Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Bill

Committee (2nd Day) (Continued)

Amendment 59

59: Clause 16, page 10, line 18, after “care” insert “, humanitarian support” Member's explanatory statement This amendment is intended to probe whether provision of humanitarian support constitutes a “reasonable excuse” as a defence to the offence in this clause.

In moving this amendment, I will speak also to Amendment 60. This clause, again, is about collecting information and reasonable excuses.

Clause 16(8) provides a non-exhaustive list of reasonable excuses. Our amendment is probing. We would like to see as many good reasons as are likely—I emphasise good reasons—in the legislation, rather than on each occasion being assessed by, in the first instance, someone fairly junior. In Clause 16(8), there is provision for an action or possession being for the purpose of

“providing, or preparing for the provision of, medical care or emergency shelter or supplies”.

Our amendment would insert “humanitarian support”. It seems that there is no difference between us as to the importance of promoting human welfare, so referring to it in the Bill follows from that.

I have been prompted having heard of so many refugees—I do not know whether this is a good example of a humanitarian matter or not—being keen to progress their education, or to work in a profession or another activity for which they have qualifications, but not when they get here being able to prove what qualifications they have. Bringing a document showing those qualifications would not be for the purposes of a “relevant journey”, but it is not irrelevant either to an asylum seeker for his or her future life. As I say, this is a probing amendment.

Amendment 60 concerns a matter raised by the organisation Justice and would except from the offences a person carrying out a legal activity, as defined—in other words, providing legal services. Perhaps I should declare—there have been a lot of declarations this afternoon and evening—that I was a solicitor, but that feels like a million years ago, so it is not personal. Everyone involved in the Bill will be aware of the shortage of good lawyers working in this field and available to undertake work on a legal aid basis or through a charity. The Bill is drafted widely, so it does not necessarily preclude the defence that it is for legal services, but I do not think that would be a huge encouragement to lawyers who might be worried about exposing themselves to a charge.

Lawyers, as a breed, are not always popular and are not always, in this field, trusted by the Government of the day, because the work almost inevitably means challenging the Government. If we are not further to risk access to justice, which is already an issue, we should not add further deterrents to legal practice in the asylum and refugee field. So the amendment proposes a specific exemption from prosecution.

My Lords, there are only two amendments in this group, both of which are from my colleague and noble friend Lady Hamwee. They both probe whether providing humanitarian support and legal services is a reasonable excuse in the offence in Clause 16:

“Collecting information for use in immigration crime”.

While we welcome the inclusion of the defence of “reasonable excuse” in Clause 16 and the inclusion of those examples already contained in the Bill, we consider there to be a notable and concerning omission, namely an exception for those providing legitimate legal advice and preparing legitimate legal claims.

Given that I have just received an email from those representing lawyers stating that the Ministry of Justice has increased the amount of pay that it is giving for immigration lawyers—it is not sufficient, I am told by the lawyers’ association, but there is nothing surprising about that—it would be very strange indeed if they were to be subject to any danger from providing that legitimate advice. Because those who represent asylum seekers in the UK provide legal advice about their rights and publicise their work, they should be confident that they will not be caught by one of the offences, given the wide drafting of the Bill. Although the Bill does not necessarily preclude a defence for such individuals, in our view, they should be specifically exempt from prosecution, otherwise those providing legal services to vulnerable individuals will be left in an uncertain position, which, in turn, will create an unjustified risk to access to justice and the rule of law.

My Lords, I am afraid that I will again speak against the amendments in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee. I recognise that both these amendments are probing amendments, but I suggest they are unnecessary. Clause 16 already provides a robust and comprehensive defence of reasonable excuse for those charged with the offence and collecting information for use in immigration crime. Subsection 8(b)(v) explicitly references those preparing to provide medical care or emergency shelter or supplies. In plain terms, that is humanitarian assistance.

Indeed, subsection 8(c) goes further by protecting those acting on behalf of bona fide organisations assisting asylum seekers. So it is our view that humanitarian activity is not only covered but it is expressly protected in the text. Therefore, to insert an additional, open-ended reference to humanitarian support simply risks introducing ambiguity to a legal provision, which already strikes a careful balance between protecting genuine humanitarian actors while still enabling the prosecution of those who aid illegal immigration. It is vital that the law is clear and enforceable and it is our view that the clause already offers wide and meaningful protection to doctors, volunteers, NGOs and others engaged in humanitarian work.

On Amendment 60, again in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, I completely understand the desire to ensure that legal professionals are not inadvertently caught up in Clause 16, but I disagree with the amendment as it stands. It seeks to add a new limb to the reasonable excuse defence, namely that a person was carrying out a legal activity as defined by the Legal Services Act. It is arguable that that protection already exists in the clause as drafted; it is a flexible and general defence in terms of reasonable excuse, and subsection (8) sets out several examples of what that defence might include: journalism, academic research, rescue efforts et cetera, but crucially also those acting on behalf of legitimate asylum support organisations. I respectfully say that this is a deliberately broad and protective provision. It gives courts ample discretion to protect those acting lawfully, including legal professionals who are working to assist asylum seekers.

My Lords, I am tempted to just say “I agree”, but it is important that we put some points on the record.

I thank the noble Baroness for her amendments. Amendment 59 seeks to include an explicit carve-out in the clause to list humanitarian support as a reasonable excuse. The list of reasonable excuses is already quite wide and includes specific exemptions for those undertaking or preparing to undertake the rescue of individuals from danger or serious harm, as well as for those acting on behalf of organisations that provide assistance to asylum seekers and do not charge for their services. I put to the noble Baroness that the list of reasonable excuses in this clause is non-exhaustive, and the provisions ensure that legitimate humanitarian activity is not captured by the offence. I hope that with that assurance, she will withdraw Amendment 59 accordingly.

Amendment 60, again to Clause 16, also provides a list of very reasonable excuses where a person acts for a purpose that is reasonable in the circumstances. That list is non-exhaustive and the wording is intentionally broad to allow courts to assess on the facts of each case whether an individual’s conduct falls within the scope of legitimate activity, including carrying out legal work. In practice, as previously mentioned, law enforcement agencies exercise investigatory discretion when assessing the circumstances of any case, and the prosecution will apply the public interest test when considering charges. That means that individuals acting within the scope of their legal role will not be targeted for prosecution. I hope that gives the noble Baroness some reassurance on the points that she has raised in the amendment.

The clause as drafted provides robust protection for those acting lawfully while allowing law enforcement to focus its efforts—as I have said in every discussion we have had to date—on the groups facilitating illegal and dangerous crossings. I hope that is a reassurance to the noble Baroness and she will not press the amendment, but essentially these are areas where we think there is clarity. Therefore, I hope she will reflect on those points and withdraw the amendment.

My Lords, of course I recognise that the lists are not exhaustive. It seemed to me to be fairly helpful to use the term “humanitarian”—but there we are.

I am puzzled by the opposition to the reference to lawyers acting in the field. I wonder whether anybody in this Chamber who provides professional services would like to be dependent on discretion, on the public interest test, particularly when the specific provision in subsection (8)(c)(ii) is that the organisation

“does not charge for its services”.

The legal aid lawyers and others acting for asylum seekers and refugees do not get paid very much, and sometimes they are employed by charities that do not get paid directly for their services, although they raise funds to enable them to carry out those services.

This is not special pleading on the part of the legal profession. It is pleading on behalf of the recipients of legal services, in fact, because of the widespread concern that the relevant legal services are not easily accessed. There are far too many legal aid deserts and far too few people who are in a position to provide advice and representation in this field. I had better not say—I suppose I am about to—that it strikes me a little that “not invented here” is the response to this. That will not win me any friends, but I do not see a damage or a harm that would be caused by including an amendment on the lines of the second in this group.

I am clearly not going to pursue the matter tonight, but it is a concern if this is not accepted and if individuals are told they should just be dependent on discretion and the CPS’s good sense. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 59 withdrawn.

Amendments 60 to 62 not moved.

Clause 16 agreed.

Clause 17 agreed.

Clause 18: Endangering another during sea crossing to United Kingdom

Amendment 63

63: Clause 18, page 11, line 23, leave out “France, Belgium or the Netherlands” and insert “any other country”