Border Carbon Adjustment Tariffs and Decarbonisation

Border carbon adjustment can transform that process: charge imports from a high-carbon economy the same carbon cost as we impose on our domestic industry via a BCA, and the problem is solved. There would be no incentive for our manufacturers to base production abroad, since the costs would be equalised. Foreign companies would no longer have an unfair trade advantage. In fact, it would provide them with a direct incentive to reduce carbon usage in their domestic environment to avoid corrective tariffs. From a policy perspective—I am using China as an example—the Chinese Government would have a choice: either their exports pay a carbon price at our border and the money goes to our Exchequer; or they create a carbon price in their domestic market and they get to keep the money themselves. There is, therefore, a really positive incentive internationally for carbon reduction and the benefits to be spread. After all, climate change knows no borders. Better still, using the same calculation for border carbon adjustment but this time in reverse, our own factories would get the benefit of a carbon cost rebate at the border when they export, making their exports both cheaper and more profitable, increasing our competitiveness already on the international market.

There are many ways in which you can skin this particular cat, Madam Deputy Speaker. We can either design a system whereby all products coming in or out of the United Kingdom have their carbon contribution assessed, or, if that is considered to be too complex, we can take baby steps. We can start off by applying a BCA to the five or six most carbon-intensive industries and then take it from there. We would start with steel, fertiliser, petrochemicals, aluminium and energy. I will take two examples from that list by way of explanation.

First, an independent research project has been undertaken to assess the impact of a border adjustment tariff on the steel industry. It concluded that were we to implement a BCA in the United Kingdom, it would increase the competitiveness of UK steel against many of its international competitors, at the same time as raising for the Treasury a tax windfall of between £270 million and £850 million if that carbon price was set at between £50 and £75 per tonne.

What single better way is there to forward this Government’s levelling-up agenda than by putting in place the economic conditions for the market to want to reindustrialise in the UK, and all that with no need for Government subsidies. In fact, not only does it not require Government subsidies, but it will actually produce an annual windfall for the Treasury year after year. Working out how big that windfall might be has a number of imponderables in it, but the Grantham Research Institute of Climate Change and the Environment has produced a report on this, and, again, using the assessment of a carbon price between £50 and £75 a tonne, starting in 2020 and working up towards 2030, it assessed that the gross amount that the Treasury could recover under this process would max out at £36.7 billion a year. I stress that that is the gross amount. Members may well take the view that, rather like VAT, this is a tax that is consumer based and would impact poorer households disproportionately as a percentage of their gross income. The Government might very well want to use some of that £36.7 billion to cushion the blow and to make it more acceptable for lower-income families, perhaps by investing in insulation for their houses or other measures.

What is stopping us from delivering on the Prime Minister’s vision of a low-carbon, dynamic economy? Some worry about a protectionism challenge at the World Trade Organisation, but with a BCA applied in an open and transparent manner, nothing could be further from the truth. This policy is about removing unfair competition, not creating it. In any event, WTO rules expressly allow for tariffs whose purpose is to protect

“human, animal or plant life and health”

or

“to conserve exhaustible natural resources”.

Those are two exceptions tailor-made for this kind of tariff.

More practically, if the UK were to join the United States of America, our friends in the European Union and other countries to establish the principle of BCAs at COP26, that would be a game changer, because it would ensure their practical acceptance. Others worry that putting forward such an ambitious proposal at COP26 runs the risk of failing to achieve the consensus that would allow the PR men to claim a stunning success. It might, but the risk of failure is the price of ambition, so should we give up on our ambition? Of course not.

If my hon. Friend takes a broad view of this subject internationally, he will see that 2020 has seen far greater progress than any previous year. Only a couple of months ago the Chinese Government pledged to achieve a net zero carbon target in 2060, and that is incredibly significant. I remember when I was first appointed to this job, someone said to me that what we did in the United Kingdom would make no difference if China continued along its present path. I am pleased to say that China has changed its path and said very clearly that it has set a net zero target for 2060. The Japanese followed suit soon afterwards, adopting our target of 2050, as did the South Koreans. So the auspices for international co-operation on the measure that my hon. Friend has described are actually very good, and there is a chance that if we cannot reach an agreement at COP26 next November, we may well be advancing along the lines that he suggests in the not too distant future. I have to stress that multilateral co-operation on how we price carbon and how we account for carbon in the round is far more constructive than imposing a unilateral tax in the way that he has described.

One thing I would say about the figures that my hon. Friend very ably quoted in regard to the benefit to the Treasury is that there would obviously be behavioural impacts, so it would be difficult for me to model the consumer demand for products that had been taxed in the way that he has described. I would be interested to have a conversation with him about the assumptions behind the analysis to which he so ably referred in his excellent speech.