Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Bill

Committee (6th Day) (Continued)

Debate on Amendment 184 resumed.

My Lords, I will continue where other noble Lords left off. In particular, I commend the words of the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, who gave a very perceptive analysis of the problems that the noble Baroness’s amendment revealed. As he said, the amendment is legally coherent, and I also note that it is well motivated.

I add only this. We have adhered to the convention since 1951 or thereabouts, and it has not been domesticated into our law, as the European Convention on Human Rights has been, through the Human Rights Act 1998. I recall, when I was on the Opposition Front Bench in the other place, when discussing the Human Rights Bill, as it then was, and the then Government’s proposals to domesticate that convention into our jurisdiction, that one of the points I made was that one could be entirely in favour of our membership of the European convention—and I remain in favour of it—without necessarily supporting bringing it within the British domestic legal system.

I say in relation to the 1951 convention that one could be entirely in favour of our remaining a member of it without introducing the problems that are caused when these international treaties become part of domestic law. I said in 1998 that by bringing the European convention into our law and permitting British courts to adjudicate on cases which had to do with disputes under the convention would introduce a dangerous political element into the deliberations of our courts. I do not think I was wrong to say that. The last 25 or 30 years or so have demonstrated that a number of highly political cases have found their way through the courts, both at the lower court level, but also right the way up to the Supreme Court. Whether that has been to the advantage of the litigants or to the development of justice policy and to the development of the law in this country is a matter of debate, but it has created inconveniences, and it has created clashes between Parliament and the courts, and that is not to be wished for.

I gently urge the noble Baroness, when she comes to consider the good sense of her amendment and whether to push it, that she might find it better to leave things as they are. We have adhered faithfully, I think it is fair to say, to the 1951 convention since we ratified it, and there have been immigration and asylum statutes passed by Governments of both parties—the Labour Party and the Conservative Party—since, which have not, in my view, been unfaithful to the convention, either in its spirit or its implementation. I leave it there. I urge her to think carefully about what the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, and others have said, and perhaps to allow the convention to exist as a convention and to allow Parliament, this Government and any future Government to make up its or their own mind about the way in which it should be implemented on the local stage.

My Lords, this is an interesting group with two distinct parts. I must confess that I am not immediately drawn to Amendments 184 and 185 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti. They would, in effect, incorporate the refugee convention into the domestic law of the UK, as identified by the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Garnier. I therefore cannot accept that, given the unhappy experience that we have had of the Human Rights Act and the unpredictable effect of incorporating an international convention into domestic law. I am not tempted to repeat that mistake. I therefore support the Government in their sensible and inevitable rejection of the amendments that the noble Baroness proposes.

I shall not be drawn into a broader conversation about the suitability of the refugee convention, as the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, and the noble Baroness, Lady Fox of Buckley, were. It is clearly an interesting and important debate, which builds on comments made by the noble Lord, Lord Macdonald, about whether, in principle, a well-founded fear of persecution is the correct test for the grant of asylum. These are important and justifiable discussions, but a debate on these amendments in Committee is not the place to have them.

All this takes me to the wording of my Amendment 203I. I invite Members of the Committee who have a copy of the amendment just to look at it for a moment. This amendment emulates the one laid by the noble Baroness in seeking to revise the provisions of earlier statutes. It would amend Section 31 of the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999 by inserting a new subsection (2). This would provide:

“For the purposes of subsection (1) a person is not to be taken to have come directly to the United Kingdom from a country in which their life or freedom were threatened as mentioned in that subsection if, in coming from such a country, they passed through or stopped in another country outside the United Kingdom where their life or freedom were not so threatened”.

My Lords, I apologise for not being here right at the beginning. I hope no one will object if I none the less intervene, as I was here for the previous discussion. I think I understand the motivation behind Amendment 184, in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti. It would not perhaps be regarded by her as necessary if it were not for the nibbling away at the refugee convention in recent years.

I must confess that I am not attracted by the solution of the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, which is to say that we will have a complete disconnect between being a party to the refugee convention—sort of parking it over there—and saying that in domestic law we can do whatever we like. Sorry, I do not wish to parody what he said, but he was basically saying that we will do our own thing in domestic law and Parliament will decide what we want to implement. I am not sure that that really honours being a party to the refugee convention.

I am not quite sure whether my legal analysis matches that of other contributors to this debate but, as I read it, the amendment of the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, does not seek incorporation in the way that the ECHR was incorporated through the Human Rights Act. It is a bit stronger than the assimilation that we have had, such as in the Conservatives’ 1993 immigration appeals Act, which absorbed some of the definitions and wording of the refugee convention. Perhaps some kind of rather British compromise is going on.

What has happened in recent years is that there has been an attempt to ignore aspects of the refugee convention. I am sure the noble Lord, Lord Murray, is more expert on the refugee convention than I am, but I cannot really follow his assertion that his Amendment 203I would restore the correct reading or interpretation of Article 31. I do not know where he gets that from. Article 31 is worded as it is; it says anyone “coming directly”. It does not incorporate any kind of wording like that in his amendment. It just says someone “coming directly”; it does not say that they have not come directly if they have passed through or stopped in another country. I have a vague recollection that there is case law that says if someone passes through rather quickly—there are probably other qualifications, but with no intention to stay and not staying several years somewhere—then that would be ignored. That would be de minimis and it could still be concluded that they had come “directly” to the UK. I do not think the definition of “directly” has to be absolutist. No doubt the noble Lord will correct me, but I do not understand where this assertion that he is restoring the correct interpretation of the refugee convention comes from.

The noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, has good intentions with Amendment 184. I can see that it is probably not going to gain a lot of traction with the Minister, but I think that she has been pushed towards this position because there is such undermining of our commitment to the refugee convention. Speaking personally—I do not know whether my Front Bench colleague, my noble friend Lord German, agrees with me because I am afraid I have not checked with him—I see considerable merit in the wording of Amendment 185 because it seems to me that it should be a broad defence to prosecution that someone comes under the terms of Article 31(1) of the refugee convention, yet what we have at the moment is a patchwork, and the noble Baroness well described it. Someone who comes with forged papers is treated in one way, and someone who comes with no papers is treated in a completely different way, and that seems to me to be an unsustainable position. I think a clean assertion without all these caveats and exceptions has considerable merit, but, again, I fear that the Minister might not be persuaded. I have a lot of time for the motivation and some of the wording of what the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, is trying to do. I think she would not have to mount this effort if it were not for the assaults that are taking place on the refugee convention.

My Lords, I am perhaps not as warm towards this amendment as the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, just was. It seems to me that it does give away its intention in the title,

“Primacy of the Refugee Convention”,

which fundamentally is an assault on whether we think Parliament has primacy in our view. Of course I will give way, although I have not got very far in my argument.

As a point of information, does the noble Lord realise that the title,

“Primacy of the Refugee Convention”

is directly adopted from the Conservative’s Asylum and Immigration Appeals Act 1993, as brought forward by the noble Lord, Lord Clarke of Nottingham, and implemented by the noble Lord, Lord Howard of Lympne?

I was not aware of that, but I am not sure it changes my argument. As we have just discovered by listening to the debates about Article 31 of the convention, part of the issue here is that the interpretation of the words is contested, as we heard from the points my noble friend Lord Murray set out when he talked about restoring what he feels is the original definition—indeed, that has already been done in the Nationality and Borders Act, which I think has about half-a-dozen interpretation sections interpreting parts of the convention—and from what the noble Baroness said when she disagreed that that was the original intention.

The whole point is that, if there are disputes about what the convention means, somebody has to decide what it means. It can be either be courts and judges or Parliament setting out what we think we have signed up to and being clear about that, and Parliament has done so in a number of cases. If you put this amendment into statute, it would effectively say that judges could assert that what Parliament said was not the interpretation of the convention and a judge would decide what to do.

The noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, said that she has been careful to word this amendment so that the court could not strike down primary legislation. If I may say so, I do not think that is a terribly good safeguard, because an enormous amount of our immigration legislation is not primary legislation but secondary legislation. All the Immigration Rules are secondary legislation made by Ministers using primary legislative powers, so unless there is something explicitly in the primary legislation which gives Ministers powers to make Immigration Rules that specifically forbids a court being able to do this, if this amendment were carried, a court could strike down our Immigration Rules.

That would in effect mean judges, not Ministers, making the decision. Of course those Immigration Rules are not just made by Ministers; Ministers draft them, but they are put before both Houses of Parliament and approved by Parliament. In the end, my contention is that, if you want to have an immigration system that carries the support of the public, decisions have to be made by people who are accountable to the public.

I thank the noble Lord for giving way a second time. My point is on not the big stuff around public opinion but the specific question of the danger of courts striking down the Immigration Rules. Does the noble Lord realise that the 1993 Act, which he said a moment ago does not really matter, is still in force; and that the provision I cited already prohibits the Immigration Rules breaching the refugee convention?

Parts of the Act are still in force, obviously, but, if what the noble Baroness says were true, there would be no need to have her amendment. The fact is that, if you say that the courts can decide that the convention—as they interpret it—can override legislation, that is damaging. The world is a very different place now from what it was in 1951 when the convention was adopted. You have to reflect that by democratically accountable Ministers and legislators making decisions about how we interpret it in the modern era; that is how you strengthen the principles underpinning it, but in a way that works in the modern world. If you do not do that, you will just have more people thinking that the whole thing is nonsense and that we should pull out of it. Actually, I do not think that we should pull out of it—it needs work and it needs to be amended, but we also need to interpret it correctly. My noble friend Lord Murray’s amendment, which sets out a definition that is relevant in the modern world around people who pass through a number of safe countries then choose to come to the UK, is sensible; it would, I think, have the support of a large number of people in the United Kingdom.

In the end, the decision on whether that is the correct interpretation of the convention should, in my humble opinion, be taken by Ministers and by Parliament. It should not be taken by judges being able to insert their interpretation of the 1951 convention, as it was drafted for a very different world, and how they think it should be interpreted now. That would be a retrograde step and would not do what the noble Baronesses, Lady Chakrabarti and Lady Ludford, are trying to do. I think that they are frustrated that the public do not support the provisions of the convention and they are being chipped away at, but what the noble Baroness is proposing, supported by the noble Baroness opposite, would actually make things worse, not better. If the public think that the asylum system is not under any democratic control and that decisions are taken by courts, not accountable people, the system will become less supported by the public—not more—and the whole thing will unravel. If you believe in an asylum system, which I do, and you want to strengthen it, you have to allow democratic institutions to reflect the world in which we now live, not the world in which the convention was drafted. If you do that and make it a convention that is able to be interpreted in the modern world, you strengthen it and make it more likely to succeed than doing the opposite.

Before the noble Lord sits down, I think that he is misrepresenting me, but I will not linger too long over that. I have absolutely nothing at all against, for instance, this Government wanting to go to Strasbourg to seek to change the wording of Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights —good luck with that—but it is also open to them to analyse, as I think they are doing, whether Article 8 on the importance of family considerations is being wrongly interpreted or implemented in British tribunals and courts. They are then completely able—I do not oppose this being done—to issue guidance to the court on the analysis, interpretation and application of Article 8. I am sure that there are similar articles of the convention where that could be done.

What I think the noble Lord, Lord Murray, is doing in his amendment is rewriting the refugee convention, which is a different matter. I am not up for rewriting things, but I am perfectly prepared to see guidance issued to the courts if they are overly generous or wrong in their interpretation. I certainly want precision and integrity in the law; if the noble Lord is trying to imply that I do not, I reject that.

I had sat down but, given that the noble Baroness intervened on me, I will make a brief response since we have gone over the time—although that was largely to do with her rather than me.

I was not saying that the noble Baroness was in favour of imprecision; I was saying that it is about who decides what things mean. I think that Parliament should decide what they mean. It can keep the convention updated with the modern world, rather than courts doing that in a way that is not compatible with the views of the public. That is all I am saying; it would fundamentally strengthen the convention that we have signed up to and is likely to keep it in force for longer, with the support of the public. That is the thrust of my argument. I am content to leave it there.

Let me go briefly through my quick summing up of what I have heard.

It seems that there are those who wish to leave things as they are; those who wish to have a more relaxed regime in terms of getting further from the convention; and those, such as the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, who want to lock them together. We have just heard those three different positions but I have never heard, except from my noble friend Lady Ludford behind me, the view that what you can do is to seek to change, alter or amend while seeking definitions of “internationally”. After all, this is an international document that we signed up to. If we believe that we are on our own in this world and that there is nobody else who will support us in making any changes, then, surely to goodness, we are not going to be stuck in saying that everybody else is out of step except us. That is not an argument I can accept.

The crucial issue here is how we make the best use of the convention and of our laws with it together. Whether or not we change from the position where we are now to a more fundamental change, in wrapping the two together, is an issue that requires a lot of debate and discussion—and by wise heads who are in this area—but it seems that what we have is a suspicion, which I can hear from those on my right, that we need to slacken our application of the refugee convention. In the sense that we have not tried to seek accommodation with others who might feel the same way, that strikes me as an incorrect way of dealing with something that has been integral to our law and integral to the way in which we operate for such a long time.

My Lords, I am sorry not to get in before the noble Lord, and I am grateful for the tolerance of the House. I will be as brief as I can. I support Amendment 203I in the name of my noble friend Lord Murray. He has explained the reasons for his amendment, which seeks to restore the initial intention behind the refugee convention, on which Section 31 of the 1999 Act is based. This is an important amendment because as we have seen, even today, there is a lack of clarity on and a great deal of debate about the refugee convention, its status and its very meaning. I will touch on two of the problems I see, which my noble friend’s amendment would overcome.

The first is the problem of the convention itself. It does not oblige the refugees themselves to seek refuge in the first country; it is an agreement between states, and therefore it is for the states, not the individuals. That has given rise to a lot of the discussion we have heard about whether they have to make a claim in the first safe country. The second problem is the guidance, updated by the Home Office on 27 June this year, which explains the inadmissibility rules in respect of safe third countries and where asylum should be claimed if asylum has been claimed, should be claimed or could reasonably have been expected to be claimed,

“(or, for claims made before 28 June 2022, where exceptional circumstances didn’t prevent such a claim), provided there is a reasonable prospect of removing”

the claimant—which I understand is to reflect the case law. Therefore, we have all kinds of obstacles and not very much agreement on the problem.

I recognise how far the Government have gone to tackle the problems of historically high levels of not only immigration but asylum claims, and the small boat arrivals pose a particular problem, with people crossing the channel from the French coast, having travelled through France and probably a number of other safe countries in the EU, as has been stated. We paid France £476 million to deal with this problem and try to control their coastal departures but, sadly, it has not worked. This year we added the one-in, one-out agreement, but so far that has not paid many dividends: as of last Thursday, we have seen 26 people sent to France and nine people come in from France, which is a drop in the ocean of the 32,000 recorded in September.

My Lords, this group is certainly a tale of two halves. We on these Benches are unable to support the first two amendments. The United Kingdom’s problems with the current migration crisis stem not necessarily from the refugee convention itself. Rather, the problems lie with the metaphorical scaffolding which has been built around the convention. First, the Government are unable to carry out the will of the British people and turn away those who arrive here unlawfully. To all intents and purposes, the convention already has primacy in United Kingdom law. Those who qualify as asylum seekers have their subsistence paid for by the British state. They have an army of lawyers to hand.

Secondly, the problem lies with processing. Because this Government have continued to expand the incentives for people to come here, asylum processing remains severely backlogged. Removing legal safeguards against illegal migration will only make this problem worse. We already know the impact the Human Rights Act is having on our ability to control our borders and end this crisis. We will debate that Act further in a later group, so I will not go further now. Suffice to say that further incorporating treaties and conventions into domestic law is not the right way to reduce crossings by small boat.

Amendment 185 is another attempt to promote a world view divorced from reality. It is a measure that would allow people claiming to be asylum seekers to face no penalty for illegally entering this country regardless of the country they directly came from. It would open the door to even wider and more egregious exploitation of our already generous system. Let us consider what the effects of this amendment would mean. Asylum seekers, having arrived in France or a similarly safe third country, would have no disincentive to make the dangerous crossing over the channel. Not only would they be enticed by free board and lodging which we provide, alongside many other amenities on offer, but they would face no recourse to justice should they be forging their identity or embellishing their story.