I beg to move,
That this House has considered re-procurement of adult community services by Bristol, North Somerset and South Gloucestershire Clinical Commissioning Group.
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Gapes. I am pleased that this important subject has been selected for debate. Although they cannot be present, my hon. Friends the Members for Bristol West (Thangam Debbonaire), for Bristol East (Kerry McCarthy) and for Bristol North West (Darren Jones) fully support my comments. This is an important issue for the people of Bristol South, and it is a local example of the debate on the legacy of the Health and Social Care Act 2012 and of the invidious position that local managers are being put in to understand the procurement rules.
Hon. Members know that I speak frequently about accountability and the opaque way in which many parts of the NHS operate. We seem to have lost sight of the fact that, however individual bodies are constituted, our health services are public services that are paid for by taxpayers—our constituents. I have also repeatedly said that if we keep asking people to pay more for our health services, they must have a greater say in the way that those services are run, particularly when they are being changed.
I have spoken before of my concern about the attitude of my local clinical commissioning group in Bristol, North Somerset and South Gloucestershire to the openness and transparency of its work, especially on the reprocurement of adult community services. The lengths to which the CCG, supported by NHS Improvement, has gone to hide, cover up and obfuscate are nothing short of a scandal. Most infuriatingly, the whole protracted cloak-and-dagger exercise has been entirely unnecessary, because a far less onerous and costly approach could have been used instead. The reprocurement is the wrong approach at the wrong time to developing community services, and runs counter to the direction of travel being set, in theory, by the new NHS 10-year plan.
Before I review the shortcomings of the reprocurement in greater detail, I will remind hon. Members why it matters. Away from the jargon, acronyms, terse letters and confidentiality agreements, thousands of people across Bristol, North Somerset and South Gloucestershire simply want to know what is happening to their local health services.
My constituent Clive got in touch just over a year ago to tell me about the great work being done at the Healthy Together leg clinic at the Withywood Centre, which provides intervention and treatment for the leg ulcers of patients in south Bristol. It is exactly the sort of joined-up, innovative and integrated community provision that Ministers tell us they want to see—a true partnership between Bristol Community Health, local GP practices and Age UK in Bristol, which come together across different sites to deliver gold-standard patient care that promotes faster and longer-lasting wound healing. The clinic also provides a social setting where patients feel more supported and are encouraged to feel more in control of their condition. There is time for people to care.
The service has transformed countless lives in my constituency and has been nominated for a national award. As I saw first hand when I visited the clinic earlier this month, it is an exemplar of the sort of collaborative provision that the new adult community services contract could and should expand on. Such collaboration takes years to yield results and very much responds to the local needs of the particular community.
The people who are providing the service, however, do not know for how long they will be able to continue, because the CCG will not tell them. The patients do not know for how long they will be able to access that life-changing service, because the CCG will not tell them. As the local MP, I cannot lobby, engage or reassure people, despite asking repeatedly for a peek behind the self-imposed reprocurement iron curtain, because—hon. Members will have guessed it—the CCG will not tell me.
Interestingly, another consequence of the process, which I do not have time to really go into, is the destabilising impact on the voluntary sector. Age UK will have to wait, cap in hand, to see which successful bidder secures the primary contract and how it then decides to sub-contract the provision. The same goes for all voluntary organisations involved in this sort of service provision. It would be bad enough if the Healthy Together clinic were a one-off —the only service caught up in a closed-shop procurement mess—but it is not. In truth, every adult community service is in the same position, which is simply not good enough.
Despite a year of making speeches in this place, asking questions of Ministers, doing time-consuming research and making countless phone calls to offices, neither the CCG locally nor NHS Improvement nationally will engage with me beyond continually asserting that they had no choice but to go down this route. That is a prime example of what the Health and Social Care Committee referred to in its recent report, which said that the
“problems stem not only from the procurement rules themselves, but also from people’s interpretation of these rules and their difficulty in understanding what is permissible within the rules.”
In place of answers, I am forced to restate the litany of my constituents’ questions and concerns that have essentially gone unanswered. First, there is a fundamental lack of clarity surrounding the reprocurement and an abject failure to link it to any broader NHS strategies. I am not the only one who is concerned about the process. I have been spoken to privately by many consultants, nurses, and other staff throughout the healthcare system; I am grateful to them for contacting me.
At no point has the CCG properly defined a needs assessment in the request for proposals. Moreover, at no point has it made the business case for change—the most basic starting point for any such process. Staggeringly, there is no service baseline, so we do not know what services exist. By extension, there are no defined outcomes, so bidders are being asked to make proposals. That is not what commissioning is meant to be about.
Although Ministers continue to trumpet the importance of the sustainability and transformation plans, there is no sense of alignment with those plans, the NHS long-term plan or the emerging integrated care systems. Similarly absent is any indication of integration with local councils on social care or public health, which we all acknowledge are the key issues facing our constituents.
Secondly, there are concerns about the chosen procurement process, because any number of much less onerous and costly approaches were possible. As ever, however, accurately assessing the process is near impossible because of the vice-like secrecy that the CCG has used throughout. What is certain is that we do not know how much it is costing the CCG or the bidders, which include the current not-for-profit community service providers. That means that we do not know how much it is costing us, the taxpayers.
I worked in the national health service for many years, and I have some experience of procurement in the organisation, but I have struggled to understand properly the process through which the procurement has been undertaken. To illustrate, the CCG’s description of the chosen process, in its own words from its own document—bear with me, Mr Gapes, because I did not write it—says:
“The procurement is being undertaken using a process developed by the CCG which has similarities to a competitive process with negotiation. For the avoidance of doubt, the CCG is not running the process strictly in accordance with any specific procedure set out in the Regulations so reserves the right to depart from that form of procedure at any point. This Request for Proposals sets out the procurement process the CCG plans to use for this particular Contract. The inclusion of particular stages, the use of terminology and any other indication shall not be taken to mean that the CCG intends to hold itself bound by the full scope of the Regulations.”
What does that mean? I think it means that the process is as clear as mud, carried out behind a wall of secrecy, but with a disclaimer that enables the CCG to do what it wants without our knowledge. Although we cannot access the process details, what we know does not bode well.
There are myriad loose ends and errors throughout the process. Taken together, they form a significant body of concerning issues. Of course, I would never have known about them—most people do not—if I had not scoured 300 pages of detail and 100 clarification questions asked by bidders. In fairness, I doubt the CCG was expecting anybody outside the process, including the local MP, to do so, but I read them all because I like detail and I think it is important to know what is going on. A lot of the gaps and oversights concerned me.
There seem to have been incorrect working assessments about bed numbers at South Bristol Community Hospital; gaps relating to workforce numbers and staff who have been TUPE-ed; and a number of misunderstandings and examples of where the CCG lacked knowledge about current contracts, rental payments and void space. There is also missing information about assets, and the bidders were apparently expected to carry out the due diligence. That not only places a huge burden on providers, but runs the risk that the entire process will collapse if it is not carried out correctly, as has happened elsewhere. It is worth highlighting that the National Audit Office investigation into the collapse of the UnitingCare Partnership contract in Cambridgeshire and Peterborough found that bidders
“faced significant difficulties in pricing their bids accurately due to limitations in the available data”.
The evidence I have seen in the documentation suggests that that is now happening.
We should all be very worried about that, because failed procurements in Staffordshire for cancer services and end-of-life care, and in Cambridge and Peterborough, had similar procurement processes to the one chosen by Bristol, North Somerset and South Gloucestershire CCG. In each case, there was a secretive process, a complex procurement methodology and a failure to engage. Together, they cost taxpayers millions, and they all failed. Instead of learning lessons, NHS Improvement and the CCG seem intent on repeating the mistakes.