reinforcing the different legal and constitutional arrangements in Scotland”.
It would be very helpful if the Minister could tell us what attempts have been made to address these concerns expressed only yesterday by the deputy chief constable of Police Scotland.
We are told that there is an Operation Kingfisher—a bailout fund to prop up businesses in the event of a no-deal Brexit; and an Operation Black Swan, a worst- case disaster scenario for surprise events with huge repercussions. Can the Minister give us more details of these contingency planning analyses, which we understand are going on within the Government but they are not being totally open about? Are they planning to have any other birds? One could speculate whether Operation Emu might be for a plan that will not fly.
At the time of the attempted Prorogation, a number of pieces of legislation had not been completed. The Queen’s Speech that started this Session back in June 2017 foresaw,
“legislation to ensure that the United Kingdom makes a success of Brexit, establishing new national policies on immigration, international sanctions, nuclear safeguards, agriculture and fisheries”.—[Official Report, 21/6/17; col. 5.]
How many of these Bills have actually been passed? What about the ones which have not? Are the Government saying, having thought that they were necessary to make a success of Brexit, that Brexit will not be a success because they have not passed them?
If one listened to the exchanges in the Supreme Court on the final day of the recent case, the Advocate-General for Scotland, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen of Elie, appeared to say that the Government had provided the court with an explanatory note on Brexit-related primary legislation not required for an exit date of 31 October. It would be very helpful, if that note exists—I understood that it was given to the court—if it could be placed in the Library so that we could see the Government’s analysis of legislation that has not been passed. In the event of an agreement being reached, can the Minister also tell us how quickly he thinks the implementation legislation could go through your Lordships’ House?
I have two concluding points. We are told constantly that the theme of the Conservative Party conference is, “Get Brexit done by 31 October”. That conjures up an idea that simply leaving with or without a deal is all that is required. Should that happen, people will very quickly realise that that is only the end of the beginning; that a new, and likely very long, phase of negotiations on our future relations with the European Union would ensue, even longer and more difficult were we to crash out without a deal. There is no sign that the Government have given any thought to the way forward, so what kind of public disillusionment will be created by the kind of simplistic sloganizing that does not bear out reality?
On these Benches, we believe that the best way forward is a people’s vote. Can any of us for one moment think that if the June 2016 result had been 52 to 48 the other way around Brexiteers would have said, “Fair cop, guv, we’re packing up our tents and we are going to quit the field”? Of course they would not. Painful though it would have been to have heard Bill Cash continue to go on, I would have respected the long-term and long-held beliefs of people who have opposed our membership of the European Union for a long, long time. Why, therefore, should not my colleagues and I be afforded a similar respect for the beliefs that we have held for a long time? Why should we abandon those views that we have held for decades? If there is not a people’s vote, we have said that we will campaign in a general election for a majority and a democratic mandate to revoke Article 50.
Brexiteers do not have a monopoly on patriotism. I believe passionately that the prosperity, security and the well-being of our country and the communities that we serve—and not least future generations—are best achieved by our continuing membership of the European Union. No one is going to deny our right to campaign for it.
I just make a few comments on the situation in Ireland. It is worth noting that there has always been a border between Northern Ireland and the Republic, not only before we all joined the European Union, but for the last 40 years. It is a border that is heavily policed by Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs. There have always been massive, complex cross-border tax and regulatory issues that have had to be dealt with by endless experts and consultants. If you ask any senior businessman in Northern Ireland, they will tell you all about the arrangements that arise as a result of there being a border. The most obvious one is VAT: 23% in the Republic—with a whole range of derogations, right down to 4.8%, I think, on greyhounds—and 20% this side of the border, in the United Kingdom, although we have been in the EU so far. That is just one example of the whole list of differences on payroll, labour provisions, the currency, which is of course quite different, transfer pricing and a whole range of other issues. Yet everyone has managed quite well with an invisible border.
Why, when we move into this new situation, it should become so impossibly difficult, I do not understand. I do not understand the voices that are still coming from Dublin saying, “No, we don’t want any of that at all”. I have to ask—I think any reasonable person has to ask—what exactly does Dublin want? We want co-operation and constructiveness with the Republic of Ireland. We have a very close relationship, bad in the distant past but better in the last 50 years, and we want it to be better still. Do those in Dublin want to get rid of the common travel area that has been with us since 1922? If they do, it will be very painful for them. Do they want to build a physical border to mark the edge of the EU? Again, I cannot believe they really do, but that is the consequence of being negative about the proposals and allowing things to drift to no deal.
Under the new proposals, as I understand it, we have two, or maybe even four years—I am not quite sure; I am going by the Daily Telegraph, which may not be all that reliable—to sort out how these new arrangements could really work in practice. Over those several years, a lot will change. A lot will change here, because we will see far greater devolution to all the regions, including Northern Ireland, Scotland—if it does not go independent—and Wales. We will see the status of all devolved Governments vastly increase in this country in the digital age. We might as well recognise that that is what is coming and that a new pattern will develop if we can show patience. If this Parliament can show patience and can agree to a withdrawal agreement, then we can go forward constructively. If this Parliament remains paralysed and cannot ever reach agreement, then I fear the obvious outcome—which many of us predicted all along—is a general election and a new pattern, which may be slightly better than that which, so far, the House of Commons has been able to deliver.
Thirdly, the UK is apparently proposing that this arrangement will be temporary: it will have a life of only four years and then it will be up to the Northern Irish. However, in practice, the way they have put it, as I read it, is that it would give the DUP a veto: it would not be representative of Irish opinion in Northern Ireland as a whole.
Fourthly, is this a take it or leave it offer or not? I hope that the Minister will enlighten us, because if it is take it or leave it, it does not fill me with optimism. Therefore, let us not be under illusions: under this Government we are heading for no deal. And let us not kid ourselves that the deal they would actually seek if they avoided no deal would be that much better, because their firm intention is that Britain will leave both the single market and a customs union at the end of the withdrawal agreement’s transition period. We may avoid chaos in December, but 14 months later we would have the certainty of no frictionless border with the EU, a self-imposed calamity for all our manufacturing industries with integrated supply chains, and potentially significant disruption to our present competitive position in services.
The Government may say that that is nonsense, and that by then they will have negotiated the most wonderful Canada-style free trade agreement with the EU. Let us be clear: they will not have done. That is not just because of the shortage of time. There has been, again under Mr Johnson, a very significant change of government policy. Boris Johnson wants Britain to be a competitor with the EU, not to converge with the EU’s standards. He wants to junk EU regulations; he wants to remove EU protections; he wants to slash taxes. Can he be serious on this point? How can our EU neighbours offer us preferential access to their markets if our policy is to create a deregulated tax haven across the channel, 20 miles away? It is not going to happen, and we will suffer a great deal as a result. So I fear that we are in a very difficult situation on Brexit.
I will end with a word about democracy. A general election, which the Conservatives want, could result in a majority in Parliament for no deal—but that could be won, under our first-past-the-post system, on 33%, 34% or 35% of the vote. For me, and for many others in this Chamber, that would have absolutely no legitimacy. The only democratically legitimate solution to the problem that we have is a referendum. If we want to avoid a constitutional crisis, that is where we should now go.