106: After Clause 38, insert the following new Clause—
“Unaccompanied children and power to provide for exceptions(1) The duty in section (Duty to make arrangements for removal)(1) does not require the Secretary of State to make arrangements for the removal of a person from the United Kingdom at a time when the person is an unaccompanied child.(2) The Secretary of State may make arrangements for the removal of a person from the United Kingdom at a time when the person is an unaccompanied child.(3) The power in subsection (2) may be exercised only—(a) where the person is to be removed for the purposes of reunion with the person’s parent;(b) where the person is to be removed to a country listed in section 80AA(1) of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 (safe States for the purposes of section 80A of that Act) which is—(i) a country of which the person is a national, or(ii) a country in which the person has obtained a passport or other document of identity;(c) where the person has not made a protection claim or a human rights claim and the person is to be removed to—(i) a country of which the person is a national,(ii) a country or territory in which the person has obtained a passport or other document of identity, or(iii) a country or territory in which the person embarked for the United Kingdom;(d) in such other circumstances as may be specified in regulations made by the Secretary of State.(4) Regulations under subsection (3)(d) may confer a discretion on the Secretary of State.(5) For the purposes of this section a person (“C”) is an “unaccompanied child” if—(a) C meets the four conditions in section (Duty to make arrangements for removal),(b) C is under the age of 18, and(c) at the relevant time no individual (whether or not a parent of C) who was aged 18 or over had care of C.(6) In subsection (5) “the relevant time” means the time of C’s entry or arrival in the United Kingdom by virtue of which the duty in section (Duty to make arrangements for removal)(1) would apply in relation to C apart from this section.(7) The Secretary of State may by regulations make provision for other exceptions from the duty in section (Duty to make arrangements for removal)(1). (8) Regulations under subsection (7) may make provision—(a) for this Act or any other enactment to have effect with modifications, in relation to a person to whom an exception applies, in consequence of the application of the exception to that person;(b) for an exception, or for any provision made by virtue of paragraph (a), to be treated as having had effect from a time before the coming into force of the regulations.(9) Regulations made by virtue of subsection (8)(a) may, in particular, disapply any provision of this Act or any other enactment in relation to a person to whom an exception applies.(10) In subsections (8) and (9) “enactment” includes—(a) an enactment contained in subordinate legislation within the meaning of the Interpretation Act 1978;(b) an enactment contained in, or in an instrument made under, an Act of the Scottish Parliament;(c) an enactment contained in, or in an instrument made under, a Measure or Act of Senedd Cymru;(d) an enactment contained in, or in an instrument made under, Northern Ireland legislation.(11) A statutory instrument containing regulations under subsection (7) must be laid before Parliament after being made.(12) Regulations contained in a statutory instrument laid before Parliament under subsection (11) cease to have effect at the end of the period of 28 days beginning with the day on which the instrument is made unless, during that period, the instrument is approved by a resolution of each House of Parliament.(13) In calculating the period of 28 days, no account is to be taken of any whole days that fall within a period during which—(a) Parliament is dissolved or prorogued, or(b) either House of Parliament is adjourned for more than four days.(14) If regulations cease to have effect as a result of subsection (12) that does not—(a) affect the validity of anything previously done under the regulations, or(b) prevent the making of new regulations.(15) In this section—“human rights claim” has the meaning given by section 113(1) of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002;“national” includes citizen;“protection claim” has the meaning given by section 82(2) of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002.”
My Lords, I will also speak to Amendments 107, 108 and 111 standing in my name. They are all linked to the amendments in the previous group and once again are aimed at understanding exactly why the Government are repealing each of these clauses.
First and foremost, Amendment 106 rightly acknowledges the unique vulnerability of unaccompanied children. Unlike adults, these children do not have the benefit of parental guidance, support or protection, which fundamentally changes the context in which any immigration or removal decision should be made. The exemption from removal under proposed new subsection (1) reflects the humane principle that children, especially those who arrive without guardians, require special consideration. At the same time, the amendment incorporates a balanced discretion for the Secretary of State to make exceptions, but, crucially, only in narrowly defined and principled circumstances. This discretion is limited to cases of family reunion or removal to a safe state to which the child has a clear connection, such as nationality or passport holding. This would ensure that the state maintains the ability to act in the best interests of the child and public policy without resorting to indiscriminate removals.
Amendment 107 would bring much-needed clarity and accountability to the handling of European Court of Human Rights interim measures, in relation to the duty to remove under Amendment 105. Interim measures, often issued to prevent irreparable harm while a full hearing is pending, are a critical tool in safeguarding human rights. However, this amendment rightly recognises that these measures must be balanced with national sovereignty and the Government’s responsibility to manage immigration effectively. First, the amendment would establish that the decision to give effect to a European Court of Human Rights interim measure is the discretionary personal responsibility of a Minister of the Crown. This personal involvement emphasises the gravity of the decision, ensuring that it is not delegated lightly or handled bureaucratically. Such a provision would enhance political accountability, requiring Ministers to engage directly with complex legal and humanitarian issues rather than allowing automatic suspension of removal without sovereign consideration.
My Lords, I know that the Government vigorously opposed the Rwanda Bill, and indeed the Prime Minister described it as a gimmick, or words to that effect. I understand that that is the Government’s position, and I do not expect them to change their mind. But the point worth making is that, although the Rwanda scheme as a whole may not have found favour with the Government, it does not follow that some of the provisions in that Act are not appropriate to whatever policy the Government ultimately may think is appropriate. I know that this is something of a moving picture, as the Minister acknowledged.
I will not repeat what I said in the wrong group in relation to Amendment 107, but I place particular emphasis on that amendment because that issue was a pretty obvious excess of jurisdiction on the part of the European Court of Human Rights. This Government, whatever the final form their policy takes in statutory terms, may find that they have an interim ruling from the European Court of Human Rights that offends natural justice. The fact that—as the noble Lord, Lord Davies, quite rightly said—it needs a Minister before a decision is taken to reject it is an important safeguard. It is not a question of casting it aside and ignoring it; it is considered at an appropriate level, having regard to the unsatisfactory nature of the interim order that the court made under Rule 39. It is important that that provision should be inserted, whatever form the policy takes.
I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Davies, supported by the noble Lord, Lord Cameron of Lochiel, for the amendment. As I have said previously, the Government are trying to ensure that we have a properly functioning immigration system. The Illegal Migration Act 2023 included provisions that, in my view, prevented asylum decision-making, increased the backlog of asylum cases awaiting an outcome and put impossible pressure on asylum accommodation, with significant costs to the taxpayer, which we have discussed on other groups.
The Act has largely not been commenced, and it is this Government’s policy—I confirm this to the noble Lord, Lord Faulks—that we will not commence the Act, as we have accordingly stated in our manifesto and elsewhere. Therefore, Clause 38 repeals the majority of the measures contained in the Illegal Migration Act 2023, including Section 2 on the duty to remove and associated provisions. However, it is not a blanket approach to repealing the Act. The six measures that the Government intend to retain include provisions that are in force and that have been identified as having operational utility and benefit. The Government see all these powers as important tools to allow for the proper operation of the immigration system and to achieve our wider priorities, along with the other measures that we brought forward.
Amendment 106 seeks to retain Section 4 of the Illegal Migration Act. I believe this measure to be unnecessary. The new clause would, for example, preserve the power to remove unaccompanied children under 18 in specific circumstances when the duty to remove applies.
Section 55, which the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, referred to and which Amendment 107 seeks to retain, would provide for a Minister of the Crown to disregard an interim measure of the European Court of Human Rights where the duty to remove applies. I have heard what the noble Lord said. We have made a judgment that we do not need that provision, and therefore this is part of our proposals on the repeal of the Act.
My Lords, I am not sure that the noble Lord has explained fully why the Government are removing these sections of the Illegal Migration Act and why they oppose these amendments. The first amendment sought to protect unaccompanied children from automatic removal, while allowing for carefully defined exceptions. The second amendment aimed to clarify ministerial discretion when it comes to interim measures from the European Court of Human Rights—a safeguard that balances human rights considerations with the practicalities of border control. The third amendment addressed the worrying practice of disregarding outright certain protections, human-rights trafficking claims and judicial review applications—something that risks undermining access to justice. The fourth amendment ensured the coherence of asylum support provisions in cases where claims are declared inadmissible, preventing gaps and confusion around entitlement to state assistance. I make it clear that these concerns remain very much alive with us and may well be brought forward again in the future. But for now I beg to withdraw my amendment.
110: After Clause 38, insert the following new Clause—
“Powers to amend Schedule (Countries and territories to which a person may be removed)(1) The Secretary of State may by regulations amend Schedule (Countries and territories to which a person may be removed) to add a country or territory, or part of a country or territory, if satisfied that there is in general in that country or territory, or part, no serious risk of persecution.(2) If the Secretary of State is satisfied that the statement in subsection (1) is true of a country or territory, or part of a country or territory, in relation to a description of person, regulations under subsection (1) may add the country or territory or part to Schedule (Countries and territories to which a person may be removed) in respect of that description of person.(3) A description for the purposes of subsection (2) may refer to—(a) sex,(b) language,(c) race, (d) religion,(e) nationality,(f) membership of a social or other group,(g) political opinion, or(h) any other attribute or circumstance that the Secretary of State thinks appropriate.(4) In deciding whether the statement in subsection (1) is true of a country or territory, or part of a country or territory, the Secretary of State—(a) must have regard to all the circumstances of the country or territory, or part (including its laws and how they are applied), and(b) must have regard to information from any appropriate source (including member States and international organisations).(5) The Secretary of State may by regulations amend Schedule (Countries and territories to which a person may be removed) to omit a country or territory, or part of a country or territory, and the omission may—(a) be general, or(b) have the effect that the country or territory, or part, remains listed in Schedule (Countries and territories to which a person may be removed) in respect of a description of person.”
My Lords, the amendments in this group seek to understand why the Government have decided to remove key parts of the legal architecture that we say provided a robust legal framework for dealing with this issue. Amendment 110 seeks to reintroduce an essential power from the Illegal Migration Act which enables the Secretary of State to update, through regulation, the list of countries to which individuals can be safely removed. These are countries that meet the test of presenting no serious risk of persecution in general. I repeat the point that I made earlier: the test is “in general”. The provisions in the amendment allow that list to evolve with circumstance, reflecting real-world developments, legal reforms and international assessments.
The capacity to have that list is a crucial part of the architecture of deterrence, because the only way we will stop people risking their lives to come here illegally is if they know with certainty that doing so will not result in a permanent right to stay. That means that swift and lawful removals to safe third countries must be a central pillar of our strategy. To achieve that, we need a legal framework that enables such removals to happen. That is what this clause does; it gives the Government flexibility to respond to changing global conditions and build bilateral or multilateral returns agreements on a lawful, transparent and evidence-based footing. Without that power, our capacity to remove inadmissible claimants is drastically reduced.
It is not about denying protection to the vulnerable. Proposed new subsection (4) rightly requires the Secretary of State to have regard to the legal, social and political context of any country before designating it as safe. It allows for targeted assessments—for example, recognising where certain groups might still face harm, even if others do not. As I have suggested, this is a balanced, evidence-led provision which allows us to remove those with no right to stay, while also upholding our obligations to those who genuinely need refuge. Amendment 120 works in conference with Amendment 110 and sets out the list of safe third countries to which I have already referred. To conclude, we cannot reduce illegal migration by making it easy to stay. We reduce it by making it clear, through law and through action, that illegal entry will not be rewarded. We hope the Government can set out why they have now abandoned that strategy.
My Lords, I return to something I said in the earlier groups of amendments. The country that is at the heart of so much of this debate and previous debates is Rwanda. The noble Lord, Lord Cameron, has introduced his amendments with customary coherence but, ultimately, I do not think he has thought through some of the countries he is talking about. He certainly has not responded to the points that were made earlier about Rwanda.
It is not just about Rwanda. The problem is that this is about generalities, and we are required by the obligations that we have entered into to get down to specifics. I shall give one illustration of what I mean by that from another example in this long list in Amendment 120—that is, the country of Nigeria. The Joint Committee on Human Rights report, referred to in earlier proceedings on this Bill, quotes the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees as saying that,
“while designation of safe countries may be used as a procedural tool to prioritise or accelerate the examination of applications in carefully circumscribed situations”,
which is really what the noble Lord, Lord Cameron, was saying to us, and I do not think that there is conflict about that,
“it does not displace the requirement for an individualised assessment of an asylum claim”.
The UNHCR notes that the risk of refoulement in the absence of individualised assessments is unacceptable. I refer the noble Lord, if I may, as well as the Minister when he comes to respond, to paragraph 122 of the Joint Committee on Human Rights report that deals with that.
The JCHR concluded that it shared the concerns of its predecessor committee—because this is not a new issue; it has been around for predecessor committees. I look at the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, because she and I seem to have gone around this course many times over the past few years. It said:
It is an honour to follow the noble Lord, Lord Alton, and his detailed introduction to Amendment 120. I will start there and then very briefly go back to Amendment 110. I will not repeat what I said earlier or what he has just said.
I have checked every single country on the list where it says, in brackets, “in respect of men”. All of them have similar approaches to gay men in particular, as the noble Lord described. There are a number of European countries that are now doing that, including Hungary and Slovakia. When I was last in Bratislava, we went to place some flowers where a friend of a local had witnessed her two colleagues being shot as they went into a bar. It includes Moldova and a number of other countries which are becoming extremely intolerant.
Going back to Amendment 110, the detailed descriptions in proposed new subsection (3) which start with sex, language and race are helpful, but they are exclusive. They exclude key protected characteristics which we and our courts recognise in this country. Can the Official Opposition say whether there is a particular reason for doing that? For example, the protected characteristic is “religion or belief”, not just religion. There is gender reassignment, sexual orientation and pregnancy and maternity, which is extremely important for not just adult women but young girls, who may be returning to a place where young girls are traded for marriage and pregnancy. The last remaining two are age and—I am sorry to say I do not find this here—disability.
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I hope that, should the Official Opposition bring this back on Report, this will be remedied. If the courts here say that these are special reasons why somebody might face a particular problem in their life, I would find it astonishing if we ignored them and sent people back, particularly when we know there are problems in some of the countries on the list in Amendment 120.
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Furthermore, by restricting the obligation of immigration officials, courts and tribunals to give effect to the interim measure where a Minister has chosen not to recognise it, the amendment would prevent conflicting mandates within the system. This avoids a confusing legal limbo where different authorities might take contradictory positions regarding removal actions that undermine coherence and efficiency in immigration enforcement. This provision strikes a pragmatic balance between respecting international human rights obligations and preserving the Government’s capacity to maintain effective border control. It avoids rigid, automatic enforcement of interim measures that could paralyse immigration functions while still providing a structured framework to engage with the European court’s decisions.
Amendment 108 is a crucial step towards ensuring the duty in Amendment 105 is not needlessly hobbled, and that anyone who enters illegally is removed no matter who they are. It would tackle head-on abuse of asylum and human rights claims, a process that can delay removals and undermine the integrity of the immigration system. The amendment would make it clear that, for individuals meeting the statutory conditions for removal, any protection claim, human rights claim, trafficking or slavery victim claim or application for judicial review cannot be used to delay or frustrate the removal process.
This is vital. Currently, the system is frequently exploited through repeated and sometimes frivolous claims, causing prolonged uncertainty, administrative backlog and resource drain on the Home Office and courts. Declaring claims inadmissible at the outset when conditions for removal are met would significantly reduce abuse. It sends a strong message that these legal routes are not loopholes for indefinite delay. This also enables faster removal decisions, preserving our ability to control our borders effectively.
We have also included a judicial ouster clause in this amendment to prevent courts from setting aside inadmissibility declarations, promoting legal certainty and finality in removal proceedings. This avoids protracted litigation and vexatious legal challenges, which often tie up judicial resources without improving outcomes for genuine claimants.
Finally, Amendment 111 addresses the question of what support, if any, is available to individuals whose asylum or related claims are declared inadmissible under these amendments. By amending the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999 and related legislation, the proposed clause ensures that the withdrawal or withholding of support aligns consistently with the inadmissibility framework. This is essential for legal clarity and operational coherence. Without these amendments, there would be a disconnect between the removal of rights to remain and the removal of support, potentially creating gaps or confusion in how support is administered. The amendment ensures that, when a person’s claim is declared inadmissible under the new rules, the support framework adjusts accordingly, reflecting that the individual is no longer entitled to certain forms of state assistance. It also protects the integrity of the asylum support system by preventing those whose claims do not meet the admissibility criteria from accessing support intended for genuine asylum seekers. I beg to move.
Section 5 of the Illegal Migration Act, which Amendment 108 seeks to retain, would have meant that an asylum claim and/or human rights claim would be declared inadmissible and would not have been substantively considered in the UK where the person had entered or arrived illegally and had not come directly from a country in which their life or liberty were threatened. It would also have meant that an asylum claim and/or human rights claim would have been declared inadmissible if the person was from a country of origin considered generally safe.
Section 9 of the Illegal Migration Act, which Amendment 111 seeks to retain, would ensure that individuals whose claims are disregarded as a result of being subject to the duty to remove and disregard of certain claims provisions—these are a result of amendments we have considered earlier, such as Amendment 105, and now Amendments 108 and 109—are entitled to support only under Section 4 of the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999. This would align their entitlement to support to others declared inadmissible under Sections 80A or 80B of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002, akin to that of failed asylum seekers. This clause is also unnecessary.
The sections included in this group of amendments were designed to operate alongside Section 2 of the IMA Act, which imposed the duty to remove. As we are now repealing Section 2, this group of amendments has no legal or practical effect. Leaving them in place would simply create confusion. Repealing these sections is a necessary step to ensure the law reflects the Government’s policy direction and avoids ambiguity. Again, I appreciate the comments from the noble Lord, Lord Faulkes, and the Front Bench, but, on the basis of the comments I have made, I invite the noble Lord, Lord Davies, to withdraw his amendment.
“We share the concerns of our predecessor Committee that, whilst the states listed may be considered safe in general, this does not guarantee the safety of all individuals from these states, especially those who are members of particular social groups facing persecution. It must be possible for such individuals who face a real risk of persecution upon return to make a protection or human rights claim which must be considered on its merits in order to guard against the risk of refoulement. If the Government chooses to bring section 59 of the Illegal Migration Act into force, it should, at the very least, periodically review the list of safe states, with a particular consideration of the rights of minority groups”.
Again, the noble Lord, Lord Cameron, accepted that there would be regular review, but I would like him to respond further, when he comes to reply to the group of amendments, on how he looks at the position of minority groups in some of these countries. These are not just groups that are defined by issues such as ethnicity, religion, gender or orientation: it is also about what happens inside particular countries. A country such as Nigeria may be safe, and that is the example that I shall turn to in a moment, if you are in Lagos or Abuja, but it is not necessarily safe in Benue state or northern Nigeria—depending, again, on aspects of your background. How will that be dealt with in a list of this kind?
I have a dislike of these kinds of lists anyway, as a principle. I do not know that they help matters. We should look at every single case and country on the merits of the arguments. These are things that we should keep abreast of without having to draw up lists. I shall give a specific example of the dangers of this one-size-fits-all approach in what can be variable conditions, depending on many issues—everything from minority ethnicity or religion to gender or orientation. It is an issue that I raised in the debates on the Nationality and Borders Bill, when we were debating it on 8 February 2022, and again on Report on the Illegal Migration Bill, and I refer to Hansard of 5 July 2023.
I cited the case of Mubarak Bala, president of the Humanist Association of Nigeria, who was sentenced to 24 years in prison for so-called blasphemy committed on Facebook. Nigeria is one of 71 countries that criminalise blasphemy, and as long as those laws exist people will face persecution, prosecution and imprisonment. As I have said, some will even face the possibility of death and be pushed to find safe haven abroad. During those debates, I also raised the case of Usman Buda, a Muslim, who was murdered in Sokoto state in north-west Nigeria because it was alleged that he had blasphemed. I raised the case of the lynching of Deborah Emmanuel, a Christian, at Shehu Shagari College of Education, again following an unsubstantiated accusation of blasphemy.
Last year, I raised the plight in your Lordships’ House of Nigerian Christians in the northern and middle belt states and pointed out that some 82% of Christians killed for their faith in the previous year were in Nigeria—4,998 Christians were slaughtered, with 200 murdered during the Christmas services in 2023. The highly respected voluntary organisation and charity Open Doors reports that
“Christians in Nigeria continue to be terrorised with devastating impunity”
with
“abductions for ransom, sexual violence and death … leaving a trail of grief and trauma”.
I met Dominic and Margaret Attah, who were survivors of the Boko Haram Pentecost attack at St Francis Xavier Church in Owo, where 30 were murdered. Margaret’s legs had been blown off. She wanted to know why nobody had been brought to justice. I asked the then Minister, who told me in reply:
“We continue to call for those who committed this attack to be brought to justice and held to account”.
Needless to say, they have not been brought to account. Nor have the abductors of Leah Sharibu, who was abducted on 19 February 2018 by ISIS West Africa from the Government Girls Science and Technology College in Dapchi, Yobe State. Leah was told to convert; she refused, and was raped, impregnated and enslaved. She is still held captive. I promised her mother, Rebecca, who I showed around your Lordships’ House, that I would lose no opportunity to raise her case. I have done so on a number of occasions with Ministers.
When I see that this country is safe, according to the amendment, to send men back to, I wonder what will happen to these men if they come from a particular religious group or one that holds a set of views that are unacceptable, or a group that is defined by their sexual orientation. The Government’s travel advice contradicts the presumption that it is safe, particularly for gay men:
“Same-sex sexual activity is illegal in Nigeria with penalties of up to 14 years in prison. Some northern states observe Sharia Law which can prescribe the death penalty for same-sex sexual activity … Same-sex relationships are generally viewed as socially unacceptable in Nigerian society. There is an increased risk of violence, attacks and threats, such as blackmail and intimidation against anyone being thought to be part of the LGBT+ community or supporting their rights”.
This advice is based on facts, not wishful thinking that adding Nigeria to this list will somehow make it a safe country. We have got to follow facts and evidence. Similarly, atheists face significant risks, including discrimination, marginalisation, ostracism, violence and, as I said, potentially death, particularly in the northern states. No differentiation is made in this list between different parts of the country. No distinction is made according to people’s minority status. It demonstrates the dangers of drawing up lists of this kind. I plead with the Official Opposition to give this further thought before we are perhaps asked to vote on this on Report, which I hope we will not be.